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Preface 
The main purpose of this study has been to establish the 
chanoino character of the RAs (Research Associations) in the UK 
from 1970 to 1989 and beyond. The last major piece of research 
carried out on the RAs was the Bessborough Report which was 
undertaken in 1972. 
One of the main problems encountered was the availability 
of secondary data on the RAs. Most of the data, especiall y 
statistical ones, had to be generated from primary sources e.g. 
Annual Reports of RAs, internal papers of RAs and interviews. 
Consequently, a great amount of time and effort went into the 
accumulation of data. 
The thesis is divided into five parts. Part 1 consists of 
the research methodology. Part 2 and 3 provide the necessary 
background information in order to map out the changes in the RAs 
over the two decades. Part 4 forms the core of the thesis and it 
presents the results of the research model used. Part 5 presents 
the conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
Part 1. 
This part consists of one chapter. Chapter 1 provides a 
literature review of past studies, explains the objectives of the 
research, describes the research methodology and outlines the 
sources of data. It also provides a brief introduction on the 
RAs. 
iii 
Part 2 
This part consists of Chapter 2 to 6 which provide the 
background, in particular, governmental policy which triggered 
major changes in the RAs. Chapter 2 discusses the economics of 
technology policy and highlights the different policy instruments 
available. Chapter 3 describes the S&T (Science and Technology) 
policy in the OECD member countries over the last two decades 
while Chapter 4 focuses on the changes in the S&T policy in the 
UK during the same period. Chapter 5 analyses the R&D funding 
in the UK and Chapter 6 looks into the Department of Trade and 
Industry which is closely linked with the RAs. 
Part 3 
This part consists of Chapter 7 and 8. Chapter 7 describes 
the background to the RAs and Chapter 8 provides a statistical 
analysis of the RAs. Chapter 7 also provides the history of the 
development of the RAs and their features. 
Part 4 
This part which consists of five chapters i.e. Chapters 9 
to 13, present the results of the research model used. Chapter 
9 and 10 show the results of the environment analysis and the 
internal audit of the RAs respectively. Chapter 11 shows the 
strategic choices available to the RAs generated from a SWOT 
(strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) anal ysis using 
the results from Chapter 9 and 10. Chapter 12 analyses the RAs' 
response and highlights the major changes in the RAs over the 
last two decades. 
iv 
It would be ideal to examine each RA as an individual entity 
in order to make sensible comment at the level of operational 
policy but the task would be too great. Therefore only four case 
studies have been chosen and presented in Chapter 13. 
Par~~ 
This part consists of Chapter 14. It presents the 
conclusions and the recommendations of this research. 
v 
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1 
Research Associations (RAs) are a group of organisations 
which carry out R&D or provide related services (testing, 
accredi tation, training, consul tancy) for indust ry and government 
departments. The RAs have been subject to many studies since the 
first were created at the end of the first World War. 
Their diversity increased with time, some being created 
around an area of technoloay rather than a sector of industry, 
with considerable differences in size and in structure, but all 
subject to the privileges which the Research Association status 
endowed upon them. An important benefit was derived from 
government support (Grant-in-Aid) which was calculated according 
to their membership income, but at a ratio set individually for 
each RA. Some had no such support and were wholly financed by 
their membership (Appendix 1.1 shows the list of non-grant-aided 
RAs). These non-grant-aided RAs were few and their role was less 
significant in comparison to the grant-aided RAs. They are not 
. dealt with in,this resear'ch. 
When -RAs were first established in 1917 , it had been 
intend~~ ~~at government grant-in-aid should be used only to help 
., . 
establish them over the first five years. At the end of that 
period the i~dustries concerned were expected to provide total 
financial support. In the event, government support continued, 
subject to an annual Parliamentary Vote. By the end of 1945, the 
2 
Government decided once more to ext end t!'le Gl:J.r. t - in-Aid though 
various stiffening measures which came into ~ff~ct from 1951 
onwards. Although no time limits were set. the RAs were expected 
to derive an increasing income from industry and. at each grant 
renegotiation, the Covernment was free to reduce its contribution 
accordingly. 
The period between 1945 and the early 1960's was one of 
growth for the RAs, by which time about fifty were in existence. 
By the 1960's stronger differences had developed between them: 
some had extended their membership to companies overseas. some 
had given greater emphasis to technical zer'Jice work in their 
field, some had gone towards contract research. A good picture 
of the situation as it was around 1970 is given by two 
comprehensi ve, studies of the time: Research Associations: the 
~hanainq pattern by the Centre for the Study of Industrial 
Innovation (1972)1 and Industrial Research and Deyelopment, the 
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Research Associations 
(known as the Bessborough Report) (1973)2. These studies were 
made at the time of publication of the Rothschild Report of 
19713 I a report which was to exert a ma jor infl uence on the 
Government's support for R&D in RAs, in government research 
establishments, and in industry over the following years. 
The Rothschild Report recommended that applied research and 
development commissioned by the Government should be controlled 
in accordance with a "customer/contractor" principle (which at 
once creates problems in the funding of basic research). -It was 
for the customer to decide whether an R&D programme was necessary 
and how much should be spent upon it. The Government, as a 
customer, used the Chief Scientists in an advisory rol e to 
3 
evaluate the contractor's work. The recommendations were adopted 
by the Government and the Grant-in-Aid was gradually replaced by 
research contracts for specific proiects assessed according to 
the Rothschild philosophy. 
The Bessborough Report resulted from an enquiry set UP by 
the Conference of Industrial Research Associations and made 
recommendations aimed at increasinq their industrial 
effectiveness. The report concluded that contract schemes were 
indeed more healthy than general qrants. However, one important 
proviso was that the Government should continue to contribute 
monies other than for contract work to RAs in order to hel p 
support specified programmes which were in the national or 
industrial interest. A further important recommendation was that 
the RAs should develop a policy for overseas activities. 
Rothschild and Bessborough together, therefore influenced 
four key areas: the basis of RA funding, the relationship with 
the Government, the benefits which the members derive, and the 
membership composition. 
1.1.2 BAs - Prom the mi~ 1970'J~o~e 198~_ 
The RAs had to cope with the recessions which hit the UK in 
the mid 1970's and early 1980's on top of the changes brought 
about by the Rothschild Principle. When the Conservative 
Government came into power in 1979, the pressure to change was 
even greater with the tight squeeze in the Government I s R&D 
budget, which was intended to restore competi ti veness in economy. 
Higher Education Institutions (BEls) like universities were 
forced to get closer to industry to obtain financial support for 
their research. Some Government Industrial Research Estabishments 
4 
(GIREs) like the Hydraulic Research Station (HRS) and the 
National Mari time Insti tute (NMI) were pri vatised and others were 
forced to carry out repayment work for industry to gain income 
e.g. Harwell. Consequently, the competition in the R&D market 
intensified and RAs found themselves in direct competition with 
HEIs and GIREs. 
Unti 1 the mid 1980' s, Bri tish industry did not see the 
importance of investment in R&D brought about by international 
competition and the need to exploit new opportunities arising 
from developments in science and technology. Between 1969 and 
1983, the industrially funded R&D in the UK increased by around 
20\, whereas that in Germany doubled. Furthermore, the City had 
set too high a priority for short-term profits and dividends at 
the expense of R&D and other innovative work. The RAs found 
themsel ves in a slow-growth market where there was increased 
competition. 
In January 1988, the DTI publ ished its White Paper on 
Enterprise4, by means of which, the Government emphasized that 
industry itself was best able to assess its own markets and to 
balance the commercial risks of financing R&D and innovation. 
The Government believed that it should not take on the 
responsibilities which were primarily those of industry - whether 
directly through research subsidies, or indirectly, through new 
tax concessions. Consequently, the Government was increasingly 
withdrawing from near-market research. A continuing preoccupation 
of government policy was the management of the resources for 
research. 
The DT I has had no clear role since it was formed in 
5 
1970. In the last eioht years alone. there havE: been seven 
Secretaries of State. Without a clear role. the DTI has been at 
the mercy of a ministerial wt.im. The RAs in turn have had 
prob~ems in trying to adapt to the changing policy of the DTI 
towards R&D. For example, when the DTI's Enterpr~se Initiative 
was launched in 1988, the RAs had to adapt to this new 
environment lIii th considerabl e personnel changes in the !-!al ke ting 
Divisions of DTI. There were many changes going on and the RAs 
felt that there ought to be greater stability since ~&D should 
be a long-term business. 
1.1.3 Summary 
Despite the adverse conditions the RAs were operatinq in 
durino the last two decades, the majority had adapted to the 
environment but there were also these which had to liquidate, 
some bad fallen below a critical mass and some had to merge. By 
1988, the number of RAs had dropped to 32 in comparison to 42 in 
1970 (App. 1.2 shows the list of Qrant-aided-RAs in 1970 and 
1988). But the combined turnover of the RAs increased trom £94 
million in 1970 (1988 prices) to over £167 million in 1988. In 
1988, their total staff number amounted to over 5700 and they 
served an estimated 20,000 companies, includinQ 93 of the top 100 
companies in the UK. 
The main objective of this study is to investiqate the 
changing characters of the RAs in the last two decades (i.e. 1970 
to 1990) and beyond. A stratet;lic planninQ model is used to 
achieve this purpose. The model hiQhliQhts the RAs' environment, 
conducts internal audits and identifies the strateaies available 
and the strategies adopted. 
The RAs have changed dramatically in the last two decades: 
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each of them have responded differently aad even the~r }{emorandUIT, 
and Articles of Association can differ from each another. The 
quantifiable characteristics do not pose a probl em, but the 
philosophies, structures and technical quality ot the RAs vary 
so greatly that it is difficult, if not impo~sible to produce a 
sample of RAs which is in a statistic;~l sense representative ot 
them all. 
Factors like global competition. the S~ngle Mark~t, 
deregulation and rapid technolooical change wi 11 continue to 
force the RAs to be alert and adapt to the changing environment. 
Although the past twenty years have seen dramatic changes 
compared with the previous fifty years, the next decade is likely 
to bring about even greater change. 
1.·~_~_t_t_erature Rev.iew 
The following is a list of studies or surveys that were 
carried out in the last two decades i.e. from 1970 to 1990. They 
are listed in chronoloaical order. 
(a) lteaear.chAssocia.tions:_ the ch.anoinCJ "pat ter.1) by the Cent re for 
the Study of Industrial Innovation (CSII)(1972) 
The objective of this studY was to gather and present some 
up-to-date information on the scale and nature of tbe RAs' 
activities in order to inform public discussionS. It also had the 
aim of presentina some concl usion, based upon the evidence 
gathered, as to the kinds of considerations which should be borne 
in mind by industry, the Governrr.ent a:lei the F.A~ themsel ves if the 
technical resources which they represent were to be employed as 
effectively as possible. 
A questionnaire survey was carried out and &everal RAs were 
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interviewed. The study showed that 6:-
- the notion of co-operat1ve researCL of th~ old sty:e had lost 
its supremacy to be replaced by that of directly con~issioned 
work in its various forms. 
- the RAs were far from beina dvina institutions. 
- the RAs ought to increase their t&~hnical activities on the 
basis of direct commissionina by members. The importance of a 
general programme determined by the intermediary ot an elected 
Councilor a research committee should diminish. 
the idea of membership should cease to invol ve proaramrne 
control as its central benefits. 
- at the centre of the association affairs should be a core 
programme of non-mission oriented work to serve as a source of 
technical stimulation. 
- the Government's policy towards RAs lacked definition. 
(b) Bessborough Report (1973) 
The objective of the report was to examine the scope, 
organisation, functions and.methodsof operation of the research 
associations, including the relationshi~ and interaction between 
them and with Government, industry. uni vE:rsi ties and other 
bodies, with the object of making suggestions to increase thei~ 
effectiveness' . 
The study could be divided into two parts. Part one 
presented a thematic approach to RAs, looking into, for example, 
the RA' s objectives. the size of company RP.s served and new 
fields of RA activity. Part two of the study presented profiles 
of all the 45 RAs, each of which was divided into three sections. 
Section 1 was a brief summary, coverin9 such factors as date of 
• 
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establishment, size in te~s of income and employment, and the 
.main emphasis of work .. Seotion 2 gave a brief summary of aome of 
the technical achievements for the last 20 years and section 3 
was a oomment on the RA. 
~he atudy oonoluded that:-
- the government support to RAs had produced handsome benefit. 
for industry and the eoonomy. 
- the RA general grants should be replaced by money given for 
speoified purposes i.e. it approved the prinoiples expounded by 
Lord Rothsohild. 
- each RA should be the conoern of the Minister responsible for 
the.industry this RA mostly dealt with. 
- the RAs by their long and intimate oontaot with industry were 
better equipped to undertake work of industrial importanoe than 
most of the Government Industrial Research Establiahmenta 
(GIRES) • 
(c) Survey conducted by the ~ecbnical Change Centre ('rCC) (1985): 
.changes in the Research Associations Over The Deoade 1972 - 1982' 
'rhe purpose of the survey was to establish the nature and 
soale of the changes whioh had taken place in the RAs in the 
decade following the applioation of the recommendation in the 
Rothsohild Report. 
'rhe survey provided a brief analysis of the RAs' 
..membership, staffing, organisation, finanoe, .aotivi ties and 
collaboration over that period. Around 30\ of the sample aize 
was taken from non-grant-aided RAs and therefore it did not 
wholly refleot the changes in the grant-aided RAs. 
The survey conoluded the following':-
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- the withdrawal of Grant-in-Aid made it difficult for the RAs 
to undertake exploratory work unless they had reserve funds. 
- the income from government .ources increased over that period 
by 30' in real terms; in terms of proportion of RA income, it 
increased from 30' to 36\. Paradoxically the RAs became aor. 
depende~t on government money following Rothschi 1d t'han they ·had 
been before. 
- there were increased opportunities for industrial contract 
research over that period but the competition was becoming 
increasingly tougher especially from universities. 
- the total income of the group of RAs .tudied rose by 11' in 
real terms over that period. 
-the aupport from industry in no way matched what was needed to 
keep such institutions up-to-date technologically. 
(d) .cOllllli .. ion of .the ·Europ.anColIIDuniti.. (CKe): Contract 
. _, ....... rch Organi.ations 10th. ERe (1989)10 
This was a survey carried out by the CEe to 1 ist the 
~ontr.ct research organisations in the EEe and identify their 
... tructure.and the nature of their acti vi tiesll. The contraot 
research organisations surveyed in the OK were members of the 
Association of Independent Research and Technology Organisations 
(AIRTO) of which most of the RAs are members. 
The results of the survey basically provided a directory 
of Contract Research Organisations (CROs) in the EEe. The study 
.also concluded that12 :-
- subsidy was a barrier to the general development of European 
contract research. 
- there was a lack of awareness of CROs in Europe. 
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the CROs would need to update their technological base 
constantly. 
- greater coordination of research was needed among CROs in 
Europe. 
<e> Other Prior Research 
The Research and Technology Policy (RTP) division of the DTI 
carried out feasibility studies on randomly selected ItAs but the 
findings were not made public. 
A report on the contract research market in the UK is 
currently being carried out by the Science and Engineering Policy 
study Unit (SEPSO). The study focuses on the contract research 
.lRarket in the OK and it touches indirectly on RAs as R&D 
contractors. 
',3 Rea.arch Ob1ective. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the changing 
character of the ItAs over the last two decades (from 1970 to 
1989> and beyond. This is achieved through the investigations of 
the following points:-
1.3.1 The RA" Enyironment 
- to identify the variables that tri9geredor continue to trigger 
changes in the RAs and their .activities. 
- to provide a better understanding of the environment's effects 
on the RAs' business. 
- to identify the past and present opportunities and threats 
arising from the environment variables. 
.. 
11 
1.3.2 Ipternal Audit of the RA' 
- to pinpoint the RAs' strengths and weaknes.es. 
- to analyse the exploitation of the ItAs' r.sources and the 
extent to which the.e resources have been controlled. 
- to .xamine the role of the stak.holder groups '( •• g. the 
Council, the Government, the Research Director, the Board of 
Management and the ataff) 
1.3.3 BAs' strateaic Choic •• 
- to generate the strategic options available to RAs. 
- to evaluate the strategic options open to RA •• 
- to identify the strategies adopted by the RAs. 
1.3.' Implementation - Cbang.s in tb. IA' 
- to analyse the change. in their r.sources •. g. ,phyaical 
resources, funding level and human resources. 
-to examine the cbanges at the operational lev.l • 
- to study the variation in their organiaation structures. 
- to look at the cultural change. 
- to provide a background against which the future development 
of ItAsmay be as.essed. 
1.4 a •••• rch M.thodology 
1.4.1 Introduction 
'1'he past studi.scarried out on RAs (covered general ar.as 
like finance) aa well aa theCaae Studiea ,Approach. 'l'be.e 
approaches were simpl e and provided a cl ear background to ltAa and 
tbe changes they underwent. 'l'he general approacb, however, did 
not draw out fully the anawers to questions underlying the 
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i 
ure 1.1 The Research Model 
changes. '1'0 overc:om.these ahortcomings, an adapted atrategic 
planning model 1s used for this study. The model enables a more 
eletailed "post-mortem" on Us, using contemporary methods of 
analysis. It is important to emphasize that the study does not 
attempt to carry out strategic planning for RAs but u... the 
model to map out the changes. 
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1.4.2 Ihe Re.earch Hodel 
~he model is illustrated in figure 1.1. It can be divided 
into three .ections which are dependent on one another. 
(i) section 1 - Analysi. of BAs' Enyironment and Resources 
The events that triggered a .trategic review are analy.ed. 
~he kAs have to match their activities to that of their 
• 
environment. One can also identify the major factor. that 
affected the RAs, .ome of which gave rise to opportunities of 
some sort and many of which exerted threat. upon the RAs. Since 
the continually changing environment influences the RA. 
internally, it seems sensible to study this environment fir.t in 
order to under.tand the changes the RAs undergo. 
The internal audit identifies the RAs' .trengths and 
weaknesses. Their .trengths are 'what they are good at' or wh.re 
their re.ource. are .uperior to tho •• of their competitors thus 
. providing them with a leading .dge. Their weakn ••• es .re wh.r. 
they are at a competitive disadvantage. The aim in this analy.i. 
i. to identify the internal influences, constraints and wheth.r 
or not the RA. could overcome them. An internal audit cannot 
overlook the value ,ystems of those involved in the RA •. Given 
the same environment and re.ource., the re.pon.e would have 
differed according to the value ,ystems of the people involved 
(e.g. the Councilor the Board of Management) and their 
expectations. 
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(ii) Section 2 - BAs' Strategies 
~his section looks at the many possible courses of action 
generated and open to RAs. Once the options are generated, a 
matching or the evaluation process is carried out. One of the 
tools used will be a strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, 
Threats (SWOT) Analysis. The feasibility of the implementation 
of the options will be examined. 
~he final part in this section looks at the strategies that 
were adopted by RAs. The advantages and the disadvantages of the 
options are highlighted. ~here are no clear-out options beca~se 
the choice of any option must inevitably be a matter of 
management judgement. An attempt will be made to focus on the 
subjective or irrational factors involved e.g. the values of the 
Council and the role of the Research Director. 
(iii) Section 3 - Implementation Stage 
~his section looks at how the RAs translated the general 
directions of strategy into actions. ~he problems in doing so are 
highlighted. ~his section looks into the resource planning of the 
RAs, identifies the key tasks to be carried out, analyaes the 
matching of the organisational structure with the strategy 
adopted and looka at the management systems they adopted. 
1.5 ·Sourc •• at Dat. And it. Collection 
1.5.1 Source. of Data 
The following ia a list of the sources of data:-
- Annual Reports of the RAs from 1970 to 1989. 
- past studies on RAs. 
- journals and periodicals. 
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- visits to 16 RAs and 3 CROs. During these visits, the Research 
Directors were interviewed. 
- consultants e.g. Prof Charles Suckling. 
interviews with the President of AIRTO and the Honorary 
Secretary. The complete list of interviews carried out is shown 
in App. 1.3. 
I 
- the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). During the course 
of the research, a month was spent in RTf where it was possible 
to experience the working environment in the DTI and to carry out 
a number of interviews. Among those interviewed were the Head 
of RTP and his staff (particularly those responsible for RAs . 
• 
industrialists seconded to the DTI, the Secretary to the LINK 
Programme, the Secretary to the Chief Scientists and Engineers. 
Heads of Marketing Divisions of the DTI, the Secretary to the 
Innovation Programmes Committee (IPC), Secretaries to the 
Requirements Boards and Central Unit members). 
- visits to GIREs i.e. the Warren Springs Laboratory (WSL) and 
the National Engineering Laborator~ (NEL). 
- members of the Advisory Commi t tee on Science and Technol gy 
(ACARD) i.e. Prof. Robin Williams (who is also an advisor to the 
House of Lords Sel ect Committee on Science and Techr.ol Ogy), Prof. 
stan Metcalf and Dr. Brian Lindley. 
- the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (IPCS). 
the Policy Research in Science and Technology Centre. 
Manchester University (PREST). 
- the Science and Engineering Policy Study Unit (SEPSU), Royal 
Society. 
- attended the first conference of the European Association of 
Contract Research Organisation (EACRO) in ~terdam. 
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- interviews with Research Directors of eROs in the EEC e.;. Dr. 
A. Imbush of Prauenhofer Oesellachaft, Oermany. 
- correspondences e.;. with Mr. Eiliv Sodahl, Director of SINTEF, 
Norway. 
1.5.2 Data Collection 
Data collection using a questionnaire survey was considered 
but eliminated since advice indicated that the response rate 
would be low. Furthermore, depending on the respondent, the 
degree of accuracy of response would be questionable. Another 
major reason against this form of data collection is that over 
the last two decades, the RAs have changed so much that an 
across-the-board questionnaire survey on RAs would not have had 
• 
much significance. 
The data collection method adopted involves interviewing 
selected RAs, interviewing organisations that interact with RAs 
and collecting of statistical data on RAs. This form of data 
collection is known as triangulation, which is defined a. "the 
combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon"U. This method belps to cross-validate the data 
collected from the different method. used. Triangulation helps 
to capture a more complete, holistic, and contextual portrayal 
of the BAs under study. 
(i) Designing of Interyiew Ouestionnaires 
The designing of the interview questioning regime was done 
with the help of the comments viven by RTP. It was further 
improved after being tested on the first few RAs visited. The 
final questionnaire set used ia shown in appendix 1.4. 
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The difficulties of designing the questioning regime lay in 
the nature of the subject area and the required data. It had to 
be designed to give the flexibility needed for the individuality 
of each RA. The confidence and cooperation of the interviewee had 
to be won before any sensitive or probing questions could be 
asked and this had to be done in a limited amount of time. 
But the interview had the advantage that greater returns 
could be expected than if forms were simply distributed to the 
RAs to read, complete and return on their own. EVen though fewer 
RAs would be reached, results could be guaranteed. 
The questions asked were of a considerable length and, if 
presented as a formal questionnaire, might not have attracted a 
very charitable response. The presence and attention of an 
interviewer, however, belped to generate interest and hold 
attention. The respondent could ask questions about tbe 
information demanded before oiving his reactions and responses. 
Also many of the questions bad to be very subjective in nature 
and might bave been difficult to understand without an 
explanation. All interviews were conducted by~he same person 80 
that consistent information could be supplied. 
It was felt that results would be more accurate because 
~espondents would not onlr vet a better understanding of the 
questions asked but also because the interviewer would more 
easilr be able to understand the responses given and the true 
opinions of the respondents. It was possible to question 
participants more fully and gain a clearer insight into their 
answers. The interpretation of written answers would be more 
difficult and would result in biases of interpretation. 
18 
(ii) Sample of BAs Interyiewed 
The sample of RAs chosen was chosen to reflect the following 
criteria:-
- the size of the RA in terms of turnover and staff number e.g. 
Water Research Centre (WRC) and Shoes and Allied Trade Research 
Association (SATRA). 
- the RAs' sources of income. 
- the Us' profitability in terms of their net profit and 
turnover to staff ratio. 
- the organisational structure adopted. 
- former GIRES which were privatised e.g. British Maritime 
Technology (BMT) and Hydraulic Research (HR) Ltd. 
- tbe corporate atatus of the RAs e. g. British Hydraul ics 
Research Association (BHRA). 
- newly merged RAs e.g. British Textile Technology Group (BTTG) 
and BNF-FULMER. 
- where the majority of tbeir members are SMEs e.g. BATRA. 
- liquidated RAs e.g. Jute RA. 
- wbether the RA is a technology based or particular industry 
based RA. 
The characteristics of the RAs chosen are given in appendix 
1.S and an individual summary on each of the RAs interviewed is 
given in appendix 1.6. 
{iii) Sample of Organisations Dealing with RAs and Contraqt 
Research Organisations Interyiewed 
The complete list of organisations interviewed and are shown 
in appendix 1.3. Among them were: 
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- the DTI, which includes the RTP, REs, Marketing Divisions and 
central Unit. 
- CROs in the UK. 
- CROs in the EEC. 
- consultants 
- AIRTO. 
(iy) Statistical Data 
The primary source of statistical data is from the RAs' 
Annual Reports and Accounts. Some RAs were reluctant to dlsclose 
their Annual Reports and Accounts since they are only mear.t for 
members. There were difficulties in obtainin; the annual reports 
from 1970 to 1979 as most RAs do not have any copies or records 
left. The information from past studies is used as secondary data 
to fill the ;ap of the missinq period. The other sources of 
secondary data were: 
- Annual Reports of ;overnment-funded R&D. 
• 
- reports from the DTl and RBs. 
- Annual Abstracts of Statistics. 
- Reports on the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and 
Technolo;y. 
- AIRTO and EACRO newsletters. 
The statistical analysis of the RAs is presented in Chapter 
8 and in some of the appendices. 
(y) Problems of Data Collection 
In any phase of data collection there are potential sources 
of bias or error which can make the data less than 100\ reliable. 
From the initial sta;es of designin; sensible and meanin;ful 
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questions, to the presentation of these questions and their 
understanding. and in the accurate recording and interpretation 
of responses, there is always the danger that errors will arise. 
Each stage in the above sequence is filtered through the 
conditional perception of the human mind. An in.terview style 
should help to minimise certain sources of potential bias: both 
the understanding of questions by participants and the 
interpretation of responses should be more accurate. Obviously 
the reliability of the data depends on the honesty and 
reliability of the participant. 
The following were other areas of difficulty encountered: 
- obtaining the cooperation of the people within the RAs who 
were in a position to discuss the issues. 
- soliciting accurate, unambiguous and sincere responses. 
- gaining the confidence of the RAs. 
- finding common criteria or variables which could be used to 
measure the performance of the RAs. 
- obtaining a common level of detailed information from the RAs. 
- differing characteristics of RAs. 
- selecting the key questions when a time limit was imposed. 
1.6 Summary 
It is difficult to carry out a research in an area which bas 
not been looked into comprehensively for the last two decades. 
The character of the RAs and their activities have changed so 
much during this period that it is quite a task to study these 
changes without having many past studies to refer to. 
The study did not attempt to answer the question whether RAs 
in general (or specific ones) give great or small value relative 
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to the money they spend. This kind of evaluation of costs and 
benefits is important but can only effectively be carried out in 
the detailed context of an individual association. The full 
cooperation of the association concerned would be essential. 
The RAs could have been viewed as a group of institutions 
connected by common or similar Articles of Association, with 
privileges in respect of taxation and the like, and enjoying 
government grant support. It could have been justifiable to seek 
to establish whether or not the RAs were good value to the UK in 
terms of the money the taxpayers provided. However, with the end 
of Grant-in-Aid, and with individual institutions following a 
way-of-life which best exploits their assets and their potential 
markets, across-the-board assessments of their role and value 
have lost much of their old significance. 
It took more than a year to focus on the chosen area of 
research because of the complications brought about by the 
privatisation of NEL, which sponsored the research. In 
retrospect, this difficult year provided a first-hand experience 
of the impact of changes in government policy towards a research 
establ ishment which forced it to change and adapt to the changing 
environment. This was what the RAs went through in the early 
1970's when grant-in-aid was phased out. 
The RAs are rarely in the news nowadays. Hopefully this 
study will help to stimulate more public discussion on the RAs 
and to encourage industry, the Government and RAs themselves to 
focus on the kind of considerations which should be borne in mind 
if the technical resources which the RAs represent are to be 
employed as effectively as possible. 
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POLXC:::X 
2.1 Introduction 
~he long-run performance of any economy depends upon its 
success in innovating new products· and processes. Few would doubt 
that the spectacular post-war economic record of Japan, a. 
compared to that of the USA or the OK, has had much to do with 
its superior achievements in developing and applying new 
technologies. ~he aim of the following paragraphs' is to clarify 
theoretically a number of economic issues in technology policy. 
One can define technological change, following Schumpeter, 
as changes in products, processes of production, raw materials, 
and management methodsl • A classic trilogy that has informed and 
conditioned many debates on technology and technology policy, 
again attributed to Schumpeter, is that which characterizes three 
atages in the process of technological change: invention - the 
generation of new ideas; innovation - the transformation of those 
ideas into, for example, new marketable products and processes; 
and diffusion the spread of use of ownership of new 
technology2. Implicit in this trilogy is the knowledge base which 
underlies technological change and which is itself continually 
changing and evolving. It should be realized that a country's 
technology does not always have to be produced at home; new 
technology can be and often is imported from overseas. It is 
also worth noting that it is only at the diffusion stage that the 
economy obtains benefit from and is affected by new technology. 
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A distinction often made is that between Science and Technology. 
At a general level it is common to associate science with the 
knowledge base and technology with invention, innovation and 
diffusion. For the former, knowledge is a public good, and 
scientists compete to be first to publish new ideas. For 
technologists, however, the value of being first to innovate 
leads not to public esteem but in private return. The distinction 
is not hard and fast and it would be a serious mistake to think 
that science policy and technology policy can be considered in 
isolation from one another. 
2.2 Techpology Policy 
What does technology policy mean? In the present context, 
technology policy is defined as a set of pol icies invol ving 
90vernment intervention in the economy with the intent of 
affecting the process of technological change. However, even 
using this definition, the economics of technology policy is a 
complex subject. Some of the reasons for this are: 
(1) The incentives that firms have to invest in new technology 
are influenced by such diverse factors as the nature of product, 
market competition, the availability of skilled personnel, the 
extent of public subsidy (direct or via procurement policy), and 
the availability of finance for technological change. 
(2) Technological change and thus technology policy proceed in 
an environment of uncertainty and often very incomplete 
information. Attitudes to risk and uncertainty greatly influence 
the funding of technological activity and thus bring issues of 
finance to the forefront of technology policy discussions. 
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(3) Several government policy instruments have interacting 
effects on incentives to .dvance technology. As well .s direct 
instruments of technology policy, enforcement of property rights 
over information, subsidies, public R&D etc., it i. e •• ential to 
consider the impact of other microeconomics polici •• , notably 
competi tion pol'icy, trade pol icy, .nd education .nd training 
policies. 
(4) The severe difficulties of measurement. W.ith.r input 
measures (e.g. R&D .xpenditure) nor output measur.s (e.g. p.tent. 
fil.d) .re perfect indicators of innovative .ctivity. 
(S) Problem8 of evaluation. It is hard enough for fir~ 
themselves to make sensible .ssessments of the priv.t. return to 
technological .ctivity, and it is harder .till to •••••• aoci.l 
returns. Quite apart from difficulties in gauging the 
(probabilities of) future returns, there ia the queation of "h.t 
discount rate to apply to them, and in particular how to take 
risk into account. 
(6) ~he assessment of the national return from technology policy 
is complicated by international rivalry. For exampl., th.re may 
be the danger of countries .tt.mpting to free-ride on each 
others' R&D efforts, or on the other h.nd, vovernment. might 
compete in a sero sum game to aupport their nat,ional champions 
in the hope of vaininv atrategic .dvant.ves over their 
competitors in international markets. 
2,3 Why Haye Technology Po1ici •• ? 
There would be little point in havinv t.chnoloVY polici •• 
if unassisted market forces could be expected to lead to the 
efficient .lloc.tion of resources to technologic.l activity. 
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Technological change is concerned wi th the production of new 
information. Information is unlike ordinary commoditie.3. Once 
discovered, a piece of information can usually be made widely 
available at a very little (social) cost. It cost. virtually no 
more to produce a given piece of information many times over once 
the first unit has been produced. It is qenerally beneficial from 
the social point of view for information to be widely 
disseminated. For example, in commercial situations it allows 
firms to compete more intensively and resulting benefits are 
passed on to the consuming public. Prom the private viewpoint of 
the innovating firm, however, dissemination of that information 
is likely to be very costly. Indeed, the private value of 
information tends to diminish the more widely it is known. The 
more other firms benefit from and free-ride on the R&D efforts 
of the first firm, the less incentive is there to engage in R&D 
activity in the first place. The conflict between the public 
interest in dissemination and the private intereat in exerci.ing 
exclusive property rights over information i. known as the 
appropriability problem. 
Even where there is perfect appropriabi 1 i ty, e. g. watertight 
and long-lived patents, there are often reason. to expect the 
private reward from technological activity to be les. than the 
aocial benefit. Successful R&D is generally of net benefit to 
consumers over and above the gain in profits to the innovator. 
External i ties between firms must also be considered. If 
there are spillovers, so that firm B benefits from the 
technological activities undertaken by firm A (e.q. becau •• it 
learns or imitates) then each firm will hold back ita 
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technological efforts to some extent, and hope to benefit from 
the efforts of others. 
On the other extreme, it is possible that there will be too 
many firms engaging in technological activi ty. This is the 
potential problem of duplication of, for example, research 
efforts. It is possible to show analytically4 that industry R&D 
expenditure might exceed the socially desirably level of R&D, 
with too many firms each individually doing too little. In that 
case there is too much R&D input and too little R&D output, a 
double inefficiency. Similarly, in aome cases there may be a 
common pool problem in which the first-past-the-post-takes-all 
nature of the race to invent induces excessive speed in the 
process. It is natural to think of policies to promote 
cooperative R&D in these contexts. On the other hand, rival ry R&D 
can bave advantages. First, it is desirable when independent, as 
opposed to completely parallel, research strategies are being 
pursued. Then there is the advantage in diveraity. Competition 
~~ between researchers, whether ~hey are in an academic or 
commercial environment, allows reward to be used on priority of 
discovery. With research inputs and outputs being hard to 
observe, and the relation between them being unknown, it i. 
difficul t to provide incentives for effort in the absence of 
rivalry. 
As discussed above, technological activity is taking place 
in an environment of incomplete information and uncertainty. In 
view of the difficulties of measuring R&D inputs and prospective 
returns, R&D funding is beset with acute problems of asymmetric 
information, and the market for R&D finance ia likely to be 
highly imperfect. ~he problems include ones of adverse aelection 
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and performance monitoring. The nature of financial institutions 
can influence how well such problems are overcome, and it has 
been argued that financing via long-term relationships with banks 
may be more effective than .tock market financing due to closer 
monitoring arrangements and better information flows S• Moreover, 
given asymmetric information, managers anxious to .atisfy the 
stock market opinion may divert resources towards visible .ignal. 
of corporate health (e.g. high dividends) and away from less 
tangible activities (e.g. R&D). Such imperfections in the 
capital market reduce opportunities for risk-shifting, and riak 
aversion may become a dominant influence in R&D inve.tment 
decisions. Problems of this kind are part of what i. described 
as excessive short-termism in financial markets. It is worth 
noting that it is becoming a convention in the UK for publicly 
quoted companies to detail their R&D apending in annual reports. 
Without such information it is difficult to .ee how capital 
markets could optimal 1 y allocate resources for technological 
activity across alternative uses. 
Thus there are several reasons, including externalities, 
scale economies, market power, the attitude to risks, to expect 
that market forces will not result in desirable levela of 
tecbnologicalactivity and dynamiC efficiency if left to 
themsel ves. Pol icy intervention is 1 ikel y to be necessary to 
remedy some of these defects. Moreover, there may be other 
reasons that motivate technology policies by national government. 
in the context of international competition6• Competition in the 
civil aircraft industry between the European Airbus, Boeing and 
McDonnell/Douglas is an example of this. Thus, not only are 
unassisted market forces unlikely to lead to levela and 
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directions of innovative activity that are in the ;eneral 
interest, but CjJovernments may also seek to inf I uence the posi tion 
of their national firms in world market •. 
2.4 POlicy Instruments 
The followinq are some of the CjJovernment policies that can 
have influence on R&D activity. There are four CjJeneral approaches 
to externality problems in economics: private property ri;hts, 
public provision, subsidies/taxes and cooperation. They are 
briefly discussed here. 
2.4.1 The Patent System 
The patent system and related laws are deai;ned to CjJive 
discoverers property ri;ht. over their new information, at least 
for a period of years. The advantaCjJe. of such syatems are 
obvious, they promote dynamic efficiency by providinCjJ incentives 
for R&D effort. The disadvantaCjJes are twofold. First, patents do 
not always aucceed in ensurinCjJ appropriability of rewards. In 
addition, there are considerable enforcement coate. 
2.4.2 Public Provision 
At the other extreme from pri\fate property riCjJhta lie. the 
public provision of R&D throuCjJh institutions such a. government 
re.earch laboratories, research counci Is and un! versi ties. Publ ic 
provision overcomes free rider problem. in R&D, avoid. 
competitive duplication of effort, and allows researcher. to be 
motivated other than by the prospective market power conveyed by 
patents. The disadvantaCjJe is the relative lack of commercial 
information and incentive that firms in industry are more likely 
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to possess. Por these reasons I public R&D acti vi ty is more 
appropriate to basic research than to near-market research. 
2 ••• 3 R&D Subsidies 
Subsidies to R&D are a way of attemptin; to improve the 
terms of the trade-off betw~en static and dynamic efficiency that 
is at the heart of the appropriability problem. In principle a 
combination of R&D subsidies and relatively hi;h spillovers 
between firms could promote both kinds of efficiency'. Innovative 
efforts could be encouraqed by the subsidies and spillovers would 
allow the competitive and widespread application of improved 
technoloqy. The main problem however is knowin; the appropriate 
rate and direction of subsidy. 
2 •••• Cooperatiye R&D 
Like all the other policies considered here, cooperative R&D 
in the form of joint ventures or merqers in hiqh technoloqy 
industries has pros and cons. It internalizes the externalities 
between firms, and can in principl e overcome both free-rider 
problems and duplication problems in R&D, while also bein; 
consistent with product market competition in the case of 
research joint ventures. However, in practice there is the 
obvious danqer that collaboration in R&D will lead to 
anticompetitive collaboration in the product market. 
2 .•. 5 Other Policy Instruments 
(il Risk Sharing 
In the absence of perfect markets for shiftinq risks the 
90vernment may intervene as a risk bearer. Since the ;overnment 
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is less risk-averse than the private sector, the carrying of 
risks by the government is an appropriate policy. 
(ii) Diffusion Policies 
The diffusion stage is the stage when new technology affects 
economic activity and when the benefits arise. It is clear, 
however, that diffusion policy is the poor relation in technology 
policy. Two main types of diffusion policies are information 
provision and subsidy policies (designed to extend the use of a 
particular technology e.g. computers). 
(iii) Competition Policy 
Mergers in high technology industries may permit the 
realization of scale economies and the pooling of incentives in 
R&D, and avoid the duplication of efforts. But this ahould not 
lead to product market competition being undermined, and should 
not blunt the incentive to innovate. 
(iy) Trade Policy 
We discussed above how R&D policies, e.g. subsidies to R&D, 
can be used to affect the positions of domestic firms in market., 
including markets with international rivals. Conversely, trade 
policies can be used as instruments of technology policy. 
(v) Education and Training Policy 
Perhaps the most important input to technological activity 
is tralned personnel. An adequate resource of appropriately 
trained human capital is therefore a prerequisite for successful 
technology policies. 
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(v) Procurement Policies 
These can be oriented towards technological objectives as 
ways of hidden protectionism, R&D finance etc. However, the costs 
of deflecting procurement policy from the straightforward 
objective of cost minimization may be high. 
(vi) Defence Policy 
Although the technological spin-offs from military projects 
can be considerable, there is a danger that they will be 
exaggerated, especially, given the large vested interests 
typically involved. Moreover, the nature of military projects i. 
sometimes such that the technological information gained cannot 
be made generally available. 
(yii) Policy on standards and Compatibility 
The issue of standards and compatibility ariaes in many high 
technology industries. standardization, for example can help 
break down market segmentation and enhances competition. It can 
also allow full exploitation of scale economies. On the other 
hand, standardization can be costly. 
The list of policies could ea~ily be exte~ded. The four 
direct approaches to externality problems in R&D are shown above. 
All have advantages and disadvantages. We now turn to consider 
some of the trends on how and to what extent the instrument of 
technology policy was used in the OECD countries for the last two 
decades. 
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3: 
EOLXCY' %6 THE PEeP CXXJNTRXES FrC!lJ) 1970 
to 1985 
3.1 Iptroduction 
The economic issues of this chapter has been discussed in 
Chapter 2. During this period, Science and technology policy was 
focused on the rapid development of new technologies and their 
application in economyl. 
Government priorities for science and technology changed 
markedly during this period. Support shifted towards industrial 
innovation. Long-term research was steered to areas that may 
contribute best to advancing the new technologies, and 
university-industry cooperation was fostered for the same 
purpose. 
The emphasis on technological innovation increased the need 
for long-term research of both. basic and strategic nature. 
However, government support for long-term research, remained at 
an essentially static level in most OECD countries. 
While financial support was of considerable concern, the 
aging of the cadre of researchers and the obsolescence of their 
research equipment posed the greatest threat. It was clear that 
90vernment action was required to arrest and reverse the aging 
of the research system. 
In most OECD countries, industry increased its spending 
for R&D, continuing the trend started in the late 1970'. and 
maintained throughout the recession years. 
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Government measures for promoting innovation expanded, and 
created an elaborate structure of aids and incentives in most 
OECD countries. These structures grew in a piecemeal fashion 
with measures being added by various ministries from time to 
time, the result in many cases was an assortment of policies 
which lacked cohesion and proven effectiveness. New policies and 
programmes were being developed at a rapid rate in a variety of 
directions. Governments in general were broadening their policy 
portfolios to include more indirect assistance to industry, 
primarily in the forms of tax oredits and incentives. A .econd 
direction was greater aid for innovation activities downstream 
from R&D, particularly for applioations of the new technologies 
in manufacturing. In addition to these, intensive and growing 
efforts were directed to regional development and .mall high 
technology firms. 
Although OICD governments in general increased their 
effort. to promote innovation and technological advancement, 
there were still large differences among them in the degree and 
kind of 90ve~ent support. 
3.1.1 strategic Issues in the Planning of Publio 
lector R&D 
The planning of publio seotor R&D was fooused on the rapid 
development of new teohnologies and their application in the 
economy. The focus on these technologies derived primarily 
from2: -
(1) The extraordinary pace of advances in these technologies 
and in the science which underlies them. 
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(2) The wide applicability of the new technologies, not only in 
manufacturing, but also in communication, banking and insurance. 
(3) The growing strategic role of technology in international 
competition and trade. 
(4) Deregulation. 
(5) Hostile takeover. 
The many benefits from the exploitation of the technologies 
and the penalties for not doing so motivated the intense 
national efforts in these areas. The benefits and penal ti.s 
involved ensure a high rank for the planning of public .ector 
R&D on the political and economic agenda of most countries. 
3.1.2 Dimensions of the Planning of Public Sector R&D 
The strategic dimension of contemporary planning of public 
sector R&D policy centres around:-
(1) The role of government vis-a-vis industry in industrial R&D 
and innovation. 
(2) Policies for promoting technologies and industrie •• 
(3) Planning and coordination of R&D policy. 
(4) Funding of R&D under budgetary con.traint •• 
(5) Policy for long-term research and scientific personnel. 
(6) Integration of R&D pol icy "wi th industrial, economic and 
social policies. 
Countries differ considerably in their .tance on the.e 
dimensions. To illustrate the range of difference., the 
strategic policy stances of France and USA over the period are 
compared and contrasted. 
USA • 
-The oovernment took a less 
active and more indirect role 
in R&D policy, leaving most 
of the initiative to the 
private sector. 
-The oovernment did not have 
an explicit industrial 
or high 
technology policy. However 
its national proorammes for 
defence and space provided 
industry with important 
contracts and a market for 
high technology products and 
opportunities for spin-offs 
to the civil sector. 
Regulations were also been 
relaxed in order to allow 
industrial firms to cooperate 
in research within certain 
Quidelines. 
-Avoided centralised planning 
by government,relyino instead 
on market forces to allocate 
resources and set priorities 
except in areas where the 
government was the prime user 
of the resul ts3• 
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France 
The oovernment assumed an 
active and direct role in 
planning. coordinating. 
supporting and guiding 
its R&D policy. 
France's long-term economic 
strategy is focused on 
policy for 
promoting the key hiqh 
technology sector. The 
government initiated large 
national programmes in each 
sector to provide financial 
support not only for R&D but 
also for "downstream" 
activities such as application 
and diffusion of technologies. 
Planning and coordination 
of R&D policy were 
centralised. 
-Emphasis on national defence 
with large 9rowth in military 
R&D and reduction in civil 
areas. 
-Did not set targets and 
research personnel matters. 
They were not regarded 
as the responsibility of 
government. 
Technology and industrial 
matters were left largely to 
the private sector, while 
90vernment was concerned with 
science and economic policies. 
38 
Emphasis on civil R&D and 
innovation for revitalising 
mature industries and creating 
new ones for the future. 
Set targets for high annual 
increases of funding and the 
expanded the number of posts for 
researchers, especially young 
scientists. 
Attempted to integrate R&D 
policy with its industrial and 
broader economic policies. 
3.2 Government Spending and Priorities 
3.2.1 R&D Spending 
~he trend of total spending on R&D in advanced economies 
fell into three distinct .phases4.They were:-
(1) Phase 1 
From the post-war period until the end of the 1960's. ~rends 
in GERD as a percentage of GDP were increasing rapidly towards 
a figure in the 1.5\ to 2.5\ region. In the case of the USA and 
the UK, the percentage fell but stayed within that region. Thil 
is shown in figure 3.15• 
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Figure 3.1 Trends in GERD as a Percentage of GDP in the 1960's 
and 1970's. 
Source: OEeD (1985) 
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Figure 3.2 Total expenditure (all fields of sciences 
percentage of GDP. 
(ii) Phase 2 
r,,,,s 
From the late 1960's through to the late 1970's (see figure 
3.1). The growth curve flattened or even declined in aome 
instances. 'rhe growth in phase 1 could be interpreted as a unique 
historical learning period, in which the institutionalisation of 
industrial R&D was completed. The level of investment in R&D in 
phase 2 was considered to be appropriate for the maintenance of 
equilibrium growth, whereas there were those who voiced concern 
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Figure 3 . 3 International comparison of government funded R&D . I 
that the slowdown in R&D caused a negative effect in the long-
term growth of the economic system. The debate over the balance 
bet:ween the public and private sectors and their respec t ive 
responsibilities began to intensify in this context. 
(iii) Phase 3 
It began in the late 70's and continued as shown in figure 
3.26. There was a modest growth in R&D spending in most 
countries. Government funds for R&D increased in real terms 
(after accounting for inflation) in most count,ries in the early 
1980's. The growth was particularly large in the USA (primarily 
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Figure 3.4 Ratio of business to public GERD funding whe n GERD 
funding = 100 from 1969 to 1984. 
Source: OECD (1985) 
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for defence) as shown in figure 3.37. Several countries on the 
other hand, grew little, including Canada and the UK. 
Among the trends in phase 3 were:-
(1) The growth was strong in the USA and Japan as compared to 
European countries (see fig. 3.2). 
(2) The growth of industry funding was greater than public 
sector funding as shown in figure 3 .• 8. 
(3) A more targeted government-funded R&D, in an attempt to 
link it more to the priorities of industrial R&D. 
(.) Considerabl e pressure on publ ic funded R&D in the higher 
education sector. HIEs were anxious to get funds from the private 
• 
sector. 
3.2.2 R&D Priorities 
Governments supported R&D and innovation in two general 
ways: 
(1) By providing funds to carry out R&D. 
(2) Through indirect measures such as tax credit to firms 
which their own resources in R&D. 
The economic situation durinq the period' confronted the 
government with difficult choices reqardinq the support of R&D 
and innovation. Ifforts to constrain governmental budgets for R&D 
ran the risk of denying the resources needed for science and 
technology; but without the latter, economic recovery and the 
longer term competitive positions of countries might be 
compromised. This dilemma compelled many countries to evaluate 
their science and technology policy and to determine the 
importance to be given to R&D and innovation relative to other 
national goals involving government spendinq. 
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These constraints, combined with new opportunities in 
science and technology, led some countries to change their 
allocation of funds among R&D objectives. Such changes reflected 
shifts in R&D priorities but many also arose from changes in the 
nature of government measures. 
Oiven the crucial role of technological innovation, it was 
understandable that "economic development" R&D was given 
increased priority. Less understandable was the continuing 
decline of support for basic research. Such research was needed 
for innovation. Moreover, it was the source of fundamental 
information needed for the pursuit of all other R&D objectives. 
But beyond this, such knowledge was required to create 
opportunities for the future and to cope with the unforseeable 
challenges ahead. 
The R&D priorities for most countries were strongly focused 
on advancing and applying new technologies (e.g. oermany)', 
usually in some form of relationship with industry, and often 
directed to specific industrial sectors. This provided yet 
another illustration of the growing integration of science, 
technol09Y and industrial pol icies. The priori ty R&D areas, 
especiall y those centering on industrial technologies, were 
remarkably similar for many countries. Furthermore, cooperative 
efforts among countries emerged in 80me areas, particularly in 
those where there was a complementarity of interests and 
capabilities and where R&D costs and risks may be too large for 
individual countries to assumelO • 
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3.3 The General Response to strategic Issues 
in the Formulation of SiT Policy 
3.3.1 Project funding rather than institutional funding 
Governments took the opportunity to restructure the roles, 
procedures and responsibilities of the institutions they fund. 
The autonomy of government research laboratories was diminished 
in order to ensure greater responsiveness to changing R&D 
requirements and a more effective transfer of knowledge. Project 
funding increased in size and influence and was used more as a 
pol icy tool of governments to direct research not onl y in 
government research establishments but also in university 
research. 
However, the administrative procedures devised by funding 
bodies to ensure accountability of the project money were often 
cumbersome and time-consuming. Furthermore, short periods of 
support can I ead to piecemeal research and an inabi I i ty to 
finance large or expensive instrumentation and equipment. Efforts 
were needed by researchers to find the funds to pursue their work 
and younger researchers found it difficult to obtain funds for 
project funding. 
3.3.2 Increasing Control ~nd Direction 
A dilemma governments faced, whatever the level of available 
resources, was to ensure that research simultaneously addressed 
problems of national importance and of scientific significance. 
The problem faced by many countries was how the executive 
departments of government could infl uence laboratories to address 
issues of present national concern and to respond more quickly 
and effectively to changing needs. 
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The UK government tried to gain greater control and 
direction of R&D through a radical real I ocation of research 
funding. This approach was on the Rothschi ld Report which 
recommended the comprehensive use of the customer-contractor 
principl e i a principl e which was adopted and continues to be 
applied by government departments. 
That principle did not prove as effective as hoped during 
that period partly because as from 1977, the economic situation 
placed restrictions on departmental budgets and required 
ministers to re-examine their priorities. In addition, the 
original proposals were never fully implemented with regard to 
the Research Councils. 
3,3.3 Concentration of Research Effort. 
The concentration of research in a limited number of 
insti tutions was not a new phenomenon, but appeared to be 
increasing in some countries, particul arl y in the uni versi ty 
sector. lt would be prohibitively expensive to develop and 
maintain the potential research capabilities of all of a nation's 
research institutes at a uniformly high standard . 
. ' 3,3,,, Suumary 
New efforts to strengthen, direct, control and concentrate 
the research effort can bear fruit if they are allowed to develop 
over a period of time. Thus, research policy makers can make 
plans only insofar as forecasts can be made regarding resources 
which will be available in the future. On the whole, and in most 
OECD member countries, the future levels of support for long-
term research remain uncertain. 
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3,4 Networking 
Despite some significant exceptions, the three sectors 
(higher education-government-industry) developed their long-term 
research programmes in relative isolation from each otherp 
Governments attempted to encourage the development of links and 
relations between various performers of basic research. In many 
countries, the development of new systems of networks was 
apparent. Most significant were arrangements made to bring and 
foster collaborative research between firms, governments and 
universities. 
3.4.1 new Industrial networks 
The industry adopted new strategies for developing and 
exploiting technologies of interest to a broad range of firms and 
of a sufficiently long-term nature to be labelled as "generic" 
technologies. These incl uded cooperation between firms, 
consisting of approaches such as the pooling of resources from 
a number of companies to support research carried out by 
universities and other research institutes, as well as 
collaboration between insti tutes in conducting research 
themse! ves. The cooperation included companies from the same 
country as well as from different countries. 
3.4.2 Relations between Research Institutions and 
Industry 
Efforts were made to develop and strengthen relations 
between universities and industry11. These were because:-
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(1) The vovernments attempted to marshall resources of their 
countries to promote economic development. 
(2) The vovernments encouraged universities and other research 
institutions to contribute their capabilities (e.v. in 
Germany) 12. 
(3) On the industry side, fundamental research in numerous areas 
was needed to develop and exploit important new technolovies. 
The interest on the part of industry in strengthening relations 
with universities often centred on education and traininv. 
It is difficult to identify the main line of 
development or to see the likely course the relationships will 
take in the future. The principle efforts appear to include:-
(1) Efforts by universities to interact with industry and develop 
links with firms. 
(2) The development of research I inks in new areas or the 
experimentation with new types of longer-term contractual 
arranvements. 
(3) The setting up of new bodies within universities or related 
to universities in order to respond to industrial demands for 
certain scientific and technological services. 
(4) The· development of international industry-uni versi ty research 
links. 
(5) A growing industrial interest in infl uencing educational 
curricula and programmes. 
Although these developments did not venerate resistance, 
they were not greeted with universal enthusiasm. Some academics 
feared that closer relations may jeopardize traditional academic 
freedom and values. University research, it was feared, may be 
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compromised and its "natural" directions could be distorted by 
close collaboration with industry. 
Despite these concerns, however, interest in strengthening 
present ties and developing new ones grew. Governments provided 
stimulus and support for these developments. 
3.5 Obsolete res.arcb equipment 
Much of the laboratory equipment in universities and 
government research institutes was obsolete in many countries, 
with consequent effects on research. The funding allocated for 
equipment did not match the requi rements of research. During this 
period a vast array of powerf~l techniques and instruments became 
available which a1lowed the measurement and manipulation of 
entities and phenomena which were previously inaccessible. As 
these tools became more sophisticated, their cost increased 
substantially. 
The cost of re-equipping a laboratory was estimated to grow 
at an average' annual rate of 4\ above inflation during that 
period13 . Coupled with inadequate past spending, the 
modernisation of equipment became a formidable problem14 • 
Because equipment was expensive to replace, institutions 
kept what they had for a longer time. Much of the older equipment 
was frequently in need of repair.Governments and other 
responsible bodies were slow to respond, and when they did, the 
response was not commensurate with the magnitude of the problem. 
The scientific community can be expected to continue to find 
ways of adapting, at least partially, to the situations through 
the pooling and sharing of the available modern instrumentation. 
The development of regional and national facilities is likely to 
so 
be a major direction favored by ;overnments. This may well be 
complemented by increased efforts to create "centres of 
Table 3.1 Business enterprise R&D expenditure (BERD): 
national trends. 
Source: OECD!STHU data bank - December 1985 
1981 Compound real growth rates (I) 
Millions Percentagg 1969- 1969- 1975- 1979- 1981- Millions 
of total 81 75 81 81 83 
United States 51 810.0 50.2 1.9 -1.6 5.4 6.5 4.4 62 816.0 Japan , 15 517.3 15.0 8.4 7.6 9.2 13.6 10.7 21 270.0 
Germany 10 686.3 10.4 5.9 5.6 6.2 2.0 2.9 12 649.0 
France 6 304.4 6.1 4.2 3.9 4.4 5.7 2.9 7 461. 1 
United Kingdom (nse) 7 029.7 6.8 2.0 -0.1 4.1 2.2 -1.3 7 662.9 
Italy 2 563.1 2.5 5.6 6.3 4.8 9.5 5.5 3 179.0 
Canada 1 902.9 1.8 5.9 1.9 10.1 16.9 1.3 2 168.0 Spain 442.7 0.4 10.9 21.9 0.9 2.5 
Australia 344.4 0.3 1.6 1.4 
Netherlands 1 336.0 1.3 1.7 2.7 0.8 1.7 3.9 1 607.2 Turkey 
Sweden (nse) 1 442.1 1.4 6.8 8.5 5.1 7.5 7.9 1 874.6 
Belgium 950.1 0.9 7.0 8.5 5.4 3.6 4.1 1 148.7 Switzerland 1 324.8 1.3 O.S 0.7 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 1 471.0 Austria 427.4 0.4 11.0 13.4 8.6 5.9 
Yugoslavia 294.4 0.3 
Denmark 273.8 0.3 3.7 1.9 5.S 5.2 10.7 372.3 Norway 309.1 0.3 7.3 10.0 4.7 2.4 9.0 414.2 Greece 22.9 0.0 
Finland 272.9 0.3 9.2 9.9 8.6 10.4 10.6 372.3 Portugalc 48.3 0.0 5.6 -0.8 12.5 31.7 New Zealanda 52.0 0.1 7.2 12.2 2.S 
Ireland 67.7 0.1 7.2 5.5 9.0 14.9 Iceland 1.7 0.0 46.4 73.8 23.2 5.8 Total OECDa 103 120 100 3~ 1 5~ 6~ 
of which 
EEea 29 230 2e~ 4 3~ 5 3~ 
OECD estimates. a b 
c Secretariate estimates are provided where 1981 figures are not available. 1982. 
excellence" to specialise in selected fields of research, with 
a substantial portion of any new funds for equipment bein; 
channelled to them. Centralisation and specialisatign may appear 
I 
I 
Sl 
to be the major directions countries will take in responding to 
the instrumentation problem. 
3,6 Industrial strategies for InDovatioD 
3.6.1 Industrial R&D Spending in the early 1980's 
Industrial expendi tures for R&D continued to increase during 
this period. In general, R&D fared better than other areas of 
corporate spending. There were several possible explanations for 
the continuing growth of R&D spending. It could be due to: 
(1) Industry which regarded R&D as a high yield investment 
particularly under the circumstances of rapid technological 
innovation and promising prospects for advances and application. 
(2) The recession caused by the Oil Crisis itself had contributed 
by intensifying competition and leading firms to resort 
increasingly to their R&D as a source of competitiveness. 
(3) Finally, government policies for promoting industrial R&D may 
well have stimulated addi tional spending. The table 3.1 shows the 
BERD for OECD countries IS. 
Some information as to the factors which firms regard as 
influencing their present levels of R&D expenditure was obtained 
in a survey of European companies. The findings are summarised 
in tabl e 3.216 • 
For the industry groups as a whole, two factors were 
dominant: company strategy/objectives and the competitive 
climate. These factors were rated by all industrial groups not 
only as highly important in the circumstances then but then also 
as increasing in significance. Next in order of influence were 
several factors concerned with technology: technical 
sophistication, the rate of technical change, the state of 
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~.ble 3.2 ractor. influencing R&D expenditures. 
Source: OleD Science and Technology Indicator 
Product-process factors .. Rating* 
1 Technical sophistication of product 6.2 , 
2 Rate of technical change ~ 6.1'--'" 
3 Uniqueness of know-how 5.5 
4 Time needed for R , D/commerciali~ation 4.0 . 
5 Cost of commercialization . . . ~ . .3.4 
-
II 
Internal company factors 
6 Company strategy/objectived 8.0 
7 Exis~ing R , D capacity . 0.3 
8 Financial resource~ of company 5.9 
9 Image of R , D within company 2.2 
10 Backlog of problems 2.1 
External factors 
11 Competitive climate • 7.0 
12 State of. technology 6.0 
13 Energy/materials situation 4.9 
14 Economic climate 4.6 
15 Social-political climate 0.7 
*Scale of importance 0-10 
technology and the uniqueness of know how. A third class of 
factors which were rated as important incl uded the internal 
company aspects of existing R&D capac! ty and the financial 
resources of the company. 
3.6.2 Internationali.ation of Indu.trial Innoyation 
Industrial R&D .pending was concentrated in large 
multinational firms • Such firms were responsible for 
approximatel y 75\ of all industrial R&D funding in the OleD 
member countries. 
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The 1981 spending levels of some of the largest 
multinationals are presented in Table 3.3. 17 • An appreciation of 
the magnitude of these spending levels is given by noting that 
Siemens spent more on R&D than all of Swedish industry 
combined,and nearly as much as all" Italian firms. Among the 
strategies used by multinational firms were:-
(1) Various kinds of arrangements with universities. 
(2) Co-operative R&D programmes between firms. 
(3)Acquisition of limited shares in other companies engaged in 
developing the new technologies. 
These strategies may be viewed as:-
(1) Approaches to reduce the cost. 
(2) Spreading the risk. 
(3) Expanding the areas of R&D and innovation • 
Costs are rising rapidly and R&D increasingly requires large 
teams of researchers, sophisticated equipment and considerable 
capital investments. Risks, always great in R&D and innovation, 
have become even larger as competition intensifies, the pace of 
, 
innovation accelerates and the life cycle of products diminishes. 
Finally, needs and possibilities for R&D may cover a wider 
. , 
spectrum than some firms can afford to encompass in their own 
programmes, or incl ude areas of technologies which can be pursued 
more effectively in smaller organisations. 
3,6,3 Summary of Hew industrial strateaies 
Industry adopted new strategies for developing and 
exploiting the array of technologies. These include:-
(1) Joint R&D programmes. 
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Table 3.3 The 1981 spending levels of some of the largest 
multinationals are presented below. 
Source: OECD Science and Technology Outlook 
Millions in 
National currency 
Siemens 3 300 
Hoechst 2 199 
IBM 1 612 
General Electric 814 
Hitachi 139 700 
Toshiba 84 000 
Philips 2 907 
Ciba-Geigy 1 076 
Compagnie Gen6rale d'Electricit6 1 950 
(2) Technology exchange agreements. 
(3) The acquisition of limited shares in foreign firms engaged 
in developing new technologies. 
(4) Joint ventures for innovation ,production and marketing. 
The reasons for these private sector collaborations were: 
(1) The pooling of capabilities and resources and the sharing of 
the rising costs and risks in bringing high technology to the 
market. 
(2) To gain access to technology and to foreign markets. 
, , 
(3) The ability to tap into the science and technology base of 
the countries involved. 
Such cooperation can erode the significance, and even the 
meaning of conventional concepts such as "national 
competitiveness" and "technological leadership", while increasing 
the interdependency of countries with respect to technology and 
know-how. 
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3.7 Goyernment Policy tor Industrial. 
Innoyation 
The governments clearly had a role and responsibility for 
promoting R&D innovation. Problems arised, however, from 
differing views among countries to the degree and kind" of 
government involvement which was appropriate. There were views 
often strongly conditioned by the prevailing political and 
economic philosophy. 
The following are some developments and trends in 
sel ected areas of government pol icy for industrial R&D and 
innovation over this period. An extremely wide variety of policy 
tools was used and they are illustrated in table 3.418 • 
3.7.1 Taxation Incentiyes 
Indirect support for innovation was favoured by most 
governments a1 though direct support was sti 11 used in many 
countries. Some countries introduced extensive packages of new 
measures, while others strengthened their existing tax relief 
provisions. Behind this was a concern that, unaided, firms lacked 
the financing capacity to undertake the broad range of activities 
involved in innovation, particularly under conditions of low 
profits and high level of borrowing. 
Of all financial incentives, this class of measures involved 
the least amount of government intervention, with administration 
being mainly within the existing tax apparatus, and the greatest 
discretion for spending decisions by individual firms. 
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Table 3.4 Government policy tools for innovation. 
Source: Adapted from Rothwell, R (1982). 
Policy tool Examples 
Public enterprises Innovation by publicly owned industries 
Scientific and technical Research Laboratories 
Education General education. universities. technical 
education 
Information Information networks and centres, advisory and 
consultancy services 
Financial Export credits. grants. loans. subsidies. 
financial sharing arrangements, loan guarantees 
Taxation Company. personal, indirect and payroll taxation. 
tax allowances 
Legal & Regulatory Regulations, standards, patents. inspectoratea 
Political Planning, regional policies, encouragement of 
mergers or joint consortia 
Procurement Central or local government purchases and 
contracts, prototype purchases 
Public services Transportation. communication, health .ervices 
Commercial Trade aireements, tariffs, currency regulations 
Overseas agents Commercial and defence sales organisations 
3.7.2 Direct rinancial Assistance 
In its wider meaning, direct financial assistance can apply 
to any measures which invol ve a transfer of funds from government 
to enterprises to eriable them to carry out activities which they 
would not otherwise perform. With direct assistance however, the 
intentions behind schemes are often more clearly identifiable and 
separable • 
Three main forms of general aid were grants, risk sharing 
investment and assistance with loans. Clearly, these measures 
provided a spectrum of cost sharin9, with 9rants most 
57 
advantageous to firms and most expensive for ;overnments, and 
conversely for loans. 
A great deal of effort was concentrated upon this phase of 
the innovation process. This was partly due to its importance and 
partly because it was a relatively well defined activity towards 
which policy measures could be aimed. While an impressive 
structure of assistance schemes remained in place in many 
countries, and indeed strengthened in some countries, the trend 
during periods of financial stringency was to concentrate 
resources on specific priority areas, such as hi;h technolo;y. 
3.7.3 Regional Innoyation Policy 
Regional policy for innovation can exist at different 
levels. In some countries with federal or other developed 
structures, the re;ional government has a considerable de;ree of 
financial autonomy and may have policies in parallel with those 
of central the government. Alternatively, re;ional innovation 
policy may be an instrument used by central ;overnments to 
achieve differential economic ;rowth between regions and thus 
eliminate unwanted economic and social disparities. 
A survey of OECD19 member countries inquired about the 
kinds of policies that were pursued or were bein; planned in 
order to introduce and encourage R&D activities and the adoption 
of innovations in companies. A wide range of pol icies and 
measures were identified by the study, as shown in table 3.S. 
The table shows that pol icies were oriented toward enhancin; 
the flow of information relevant to R&D innovation and improvin; 
the infrastructure related to these acti vi ties. In sununary, there 
was much enthusiasm and many initiatives on the part of local 
~able 3.5 Some re9ional 
innovation. 
Source: OECD, 1982. 
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policies for promoting R&D and 
A Direction Assistance to Enterprises for Technological Advance. 
Innovation, New Enterprises 
1 Form of Assistance 
Advice to individual firm 
General dissemination of information 
Financial . 
21 Immediate Purpose of Financial Assistance 
Studies, surveys, pilot schemes 
Operations 
3 Target Beneficiaries 
Particular industries 
Particular types of enterprises 
B Assistance for Improving Infrastructure and Information Transfer 
1 Creation of new R&D institutions 
2 Extension of institutions' functions to aid in innovation 
3 Development of counselling services 
4 Training courses and aites 
5 Planning for and creation of Science Parks 
90vernments in this area. Some central 90vernments were, however, 
reappraising their long experience in regional development. 
3.8 Co - ordination of BiT Policy 
~he science and technology policies of most countries were 
often sectoral, in origin and orientation. Ministries, councils 
and other bodies devise policies to meet their individual 
interests and needs, often with little coordination among them. 
As a result, "national " science and technology policies were 
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sometimes a conglomerate of various aims and measures which may 
lack cohesion and strategic purpose from a national perspective. 
The closer coordination of the various science and 
technology policies assumed greater importance and urgency as 
countries sought to accelerate technological innovation in order 
to improve their economic growth, productivity and 
competitiveness. Rapid innovation required timely and relevant 
inputs from virtually all parts of the science and technology 
system and close interaction of its components. 
Better co-ordination of science and technology policies 
and their closer integration with economic and other policies 
were among the main goals of several countries. Co-ordination, 
however, was made difficult by:-
(1) The institutional complexity. 
(2) The diversity of science and technology systems (with 
components ranging from university to industry). 
(3) The weak coupling between components and differences among 
them in purpose, values and outlook. 
(4) A particular difficulty in co-ordination was in the time 
dimension: components of the system had widely different response 
times, ranging from the multi-year scale of institutions involved 
in long term research to the short time frame of applied work in 
industry .. 
Better coordination of science and technology polici,s will 
continue to be an important goal and a difficult problem for most 
countries. Further efforts can be expected to strengthen existing 
mechanisms for co-ordination. Furthermore, coordination may be 
improved considerably by the trend towards strategic planning 
of science and technology. 
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3.9 strategic Planning 
Governments have given increased attention to strategic 
planning for science and technology. By their nature, advances 
in science and, to some extent, developments in technology are 
difficult and often impossible to anticipate. Furthermore, such 
advances and developments create opportunities and options which 
may not have been forseeable at the time of planning. In these 
respects, science and technology themselves are major sources of 
uncertainty and because of their wide ranging impacts, they 
destabilise the broadened system within which they operate. Many 
countries found that economic. political and social conditions 
could significantly alter the best laid plans. 
The trend towards strategic planning by governments for 
science and technology had several sources. One of the most 
significant and general of these was the increasing role which 
numerous countries expected science and technology to play in 
shaping conditions of the future. Planning increased also as a 
result of the importance many countries assigned to the 
development and introduction of new technologies for:-
(1) Restructuring their industry. 
(2) Enhancing productivity. 
(3) Restoring their productivity and restoring their economic 
growth and competitiveness. 
The achievement of these goals, it was recognised, required 
sustained effort and the coromi tment of substantial resources over 
several years. Hence strategic planning became a necessity. This 
was reinforced by the paucity of resources available during the 
prevailing period of economic stagnation: careful planning and 
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judicious choice of priorities were needed if the scarce 
resources were to be focused on important goal sand appl ied 
I 
efficiently. 
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c:::HAE'"""re :B 4: R&P IN TffE UK Frqrn .1..970-.1..989 
4.1 Definition of R&D Activities in the OK 
Research and experimental development (R&D) comprise 
creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to 
increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, 
culture and society and the use of this ~tock of knowledge to 
devise new applications. 
A definition of R&D activities in the UK can be drawn 
between broad categories of R&D activities as follows 1:-
{l)Basic Research 
(2)Strategic Research 
(3)Applied Research 
(4)Development 
The definition of the terms used above are based on those 
of the Frascati Manual 2• They have been modified slightly to 
introduce the concept of strategic research. 
Basic research is experimental or theoretical work 
undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying 
foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any 
particular application or use in view. 
strategic research is defined as applied research which is 
in a subject area which has not yet advanced to the stage where 
eventual applications can be clearly specified. 
Applied research is also undertaken in order to acquire new 
knowledge. It is however, directed primarily towards practical 
aims or objectives. 
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Experimental development is systematic work drawing on 
existing knowledge gained from research and practical experience 
that is directed to producing new materials, products or devices, 
to install ing new processes, or to improving substantiall y 
existing materials, products or devices. 
~he categories above are not clear-cut. Research spans a 
spectrum and it would be a misleading concept to suggest that any 
research project can be assigned to a particular point in the 
spectrum. A research and development project may involve elements 
from all categories in changing proportions as the work 
progresses. The categories are necessary to faci 1 i tate discussion 
with regard to the research activities of RAs but the 
difficulties must be kept in mind. 
4,2 Historical BackgrQund 
•• 2.1 tbe Post-War Period 
The wartime mobilization of scientists and technologists 
in Britain had an enormous effect on the country's post-war 
acience policies. At the operational level, there was an 
expansion into nuclear, aviation, and electronic research. 
Advisory systems were established in the defence and civil 
sectors which, it was hoped, would steer the nation's growing 
R&D effort into areas of national concern. The Labour Government 
which took office in 1945 was committed to the relief of long-
standing social inequities and to new programmes of social and 
economic planning. It was convinced of the importance of R&D to 
the achievement of its goals but the possibilities for 
implementing a science policy that took into account these new 
social priorities were strictly limited'. Britain's economic al 
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political atatus was seriously undermined by the war, and 
international trade and finance had to be considered in' all 
domestic policy-making. 
The colonial legacy affected British defence policies for 
many years after the war and hindered economic cooperation with 
Europe. The "special" relationship with the United States and the 
government's determination to possess an independent nuclear 
deterrent forced the British to undertake a massive rearmament 
programme. The nuclear programme, ita commitment to NATO and the 
defence interests in Ifear and Far East entailed an enormous 
diversion of resources and technological capabilities away from 
civilian industrial production, and Britain was launched into an 
arms race in advanced weaponry that ahe could not afford and 
that seriously distorted the R&D profile of the nation for many 
years and, to some extent, still does. 
An attempt was made to improve the machinery for scientific 
advice and coordination with the creation, in 1947, of the 
Advisory Council for Scientific Policy (ACSP). The chairman, Sir 
Henry Tizard, was also the chairman of the new Defence Research 
Policy (DPRC) and it seemed at first that this machinery would 
be sufficient for the coordination of the national R&D effort. 
The powers of ACSP were, however, severely limited. It had no 
executive responsibility, no power to allocate funds, and no 
power to initiate research or determine priorities in any way. 
When Tizard resigned in 1951 the ACSP and DPRC were completely 
aeparated again, there were even less coordination of civil and 
military R&D. British Bcience policy immediately after the war 
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was summarised by Vig4 as follows:-
"For the most part, the Labour Government's aspiration to 
redeploy science and technology for social and economic 
purposes came to naught. Ci vi 1 research expendi ture was 
increased significantly but pre-war institutional 
arrangements were largely consolidated in the post - war 
years. Science policy coordination was improved temporarily, 
but "mission" oriented programmes in military and other 
departments soon overwhelmed general policy considerations. 
These were expanded in the years thereafter." 
In the expansion that followed, civil and military nuclear 
developments heavily influenced university research priorities 
as well as governmental ones. High energy physics and related 
disciplines, especially, began to dominate university research 
expenditures. Nuclear energy and aviation absorbed at least half 
of all civil research funds in the 1950'8 in addition to most of 
the mdlitary R&D expenditure. Thus, the priorities of rearmament 
and weapons developments led to a concentration on big science 
activities in the universities and government. This, in turn,! led 
to ongoing commitments that had to, be met, making priority 
planning an impossibility for ACSP or any other sub-cabinet 
advisory body. 
By 1963, a serious crisis developed over government aid to 
acience and technol 09Y. Publ ic expenditure rose exponentiall y for 
80me years, averaging 12-13 percent growth per annum, but there 
was no effective machinery for coordinating this expenditure or 
for establishing budgetary priorities. The Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) and ACSP recognized the 
Deed for priorities but declared themselves incapable of setting 
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them. There was also concern in DSIR and ACSP over the apparent 
failure of the large R&D investments to ~ay off in the industrial 
and economic area. 
A Committee of Inquiry into civil science was set up in the 
early 1960s under the chairmanship of $ir Burke Trend and in its 
report to the government in 1964 it recommended that:-
(1) A new Ministry of Education and Science be established. 
(2) ~he ACSP be abolished. 
(3) A new advisory committee, the Council for Scientific Policy 
(CSP) be established to advise the Secretary of State for 
Education and Science on the distribution of funds among Research 
Councils; 
(4) ~hree new Research Councils be established. ~he Science 
Research Council would take over the granting functions of DSIR 
and appropriate research establishments. An Industrial Research 
Development Authority would take over the DSIR's industrial R&D 
promotion activities and appropriate research establishments. 
~he new Labour administration which took office in 1964 
implemented all of these proposals except one. Instead of an 
Industrial Research Develop~ent Authority, a ne.w Minist,ry was, 
created, the Ministry of Technology, which was.to fulfil Prime 
Minister Nilson's promise to remake Britain in the white heat 
of scientific revolution. A Central Advisory Council on Science 
and Technology, headed by a Chief Scientific Adviser, was 
established within the Cabinet Office to advise the government 
on the most effective strategy for the use and development of 
scientific and technological resources. 
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4.2.2 The Customer-Contractor Principle {Rothschild 
Principle 
With the change of government in 1970, there were again 
changes in the organisation of the British Government's research 
system. The Ministry of Technology was abolished, a Department 
of Trade and Industry created instead. There was a compl ete 
review of governmental R&D carried out by Lord RothschildS, head 
of the Central Policy Review staff. His detailed recommendations, 
which the government accepted, were that 
(1) Applied research should be organized more widely in 
accordance with a customer-con~ractor principle under which the 
departmental "customers", aided by their scienti fie advisers, 
would be responsible for defining their research requirements in 
te~ of departmental objectives and for commissioning work from 
in-house or external "contractors" who would advise on the 
feasibility of meeting particular requirements and put forward 
proposals for appropriate projects. 
(2) In order to bring applied research in some areas covered by 
the Research Councils within the scope of the customer-contractor 
principle, some of the funds provided to the Councils should be 
transferred to customer departments. 
(3) Departments should become more closely associated with the 
framing of the Research Councils' programmes by having full 
members on the Councils, not assessors. 
(4) The Council for Scientific Policy should be abolished and a 
Dew Advisory Board of the Research Councils established to advise 
the Secretary of State for Education and Science on the 
allocation of the Research Council science vote. 
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(5) Adequate central machinery should exist for ensuring 
cooperation 
providing a 
and coordination between departments and for 
concerted view on scientific and technological 
aspects of the government's policies, both domestic and 
international. Responsibility for this should be exercised by 
the Lord Privy Seal, a Minister without portfolio. 
From 1972 onwards, the customer-contractor principle was 
introduced into the departments and these now commissioned the 
applied R&D they needed from one of the Research Councils, 
industrial firms or one of the department's own laboratories. 
Decisions on research requirements were ~elated to departmental 
objectives and did not fit directly into any national science and 
technology policy. Indeed, Rothschild specifically stated in his 
report that any attempt to formulate overall objectives for a 
supposedly collective activity like R&D would only lead to 
confusion (see App. 4.1). 
By 1976, it seemed that the new system was not providing 
the expected resul ts and the government reviewed the arrangements 
that existed for the coordination of its research activities. 
Changes were made in the hope of achieving greater coordination, 
among them the establishment of a new advisory body, the Advisory 
Council for Applied Research and Development (ACARD), which was 
to provide a forum of external advice to . the government on 
applied R&D. An overall coordinating committee of Chief 
Scientists and Permanent Secretaries was established, the office 
of the Chief Scientific Adviser to the government was abolished 
and a Chief Scientist was appointed to the Central Policy Review 
staff. 
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4.2.3 Prom 1979 - 1987 
When the Conservative Government replaced the Socialist 
Government in 1979, a prime objective was to restore 
competitiveness in economy. Tax cuts were introduced and 
therefore there were constraints on public expenditure. The RAs, 
like any other beneficiaries of public funding, were affected. 
Although Britain had an excellent record in basic research, 
its performance in exploiting the results of research still left 
a lot to be desired. The Government therefore encouraged the 
academdc and the industrial spheres to move closer together. The 
Government believed that a beneficial by-product of the 
restrictions in public funding (provided they did not go too far) 
would create an incentive for that to happen. As a result, there 
was a considerable increase in universities' earnings from 
research contracts placed by industry - from £27 million in 1982-
83 to £68 mdllion in 1986-87. Another incentive given to 
universities was the property rights to scientific discoveries. 
Universities could keep any additional funds they attracted from 
the private sector without being penalized by a corresponding 
reduction in public funding. 
Schemes such as Alvey initiative were established to foster 
the important areas of information technology. This concept was 
later broadened and the LINK scheme was introduced to provide a 
framework for collaboration between all Government departments, 
Research Councils, HEls and industry in a range of areas of 
strategic importance. 
British Business had more than doubled its support for UK 
universities through research contracts between 1984 and 1988 
i.e. it went up by 140\ to £78m during the five years {1984-88)6. 
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In spite of this fast growth, contracts from British industry 
accounted for only 2.8 percent of the total university income in 
1987/88, suggesting that there were distinct 1 imi ts to the 
revenue which universities can expect from business7. 
In July 1987, the Government published its White Paper on 
Civil Research and Development8; and in January 1988 the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published its White Paper 
on Enterprise9• 
In the DTI White Paper, the Government emphasized that 
industry itself was best able "to assess its own markets, and to 
balance the commercial risks of financing R&D and innovation. The 
Government believed that it should not take on the 
responsibilities which were primarily those of industry - whether 
directly through research subsidies, or indirectly through new 
tax concessions. Consequently, the Government was increasingly 
withdrawing from near-market research. A preoccupation of 
Government pol icy was the management of the resources for 
research. 
There were a lot of changes going on during this period and 
the RAs felt that there ought to be greater stability since R&D 
was a long term business. 
1.3 Elements in the UK·s Research System 
The advisory and executive elements of the British research 
system are shown in figure 4.1 and it can be seen that, on the 
surface at least, it appears to correspond to a coordinated 
systemlO • The following paragraphs wi 11 brief 1 y describe the 
functions of these elements. 
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Figure 4.1 Maln e ements 1n the UK Government R&D system. 
j.3.1 Cabinet Office 
'l'he Cabinet Office had two functions. The first was a 
general supervision of the coordinating links between two or more 
departments; the second was more creative in that it involved 
both the provision of a forum in which import'ant issues could be 
discussed and the initiation of reviews of subjects of interest 
to a wide range of departments in which there was a significant 
scienti fic and technological input. Thus, in its scienti fic rol e, 
the Cabinet Office:-
(1) Provided a focal point for advising ministers or ensuring 
that advice reaches them on the science and technology aspects 
of the government's policies, both domestic and international; 
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(2) Invited studies on certain trans-departmental issues 
involving R&D; 
(3) Monitored and advised on how the arrangements for the 
management of the government's R&D effort were working; 
(4) Assembled information to ensure that Pari iament and the 
public had readily available sources of information about 
departmental R&D programmes. 
'.3.2 CODlDittee of Chief Scientists and Permanent 
secretaries 
In order to ensure an overall review of R&D and other , 
scientific matters at a top official level, the Conunittee of 
Chief Scientists and Permanent Secretaries under the chairmanship 
of the Secretary of the Cabinet was responsible for seeing that 
scientific questions were brought before ministers collectively 
and appropriately and that scientific priorities reflected those 
of the government as a whole. 
'.3.3 Central Policy Reyiew staff (CPRS) 
The CPRS was within the Cabinet Office and has 
responsibilities which covered the whole spect(um of government 
business but, from its inception, it had b~\'::m interested in 
issues which had a scientific content, and it hod always included 
a number of graduate scientists among its Jl .,mbers. The CPRS 
assisted the government in:-
(1) Working out the impl ications of its b... ic strategy in 
specific areas. 
(2) Establishing the relative priority to be gi'Ten to different 
elements of the government's programme. 
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(3) Identifying areas in which new options could be examined; 
(4) Ensuring that the underlying implications of the course of 
action were fully analysed and considered. 
Prior to the establishment of the office of the Chief 
Scientific Adviser wi thin the CPRS, concerted advice to ministers 
on science and technology aspects of government pol icies was 
arranged through the Cabinet Office machinery at an official 
level where the view of the departments and their chief 
scientists were coordinated - normally under the chairmanship of 
the Head of the Science and Technology Group. When the Chief 
Scientific Adviser was appointed to CPRS the Science~ and 
Technology Group in the Cabinet Office was dissolved. The Chief 
Scienti fic Adviser worked wi th other professional staff in a 
multidisciplinary team and was a member of the Committee of Chief 
Scientists and Permanent Secretaries. There was a considerable 
scope within the ter~ of his appointment for direct submission 
of advice to the Cabinet on scientific and technological matters, 
and he had access to, and could comment on, all departmental 
reviews and reports prior to their submission to Cabinet. The 
role of CPRS was not primarily one of coordination. Rather, it 
was one of asking fundament~l or innovatory questions and 
undertaking studies or projects that were best led from the 
centre. 
4.3.4 AdyisorY Board for Research COuncils <ABRC) 
The ABRC was set up in 1972 as the successor to the Council 
for Scientific Pol icy to advise the Secretary of State for 
Education and Science on two matters:-
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(1) His responsibilities for civil science with particular 
reference to the Research Council system, its acticulation with 
the universities and government departments, and the support of 
postgraduate students. 
(2) The allocation of the science budget amongst the Research 
Councils. 
The Board was also charged with the promotion of close 
liaison between Councils and the users of their research. 
The most important function that the ABRC performs was the 
allocation of resources to the five Research Councils. In 
advising the Secretary of State on the distribution of the 
science budget amongst the Research Councils the Board used a 
forward planning procedure that it called the Forward Look. The 
Councils were asked to submit to the ABRC their own 'Forward 
Looks' in a format called the Common Framework, which allowed for 
comparison of the policies and activities of five different 
bodies. 
..3.5 Research COuncils and Ministries 
Since 1972 the Rothschild customer-contractor principl e was 
built progressively into the management of 90vernment-sponsored 
R&D. Funds were transferred from the science budget of the 
Department of Education and Science to the "customer" departments 
so that they could commission appropriate research from the 
Agricultural, Medical and Natural Environment Research Councils 
(ARC, NRC, NERC). The SERC and the SSRC were exempted from the 
compliance with the customer-contractor principle because the 
former was concerned with pure rather than applied research and 
the latter was, at that time, very small. Arrangements were me 
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by amending Research Council charters, to appoint departmental 
representatives as full members of the Research Councils. The 
main intentions of the Rothschild changes as they affected the 
Research Councils and the work of the ABRC could be summarized 
as follows:-
(1) The customer-contractor principle already in use in major 
areas of government R&D would be applied more widely. 
(2) The Research Councils would be preserved within the 
Department of Education and Science and not be transferred to the 
departments that would be expected to be their major customers. 
(3) Departments would be more closely associated with Research 
Councils by full representation on the Councils themselves. 
(4) The ABRC would be given information about the size and nature 
of the work to be commissioned by customer departments and to 
take this into account when advising the Secretary of State on 
a policy for the science budget. 
(5) The ABRC's recommendations would be considered by the 
government in planning future public expenditure totals for R&D. 
(6) The Councils would be responsible for the detailed management 
of the commissioned research. Partnership and cooperation between 
departments and Research Councils would be an" essential feature 
of the new approach. The support which the Research Councils were 
giving to the universities would continue unimpeded. 
In its second report, issued in 1976, the ABRC claimed that 
a good start was made toward realizing Rothschild aims. In March 
1979, a major review of the effects of the Rothschild system on 
the Research Council was carried out. The review, which was 
presented by the Lord Privy Seal, gave the impression that in 
general the new system was working satisfactorily in all areas. 
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But the difficulties experienced by at least one Research Council 
in dealing with the customer-contractor principle would seem to 
cast some doubt on the value of this review. The NRC was 
violently opposed to the introduction of a customer-contractor 
relationship between itself and the Department of Health and 
Social Security (DHSS) and to a removal of a part of its budget 
to the Department. The OHSS for its own part had to build up the 
necessary expertise to discharge its own separate functions for 
developing health and social services research and did not feel 
competent to also develop expertise for a full commissioning role 
in the biomedical field because its research activities extend 
into other areas. 
By 1981, the secretary of the HRC announced that the 
customer-contractor was abandoned in the MRC and that the Council 
regained control over the part of its budget which was previouly 
been earmarked for DHSS contracts. 
4.3.6 _CARD (which was superseded by ACOST) 
The Advisory Committee on Applied Research and Development 
(ACARO) was established as a separate body to improve the 
interface between government and external organization,in the 
area of applied R&D. The ACARD complemented the work of the ABRC 
but was distinct from it, and differed from it in several ways. 
Unlike the ABRC, it concentrated mainly on technology and the 
industrial applications of science rather than on "pure" science. 
It did not manage scientific institutions nor did it allocate 
resources. In term of reference it was to advise ministers and 
to publish reports as necessary onll :_ 
(1) Future developments and application of tec~ology; 
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(2) The role of the UK in international collaboration in the 
field of applied R&D. 
(3) The coordination, in collaboration with the Advisory Board 
for Research Councils, of these activities, with research 
supported through the Department of Education and Science. 
The members of ACARD were mainly senior industrialists and 
academics: the Chairman of ABRC and the Chief Scientific Adviser 
were also members. The Chairman of the Council was a leading 
industrialist. Its secretariat was provided by the Cabinet 
Office. The Council reported to the Prime Minister. 
4.4 Coordinated ..B_~j) 
The need for a more coordinated R&D effort was echoed by 
ACARD (1986): 
"Countries with a rna jor technol09ical capabi 1 i ty have 
developed mechanisms for holding debates about directions 
in science and technology and the associated policy. In 
this country, we do not have a forum in which to carry out 
this activity. In fact, we do not even have the information 
which would allow this to be managed effectively. and our 
presently dispersed data are essentially non-interactive" 
Responsibility for R&D in the UK was shared between many 
Departments. No minister was responsible for science and 
technolo9Y issues across the board. 
The 90vernment agencies involved in the funding and 
performance of R&D (besides the Dept. of Education and Science) 
were the Ministry of Defence and the Department of Energy, 
Industry, Environment and Transport, and Heal th and Social 
Security. No sin9le ministry or department was responsible for 
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the government's civil R&D effort. though most Qf the funds for 
civil research were channelled through just two - the Department 
of Education and Science and the Department of Industry. 
The elements of coordinated science policy machinery were 
present but to describe it as such brings a negative official 
response. The official view on coordination was thisl2: 
"Whilst there is coordination of the UK policy 
implementation, it occurs much more at the working level 
than at a central steering coordination level. To this 
extent the UK system falls between Brickman's atomistic and 
low levels of coordination." 
It appeared therefore that although there was a high level 
coordinating committee (i.e. the Committee of Chief Scientists 
and Permanent Secretaries), a Cabinet Office Chief Scientist and 
an independent scientific advisory committee (ACARD), the level 
of coordination of the nation's R&D effort was quite low. The 
ministers and departments set their own pri ori ties and. in 
accordance with the customer-contractor principle, commissioned 
the research they needed. Interdepartmental rather than overall 
coordination would seemed to be the preferred science policy 
mechanism (see App. 4.2). 
~. 5 Priority and.JJ~_l_Qil_ab1-li.U 
The realization that technological exploitation was a 
particular prohl em in the UK was evident and widel y discussed for 
some years. It called for different kinds of government policies, 
accelerated sectoral concentration combined with attempts at 
central economic planning in the 1960s, new structures for the 
funding and direction of publicly funded research in the 1970s, 
a conscious attempt to increase private expendi ture on new 
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ventures and development in the 1980s. Some of these were more 
successful than others, but it took the drastic effects of 
sustained recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the 
realization that chanqes would be far more rapid in the new 
industrial environment, to create a new determination to get a 
greater economic return from scientific and technological 
activity. 
UK contributed only about 5\ of the world's output from 
researchl!. It would be difficult for the Government to change 
this figure no matter how generous the qovernment could be 
towards R&D. 
This implied that priorities and mechanisms for selecting 
and rejecting opportunities to spend public money on research 
had to be established. The need for such mechanisms was 
identified in a report by ACARD (1986)14: 
"a process should be established for identifying exploitable 
areas of science, which has some certainty of continuity, 
for the long-term economic health of the country." 
A country that adopted this strategy of a more selective 
approach to research was Sweden. It recognised the need to 
concentrate its resources more than a decade ago and was 
successful in identifying scientific priorities. Even the US, 
despite its vast science budget, had to make hard choices lS • 
But on the the other hand: 
"the more one concentrates, focuses and selects, the less 
flexibility one has." (Dr. Donald Braben, head of venture 
research at BP.) 
In the UK, the basic mechanism to privatise and selection 
of research were as follows:-
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(1) The first mechanism was through the Advisory Council for 
Science and Technology (ACOST)l, representing both academic and 
industrial science. The Chairman reported to the Prime Minister, 
who can - indeed has - attended ACOST meetings. A good example 
of ACOST's work was a study of opportunities in opto-electronics, 
a subject it considered vital to Britain's future. 
(2) The second mechanism was the Cabinet Office's science 
secretariat, headed by the Government's chief scienti fic adviser, 
who also had access to the Prime Minister. This secretariat was 
also responsible for assembling the annual report on Britain's 
research and development. 
(3) The third mechanism, the Centre for the Exploitation of 
Science and Technology (CEST), was conceived in Whitehall but 
was mainly funded from subscriptions of science based British 
firms. CEST was expected to play a key role in identifying 
opportunities for IRCs. 
j.5.1 CEST 
The Centre of Exploitation of Science and Technology (tEST) 
was formally launched in Nov 1987. Some of the UK's leading 
companies were involved in and contributed about £5 million to 
the launch. The Government vave a further £1 mi 11 ionl6 . The 
establishment of the Centre was recommended in a 1986 report from 
ACARD. 
The thinking behind CEST was that Britain urgently needed 
a mechanism for spotting and synthesising commercial 
opportunities. Although the country had a fertile intellectual 
1 ACOST superseded ACARD in 1987. 
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base, it had a dismal record in exploiting high-yielding idea~ 
of the kind that brought Japan international success17 . 
The rol e of CEST was tola : 
(1) Develop a demand-led industrial perspective, 
(2) Develop methods for practical exploitation, 
(3) Act as a focus to allow industrial relationships to form 
(4) Reduce uncertainty in industrial investment in science and 
technology. 
The new machinery for managing science began to have an 
impact. For example, the budget for Astronomy was cut back. 
Savings was channelled into new IRCs and other initiatives such 
as the £15 mi 11 ion Materials Commission announced by SERe in 
1988. 
4.5.2 IRCs 
The idea of the IRCs originated with the ABRC in 1987 in a 
discussion document "A strategy for Science Base,,19. The 
proposals were set against the background of Britain's declining 
economic competitiveness, higher education's need to justify 
itself to government in increasingly utilitarian terms, and the 
ABRC's plans for stretching limited resources by further 
concentrating university science and scientific research in fewer 
departments and centres. 
The first was announced that year at Cambridge. Four more 
centres, each with an engineering bias, were announced by the 
SERe in early 1989. These centres would be reviewed individually 
after a certain length of time (around six years), and may get 
backing for another two to four years. After that they may be 
asked to become self-supporting. 
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The IRes were proposed as national centres of excellence 
in their respective fields. They were intended to pool expertise 
from different departments in various universities into single 
centres. The hope was that such centres would be better placed 
to use government money efficiently and to attract large-scale 
industrial backing than the existing, diversified university 
research structure. 
But some scientists in the universi ties argued that the old, 
diverse and often small-scale ways of doing research were 
successful at the pure research level 20. The grants involved were 
huge by SERe standards and people in the universities expressed 
concern that they would lose out if and when the IRe programme 
were to build up and more and more of the SERe budget was 
apportioned to it. Critics of IRes claim that the programmes 
would erode the human and financial resources to a damaging 
extent. The IRe defenders' response was that IRes attracted new 
money from both government and industry, so no damage would 
occur. 
Another possible problem of trying to organise and 
concentrate resources was expressed by Prof. Denis Noble of the 
Save British Science pressure group21: 
"It is a mistake to over-organise science. Discoveries are 
not made by telling people to create something. You cannot 
plan them. The tactic of backing individuals has worked 
brillantly for this country". 
The IRes were fiercely controversial feature of the 
Government's strategy for science. They were set up from the 
funds of the science budget. Thus they could drain money which 
otherwise could help sustain present research in university 
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departments or national laboratories 22 . 
•. 5.3 LINK 
This programme was announced by Mrs. Thatcher in Dec 1986. 
It was a £210 million government initiative to boost industrial 
R&D and to make scientists and the business community more aware 
of the potential for profitable exploitation of science and 
technol Ogy23. 
The first five programmes were launched in Feb. 1988 at a 
cost of £83 million, of which the Government would provide up to 
hal f. Over the following five years further programmes were 
expected to take the total Government and industry spending on 
LINK to at 1 east £420 mi llion24 • 
The main objectives of LINK were25 : 
(1) To foster priority areas of scientific research directed 
towards the development of innovative products, processes and 
services by industry. 
(2) To stimulate a real increase in industry's own investment in 
R&D. 
(3) To help industry exploit developments in science and make 
scientists more aware of industry's needs by strengthening the 
links between industry, higher education, the Research Councils 
and other research establishments. 
(4) To develop technologies which cross the boundaries of 
industrial sectors and scientific disciplines. 
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4.6 BEls 
The uni versi ties, which received more than hal f of the funds 
provided by the Government to support the science base, the 
University Grants Committee (UGC) instituted a number of 
important changes. Its allocation procedures incorporated 
expl ici t recoqni tion of the research dimension, and it undertook 
a series of subject reviews which would have far-reaching 
implications for the pattern of research support within system. 
The Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC), in its 
strategy Advice on the Science Base, proposed a differentiation 
by institutions according to research role - the so-called B, T, 
X proposal 26 • The Government did not accept that such categories 
should be imposed. 
4.7 Privatisation an~ Aqenc~~~ 
In the 1980's, political philosophies which favoured freer 
use of market forces directly confronted the issues of flexible 
resource deployment. Increasingl y, the "automatic" right of 
funding was removed from research institutions. The process 
started with organisations such as BAs which were already in the 
private sector and were in receipt of larqe tranches of 
extramural funding from the DTI. 
j.7.1 Impact on GIRE~ 
In June 1988, the DTI announced the decision to privatize 
one of its REs (NEL) and the remaining three REs would be given 
agency status (NSL, NPL. LGC) and greater autonomy wi th thei r own 
executive. Furthermore the accountability for their own 
performance would be clearer. 
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The decision to privatize NEL was a result of the recently 
decl ared pol icy of shi ftinq the financi a 1 burden of "near-market" 
research away from the public purse. The government regarded 3/4 
of the work at the the National Engineering Laboratory as falling 
into the category of industrially relevant R&D. Since the 
principal beneficiary was industry, the "market-pUll" was felt 
to be more easily provided and understood when the R&D was 
carried out in an organisation whose progress depended on its 
success in providing services to industry. The DTI would still 
continue to support industrially relevant R&D carried out once 
MEL was privatized, subject to normal criteria applied to 
extramural R&D. 
The agency status given to the remaining three REs was meant 
to give greater flexibility and responsibility to the REs. This 
was done in I ine with the pol icy described in "Improving 
'7 . Management in Government: - The Next Step"" . It was consl.dered 
an appropriate structure for REs whose main task was to undertake 
research for public sector customers. Industrially relevant R&D 
and repayment work for industrial customers would each be I imi ted 
in the future to 10\ of the full cost of each RE. They were 
allowed to spend 10\ of the full economic cost on strategic 
research carried out for the QTI. They were also allowed to work 
on collaborative research and receive up to 50\ support . 
•. 7.2 UDP 
The UKAEA was establ ished in 1954 as a publ ic sector 
organisation with a mission to act as a resource for technical 
excellence in support of nuclear power development. Since then, 
it expanded into a conglomerate of seven management centres 
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providing a wide range of research and development work and 
regulatory bodies. 
In May 1989, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
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changed its status to an agency and called AEA Technology~~. The 
aim was to convert a public sector, mainly government-funded 
insti tution wi th huge R&D resources to a commercial organisation. 
This would not be easy considering the civil servant culture that 
was imbedded in the organisation29 : 
"Encouraging such changes within a large, unwieldy 
organisation which has not had a strong commercial ethos 
is easier said than done." 
The Atomic Energy Authority had a total staff number of over 
12000, about 5000 could loosely be described as being in 
management positions, most of them scientists and engineers. 
Selling UKAEA's service was not an entirely new venture. In 
1986, the Authority was allowed to become a Trading Fund with the 
aim of putting it on a more commercial basis, which in this 
instance meant emphasising the customer-contractor relationship 
for nor.-nuclear business rather than relyfng on " government-
orientated work. Since 1986, the industrial and overseas non-
nuclear work has risen to about £40 million with prospects of a 
further £10 million in 1989i At Harwell, the biggest laboratory, 
30 the figure was 25' . But this was only 10 percent of the 
Authority's work. The launch of AEA Technology was meant to open 
the doors of the largest research and develoment organisation in 
Europe and to launch a major marketing drive to sell its high-
tech knowhow to industry and business throughout the world. 
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4.1 International Collaboration 
In some advanced technologies the resources required to 
stay in the front rank are beyond the individual capacity of 
even the largest firms. International collaboration, especially 
within Europe, was therefore essential if UK firms were to be 
competitive in world markets. In the information technology and 
telecommunications sectors, in particular, collaboration became 
increasingly important, primarily because of the need to pool 
resources, develop common standards and exploit the forthcoming 
Internal Market. 
In some other sectors there may be advantages· for industry 
in international collaboration for certain large or lonoer-term 
projects in order to reduce costs, tap into other expertise, or 
to build better international links, particularly in Europe. For 
example, EUREKA was complementary to European Communi ty R&D, 
being industry-led to a much greater extent and mainly concerned 
with the commercial exploitation of R&D. However, some of the 
programmes proposed by the EC were neither necessary nor 
particularly beneficial, and one sees little advantage in 
collaboration for collaboration's sake. 
It was particularly important to bear in mind that the 
existence of a European activity did not of itself obviate the 
need for a domestic counterpart. In order to be seen as credible 
partners, to be in a position to significantly influence the 
content and direction of collaborative projects, and to be able 
to benefit from the eventual commercial exploitation, all usually 
require a strong national capability in the first place. In 
deciding the UK's negotiating line on the content of European 
Community R&D and in deciding on what projects to support (e.g. 
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what EUREKA projects), the Government therefore paid ~articular 
regard to what could best be done domestically and what could be 
done collaboratively in Europe. 
4 9 C -, • • _on~.\J.$.~n 
j,9.l Problems Faced by UK 
The S&T policy of a country encompasses its innovation 
. 
pol icy. Innovation is the introducti<m of new products or 
processes to the market, incorporating new technologies or using 
old technologies in a novel way. Successful innovation is an 
essential ingredient of wealth creation. 
The UK industry overall has had a long history of failing 
to match the international competition in innovation. This was 
reflected in the relatively low level of resources invested by 
the UK industry as compared to the USA, West Germany or Japan 
(see Chapter 5). Dr. Eric Duckworth, President of the Association 
of Independent Research and Technology Organisations, points out: 
"It is a worrying fact that I ess than 1,000 of the 80, 000 
manufacturing companies in the UK spend anything at,all on R&D. 
Within that group, there are 20 companies that account for half 
of the total expenditure." Among the most eviden.t were:-
(l) UK industry performed too little R&D and tended to take too 
short-term a view, even in many large companies. 
(2) UK industry was slow to exploit new technology. 
(3) Technological weaknesses were widespread, there was a general 
lack of awareness of the importance of technology and a shortage 
of necessary skills in management and workforce. 
(4) The UK's R&D was scattered around scores of institutions 
with very few centres of excellence. 
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(S) British science was underfunded, undirected and the research 
was too widely spread. 
(6) Pumping more public money into companies traditionally 
benefiting from state contracts rather than spreading the net 
further to widen and strengthen the technological base 
4.9.2 The Goals of the UK's R&D Policy 
The whole thrust of the Government's industrial policy was 
directed at ending what was seen as spoon-feeding, whether in 
terms of grants or other forms of assistance. The new-styled 
Department of Trade and Industry, now wearing its mantle of the 
Department of Enterprise, is indicative of the change. Lord 
Young, Trade and Industry Secretary from 1987 to 1989, placed the 
emphasis OJ;l marketinq services and advic~ to industry rather than 
providinq hand-outs. 
The above mentioned problems (see 4.9.1) should be seen 
against a background of:-
(1) A worldwide quickening of the pace of technological change. 
(2) An increasing internationalisation of markets. 
(3) An increase in the intensity of R&D in all major competitor 
countries. 
(4) Very high costs of product and market development. 
(5) A need for wider application of new "horizontal" technoloqies 
which cut across the traditional boundaries of industrial 
sectors. 
In order to stimulate an improvement in the UK performance, 
the Government's policy was to create and maintain a climate in 
which successful enterprise can flourish. R&D policy had a vital 
role to play, alongside economic policy and education and 
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training policies. in creating the rigtt climate. 
To remedy the weaknesses identified earlier on, the 
goals of the UK's R&D policy were as follows:-
(1) To encourage British industry to increase its own expeuditure 
on R&D. 
(2) To encourage a greater commercial exploitation of new 
technology whether that technology originated in the UK or 
overseas. 
(3) To obtain a greater contribution to wealth creation from R&D 
financed by Government. 
(4) To foster the development of international collaboration in 
science and technology to complement UK domestic activities. 
(5) To better target resources. 
(6) To change from a widely distributed research base to one with 
fewer centres. 
(7) Collective decisions among the various ministries on 
priorities of research. 
(8) Withdrawal from big sciences. 
~,9,3 The Chanaes in R&D~licy in the OK 
The changes in R&D policy in the OK could be summarised as 
a move towards:-
(1) Providing financial assistance for collaborative research of 
medium/long term importance to industry. 
(2) Financial assistance to bring forward good, innovative 
projects in individual companies. 
(3) Provision of advisory and consultancy services to improve the 
performance especially of smaller companies. 
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(4) Scherr.es to encourage technology trans f er , inc I uding the 
awareness of the developments overseas. 
(5) The need to better target re!iourcez. The task of the 
government was to support basic research and to contribute where 
business could not be realistically expected to carryall the 
risks. The Advisory Council On Applied Research And Development 
was set up to ensure that government spending was firmly directed 
towards areas of high national priority. ACOST played an 
important role in setting up The Centre for Expl oi tation of 
Science And Technology (CEST) to establish a process for the 
identification of exploitable areas of science which had some 
certainty of continuity for the lon~ term economic health of the 
country. 
(6) The commitment to fund and to face the conf 1 icts wi th 
universities over the establishment of new centres of excellence 
(IRCs) . 
(7) A collective ministerial consideration of R&D policy under 
the Prime Minister's leadership. 
(8) Withdrawing from "Big Sciences" especially big physics. 
(9) other actions to maintain the climate for innovation, such 
as pressure on companies to disclose their R&D spending. 
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c::HAl:""'"l"f:R 5: R&D PVND;[NG ;[N THE UK 
5.1 International Comparison 
A comparison of OECD member countries spending on R&D for 
the last two decades has been carried out in Chapter 3. The 
following paragraphs are intended to highlight the disturbingly 
low level of civil R&D spending by the UK Government. 
FRA 
SWEDE 
. GERMANY 
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 \ 
Figure 5.1 civil GERD as a \ of GOP 
Figure 5.1 shows that the civil GERO as a percentage of GDP 
(1987) of UK was ranked below its main competitors i.e. Japan, 
Germany, Sweden, USA and Francel . 
Figure 5.2 shows the GERO as a , of GOP (1987). On this 
basis, the UK's performance was below the level of Sweden, Japan, 
Germany and Uni ted States2• 
The above comparisons do not include a time factor and do 
not take into account the changes in GDP. A better indicator of 
a country's commitment to R&O is obtained by comparing growth 
in GERO against growth in GOP. Figure 5.3 shows the comparative 
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Figure 5.2 GERO as a Percentage of .GOP 
growth of GERO and GOP (1981-1985) (fixed prices)3. In this 
diagram the position of a country in relation to the diagonal 
line i~ an indicator of that country's R&O effort. In countries 
above the diagonal line, growth in GERO was greater than the 
9rowth in OOP and the 9reater the distance from the diagonal line 
the 9reater the country's R&O effort in relation to its available 
resources. The OECO commented that: 
"The UK was the onl y country where growth in R&D expendi ture . 
, 
was lower than growth in GOP."· 
Commenting on the above analysis, the Select Committee on 
Science and Technology ~aid that5: 
" ... therefore the disturbing conclusion that, as a nation, 
we are investing too little in civil R&D and the situation 
is getting worse. Our national expenditure (especially in 
the private sector) is not in line with our competitors" 
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jAND GDP 1981·1985 (fixed prices) 
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GOP : ANN, COMPOUND GROWTH, RATES 11115 
SOURCE: 'OE.CD SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGr INDlCA:TO«S, «~O«T NoJ',/N9, GRQH 4, 
F1gure . Campara ve Grow GERD an 
(fixed prices) 
A study undertaken by SPRU for ABRCl which looks into the 
government support of basic research in six countries also 
lttartin B It,Irvine J,"An International Comparison of 
Government funding of Academic and Academically Related 
Itesearch", SPItU,University of Sussex. 
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concluded that the UK spends less on academic and academically 
related research than its two closest European competi tors, 
France and Ge~any. 
As was Doted by the DTI in their Science and Technolo;y 
Report for 1984/85, "Of the five leading industrial nations, the 
UK DOW devotes the amallest share of' its gross domestic product 
to civil research and development. This disadvantage in quantity 
is not offset by any generally greater effectiveness of R&D in 
Britain." 
5,2 Goverpment Pinanced R&D 
Government-financed R&D fell into two distinct categories: 
(1) Research undertaken to advance knowledge, to maintain a 
fundamental capacity for research and to support higher 
education. The Secretary of State for Education and Science made 
resources for this research available to the universities, 
research councils and other bodies. 
(2) Other R&D aupported by government departments, each in its 
own areas in accordance with the customer-contractor principle, 
on the scale and pattern which it judged to be appropriate to 
the formulation and pursuit of its policies, whether relating, 
for example, to defence, industry, agriculture or environment, 
" ,. 
and the solution of specific needs and objectives, ahort or lon;-
term. 
It should be Doted that while the two categories were 
distinct in te~ of motivation and funding, there may well be 
aubstantial overlap in terms of scientific content. 
The government financed ci vi I R&D through the Science Budget 
for the Department of Education and Science (DES) and R&D 
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supported by other government departments (OGD) except MoD. Of 
the two sources, the RAs' main source of income came from the 
latter where the DTI was the main source of support. The role of 
DTI will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
The Science Budget was under the responsibi I i ty of The 
Secretary of state for Education and Science and it accounted for 
about half of the Government's annual expenditure on civil R&D. 
It could be broken into two main components i.e.:-
(1) Grant-in-Aid to Research Councils 
(2) University Grant Committees (UGC). 
The R&D supported by Government Departments other than the 
DES accounted for the other hal f. Many departments and government 
agencies had significant R&D programmes in support of their 
policies and responsibilities. Together these programmes 
(excluding that of MoD) accounted, in 1985-86, for 45\ of the 
total Government spending on civil R&D. Nearly three quarters of 
this work was in the applied R&D category; over 20\ was strategic 
and less than 5\ basic research. 
5.2.1 Why rinance Industrial R&D? 
It was believed that the main responsibility for financing 
and conducting R&D and applying the result must rest with 
industry i tsel f and be governed primari I y by market forces. 
However, in a major review carried out jointly between DTI and 
the Treasury in 19856 it was agreed that it was appropriate for 
the Government to intervene where the market mechanism operated 
less than perfectly. Examples of such market imperfections from 
the review were:-
(1) Where projects with a potentially attractive economic return 
101 
were too risky (or benefits could be long-term) for companies to 
proceed on their own. 
(2) Where industry lacked relevant information e.g. the potential 
of a new technology. 
(3) Where competition was limited •• g. where entry costs were 
high. 
(4) Where potential benefits of the R&D were low for the company 
undertaking the work, but much greater for the economy as a 
whole. 
(5) Where it was necessary to secure a UK presence in certain 
key technologies or markets, especially where technologies were 
changing rapidly. 
Other governments recognised the need to intervene to 
support industrially relevant science and technology, especially 
in certain advanced technology sectors. There was a clear risk, 
which UK industry felt strongly about, that in the absence of 
siadlar support by the UK Government, UK companies would be put 
.. 
at a competitive disadvantage internationally. This concern was 
particularly evident where UK companies took part in 
international projects where the overseas partners received 
substantial government assistance. 
5.2.2 Defence R&D 
Defence research, long eyed enviously by other sectors, was 
the first sector to suffer cut. The Cabinet Office statistics 
showed that the research portion of defence R&D was scheduled to 
contract from £408m in 1986/87 to £3S7m by 1990/91. Defence 
development, mainly devoted to big weapons projects, was to 
shrink from £1.93 billion to £1.66 billion over the same five 
~ears. 
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Some 225,000 people were employed directly, 110,000 
indirectly and a further 120,000 if exports of defence equipment 
were included'. The MoD is British industry's larQ'est single 
customer. The defence R&D pro(Jramme, about £1.9 bi 11 ion for 
development and £400 ndllion for research, amounts to over 50\ 
of the Government spendin(J on R&D in 1985/86. This absorbs a 
higher proportion of GOP than in any other commercial competitor 
country except the USA8• 
The government considered a proposal to transfer control 
of the half-dozen non-nuclear research establishments away from 
the Ministry of Defence to an independent a(Jency in 19889• An 
a(Jency outside the MoD's control would provide a more direct 
means of plou(Jhin;- back money from contract work into the 
research establishments. The status would give them greater 
freedom to set new pay scales for their employees. The a(Jency 
would inevitablJ want to eliminate duplication of work at the aix 
establishments involved. Therefore some of the 15,000 employees 
in the non-nuclear defence research outfits would be laid off. 
Most probably an executive a(Jency would be formed with some 
private enterprise involvement, plus a government presence that 
would ensure protection of the national security interests. 
In a repo.rt by ACOST in 198910 , it recommended that the 
Ministry of Defence should pay more attention to national 
technology needed in spending its £2.4 billion R&D bud(Jet. The 
report called for reorganisation within the MoD to promote what 
it called spinning-in of new technolo(JY from the civil aector. 
Previously the focus was on harnessin(J spin-offs from defence for 
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civil use. 
The inquiry found that 25\ of the national R&D budget and 
50\ of government-funded R&D was devoted to defence, but only one 
fifth of the MoD's expenditure on R&D was likely to have any 
applicability in the civil sector. 
5.3 Indu§trial R&D in the UK 
Table 5.1 Research & Development Perfo~ed In The UK In Each 
Sector According To The Source Of Finance (1983) • 
Source: Cabinet Office (1986) 
sector providing the funds (£M) Sector doing the work (%) 
univ. public: 
and corps( 101111 
educ:. research privale in 
IOYRt atabs assoc:s indo olher U.K. 
IOvemmenl 1228.8 634.0 39.9 1217.6 97.5 3217.9 (48.9) 
universiliest 25.0 25.0 (0.4) 
public: corporalions and 
research associations 12.6 9.1 433.5 60.0 515.2 (7.8) 
privale industry 157.5 16.9 29.9 2099.2 SO.7 2354.2 (35.8) 
overseas 42.1 18.0 23.0 260.3 4.5 347.9 (5.2) 
olher 52.7 46.5 23.7 122.8 (1.9) I 
10lal COSt of RIlD performed 1493.8 749.S 526.3 3637.1 176.4 65R3.0 
• Research in Ihe social sciences is exduded. 
t Including also funher educalion establishments. 
Table 5.2 Funding Of Industrially Performed R&D In The UK 
(1983) 
Source: Cabinet Office (1986) 
covernmenl 
public corporalions and research associalions 
privale induslry 
100ai 
·Privale induSlry. public corporalions and research associalions. 
£M 
1257.5 
493.5 
2129.1 
283.3 
4163.4 
% 
30.2 
11.9 
51.1 
6.8 
100.0 
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Table 5.111 shows that private industry funded only 36\ of 
the total R&D in the UK in 1983. Table 5.2 shows that of the 
total of industrially performed R&D, industry itself funded only 
just over hal f. Government funded directly about 30\ of the 
total. 
Table 5.3 Industrially Performed R&D In The UK By Source Of 
Funds At Constant (1975 Prices) (£m) 
Source: Cabinet Office (1986 & 1987) 
1967 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 • 1983 1985 
ownrunds 1028 988 866 853 994 1018 985 1149 
overseas runds 58 72 92 85 125 145 106 196 
governmenl runds 446 481 473 414 458 498 472 406 
lotal 1533 1S42 1431 1352 1577 1661 1564 1751 
• Private industry. public corporations and research associations. 
Figure 5.412 (data in tabl e 
5.313 ) shows that industry i tsel f 
spent, at 1975 prices, f1,OOOm 
plus or minus '150m on R&D over a 
period of 18 years. Few historians 
looking at this figure would 
believe that this period coincided 
with the explosive growth of the 
integrated circuit, the advent of 
biotechnology, the start of home 
computing, the commercialization 
of space, the revol ution of 
composite of materials, the use of 
0 .. .,. ••• 1 
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Figure 5.4 Tren s In T e 
Proportional Funding Of R&D 
In The UK, As A Percentage, 
For The Period 1967 -1985 
radically new pharmaceuticals, and mass travel by wide-bodied 
aircraft with fuel-efficient jet engines14 • 
The flat performance shown in figure 5.5 disguises marked 
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variations between industrial sectors. Figure 5.6 (data in table 
5.4) shows that there was substantial growth in electronics and 
some growth in the chemical sector that offset declines in other 
areas, especially in mechanical engineering. 
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Figure 5.5 Trends In Industrially Performed R&D In The UK, 
1967 - 1985 (1975 Prices) 
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Table 5 . 4 Industrially Performed R&D In The UK By Industri al 
Se ctor At Constant 1975 Prices (£m) 
Sou rce: Ca b inet Of fice (1986 & 1987) 
1967 1969 1972 1975 
all product groups 1514.1 15 12.9 1417 .6 1340.1 
all manufactured products of which : 1487.8 1491.4 1376.2 1293.4 
chemical and allied products 2 16.1 236.5 230 .8 245.4 
mechanical engineeri ng 154.5 132.9 93 .7 103 .4 
electronics 285 .1 308.5 301 .5 279 .0 
o the r electrica l engineeri ng 9 1.8 85 .0 67 .9 73 .0 
motor vehicles and pa n s 112.8 11 1.6 96.9 88 .3 
aerospace equipment. manufact uring 
and repairing 355.8 350.9 366.4 291 .5 
other manufacturing 271.6 266.0 2111 .9 212 .8 
• Priv~I " inrl ll ~ t rv . Dublic coroorations and research associations . 
tOO 
80 
60 
40 
20 
o L...l...-UI ........... ___ I. 
chem mech.eng 
• government 
fl 
• I l I 
i I--
I 1 
! I I I 
I 
elec. 
o industry 
-
---malar 
1978 1981 1983 1985 
1566.2 1661.2 1564 . 1 1750.6 
15 11.6 1554 .5 1465 .4 1597 .7 
283 .5 277. 1 278.6 320.4 
118 .3 11 1.2 98 .8 91.6 
441.9 510.6 528.6 591.2 
68.6 53 .4 44 .8 46.4 
87 .8 SO.3 91.2 \26 .4 
285.4 336.7 272.2 287 .5 
226. 1 185. 1 151.3 134 .3 
\ 
I ' 
Ii 
aerospace other 
Figure 5.7 Proportion Of Government 
R&D Performed In Industry, 1969 
Represent The Years 1969, 1975 and 
And Industrial Funding Of 
1981 . Column Groups 
1981 Respectively . 
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But figure 5.7 (data in table 5.5) throws a revealing light 
on figure 5 . 6 because it distinguishes industry-funded R&D by 
sector from industry performed R&D by sector. The increase in 
electrical and electronics R&D is shown to be largely government-
funded while the industry's own investment in aerospace R&D has 
more than doubled, although industrially performed R&D in this 
sector has decl ined over the most of the period owing to a 
reduction in government funds. 
Tabl e 5.5 Industriall y Performed R&D In The UK Funded By 
Industry At Constant (1975) Prices (£m) 
Source: DTI 
1969 1 1I7~ I (r~, I ,,-;OS 11ISI 
che micals 237 238 244 2&9 267 
117 8R 99 11 6 92 mechanical enginee ring 
electr ica lt 294 238 212 2M 333 I 
lOll 99 !l7 t(4 76 :notO! 
aerospace 41 55 52 79 100 
o the r ma nufacturing 254 202 201 21-1 I foX 
a ll manufactur ing 1052 920 93R 111 9 11 63 
• Pri va te industry . public co rpora t ions and research associa tions : includes overseas funds . 
t I neludes compute rs . 
I 
The general concl usion must be that Bri tish industry did not 
see the period 1967-85 as one where consumer demand or 
international competi tion requi red an increased investment in R&D 
to take advantage of new opportunities arising from developments 
in science and technology. Rather the high tech industrial 
sectors roughly maintained their level of investment 
(pharmaceuticals R&D within the chemical sector increased 
dramatically) but one sector, electrical and electronics, 
benefited from rapidly increasing government funding of its R&D. 
The so-called matured sectors, such as mechanical engineering, 
showed a declining rate of investment in R&D; motor vehicles 
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showed a decline until 1985. 
5.3.1 Expenditure on Industrial R&D in the Main 
Competitor Countries 
300 
200 
100 
0 
1969 1972 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
U.S.A. 
U.K. 
\ 
l 
I 
I 
I 
1975 1978 1981 1983 I 
R&D F1nance ustry In T e MaJor 
1983 (1969 = 100). Figures 
Currencies On The Basis Of Purchasing 
Figure 5.8 (data in table 5.6) shows that while industrially 
funded R&D in the UK increased by around 20% irl the period 1969-
83, that in Germany doubled and in the USA, after a slow period 
in the 1970s, almost doubled. Industrial funding of R&D more than 
doubled in France and it tripled in Japan albeit from low bases 
in each case. All four countries' GDP grew more rapidly than in 
the UK, but table 5.7 shows that industrially financed R&D in 
the USA, France, Germany and Japan also grew significantly as a 
percentage of net output wi th the German performance being 
especially impressive, whereas the British figure in 1981 only 
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just exceeded the 1969 percentage as it recovered from the slump 
in the 1970s. 
Industrially performed R&D in the UK was somewhat less of 
a disparity wi th competi tor countries when government funding was 
Table 5.6 Industrially 
Financed R&D By Country In 
Constant (1980) Prices (£m). 
Source: QECD (1986) 
1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 
U .K. 3226 2968 3166 3796 3941 
U.S.A . 20 282 20 561 22 102 262.34 32 384 
France 2072 2553 2831 3330 3929 
Germany 4214 4979 5353 ' 6251 7987 
Japan 5247 7386 8206 9555 t3 886 
• R&D purchasing power parity basis . 
t 1982 figure . 
1983 ! 
3995 I 
36146 
4514 
9482 
IS 317t 
Table 5.7 Industrially 
Financed R&D By Country As A 
Percentage Of Net Output 
(\) . 
Source: OECD (1986) 
1969 1972- 1975 1981 
U.K. 1.24 1.07 \.16 1.31 
USA. 1.20 \.18 \.19 1.39 
France 0.82 0.87 0 .91 1.04 
Gennany 1.25 1.39 1.4-1 1.76 
Japan 1.20' 1.26 1.26 1.59 
• 1970 figure . 
taken into account because, as table 5.8 shows, the government 
contributed around 30\ of the total funding in the UK and USA 
compared with around 20\ in France and Germany and even only 2\ 
in Japan. 
Table 5.8 Industrially Performed R&D By Source Of Finance And 
Country, 1981 (\) 
Source: OECD (1986) 
U .K . U .S. A. France Germany Japan 
own fund~ 01 68 71 82 91\ 
o therfuOl.l s· 'J 7 I 
32 22 17 :' gOA~en~ fund, :w 
Other funJ, m;lInly "v~r,e .. , throughout 
manufacturing 
0' I I 
. I 
i \ 
electrical 
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Figure 5.9 Proortional Funding Of Industrial R&D By Country 
And Industrial Sector. Col ulmn Groups Represent, Left To 
Right, The UK, USA, France, Germany And Japan. 
Figure 5.9 (data in table 5.9) also shows that the 
government subsidy of aerospace R&D in the four countries with 
major aerospace industries was broadly similar and that in the 
machinery sector was largely self-financed. The large extra 
element of government funding in the UK fell mainly with the 
electrical sector. 
Table 5.9 Industrially Performed R&D By Source Of Finance, 
Country and Industrial Sector, 1981 <\). 
Source: OECD 1986) manufacturing etectrical· machinery" aerospace 
~ own funds 51.3 42.3 71.0 24.7 
U.K. other fundst 9.4 5.0 19.8 7.8 
govntfunds 33.3 52.7 9.2 67.5 
own funds 69.0 62.1 86.9 27.4 
U.S.A. other funds 
c<'Ynt funds 31.0 37.9 13.1 n.6 
own funds 70.2 69.6 78.5 18.2 
France other funds 6.7 5.4 15.6 13.4 
lovntfunds 23.1 25.0 5.9 68.4 
own funds 85.4 84.7 89.8 22.1 
Germany other funds 1.4 2.7 0.5 2.0 
lovntfunds 13.3 12.6 9.7 760 
own funds 98.1 98.7 98.8 
Japan other funds 0.2 0.3 
covntfunds 1.8 1.4 0.9 
" OECD industrial sectors have computers in machinery. 
t Other funds mainly overseas throughout. 
111 
These dispari ties in government funding of industrially 
Table 5.10 Government R&D Expenditure By Country As 
Percentage Of GDP, 1983 (\) 
Source: OECD (1986) 
U.K. U.S.A. France Germany Japan 
101al' 1.33 1.18 1.41 1.14 0.61 
of which: civil ~ 0.67 0.42 0.95 1.03 0.60 
defehcc ~ 0.66 0.75 0.43 0.10 0.02 
• Total expenditure and expendilure on defence R&D are estimated in diUerent ways. so Ihe sub· 
division of the tOlal is nOI exact. 
: 
\ 
I 
A 
performed research resulted mainly from the large defence R&D 
expendi tures in the UK and USA and, to a I esser extent, in 
France, as shown in table S.10. Perhaps surprisingly, this did 
not greatly affect the proportion of own funds and government 
funds in aerospace and the small element of subsidy was also 
similar across the machinery sector. But the electrical sector 
and, to a lesser extent, the manufacturing sector, would appear 
to be at some advantage in the UK and USA compared with their 
counterparts in France and Germany. 
5.3.2 Short-termism 
In a conference organised by DTI on Innovation and Short-
termisrn in 1990, the Innovation Advisory Board (lAB) highlighted 
the danger and shortcomings of short-termism15 • The study by lAB 
showed that Britain was at the bottom of a league table of growth 
of industrial research and development spending. Such worries 
were also reflected in the Confederation of Bri tish Industry 
report carried out in 198716 • Indeed, apart from chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, R&D spending actually fell in real terms during 
the late 1980's, partly because of a reduced government input. 
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At the same time, the profits of leading British companies went 
up by 10% a year in real terms during 1985-1988) and the surging 
growth of dividend payments (16% a year) increased. The lAB 
concluded that the City set too high a priority for short-term 
profits and dividends at the expense of R&D and other innovative 
investments; the prevalance of take-over bids damaged the 
companies' ability to adopt long-term strategies. 
The Government wanted to force companies to publish details 
of research and development spending in their annual accounts in 
199017 . The Government was hoping that the change would send a 
signal to the investment community about the commercial 
importance of R&D. 
The Select Committee on Science and Technology18 felt that 
Britain should conform to definitions of R&D laid down by the 
OECD in its Frascate Manual and now incorporated into an 
accounting standard for industry (known as SSAP 13). 
Although some critics would consider the study to be too 
simplistic, one would tend to agree broadly with the findings. 
This was based on the interviews carried out with the RAs. The 
research directors raised the di fficul ties of convincing industry 
to invest more in strategic research rather than just 
concentrating on development work. The directors also felt that 
most firms did not look at R&D as a long-term business. This 
forced the RAs to tailor their R&D programme to the short-term 
needs of industry. Without Government support, the RAs would not 
be able to carry out any strategic research. Therefore, it was 
important for the RAs to have a balanced portfolio of R&D 
activities to survive. Over the last 2 decades, the RAs were able 
to respond well to the needs of the market. In the next decade, 
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the RAs will have to think carefully about their R&D portfolio 
and not be tempted to settle for any short-term gain. 
5.3.3 Capital ising on Scientific and Technological 
Expertise 
"Britain is facing a national emergency in its failure to 
capitalise on scientific and technological expertise and 
turning them in successful conunercial products" 19Ivor Owen, 
Director, Design Council. 
But even this scientific base was fading, Britain was near the 
bottom of a league table on R&D spending, according to a survey 
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 20 • 
According to the survey, Britain spendt less per capita on R&D 
than any main competitor. 
In the early 1980's, the UK was the only western industrial 
nation with a declining share of national income devoted to R&D. 
The UK state funding for civil R&D was set to decline further 21 . 
Meanwhi Ie, spending on R&D continued to increase in Japan I 
Germany, Sweden and the US. This coul d be due to Bri tain' s 
failure to see beyond the market conditions and technical 
limitations of the day22. 
Where British research led the world, its industries had all 
too often failed to exploit it productively. The Japanese had 
mastered the development and practice of technology transfer. The 
key to success appeared to lie in a mutual understanding between 
government, industry, HEls and research organisations and a 
willingness to conunit resources on a scale necessary to exact 
900d returns 23 • 
"Research in British Universities is far too mission 
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(market}-oriented. Some of the best ideas developed from 
fundamental research are in danger of being starved out in 
a climate which certainly would not have allowed me to 
follow the path I did" Prof. Georqe Gray, pioneer of liquid 
crystal display technoloqy24. 
Already 80% of the science and enqineerinq departments in 
Britain's hiqher education sector lacked the equipment required 
to carry out the necessary research25 . 
• 
The fai 1 ure to develop hiqh technol oqy, hiqh vol ume products 
was irreversible in Britain and was starting to affect middle and 
low technoloqy products, including the car industry. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The picture was one of British industry not perceiving any 
necessi ty, or not being abl e, to increase expendi ture on R&D 
during a period of unparall ell ed excitement and advance in 
science and technology. Industry in all major foreiqn competitor 
countries took a sharply different view and backed that view with 
its own funds. 
The picture was also one where Bri tish qovernments were seen 
to have been broadly competitive in R&D funding in industry with 
their foreign counterparts, albeit somewhat eccentric in their 
allocation of these funds and unsuccessful in qaining matchinq 
investment from industry. 
The industry may argue that for reasons quite unconnected 
with the R&D scene, its profitability fell disastrously durinq 
the period under review, and that it was remarkable that R&D 
expenditure was even maintained in real terms. The situation 
substantially improved during the last 3 years as other burdens 
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on industry were reduced. It may even be argued that British 
industry was more efficient in its utilization of R&D expenditure 
than in competitor countries. Some would argue that foreign 
governments were far more adept at concealing subsidies for 
industrial R&D, even from the keenest eyes in the OECD. More 
convincingly, they would argue that foreign governments put more 
organizational effort into ensuring that publicly and privately 
financed R&D was mutually supportive rather than randomly aimed. 
Pinally, some may argue that short-term financial outlook, 
bel ieved to be characteristic of the City, prevented British 
industry from investing enough in R&D to keep its products 
competitive in the marketplace. 
The government approach in trying to remedy this situation 
was through creating an economic and competitive climate in which 
companies were sufficiently profitable to be able to afford an 
appropriate level of R&D and also recognize that their 
profitability could only be sustained by competitive new products 
and manufacturing methods developed as a resul t of their R&D 
investment. The increased level of industrial funding of R&D that 
appears to take place since the early 1980's at 7\ in real terms 
between 1985 and 1986 {i.e. about double the average rate of 
increase between 1981 and 1985} was encouraging. If this increase 
was maintained, it would allow government funding to be used more 
generously in the area of basic and long-term research in the 
universities and elsewhere. 
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CHAPrH:R 6 : DEPAB?MENT OF 
INDUSTRY CPT];) 
6.1 Historical Background - DTI 
After the Conservative victory in 1970, Edward Heath was 
keen to develop a style of government based on a small cabinet 
and large departments. Furthermore, the machinery of the existing 
system, whereby responsibility for industrial and trade policy 
was spread among a host of different departments, was felt to be 
cumbersome and confusing. So, a new department was formed in 1970 
from the Board of Trade and Industry and the new Ministry of 
Technology. At its peak, the DTI had around 26,000 employees. 
In 1973 it lost its responsibility for energy. The next 
year, it was spl it into industry, trade, and consumer protection; 
the last was dropped in 1979, trade and industry reunited in 
19831 • In the last seven years alone there were six Secretaries 
of state. 
Without a clear role, the DTI was at the mercy of 
ministerial whim. Under Tony Benn, Industry Minister from 1974 
to 1975, he wanted to develop a socialist industrial policy. Mrs. 
Thatcher's first industry minister, Lord Joseph, was dogmatically 
hostile to intervention. Norman Tebbit was Secretary of State 
between 1983 to 1985 and was not in the least interested in 
regional policy. He was followed briefly by Sir Leon Brittan, 
who was succeded by Paul Channon (1986-87) and Lord Young 
replaced him in 1987. Lord Young was replaced by Nicholas Ridley 
after being there for over 2 years. And in 1990, Nicholas Ridley 
resigned and was replaced by Peter Lilley. Such a high turnover 
was particularly unfortunate in a department like the DTI, which 
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after all, was supposed to be at the heart of wealth creation in 
the economy. 
Officials, not surprisingl y, found it difficul t to 
accommodate all this. Tensions between ministers and officials 
continued under Mrs. Thatcher. While ministers with differing 
political views came and went, an unbroken official line was 
maintained. First laid down by Sir Anthony Part, in the early 
1970's, it was carried forward by Sir Peter Carey, permanent 
secretary at the industry ministry from 1976 to 1983, and was 
continued by Sir Brian Hayes. The central job of the DTI, as its 
officials saw it, was to protect the private sector from 
political interference2• The key concept was "sponsorship"", the 
idea that divisions of the DTI look after specific industries 
and, whenever industry-support schemes were on the statute books, 
channeled money to them. 
Of the department's 12,700 civil servants, no more than 100 
senior officials were actively involved in sponsorship, but they 
had set a tone for the whole department. As successive Tory 
governments shrank the budget for industrial support, sponsorship 
was eroded. Privatisation sharpened this trend. Lord Young, who 
arrived at the department in 1987, was Lord Joseph's political 
adviser at industry. He was well acquainted with the system of 
sponsorship and was totally opposed to it, which brought him in 
direct confrontation wi th his officials. Lord Young saw the DTI' s 
job as one of showing the private sector how best to help itself. 
His strategy was in the first place to improve the department's 
performance as a regulator, secondly to go on cutting support 
schemes and thirdly and most importantly to reorganise the 
department to look at markets, not industries. These market 
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sectors would be concerned with the interests of both suppliers 
and customers3. 
6.2 The DTI·s R&D Expenditure 
The DTI accounted for 15\ (innovation budget) of the civil 
R&D expenditure. It provided partial support for innovation in 
industry. The support was provided in the form of grants and 
contracts to assist specific activities or to spread awareness 
of new technology. 
The innovation budget was fixed at £500 million in 1988/89, 
£527 million in 1989/90 and £501 million in 1990/91. In real 
terms, there was going to be a substantial decrease4• 
Funds for statutory and regulatory work, including consumer 
protection and technological support, would fall from an 
estimated £217 million in 1989 to £60 million in each of the next 
3 years. This was due to the transfer of GIREs and Patent Office 
spending to this part of department. NPL, NEL, WSL and LGC became 
executive agencies. 
The Department had considerable difficulty in switching aid 
for R&D from single companies to longer-term collaborative 
efforts involving joint research. The number of participants in 
the LINK programme to bring companies together with HEls 
attracted only 40 participants in 1989 at a cost of £8 million. 
The plans envisaged a rise in the number of participants in the 
programme to 270 at a cost of £40 million, to 500 in 1990 at a 
cost of £76 million. The number of companies involved in the 
advanced technology programme was expected to rise from 80 in 
1989 to 248 in 1991, with an increase in programme cost from £34 
million to £113 million. 
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6.3 Background to Requirement Boards (RBs) 
In 1972, Requirement Boards were set up to operate in 
accordance with the Rothschild principle and act as proxy 
customers for the applied research of the Department. The Boards 
approved projects and provided funds for contractors from 
industry, research councils and research associations, as well 
as the Department's own R&D establishments. The Boards generally 
consisted of 12 members which incl uded 6 independent members from 
industry, 2 independent scientists, and appropriate 
representatives of DTI main customer divisions. A new Research 
Requirements Division under the Department's Chief Scientific 
Adviser was set up to provide technical, management, and 
financial back-up services for the Boards. 
In May 1981, the DTI's Requirements Boards were reorganised 
and reduced in number from nine to fiveS. The new Boards 
delegated responsibility to existing supporting executive 
committees for approving the bulk of projects. This allowed the 
Boards more time to consider longer-term issues. In 1985, a new 
structure was introduced by which a single high-level Technology 
Requirement Board (TRB), supported by 16 advisory committees, 
provided advice to Ministers and the Department's sponsoring 
di visions on all aspects of science and technology pol icy 
including advice on priorities between sectors and technologies. 
In its White Paper6 in 1971, the Government reaffirmed its 
intention to implement the customer-contractor principle 
recommended by Lord Rothschild for the control of Government R&D 
in the Green Paper with the same title7. 
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The White Paper said: 
" .•• departmental customers must work in partnership with 
their research and development 'contractor', whether inside 
or outside the Department. Responsibilities are then clear. 
Departments, as customers, define requirements; contractors 
advise on the feasibility of meeting them and undertake the 
work; and the arrangements between them must be such as to 
ensure that the objectives remain attainable within 
reasonable cost. This is the customer-contractor approach." 
Each of the Boards was concerned with customer interests in 
its appropriate technological field. The function of the Boards 
was to determine, in agreement with the minister concerned, the 
objectives and balance of the Department's intra-mural and, where 
appropriate, extra-mural R&D programme in the relevant technical 
field within the funds available. 
6.1 DTI - The Department Por Enterprise 
In January 1988, the DTI published a White PaperS 
announcing major changes in its industrial policy. This policy, 
however, continued what the Department believed to be one of its 
prime objectives: 
"We will encourage the transfer of technologies and 
cooperative research9 .. 
The White Paper declared: 
"The UK's overall weakness in industrial innovation 
performance lies not in the adequacies of scientific or inventive 
capability, but in the transfer of that capability into 
commercial appl ication10 ... 
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The main provisions of this White Paper on DTI 
reorganisation with regard to innovation are summarised as: 
(1) Greater emphasis would be placed on technology transfer -
especially linking educational institutions and industry - for 
small firms, for the regions and for new technologies. 
(2) Greater emphasis would be placed on collaborative research 
on both a national and a European scale. 
(3) Initial assistance would be given to technologically 
advanced projects in small companies, and to a very restricted 
number of projects offering exceptional national benefits. There 
would be less support for projects in single companies. 
The particular changes involved: 
(1) Ending Support For Innovation (SFI) grant assistance in 
individual companies. 
(2) Ending the Microelectronics Industry Support Programme. 
(3) Ending the Support for the Software Products Scheme. 
(4) Ending the Fibreoptics and Opto-electronics Scheme. 
(5) Encouraging collaborative research through: 
(1) European programmes such as ESPRIT and EUREKA. 
(2) LINK, which encouraged companies to undertake joint 
research with BEIs and Research Councils. This research would be 
pre-competitive but industrially relevant. 
(3) National collaborative research programmes that promoted 
longer-term industrially-led collaborative projects between UK 
companies concerned with advanced technologies. 
(4) General industrial collaborative projects. It was meant to 
help to serve the interests of fragmented industries where small 
firms typically did not have the resources for advance 
technological projects. 
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The Government also made provision for supporting individual 
companies in exceptional circumstances, despite its belief that: 
"Firms themselves are best able to assess their own markets 
and to balance the commercial risks and rewards of financing R&D 
and innovation. The Government should not take on 
responsibilities which are primarily those of industryll". 
However, the Government recognised: 
"that reliance on the decisions of firms may produce a level 
of innovation and use of technology which fails to provide the 
maximum benefits for the economy as a whol el2" . 
The support of these "exceptional" projects, which were 
"significantly" innovative and high risk and were expected to 
generate wider and additional benefits to the UK economy, would, 
however, only be offered in a very restricted number of cases, 
and had a very limited budgetary provision. 
Some of the particular schemes and developments to be 
encouraged were only at very early stages of existence. The 
regional technology centres were supported by the Local 
Collaborative Projects programme, which i tsel f was only announced 
in November 1986. As the case of one of these centres in Lowe and 
RothweII 13 (1987) shows, their formation was not unproblematic. 
The LINK programme (announced in 1986), a 1210 million 
programme devised to develop industrial collaboration with 
universities in speculative areas. 14 The first set of projects to 
be approved by the programme was announced in February 1988. LINK 
provided little by way of additional funds and controversy over 
the level of university overhead costs delayed its progresslS • 
SMART was another programme conducted on a very small scale with 
an allocation of a budget below il million. 
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The White Paper placed considerable emphasis on supporting 
high technology SMFs (Small and Medium-Sized Firms). Apart from 
SMART, innovation grants for SMFs with fewer than 25 employees 
in Development Areas were introduced. There was also a planned 
increase in the use of consultants in SMFs. 
Although there was a considerable need for increased focus 
on policy measures to support high technology SMFs, it would be 
some years before the impact of the proposed measures could 
effectively be evaluated16 • 
Under the Enterprise Initiative, independent firms with 
payrolls of less than 500 were offered financial support for 
specialist consultancy for between 5 and 15 man-days in a number 
of key management functions e.g. marketing, design, quality, 
manufacturing systems, 
information systems. 
6.5 Next steps 
business planning, financial and 
Executive agencies were set up as a result of the Next steps 
report, prepared by the Prime Minister's Efficiency Unitl7. The 
report recommended a devolution of responsibility to increase 
efficiency in the Civil Service. The DTI and the Ministry of 
Defence were the most enthusiastic departments in creating 
agencies. 
Among the executive agencies set up by the DTI were 
Companies House (Oct. 1988, 1,200 staff), National Weights and 
Measures Laboratory (April 1989, 50 staff), WSL (April, 1989, 310 
staff), NEL (Nov. 1990, 500 staff). The other candidates included 
Patent Office, Insolvency Service, Radiocommunication Division, 
LOC, NPL. The DTI's target was to see that 50 percent of all the 
13,000 staff be employed in executive agencies l8 • 
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6,6 CODclusioD 
All in all observers felt that the DTI was becoming 
increasingly marginal in its role in the economy and could become 
more so with the growing importance of Europe. The power of 
national departments would be curbed as issues such as 
competition policy were decided in Brussels. 
Looking at the changes in the DTI during the Thatcher years 
it was hard not to conclude that it was a steadily declining 
department19 . Privatisation and the policy of non-intervention 
drastically reduced the Government's interest in industry. 
Expenditure on R&D projects was cut, even for long-term, high-
technology infrastructure programmes such as the development of 
a broad band fibre optic fibre network. 
The planned cut in DTI spending from 1988 to 1993 would mean 
a significant reduction in funds for regional and general 
industrial spending, support for aerospace, shipbuilding, 
regulatory work and consumer protection. RAs would no doubt be 
affected by these cuts, especially those serving the shipbuilding 
and aerospace industry as well as those carrying out regulatory 
work for DTI. 
In a publication by the Confederation of British Industry 
in 1990, the difficulty companies faced in applying for research 
funding from the DTI was highlighted2Q . 
The industrialists' criticisms were contained in a report 
"Technology and Enterprise", based on a series of questionnaires 
sent out to high technology companies with experience of various 
government-funded programmes, asking for comments on how these 
programmes were conceived and run. While quoting a generally high 
level of satisfaction with the programmes, the replies indicated 
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widespread dissatisfaction with the procedures and paperwork 
involved. 
"The difficulties of obtaining DTI support, combined with 
the limited nature of that support, has led to the strong 
opinion among some industrialists that the programmes are 
more concerned with the public relations effect than with 
supporting UK industry21". 
It recommended that the procedures for the handling of 
applications should be simplified and accelerated. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The UK government tried to create a cl imate for the 
emergence of industry based and technology-based RAs after each 
of the two World Wars. It was modelled on a far-sighted concept 
from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). 
Collaboration was an underlying precept, and the Associations 
were "companies limited by guarantee" and able to qualify for 
tax-exempts status by operating predominantly to produce new 
knowledge through research, and distributing no dividends from 
profits. 
The RAs carried out collaborative research programmes on 
behalf of their members, themselves part of a coherent industry 
sector (e.g. Rubber and Plastics, Ships, Electrical) or having 
"-
an interest in the application of underlying technology (eg. 
Welding, Production Engineering). Members paid subscriptions 
which were augmented by Government grants, and these two sources 
of income were a major proportion (and in some cases the total) 
of the funds available to pay for the staff, facilities and 
buildings. In a few cases (e.g. Constsruction Industry) the RA 
was simply an agency commissioning work elsewhere. 
All subsisted, mainly successfully and under the original 
DSIR constitution, until about 1970 when the process of 
fundamental and far-reaching change in the national and world 
industrial scene began to dictate major changes in the RAs at a 
pace previously inconceivable. These changes became necessary for 
the survival both of their industrial partners and the RAs 
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themselves in an increasingly world competitive environment, and 
the RAs responded each in its own way. 
Altogether ,the RAs employed nearly 5347 staff in 1963. This 
expanded to 5957 in 1970. By 1988, there were only 33 RAs left 
and their total staff number declined slightly to 5515. 
In 1988, the total RAs' turnover accounted for 1.50\ of the 
total R&D expenditure in the UK in comparison to 1.65\ in 1968. 
Considering the fact that the RAs faced a very difficult 
situation during the last two decades, the RAs performed 
relatively well. 
7.2 Definition of Research Associations 
The term "research association" refers to two types of 
organisation. Firstly, there are the grant-aided industrial 
research associations. These derived their income partly from 
government departments (usually the Department of 
Trade and Industry) in the form of grant - aid, from industry, 
membership subscriptions, contract research for industry and 
government. 
In addition to these, there were a number of cooperative 
industrial research associations which were not grant-aided, but 
financed wholly by their membership. This number was less than 
20, mostly small associations. The subject of this study is the 
the formerly grant-aided industrial RAs. 
Each grant-aided RA was legally the responsibility of its 
members and was controlled by a Council elected by the mem-
bership. But because this used to receive grant-in-aid from the 
Government, it could be regarded as one of the means by which 
~ 
Government attempted to encourage and direct the development and 
application of technology in industry. 
7,3 Deyelopment of BAs 
The Government of the United Kingdom became deeply 
interested in the encouragement of industrial research towards 
the end of the 19th. century when there were signs that the 
country was in danger of ceasing to be one of the leading nations 
in applying science to industry. The first major steps taken to 
improve the position were the establishment, in conjunction with 
the Royal Society, of the National Physical Laboratory in 1900 
and the formation of the Imperial College of Science and 
Technology in 1907. 
The outbreak of the first world war stimulated government 
interest in research still further. In 1915 the Committee for the 
Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and an 
associated Advisory Council were set up by Order-in-Council. The 
Advisory Council was appointed by and reported to the Chairman 
of the Committee, the Lord President of the Council. In this way 
the responsibility to Parliament was placed. The Advisory Council 
was mainly of eminent scientific men and industrialists. 
The primary function of the Advisory Counci I was the 
application of any sum of money provided by Parliament for the 
organisation and development of scientific and industrial 
research. A white paper was published announcing the scheme. 
The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research was set 
up as a separate Government Department in 1916 to carry out the 
duties which the Advisory Counci I was charged with. I twas 
empowered to institute specific researches, to establ ish or 
~ 
develop special institutions or departments of existin9 
institutions for the scientific study of problems affecting 
particular industries or trades and to establish and award 
Research Studentship and Fellowships. 
The Advisory Council remained until 1956 when, under the 
Department of Scienti fic and Industrial Act in 1956, it was 
replaced by an executive Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (Research Council) in whose charge the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research was placed and which was 
required, formally, to comply with any directions given to it by 
the Committee of the Privy Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research. The members of the Research Counci I were to be 
appointed by the Lord President who remained responsible for the 
Department. In 1959, the office of Minister for Science was 
created and the holder became the responsible Minister for the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research as well as other 
organisations concerned with civil research and development. 
7.3.1 The Inception of RAs 
One of the first matters to which the Advisory Council, set 
up in 1916, directed its attention was the serious gap between 
scientific research and industrial practice and the extent to 
which the United Kingdom was fall ing behind other industrial 
countries. It was decided to encourage industrial research 
through the promise of 9rants to approved Associations for 
Research to be founded and maintained by industry. Such 
Associations were to be non-profit -making companies 
(incorporated under Companies Act, limited by guarantee and not 
having a share capital), which had as their main object the 
.ua 
carrying out of research in a specified industry or groups of 
industries which were governed by a Council elected in a General 
Meeting by and from their Ordinary Memb~rs. A cardinal feature 
of the government support was that it would take the form of 
grant-aid for the general purposes of the Associations rather 
than contracts for specific items of work. 
The companies were to receive subscription from 
manufacturers and were to be autonomous and independent of the 
Government. By 1917 the Government had set aside a fund of £1 
million for the grants, a Model Memorandum and Articles for the 
Associations was drawn up (see App. 7.1) and the "Government 
Scheme for Industrial Research" was approved and publicised. 
Parallel with the setting up of the research associations, 
an early start was also made in various way on the support of 
research in universities and in establishments of Research 
stations under DSIR. 
The objective of these new associations was that, by their 
means, companies of compatibl e technical interests (whether 
making similar products, being raw materials suppliers, or 
sharing similar processes) should cooperate to raise their levels 
of technical skills and efficiency through voluntary membership 
of their industry's association. The companies should pay a 
subscription, usually related in some way to their size, which, 
together with the government grant, went to finance the research 
and information services that the association provided. 
Government grants were provided in relation to the amount of 
industrial support obtained by each RA. It later changed to a 
one-to-one basis and finally, in the last decade, grant-in-aid 
was abolished. The amount of support obtained by the RAs was an 
.l..ll 
indication of the relevance of their research to the needs of the 
market and the kind of R&D the market supported. 
Members were entitled to elect the Council, or controlling 
body, of the RA and thus possessed, in a democratic sense, co-
ntrol over the programme and activities of the association. But 
among the problems the RAs faced was to get a programme of 
research which was agreed upon by all its members. Since its 
members were different in terms of size and the amount of 
investment in R&D and objectives were different, problems arose 
in trying to accommodate every member. 
By 1925 the number of RAs in existence totalled about 20. 
Their early history was not one of unmixed success. Edwards 
(1950)1 recorded that "between 1922 and 1928 more associations 
were wound up than new ones formed, industrial income was only 
slightly higher at the end of the period, and total income 
actually lower. Industry was slow to believe that associations 
had something val uabl e to sell". Despite these di fficul ties, 
amounting in some cases to great financial uncertainty, the 
number of RAs stabilised and most managed to survive the 
depression years. It was a question of survival, however, rather 
than growth and by the early forties there were still fewer RAs 
in existence than there had been twenty years earlier. 
In 1917, it was intended that the DSIR grant support be used 
only to help establish RAs over their first five years' 
existence. But at the end of the first five years of the scheme, 
and again after 10 years (1927), it was admitted that the 
associations required longer to take root than expected, and 
grants were made avai I abl e beyond the five-year period. The 
eventual depletion of the £1 million came in 1932 and, while it 
.ld!i 
was still envisaged that the RAs would and should eventually 
become self-supporting, the idea that this should be achieved by 
a set time limit was dropped. The grant system was renewed, and 
later it became subjected to an annual parliamentary vote. 
7.3.2 Overseas Membership 
Following the Ottawa Conference in 1932, it was decided that 
Commonwealth organisations should be eligible for membership in 
RAs and there was considerable support from the Commonwealth for 
many RAs. Commonwealth members were admitted as Ordinary Members 
but their representatives were not normally eligible for election 
to or for service on the Council. In addition to manufacturers, 
there were also instances of membership by Commonwealth 
Government Departments and Universities. 
In 1960, it was considered by DSIR that the international 
climate in research was favourable to throwing open membership 
to foreign manufacturers but restricted it to a non-voting form. 
Accordingly, the RAs were invited to admit foreign companies, and 
could have a number of such members. These members could attend 
General Meetings but were not allowed to vote or be elected to 
the Council. Towards the end of 1970's, overseas members were 
allowed full membership with the right to vote and to hoI d 
positions in the Council. 
The idea of Overseas Membership was a common feature among 
RAs in the late 1970's. In the 1980's, membership was accepted 
from any organisation anywhere in the world. 
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F1gure 7.1 Numbers and Total Income of RAs from 1918 to 1970 
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7.3.3 Deyelopment of RAs After the War 
Figure 7.1 shows the change in the number of RAs from 1918 
to 1970 and the total income of RAs2. In November 1945 the 
Government decided to continue supporting the RAs in the nation's 
interest. Their grants became a permanent part of the DSIR's 
activities, and it was no longer an explicit tenet of 
government policy that the RAs should within time, or even 
necessarily at all, become entirely independent of grant support. 
It was from 1945 to the early sixties that the second maior 
period of RA growth occurred. Their number doubled to 50 and in 
1963, their total income reached £10 million (current prices) 
for the first time. Hereafter, the number declined (due to merger 
rather than closure) to 40 in 1971, although the total income 
continued to rise. 
Looking at the second and highest peak in figure 7.1, one 
can deduce that the RA concept was most well received in the 
early sixties. The concept could not be extended to new 
industries. Instead there was a continued contraction of numbers 
(in 1989 there were 32 RAs left!). The RAs that were set up 
overlapped in terms of their activities. And in view of 
organisational overheads there was scope for effective 
rationalisation in the form of merger. 
7.4 Goyernment Grants 
Figure 7.2 shows the trend in total government grants to RAs 
from 1951 to 19713 • During the post-war period, grant-support 
policy remained substantially the same as that established in 
1945 although a number of ad hoc grants were offered. In 1948 
non-recurrent grants were introduced for capital projects. 
( mill ion 
195112 1953j4 1955/6 1957/8 1959/&0 1961/2 1963/4 1965/6 1967/8 1969 /70 1911/2 
F19ure 1. 2 Government Grants to RAs 
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Between 1959 and 1964 special assistance grants were offered to 
improve liaison services. In 1963 "earmarked" grants were 
introduced to assist RAs to und~rtake desirable projects which, 
because of their speculative or long-term nature, could not be 
adopted under normal grant and subscription conditions. In 1968, 
special computer grants were introduced. 
In respect of the general grant itself, the major feature 
of the post-war period was the introduction in 1951 of the grant 
"stiffening" policy. This sought to eliminate the purely 
indefinite quality of grant support and to affirm that, while no 
time-limit was set to its existence, it was still expected that 
RAs should endeavour to derive an increasing proportion of their 
finance from industry. Henceforth, the DSIR was committed to a 
policy of progressively stiffening grant terms. This meant that 
each RA had to renegotiate the grant with DSIR. This was meant 
to encourage industry to invest resources into R&D themselves 
rather than to depend on the Government. This policy also served 
to provide some control over the growth of government expendi ture 
in this area, a limit which was rendered explicit in 1968 when, 
as part of general economy measures, a ceiling of £4 million was 
placed on the total value of all grants to RAs. At the same time, 
"earmarked" grants were discontinued. The overall vol ume of 
support in succeeding years, wi th continued sti f fening, decl ined. 
The volume of the ad hoc grants had diminished almost to nothing. 
The object of stimulating the RAs to become financially more 
independent was reflected also in the official encouragement in 
the early 1970's through the forms of activity which in earlier 
times were frowned upon. These included confidential sponsored 
work for individual members, projects undertaken for a group of 
140 
members only, and ancilliary services such as training and 
conferences. 
Government grant in 1970 was equivalent to one-quarter of 
the total income of the 43 RAs in existence. The effect of the 
ceiling figure was that most RAs faced the prospect of a level 
of grant, which, in real terms, was declining. The RAs felt that 
the principle of government grant was still of importance to 
their operations. They pointed out that even though the grant was 
relatively small in proportion to their total income, its 
marginal effect was vital. Without it, an operating balance (or 
slight profit) would often turned into a deficit of unacceptable 
proportion. While no formal government policy was declared then, 
some RAs, in order to pre-empt the most serious possibility, were 
beginning to think in terms of a future without grant at all. 
7.S Industrial Support 
The industrial income of RAs was for the great majority, 
subscribed voluntarily. Time and effort had to be spent by the 
staff of the RAs in trying to increase their membership by 
further recruitment of members or even, because of an inevitable 
turnover in membership, in keeping membership static and 
preventing a drop in industrial income. For this reason 
compulsory levies for research imposed by statute on all 
manufacturers in specific industries were attractive. Five RAs, 
those for cutlery, Furniture, Cotton, Hosiery and Wool used to 
have statutory levies under the Industrial Organisation and 
Development Act, 1947. 
The weakness was that, whi I e this increased the am'Junt of 
technical know-how available, it had no direct effect on the 
uti I isation of the know-how in industry. The danger of the system 
was that it had no real effect on the companies' awareness, and 
the payments were regarded simply as taxes which must be paid. 
By the 1970's, there were but few industries whose members 
would willingly agree to the imposition of levy and a major 
extension of the system was hal ted. The levy system did not 
accord with the customer-contractor principle. It was felt that 
industries should be left free from government stipulat~on or 
1 imi tation as to the nature of support given to RAs4. The 
Conservative Government policy of allowing market forces to 
dictate would not legislate laws that imposed levies on 
industries. 
When the levy schemes were withdrawn, this caused a lot of 
difficulties for RAs which were dependent on them. HATRA went 
through a lot of difficulties when the levies was withdrawn in 
the mid seventies and it never recovered from it. W1RA and S1 
too faced similar difficulties which brought about their merger 
in 1988. 
The question of whether confidential sponsored work for 
industry i. e. work paid for compl etel y by the sponsor, who 
retains the right to the results of the work, was an appropriate 
activity· for an RA was discussed both by the DSIR and the RAs, 
particularl y soon after the war. The general opinion in the 
1950's was that there was little demand for it in the UK and 
what work existed was better carried out by consultants than by 
RAs i.e. especially those which were near-market. The view was 
also held that it would not be possible successfully to carryon 
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research on both a cooperative and a sponsored basis in the same 
organisation, if only because of the inevitable flow of 
information between the two types of projects. Also, the 
governing Councils of the RAs were unwilling to allow activities 
over which they had virtually no control. There was also a formal 
difficulty in that it was not clear to what extent the position 
of the RAs as regards to income tax exemption would be 
jeopardised if sponsored work were undertaken. The DSIR's 
attitude at that time was that it did not object to sponsored 
work but did not encourage it. 
In 1958 the Department, partly because of the growing vollUrne 
of sponsored work being placed abroad by UK manufacturers, 
decided to encourage RAs to undertake sponsored work, provided 
it was not in any way done at the expense of the cooperative 
activities. 
7.6 SA-. Actiyities 
The RAs provided their customers with:-
(1) Consultancy, problem-solving. 
(2) General level of science/technology of industry. 
(3) Credibility that was obtained by being a member. 
(4) Good forum to meet other companies in industry. 
(5) A special role RAs played· in helping in standards or 
accreditation. 
(6) The use of the RAs' facilities as a buffer e.g. when their 
own laboratories were over-loaded, or to even out peaks and 
troughs; or if a piece of research required to be done quickly, 
to tap the expertise or resources at the RAs. 
~ 
The kinds of R&D activities that were carried out by RAs in 
the 1970s were:-
(1) General programmes. This was cooperative work undertaken in 
the interest of the whole membership, the results of which were 
freely available and publicized to members. This was the original 
purpose of the RAs' existence and, for some, it comprised the 
main bulk of work. These programmes were selected and controlled 
by the RAs' Councilor Research committees, and were thus only 
indirectly controlled by members in the sense that they elected 
these bodies. In some cases, the general programme was made more 
sectional in its appeal by dividing the membership into prod~ct­
classes, for each of which a committee controlled a portion of 
the total programme. 
(2) Information services. The purpose was to perform the dual 
role of supplying unsolicited information to members and 
answering technical queries posed by them. Information services 
often included extensive library I reference and translation 
facilities. 
(3) Repayment work. It embraced all the work done by RAs at the 
specific request of individual members and for which a definite 
charge was made. It thus included research and development 
projects done on contract and confidential 1 y on behal f of an 
indi vidual member. Since fees paid for repayment were not 
regarded by the Government as industrial income for grant 
assessment purposes, most RAs were careful to charge for it in 
such a way that no grant subsidisation occured. It was 
decreasingly the case that membership subscriptions alone provide 
access to all the services which RAs offer. It was common for RAs 
to charge specifically (and additionally to subscription) for 
~ 
items of work undertaken on behalf of individual members. 
(4) Group projects. These occupied a position between the 
subscription-funded general programmes and repayment work. I twas 
a relatively new type of activity which in several RAs was of 
considerable importance. They were given a variety of names:-
(1) Joint projects. 
(2) Special investigations. 
(3) Special industrial projects. 
(4) Group projects. 
The character of such a pro ject was that, unl ike some 
repayment work, it was not confidential, or subjected to a period 
of confidentiality before results were made freely available. For 
this reason the Government viewed income raised for group 
projects as qualifying for a grant. Group projects, however, 
differed from general programmes in that they arose from a 
specific request for technical assistance from a group of members 
with a common interest in a particular problem. This type of work 
could be summed up as mul ti-cl ient sponsored work of I imi ted 
confidentiality. The group project formula combined two features 
which were of importance to many RAs:-
(1) It ensured that a greater proportion of their work was felt 
by members to be directly in their interest and directly 
applicable (since they directly requested that it be undertaken). 
(2) It served to increase the amount of grant received, which a 
fully confidential contract would not. 
7.7 Legal status 
As mentioned earl ier, RAs were incorporated under the 
Companies Act. The liability of members was limited to £5 each, 
a nominal figure which did not change since 1917. A few RAs have 
changed their status in 1989 i.e. WRc and BHRA. The reasons and 
implications of this change will be looked into in greater detail 
in later chapters. 
Because of their objects and non-profit-making character, 
the Associations were normally granted, under Section 19 of the 
Companies Act 1948, a licence by the Board of Trade to omit from 
their title the word "limited"; this distinguished them from 
commercial organisations. Some RAs prefered not to omit it to 
project the image of a commercial organisation. It also reflected 
the changes that were going on within the RAs towards a 
commercial organisation. 
The RAs did not qualify for charities reliefs which applied 
to charitable organisations as such or scientific societies. They 
were exempted from payment of income tax (as long as they were 
limited by guarantee) through specific provisions of the Income 
Tax Act, 1952. Through provisions of the same Act, any payment, 
whether membership subscriptions or voluntary donation, made by 
a trader to an RA may be counted by the trader as a business 
expense provided he was engaged in a trade which was served by 
the Association in question. 
7.8 Rb Repr~eqt_.ti...P»-:-_~TO 
Most of the RAs are members of AIRTO (The "Association of 
Independent Research Technology Organisations"). It groups 
together 44 independent research establishments which depend on 
research services provided for clients. It is the largest 
contract research organisation (CRO) grouping in the EC. 
Table 7.1 Members of AIRTO (1989) 
Source: AIRTO Directory (1990) 
(1)ARA Aircraft Res. Asso. Ltd. 
(2)AMTRI Advanced Manf. Tech. Res lnst 
(3)BCIRA British cast Iron Res. Asso. 
(4)BHRA Bri. Hydromechanics Research Asso 
(S)BMF British Non - Ferrous Res. Asso 
(6)BCR Bri Ceramics Res. Asso 
(7)BGI Bri Glass Ind Res Asso 
(8)BIC Bri Internal Combustion Engine Res Ins Ltd 
(9)BLC Bri Leather Confederation 
(10)BMT Bri Maritime Tech Ltd 
(11)BRA Building Services Res Information Asso 
(12}CCL Cambridge Consultants Ltd. 
(13)CIRIA The Construction lnd Res and Information Asso 
{14}CAT cutlery and Allied Trades Res Asso 
(15)ERA Electrical Res Asso 
(16)FCR Fabric Care Res Asso 
(17)FUL Fulmer Ltd 
(18)FIR Furniture Ind Res Asso 
(19)HAZ Hazleton UK 
(20)HAT Hosiery and Allied Trades Res Asso 
(21)HRC Hydraulics Research Ltd 
(22)IMV Inveresk Res International Ltd 
(23)LAM Lamberg Industrial Res Asso 
(24)LIFE Life Science Res Ltd 
(25)MlRA Motor Ind Res Asso 
(26)NCC The National Computing Centre Ltd 
(27)NEI NEI International R&D Co Ltd 
(28)PR Paint Res Asso 
(29)PERA Production Engineering Res Asso 
(30)PIRA Paper Ind Res Asso 
(31)RAPRA Rubber and Polymer Res Asso 
(32)RIC Ricardo Consulting Engineers plc 
(33)SAT Shoes and Allied Trade Res asso 
(34)SRC Shipowners Refrigerated Cargo Res Asso 
(35)51 Shirley lnst 
(36)SIRA Scientific Instruments Res Asso 
(37)SMI Smith Associates Ltd 
(38)SRA Spring Res and Manufacturers Asso 
(39)SCR Steel Casting and Trade Asso 
(40)TRA Timber Res and Development Asso 
(41)TOX Toxicol Laboratories Ltd 
(42)WRc Water Res Centre 
(43)WI The Welding lnst 
(44)WlRA Wool Industry Res Asso 
l..ll ,_. 
Table 7.1 shows the listS of members of AIRTO(The 
Association of Independent Research and Technology Organisations) 
as of 1989. 
The AIRTO is the result of a merger of two professional 
groups in 1986:-
(1) 'l'he Association of Independent Contract Research Organisation 
(AICRO): - Was set up in 1975 and its members consisted of 
research establishments like Fulmer, Ricardo, Huntinoton, 
Inveresek and Roberston which were totally independent of any 
industrial sector, and others such as ERA Ltd. which became 
independent. These establishments received no particular aid from 
authorities. 
(2) Contract Research Association (CORA):- This group was made 
of the "Research Associations" (RA). 
Another group of members of AIRTO are those which were 
previously government industrial research establishments. They 
were privatized by the Government in the early 1980' s. Among them 
were 8MT, BRc and WRc. All of them are now private limited 
companies (limited by guarantee) with the exception of WRc, which 
is limited by share holdings (implemented in 1988). 
'l'he two large families (i.e. AICRO and CORA) are now united 
in a single movement but nevertheless retain major differences. 
Among these differences are:-
(1) In their legal form:- The "RTOs" (members of AIRTO) which 
stem from the AICRO, are public or private limited companies. 
The Os have in most cases taken the legal form of a "co-
mpany limited by guarantee", receive subscriptions and are not 
profit making. Their members are liable for the establishment. 
(2) Financing:- In some cases the RAs still receive voluntary 
l..U 
contributions, sometimes up to 40' of their income (for example 
British Leather Confederation - 43\)6\. 
(3) Field of activity:- The RTOs are by tradition open to the 
whole of industry and any client from the UK or abroad, whereas 
the RAs are closely dependent on their industrial sector. The RAs 
tend to conduct pre-competitive collaborative research but are 
also willing to accept individual contracts. Their members have 
access to the results of joint research. 
The consolidated balance sheet of AIRTO showed a turnover 
totalling £250million7 (1988) broken down as shown in Figure 7.3. 
About 48' of their income cames from UK firms'; 32\ from public 
bodies and 20' from foreign firms. 
The AIRTO has more than 20,000 clients out of 80,000 UK 
firms and is equally well established in small and large 
companies where:-
(1) 80' of the clients are SMES. 
(2) 93 of the 100 largest industrial groupings are clients. 
Clients come from many countries (20\ on average from outside 
the UK) • 
liIl 
Break:down of Conso I I dated Income - RTO 
For 1988 
"" fIns (48.01() 
Figure 1.3 Breakdown of Consolidated Income of AIRTO 
Source: Bossad (1989) 
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increased to 5957 in 
19702 as shown in 
table 8.1. By 1988, 
this figure dropped to 
55153 i.e. a decrease 
of 442 staff or 7' in 
comparison to 1970. 
Year 
1963 
1970 
1988 
No of 
Staff 
5343 
5957 
5515 
8.1.1 Axerage Staff "umbers 
171 
... 
151 
141 
13e 
1aI 
! 111 
101 
... 
i .. .. 
t 71 
• SI > c 
51 
•• 
• 
" 11 
• 
." 1975 
Year 
Flsure 8.1 Averase Staff Numbers 
Sources:- CSII (1972); Bessborough (1973); 
Annual Reports of RAs 
No.of RAs 
43 
43 
33 
152 
It is important to note that although the total number of 
employees dropped in 1988 in comparison with 1970, the average 
number of employees increased. This is shown in figure 8.1. The 
average staff number of RAs in 1970 was 1384. By 1975, the avera-
ge staff number dropped to 1285 but it increased to 167' in 1988. 
Over the last two decades, the number of RAs decreased from 
43 to 33, either due to closure (e.g. British Coal Utilisation 
Research Associations) or merger (e.g. 81 merged with WIRA in 
1988). The surviving RAs had to fight to survive in a very 
competitive environment over the last two decades. The increase 
in the average size (staff number) of the RAs could indicate that 
the remaining smaller als had to enlarge their size to offer a 
wider range of services to the market. The increase in size could 
also indicate a growth of expertise. 
8.1.2 Distribution of Staff Number 
Tabl. 8.2 Rumber and Distribution of Staff 
Rumber and Distribution of Staff 
Year 10 to , of Total 151 to , of Total 
150 As' Employment 300 As \ Employment 
1971 24 63' 33 10 26\ 37 
1975 22 59' 26 13 35\ 51 
1988 17 52' 19 11 33\ 41 
, of Total 
Year 301+ As , Employment Total RAs 
1971 4 11' 30 38 
1975 2 5' 18 37 
1988 5 15' 40 33 
Sources:- Bessborough (1973) ; Annual Reports of RAs 
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Table 8.2 shows the number and distribution of staff in 
RAs. In 1971, 63' of the RAs' staff were in a 10-150 employees 
range. By 1988, this dropped to 52,7 with the number of RAs 
dropping from 24 to 17. This range experienced the biggest drop 
in comparison to the other two ranges. This could indicate that 
the number of smaller RAs (10-150) decreased due to merger or 
closure. These RAs were facing difficulties in trying to compete 
in the environment. It would not be surprising if the number of 
RAs of this size were to continue to decrease - they might either 
have to merge or face closure. Another difficulty was that the 
smaller RAs tended to serve a very narrow niche of a particular 
industry e.g. SRAMA. They could be too closely dependent on one 
industry and be affected by its fortune. A single down-turn could 
prove too much for that particular RA. Many of these smaller RAs 
tend to serve mature and declining industry (e.g. HATRA). Unless 
they are able to diversify in the future, they might risk 
closure. But diversifying into other areas could be difficult 
because of their size. The other option could be a merger (in the 
last 2 years, 3 RAa merged i.e. 81 merged with MIRA to form BTTG 
and BIF merged with FULMER to form BRF-Fulmer). It would be 
interesting to .ee how these Us (which opted for merger) perform 
in the next decade. 
The number of RAs with staff numbers in the range of 151 to 
300 increased from 10 in 1971 to 13 in 1975 but fell to 11 in 
1988 i.e. from 26 to 33' of the total. This could be regarded as 
approximately the ~nimum size in which an RA could operate in 
• competitive environment. PlRA8 was one example where a merger 
in 1967 enabled it to compete more effectively because of its 
improved facilities and resources. It would not be surprising 
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if the RAa that fall into this category achieved the biggest 
growth in the next decade. 
The number of RAs with more than 300 staff increased from 
4 in 1971 to 5 in 1988 i.e. from 11' to 15' of the total number 
of RAa with aD accompanying increase in the total employment in 
RA's from 30' to 40'. 
In 1971, 63' (10 to 150 region) of the total number of RAs 
employed 33' of the total employment. By 1988, 52\ (i.e. more 
than half) of the total number of RAs employed only 19' of the 
total employment. This reflects the widening gulf between the 
smaller RAs and the larger ones. If the government aim was to 
promote the RA principle, the government might have to promote 
different policies for RAs in the different size ranges to 
improve the smaller RAs as well as to encourage the continuous 
growth of RAS in the other two ranges. 
In 1971, 26' (those in the 151 to 300 range) of the total 
number of RAs employed 37\ of the total employment. By 1988, 33' 
of the RAs employed up to 41' of the total employment. 
RAs with over 300 staff experienced the biggest change. In 
1971, 11' of the total number of RAS employed up to 30' of the 
total employment. By 1988, 15' of the total number of RAs 
employed 40' of the total workforce. In other words, 15' of the 
total number of RAs employed up to twice the amount of staff 
employed by 52' of the RAs (those in the region of 0 to 150). It 
would not be surprising to see this trend continue i.e. the 
larger RAs continuing to grow and the smaller RAs having a 
declining staff number. Some of the bigger RAs changed their 
status to one that was limited by shares (e.g. WRc and BHRA), 
which enabled them to raise captital for expansion. Their former 
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status i.e. one that was limdted by guarantee did not allow them 
to raise capital through shares. Some took various steps to 
restructure their organisation. For example MIRA appointed a new 
managing director who was more oommercially oriented and he in 
turn made major changes in the organisational structure. 
8,1,3 Chapges in the Types of Staff 
Table 8.3 Staff ~lpes 
Year 
1971 
1975 
1982 
Technical 
Degree 
27 
28 
34 
staff Types(\) 
Teohnical Support 
Assistant Staff 
32 41 
32 40 
4-- 66 .. 
Sources:- Bessborough (1973); Kennedy (1985) 
The purpose of this section is to give an idea of the types 
of RA staff. It can be divided into 3 types: those with a 
technical degree, technical assistants and support staff. Table 
8.3 shows the percentage breakdown in staff types. In 1971, the 
percentage of staff members with a technical degree was 27\9. In 
1982, the percentage increased slightly to 34\10. There was a 
tendencI for all RAs, whatever their size, to have graduate 
employments at 20 to 30\ of the totai li • 
In 1971, 32' of the total RAs' staff consisted of technical 
assistants and this figure remained unchanged in 1975. In 1971, 
41' of the total RAs' staff were support staff, which also 
remained much the same in 1975. In 1982, the combined technical 
and support staff percentage came to 66', 
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~able 8.4 Ratio of Research Staff to Suppprt Staff in 1988 
staff Ranking of ratios of 
Company Total Research research staff to total 
SCR 82 70 85.37\ 
SI 191 146 76.44\ 
BUNT 1000 750 75.00\ 
BRA 82 61 74.39\ 
CCL 245 180 73.47\ 
LEA 250 183 73.20\ 
SRA 21 14 66.67\ 
SMI 60 40 66.67\ 
ERA 383 254 66.32\ 
WI 536 350 65.30\ 
INV 262 170 64.89\ 
BOI 41 25 60.98\ 
PA Tech 270 164 60.74\ 
AMTRI 61 36 59.02\ 
RAPRA 170 100 58.82\ 
BCR 223 130 58.30\ 
BLC 55 32 58.18\ 
BRc 260 150 57.69\ 
8MT 350 200 57.14\ 
BNF 90 48 53.33\ 
BHRA 199 100 50.25\ 
NEI 500 250 50.00\ 
WIRA 100 50 50.00\ 
CIRIA 40 20 50.00\ 
SIRA 261 120 45.98\ 
PUL 194 81 41. 75\ 
AM 294 100 34.01\ 
PR 56 19 33.93\ 
TRA 125 40 32.00\ 
PERA 330 100 30.30\ 
LIFE 455 135 29.67\ 
FIR 93 26 27.96\ 
RIC 375 95 25.33\ 
BIC 67 8 11.94\ 
Total 7721 4247 55.01\ 
Source:- Bossad (1989) 
Table 8.4 shows the percentage breakdown of RAs' research 
and support staff for 198812 • The percentage ranges from 28' to 
85'. Some RAs, however, lumped together the researchers with 
technical degrees and the technical assistants whereas others 
quoted only the figure for researchers with technical degrees. 
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That is whf there is so much difference in the number of research 
staff. The general picture appears to be that, the percentage of 
graduate researchers amounts to between 20 and 30' in 1988. 
8.1.4 Recruitment of Staff 
Recruitment of staff was one of the major problems 
encountered bf the RAs. This problem was highlighted by 
practicallf everf RA visited. They faced a lot of competition 
from industrf in trying to attract the best graduates. They also 
faced problems in recruiting graduates with the kind of 
qualification they were looking for. Therefore, the RAs had to 
provide an in-house training for the recruits. 
The turnover of staff among RAs was relatively higher than 
that in the industrJ they served. They faced competition from 
industry in trying to retain their staff. In order to do so, the 
RAs had to provide the proper incentives in terms of renumeration 
and job satisfaction as well as a clear career path as most 
recruits did not see themselves making a career out of working 
for RAs. On the other hand, the turnover of staff was of 
advantage to both the RAs and industry. Industry gained by being 
able to recruit personnel with the expertise and experience 
required and the RAs gained by having former staff members 
working for the industry the RAs served (which created an 
important contact for the RAs. This is especially important with 
regard to industrial marketing where loyal customers and repeti-
tive bUJing is high). 
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8.1.5 Blnking of BAA According to Staff Kumber. 
"able 8.5 
According 
(1988) 
Banking of BAa' Table 8. 513 (see also Appendix 
to Staff Humber 
Ranking of RAs According 
to Staff Humber (1988) 
RAs (1988) 
WRc 667 
WI 520 
ERA 388 
PERA 350 
BMT 340 
HRC 281 
MIRA 266 
SIRA . 250 
Lea 235 
BCR 225 
BHRA 199 
81 187 
PlRA 180 
RAPRA 165 
SAT 165 
CAMP 152 
BClRA 137 
TRA 125 
WIRA 100 
FIR 93 
BKP 90 
BRA 85 
SCR 80 
AMTRI 61 
LAM 56 
PR 55 
BLC 53 
BOI 40 
CIRIA 39 
PCR 33 
SRA 20 
HAT 16 
CAT 14 
BTT MA 
Source:- Annual Reports 
of RAs 
8.1) .hows the ranking of RA. 
according to staff number. in 
1988. Ranked on a descending 
order the top five employers 
were (with staff members greater 
than 300):-
RAs 
WRc 
WI 
ERA 
PERA 
BMT 
Ko. of Staff 
667 
520 
388 
350 
340 
Of the top five BAs, two were 
former government re.earch es-
tablishments (WRc was the 
responsibi 1 i ty of DoE and BMT 
was a merger of KMI and BSRA in 
198514 ). These two BAs "inheri t-
edIt the rather large workforce. 
In the case of BMT, it trimmed 
down its workforce since the 
merger. It was al.o interesting 
to note that WI, ERA and PERA 
are not "particular industry"-based RAs. They are "horizontal 
technologJ"-ba.ed RAs. The latter have a wider market. RAs like 
WI and PERA have moved towards information .ervices, training and 
conference., and con.ultancy. 
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In 1988 there were 17 RAs with less than 150 staff members. 
Thes. would probably be the most vulnerable group because of 
their size. Included in this group are 6 RAs which had less than 
50 staff members. They are:-
RAs Staff numbers 
(1) BOI 40 
(2) CIRIA 39 
(3) FeR 33 
(4) SM 20 
(5) HAT 16 
( 6) CAT 14 
Some of these RA5 will probably have to fight very hard in the 
neKt few years in order to survive. For example HATRA had over 
the last two decades, shrunk to a size where it will be very 
difficult to build on. BLC was trying to restructure in 1988 to 
enable it to face greater competition in the next decade. 
Table 8.6 shows the difference in staff numbers between 1971 
and 1988. The three RAs with the biggest increase in absolute 
numbers were WI (136), LEA (114) and CAMP (93). Out of these 
three RAs, two (LEA and CAMP) served the food industry. It could 
be a reflection of the increase of R&D demand from the food 
industry. Thi. was predicted in the Bessborough report (1972). 
The three RAa which experienced the biggest decrease in 
absolute numbers were PERA (200), BNF (90) and HAT (64). BNF has 
now merged with Fulmer. HAT was going through a phase of trying 
to improve its position. PERA decreased its staff number over 
the last decade and the number is now stabilising at around 350. 
In terms of percentage change, the top three wi th the 
bigge.t increase were CAMP, LEA and BHRA. The bottom four were 
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Table 8.6 Ranking of Staff Humber Difference Between 1971 
and 1988 
Ranking of Increase 
or Decrease of Staff No. 
RAs 
WI 
Lea 
CAMP 
BHRA 
MIRA 
SIRA 
ERA 
TRA 
FIR 
CIRIA 
BCR 
SRA 
SAT 
CAT 
AMTRI 
PIRA 
LAM 
SCR 
BOI 
BCIRA 
RAPRA 
PR 
WIRA 
HAT 
BNF 
PERA 
BRA 
WRc 
SI 
HRC 
BLC 
FCR 
BMT 
BTT 
1988-1970 
136 
114 
93 
77 
66 
61 
28 
19 
13 
RA 
NA 
NA 
RA 
RA 
HA 
RA 
RA 
9 
5 
o 
° -3 
-7 
-15 
-17 
-21 
-22 
-36 
-40 
-42 
-61 
-64 
-90 
-200 
Ranking of Percentage 
Increase of Decrease 
RAs As \ 
HRC ERR 
SI ERR 
BRA ERR 
BTT ERR 
BLC ERR 
BMT ERR 
FCR ERR 
WRc ERR 
CAMP 158\ 
Lea 94\ 
BHRA 63\ 
WI 35\ 
MIRA 33\ 
SIRA 32\ 
CIRIA 30\ 
TRA 18\ 
FIR 16\ 
ERA 8\ 
BCR 2\ 
SRA 0\ 
SAT 0\ 
PIRA -8\ 
AMTRI -10\ 
CAT -18' 
RAPRA -20\ 
SCR -21\ 
BCIRA -21\ 
LAM -23\ 
BOI -35\ 
PERA -36\ 
WIRA -38\ 
PR -43\ 
BNF -50\ 
HAT -80\ 
Sources:-'Annual Reports of RAs; Bessborough (1973) 
WIRA, PR, BNF and HAT. Out of these four, two (WlRA and BNF) 
merged with other RAs. WIRA merged with 51 to form BTTO. This 
merger could help them to consolidate their posi tion in the 
textile R&D market. BNF merged with Fulmer to enable it to widen 
its field of coverage beyond non-ferrous metals. 
161 
a. 2 rr.!rnovor 
Table 8.7 Comparison of RAs Turnover with UK's Total R&D 
Year 
1968 
1988 
Total(£mil) RA 
Turnover(A) 
16.80 
155.00 
Total(£mil) UK 
R&D Turnover(B) 
1016.60 
10303.00 
Sources:- CSII (1972); RAs' Annual Reports; 
Central Statistical Office (1990) 
In 1988, the total RAs' turnover accounted for 1.50\ of the 
total R&D expenditure in the UK in comparison to 1.65\ in 1968 
i.e. a drop of 0.15'. This is shown in table 8.715 . Considering 
the fact that the RAs faced a very difficult situation in the 
last two decades, the RAs performed relatively well. 
Table 8.8 Comparison of RAs' Turnover With Industry's and 
Government'. 
Year 
1968 
1988 
Total(£mil) RA 
Turnover(A) 
16.80 
155.00 
Industry 
(£mil) (B) 
601.90 
6861.00 
Govt(£mil) 
(C) AlB \ A/C\ 
372.00 
3443.00 
2.79 
2.26 
4.5 
4.5 
Sources:- RAs' Annual Reports; CSII (1972) 
Table 8.816 shows the comparison of the RAs' turnover with 
industry and Government. The total RAs' turnover to total 
industry expenditure on R&D dropped from 2.79\ to 2.26\ i.e. 
there was a decrease of 0.53\. Although in percentage terms it 
dropped, in real terms (in 1988 prices), there was an increase 
of £50 million in turnover in comparison to 1968. But the 
decrease in percentage terms does indicate that the RAs' turnover 
was not able to grow as fast as the industry's R&D expenditure 
9rowth. The ratio of the RAs' turnover to the total government 
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R&D expenditure did not alter much. It remained unchanged at 
about 4.5'. 
8.2.1 Comparison of BAs' Turnoyer with University R&D 
EIPenditur. 
Tabl. 8.9 Comparison of RAa' Turnover With HEls' R&D 
Elpenditure in 1968 and 1988 
Year 
1968 
1988. 
Total($mil} BA 
Turnover(A} 
16.80 
155.00 
HEI's R&D 
Expenditure(B} 
84.20 
629.00 
A/B \ 
19.95\ 
24.64\ 
Sources:- Annual Reports of RAsi University Funding 
Council (1988/89) 
Table 8.917 shows the comparison of RAs' R&D turnover and 
the total university R&D expenditure in 1968 and 1988. The ratio 
of the BAs' turnover to the total university R&D expenditure 
increased from 19.95\ to 24.64\. The figure does indicate that 
the BAs were more competitive than universities in obtaining 
income for R&D. One would have expected the percentage to 
decrease because over the past decade, the universities were 
encouraged to obtain as much funding as possible from industry. 
The universities were in dir.ct competition with the BAs. 
Tabl. 8.10 Comparison of University and BAs' Research Incom. 
Total cost(mil) 
R&D Expenditure(A} 
R&D Income from:-
IndustrY(B} 
As \ Elpenditure(B/A) 
Government (C) 
As \ Expenditure(C/A) 
University 
1988 
3081 
629 
78 
12.4\ 
315 
50.08\ 
RAs 
1988 
155 
155 
117 
75.48\ 
38 
24.52\ 
Sources:- BAs' Annual Reports; University Funding Council 
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Table 8.10 shows the comparison of the breakdown of research 
income of universities and RAs. RAs obtained up to 75\ of their 
research income from industry whereas universities obtained only 
12.4\. The 90vernment support for RAs came to 25\ of the RAs' 
turnover whereas 90vernment support accounted for up to 50\ of 
the universities' R&D income. 
8.2.2 Overall Turnoyer 
Table 8.11 Analysis of RAs' Turnover in 1968 and 1970 
1968 1970 , 
Total income(£mdl) 4.80 16.40 
Average income per RA(£rnil) 0.34 0.38 
Median income or RAs(£rnil) 0.24 0.30 
Number of HAs with income 
-over £lm 3 4 
-SOOk to £lmil 6 7 
-250k to 499k 11 14 
-100 to 249k 13 10 
-under lOOk 10 8 
Total 43 43 
Source:- eS11 (1972) 
The overall turnover in 1970 was £16. 4m18 (£9Sm in 1988 
prices) as shown in table 8.11. By 1988, the overall turnover 
increased to over £157m as shown in tabl e 8.12 i. e. with an 
increase of 54\. This is quite significant because despite the 
difficulties encountered by RAs over the las~ two decades which 
brou9ht about closures and mergers, the RAs performed qui te well. 
Appendix 8.2 shows the comparison of a selection of RAs' 
9rowth in turnover from 1980 to 1988. Among the RAs with the 
biGGest annual Growth were SIRA (12.92\), LEA (10.51\), NRc 
(10.32\) and PIRA (8,42\). Some RAs had neGative Growth. AmonG 
them were BATRA (-8.26\), BOI (-3.62\), BelRA (-3.4\), and BNF 
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(-2.04\). HAT's turnover in 1988 shrank to about 1/3 of its 
turnover in 1980. 
8.2.3 Distribution of BAs According to Turnoyer 
Table 8.12 Distribution of RAs Accordin9 to Turnover 
Total income(£mil) 
Average income per RA(mil) 
Median income or RAs(mil) 
Number of RAs with income 
-over £S.Smil 
-£2.8mil to £S.Smil 
-£1.4mil to £2.8mil 
-550k to £1.4mil 
-under S50k 
Total 
Source:- CSII(1972) 
1970 
94.628 
2.1926 
1.731 
4 
7 
14 
10 
8 
43 
1988 
155 
4.813 
2.75 
, 
:-Bessborough (Updated Appendix 5 in 1975) 
10 
6 
8 
5 
3 
32 
Note:- The six RAs with incomes exceeding $5.5mil(in 1975) 
were MlRA,Water RA,SI and WI. 
:- The 3 RAs >£5mil in 1968 were ERA, FERA, BSRA 
Table 8.1219 shows the number of RAs in different ranges of 
turnover. In 1970, there were only 4 RAs with turnovers exceedin9 
£5.5m (1988 prices) but in 1988, there were 10 RAs. In 1970, 
there were 8 RAs that had a turnover of less than £0.55m but only 
3 in 1988. The biggest decrease in numbers of RAs came from the 
£0.55m to £1.4m range. The number decreased from 10 in 1970 to 
5 in 1988. 
8.2.4 Ranking of BAs According to Turnoyer 
The income of the individual grant-aided RAs varied widely. 
In 1970 the largest had an income of about £1.7 millionl (£9.81 
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mdllion in 1988 prices), and the smallest under £0.18m (£0.112m 
in 1989 prices). 
Table 8.13 Ranking of RAs According to Turnover (1988) 
(£mil 1988 Prices) 
RAs' (1988) 
WRc 22.00 
PERA 15.444 Median of turnover =£2.7Sm 
WI 15.00 No. of RAs above S.Sm = 10 
ERA 10.500 £2.8m - 5.5 = 6 
BMT 10.024 £1.4 - 2.8 = 8 
MIRA 9.082 0.S5m - 1.4m = 5 
HRC 8.000 Under 0.5Sm = 3 
SIRA 7.763 
Lea 6.331 
BHRA 5.600 
PIRA 5.000 
BCR 4.609 
RAPRA 3.500 
SI 3.200 
BNF 3.000 
SCR 2.80 
SAT 2.700 
TRA 2.70 
BCIRA 2.643 
FIR 2.300 
BRA 2.300 
WIRA 2.20 
CIRIA 1.700 
AMTRI 1.409 
PR 1.000 
BLC 0.970 
LAM 0.700 
FCR 0.700 
BGI 0.700 
SRA 0.50 
HAT 0.400 
CAT 0.260 
Source: RAs' Annual Reports 
In 198820 (see appendix 8.3), the RA with the highest 
turnover was WRc with a turnover of over £22m. This is shown in 
table 8.13. WRc was followed by PERA (£15.4m) and WI (£15m). WRc 
was the first RA which changed its status in 1988 from one 
limited by guarantee to one limited by shares. It will not be 
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surprisin9 to see WRc' s turnover increase especial I y so since the 
Hater Industry (1988) and Electricity Industry (1990) were 
privatised. The success of WRc is reflected in the big 9ap in 
turnover with PERA (a 9ap of over £7m). It does reflect the 
growin9 competitive-ness amon9 RAs and the environment they 
operated in. The turnover of PERA was ranked second, but in real 
terms (1988 prices) its turnover increased by over £5.6m over the 
last two decades. 
The RA with the smallest turnover in 1988 was CAT with a 
turnover of £0.26m whereas the smallest turnover in 1970 was 
£0.163m (1988 prices). 
The RAs' turnover was distributed fairly evenly across this 
wide spread. In 1970, the median was £0. 3m (£1.7 3m in 1988 
prices) as shown in table 8.12. The average income in 1970 was 
£0.382m (£2.2m in 1988 prices). One can see that the spread of 
turnover was skewed towards to ri9ht. By 1988, the median 
increased to £2.7Sm and the average turnover per RA increased to 
£4.8m. 
8.2.S Overseas Income 
Table 8.14 RAa' Overseas Income 
(1988 Prices) 
Year 
1970 
1975 
1988 
UK 
(£mil) As 
90.70 
72.50 
134.00 
, Turnover 
96.00 
96.00 
86.50 
Sources:- RAs' Annual Reports 
Overseas 
(£mil) As' Turnover 
3.75 3.97 
2.82 3.74 
21.00 13.5 
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Table 8.14 shows the breakdown of the RAs' income according 
B-eakdown of' Conso I I dated Income - RTO 
Flsure 8.2 Breakdown of Consolidated lncome of RYOs 
Source:- Bossad (1989) 
to region. In 197032 , only 4\ of the total RAs turnover came from 
overseas sources. This figure did not change too much by 1975. 
By 1988, however, there was a big increase in income from 
overseas. It came to over 13.5,330f the overall turnover of the 
RAs. A survey conducted by Bossad Consultants34 showed that the 
income from overseas could be as high as 20\ of the overall 
turnover of RAs in 1989. This is shown in figure 8.2. 
In real terms, income from the UK and Overseas increased 
from £90.7m to £134m and from £3.75m to £21m respectively. 
These results showed that in the 1970s, there was a lot of 
resistance from the RAB Council against overseas membership and 
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contracts. The policy of DSIR at that time was ambiguous. It 
neither objected to it nor encouraged it24. Only towards the end 
of the 1970's and the 1980's, memberships of overseas 
manufacturers and organisations were encouraged. 
8.2.6 Income From Government and Industry 
Table 8.15 RAe Income Prom Industry and Government 
Turnover 
Year 
1970 
1988 
is in 1988 Prices 
Industry 
(£mil) As , 
63.6 
128.5 
Turnover 
68 
83 
Government 
(£mil) As' Turnover 
30.8 32 
26.5 17 
Sources:- Bessborough (1973); RAs' Annual Reports; 
cabinet Office (1990) 
Table 8.15 shows the breakdown of the RAs' overall turnover. 
In 197025 , 32' of the RAs' turnover came from government sources 
in the form of grants or repayment work. By 198826 , only 17' of 
their turnover came from the government in the form of contract 
work. Nevertheless, the Government remains the biggest single 
customer. In real terms (1988 prices), the income from government 
sources decreased slightly from £30.8m in 1970 to around £26m in 
1988. Instead, the income from industry increased dramatically. 
In 1970, the income from industry accounted for 68' of the 
RAs' total turnover and it increased to 83' in 1988. In real 
terms, the RAs' industrial income nearly doubled in this period, 
increasing from £63m in 1970 to over £128m in 1988. These figures 
show the development of the commercial capability of the RAs over 
the last two decades. 
filen~e: CHAP 8: CTV2 169 
8.2.7 Income From the BAs' Activities 
BreaKdown of sources of Income(1970/71) 
rrOlll ... ",ces (8.a.) 
'<blunt."" c:ont.rlbutlon (23. 
Figure 8.3 Breakdown of Sources of Income for 1970 
Source:- Bessborough (1973) 
Figure 8.3 and 8.4 show the breakdown of turnover according 
to activities for 1970 and 1988 respectively. In 1970, income 
from government grants, which comprised of 25~17, was replaced 
by government contract works. Income from contract works, which 
c~e to only 22~ in 1970, increased to 56~ in 198821 and in real 
terms, it increased from £20.8m to £87m over the same period. 
Contract research is presently the main activity of the RAs. 
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nuf.ct ..... Ag1 (5.05) 
on d patenu (1.Il10 AIIa .. rch cont.ract. ( t") 
Fisure 8.' Breakdown of Income Accordins to Activities, 
1987/88 
Source:- Bossad (1989) 
Durins the last two decades. statutory levy was abolished 
and block support from trade associations was also stopped. 
Because of this. the RAs lost two of their most stable industrial 
income sources in addition to the loss of automatic government 
srants. Membership subscriptions remained on a voluntary basis. 
The income from membership subscriptions decreased from 23.2~ in 
1970 to IO~ in 1988 but a more accurate figure for subscriptions 
income for 1988 would be 20~t' of the total turnover. 
In the 1980's. activities like information services. train-
Ins. conferences and publications. consultancy and trouble 
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shooting became increasingly important to RAs in achieving a more 
balanced portfolio of activities for the RAs. 
8.3 Membership 
In 1970, the 43 RAs had about 20,000 members of all 
categories30 • In most industries there was a number of small 
manufacturers who were not members of any RA. There were also 
some industrial sectors which did not have a relevant RA at all. 
According to the survey31, despi te the variety of cri ticisms 
which RAs faced, almost all of them managed to retain the 
membership of the major firms of their industries. These 
companies regarded a withdrawal from membership of their RA to 
be a significant step and were reluctant to take this simply on 
the grounds that they were not in anyone year receiving adequate 
value for money from their membership. Considerations of the 
overall good of industry do appear to enter into such decisions. 
This intangible factor may have contributed to the stability of 
RA membership. 
Also of importance to many RAs was the growth in overseas 
membership. Only in 1962 were RAs first permitted to accept 
membership by non-Commonwealth manufacturers. In 1970, nearly 8\ 
of all membership were by foreign organisations, and only 4 RAs 
had no overseas members at all. In some industries which faced 
intense competition from overseas rivals, the admission of 
overseas members had sometimes seemed inappropriate; but on the 
whole there was almost a total acceptance of a policy of at least 
limited recruitment of membership abroad. 
A survey conducted by TCC in 1985 on a group of RAs 
(inclusive of non-grant-aided RAs) showed that there was a 
17~ 
decline in the numbers of companies in full membership from 7798 
in 1975 to 6703 in 1985 - a reduction of 14\. 
The overall changes embody a number of factors: mergers 
between companies, the winding up of companies, membership being 
identified with a group rather than with constituent compan.ies, 
the admission of overseas members to full membership. 
Since the early 1970's, a number of factors served to alter 
the pattern of membership. In particular, changes in government 
policy towards the support of RAs, membership dissatisfaction 
with unfocused programmes, rapid technological change and general 
economic factors forced the rapid evolution of many RAs into 
bodies which are now more akin to contract research 
organisations. Membership subscriptions now often make a less 
important contribution to turnover, and co-operative programmes 
have either disappeared entirely, or have been largely supplanted 
by collaborative projects specifically tailored for groups of 
members. In some cases, RAs will carry out work for non-members 
under contract. 
Several problems inhibit an analysis of RA membership 
numbers. For these reasons figures of memberships of individual 
RAs must be treated with reserve. They are:-
(1) All RAS had a number of categories of membership, and these 
were not always common to each other2. 
2The most usual classifications were those of "ordinary" and 
"associate" members,the difference between these lying in rights 
of representation and degree of access to association 
services. But some RAs did not distinguish these two , whi I e others 
may have additional categories such as "subscribers" or 
"contributors" .Also found were "individual" 
,"honorary","private",and "university" membership. 
17~ 
(2) Some RAs list separately the divisions or subsidiaries of a 
large company, while others group these together under one entry. 
(3) Some associations have a form of group membership for trade 
or technical associations which may cover many separate firms who 
are thereby given access to association services. T.otal 
memberships of individual RAs varied widely and did not 
necessarily reflect the RA's size. Some of the smaller RAs have 
relatively large numbers of members. 
17" 
Beferences 
1. A Hammond, S Attenborough: Industrial Research Associations 
in the UK. Paris: OECD Publications, 1967. 
2. Centre for the study of Industrial Innovation (CSlI): Research 
Associations The Changing Pattern. London: CSI I 
Publications 1972, p. 23. 
3. Extracted from Annual Reports of BAs from 1970 to 1990.· 
4. cf. 1, p. 23, Table S. 
S. The Earl of Bessborough: Industrial Research and Deyelopment -
The Report of the Committee of Enguiry into the Research 
Associations 1972/73 - Reyisions to Appendix 5, pg. 4, Table 
~. Luton: White Crescent Press 1975. 
6. cf. 3. 
7. cf. 3. 
8. The Earl of Bessborough: Industrial Research and Deyelopment -
The Report of the Connittee of Enguiry into the Research As-
sociations 1972/73. Luton: White Crescent Press Ltd. 1973. 
9. cf. 8, p. 4, Table 5. 
10. A Kennedy, N Read, C Crossley: Changes in the Research 
Associations Oyer the Decade 1972 - 1982. London: Technical 
Change Centre 1985, p. 9. 
11. cf. 8, p. 4. 
12. Bossard Consultants: contract Research Organisations in the 
Ilk. Brussels: Commdssion of the European Communities 1989, 
p. 54. 
13. cf. 3. 
14. Minister of state Treasury: Treasury Minute relating to the 
transfer of the undertaking and assets of the National 
Maritime Institute to NMI Ltd. Cmnd. 8677. London: HMSO 
September 1982. 
15. cf. 3; 
cf. 2, p. 21, Tables 1 and 2; 
Central statistical Office: Economics Trends No. 443. London: 
HMSO September 1990, p. 92, Table 1. 
16. ibid. 
17. University Funding Council: university Statistics 1988-89 
yolo 3, Finance. London: University Statistical Records 
1988/89.; 
cf. 3; 
cf. 2, p. 21. 
17.5 
18. cf. 2, p. 23, Table 4. 
19. cf. 8; and cf. 3. 
20. cf. 3. 
21. cf. 8, Appendix 5, Table 5. 
22. cf. 3. 
23. cf. 12, p. 50. 
24. OECD: Industrial Researcb Associations in tbe UK. Paris: OECD 
Publications 1967, p. 49. 
25. cf. 8, p. 186, Table 6. Note that Government repayment work 
came to about 8.5\ of turnover. Tbis was added as well. 
26. cf. 3.; 
Cabinet Office: Annual Reyiew of Goyernment Funded R&D 1990. 
London: HMSO 1991, p.58, Table 1.9. 
27. cf. 8, Appendix 5, Table 6. 
28. cf. 13, p. 25. 
29. cf. 3. 
30. cf. 2, p. 24, Table 6. 
31. cf. 2. 
176 
, 
c:::HAJ:"I'" ... ·e:R 9: rn-J"E 'Rl\§. ENVIRONMENT 
Economy 
Deregulation 
statutory 
Levy 
Competitors 
RAs Enviroment 
Forces 
-- DTI 
Political, 
Government 
-- Shrinking 
R&D Budget 
Pr;vat;sation 
The Industry Collaborators 
Flgure 9.1 RAs Envlronment 
The environment audit involves the evaluation of competito-
rs, social forces, political and legal forces, collaborators, 
the Industry, deregulation, and economy for the purpose of 
identifying the key opportunities and threats to the RAs for the 
last two decades and beyond. This is shown in figure 9.1. By 
identifying and evaluating when, where, how and why relevant 
trends had impacted the RAs, the environment audit can help in 
identifying and evaluating the strategies formulated and imple-
mented by the RAs. The environment audit could also assist in 
formulating and implementing strategies for the RAs in the 
future. 
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Figure 9.21 shows the GOP change from 1969 to 1988. Looking 
at the GOP change over this period, it is clear that the UK went 
through a recession (if production declines for two or more 
consecuti ve quarters, a recession has occurred2) in the mid 
1970's, early 1980's and the beginning of 1990. The first two 
recessions were very difficult for the RAs and it would be too 
early now to analyse the impact of the current recession which 
started in 1989. 
The UK went into a recession in the first quarter of 1974 
and it recovered by the first quarter in 1976 (see fig. 9.2). The 
weak trends in activity in 1974 continued into 1975, accompanied 
by rising unemployment and rapid inflation. By Nov. 1973, the 
short-term money rate for selected retail banks went up to 13\ 
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Table 9.1 Selected retail banks: ahort term money rates. 
Source: Economic Trends (1991) 
-- Newr_ 
Date of c:Nnge !per I*\t' 
1971 lIS September 5 
15 October 4 ~·5 
2fSNo~ 4~ 
1972 9. 13 Iftd 15 June 5 
30 June II 
21 .IvIy IS-7 
25.1v1y 11'1.·7 
19 Seotember 7 
12 and 13 December 7 Yo 
1973 3 Iftd 4 Janurt 7~·8~ 
9 -'-Y 8"-151& 
25~ n 
15 February 9 V. 
3. " Iftd 5 April 9 
22 Iftd 23 May 8% 
IS Iftd lIS June 8 
2 August 10 
22 Iftd 23 AU9USt I I 
14 Iftd 15 "I~\'ernber 13 
1974 11 April 12~ 
13 May 12·12% 
23 and 24 May 12 
1975 20 -'-Y 11 ~ 
4 Iftd IS March 10"·11 
25 March 10\l.·10V. 
22 April 9V. 
5 August 10 
IS. 7 Iftd 8 October 11 
19715 12 -'-v 10V. 
3OJ.....ary 10 
ISF~ 9V. 
25 May 10V. 
13 Seotember 12 
8 October 13 ~ 
21 October 14 
1977 26 J..-rv 13 
4 Febo\oary 12 % 
18 Febo\oary 11 % 
14 March 10V. 
31 March 9V. 
26 April 9 
3 May n 
9August • 
13 Seotember 7 
17 October IS 
29No~ 1S-7~ 
5 o.c:.mbet IS~· '" 
New rete New rate 
Data of chenoa !per cent' Dlta of chlnge (PI' centl 
1978 9 January --6-)1,--- 20 NoYembe-r -9~"::-:·'-=0---
21 April 7)1, 2 3 November 9 V..9 ~ 
10 May 9 1985 I I Janulry 10V. 
12 June 10 14 Jlnuary 12 
II Noyember 11)1, 28 Janulry 14 
15 November 12" 20 Mlrch 13.50-14.00 
1979 14 Februery 13)1, 21 March 13.50 
6 March 13 29 Mlrch 13.00·13.50 
6 April 12 2 April 13.OQ.13.25 
15 June 14 12 April 12.75-13.00 
111 November 17 19 April 12.50-12.75 
1980 4 July 18 12 June 12.50 
25 November 14 15 J .. ly 12.OQ.12.SO 
1981 11 March 12 145 July 12.00 
III September 14 29 July 11.50-12.00 
1 October liS 30 July 11.50 
14 October 16)1, 1988 9 January 12.50 
9 November 15 19 March 11. SO 
3 December 14)1, 8 April 11.00-11.50 
1982 22 January 14 9 April 11.00 
25 Flbruary 13)1, 21 April 10.50 
12 Mlrch 13 27 May 10.00 
8 June 12)1, 14 October 11.00 
13 July 12 1987 10 March 10.50 
2 AugUll 11)1, 19 Mlrch 10.00 
18 August 11 29 April 9.50 
31 August 10)1, 11 May 9.00 
7 October 10 7 Augult 10.00 
14 October 9)1, 26 OctOber 9.50 
4 November 9 5 Novembe, 9.00 
28 November 10-10" 4 December 8.SO 
1983 12 January 11 1988 2 Fabruary 9.00 
15 March 10)1, 17 Mlrch 8.50 
15 April 10 11 April 8.00 
15 June 9)1, 18 May 7.50 
4 OctOber 9 3 June 8 00 
1984 7 Mlrch 8"·9 8 June 8.50 
15 March 8)1,-I5~ 22 June 9.00 
10 May 9·9" 29 June 9. SO 
27 June 9" 5 July 10.00 
9 July 10 19 July 10.50 
11 July 10·12 8 Augult 10.50·11.00 
12 July 12 9 Augult 1 1.00 
9 August 11)1, 25 Augu.t 1 1.OQ. I 2.00 
10 Aug"st 11 26 A .. g .. st 12.00 
20Augult 10)1, 25 November 13.00 
7 November 10 1989 24 M.y 14.00 
5 OctOber 1 ~.OO 
1990 8 October 14.00 
as shown in table 9.13• Industrial production in the first four 
months of 1975 was at about 3\ below the level in the second half 
of 1974, and some 5.5\ below the 1973 peak level 4• By June 1975, 
unemployment reached a total of 864,000 and the. number of persons 
on short-time jumped to 250,000. Manufacturin; investment 
179 
weakened markedly in the first quarter of 1975. The rate of 
inflation increased dramatically to a peak of 24\ in 1975 (as 
shown in table 9.25) and consequentl y it affected the annual rate 
of increase in basic wages. 
Table 9.2 Rate of Inflation Prom 1970 to 1986. 
Source:- Department of Employment (1987) 
.I._ Felt Mar Apt' Ma, .1_. .I.., A_. Sept Oct No. Dec A ••• " A'c",. 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
194 9.7 7.2 7.9 7.6 7.0 5.1 4.9 6.0 
19.4 "6 ~9 2.3 0.6 2.6 1.3 3.0 3.1 l.~ 3.6 3.3 3.S 2.8 
19SO ~.f\ 3.7 4.2 '.9 3.3 2.3 2.2 1.7 ~.n :! ~ ~.q 3.2 3.1 
t9SI 3.9 4.6 5.0 6.3 1.7 9.6 11.3 12.2 12.3 11.9 11.9 12.0 U 
t9S2 13.0 12.0 11.1 11.8 lI.1 .10.6 I.a 7.6 6.7 6.9 6.l 6.4 9.2 
1953 4.4 4.6 4.1 4.1 3.8 B 2.7 2.6 2.6 1.7 2.2 1.0 3.1 
1954 1.4 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 2.4 2.4 2.4 :u 3.0 4.0 1.9 
1955 4.1 4.4 3.4 3.5 3.6 5.2 3.8 ].I 4.6 5.3 6.4 U .u 
1956 5.1 5.J 6.4 7.3 7.3 5.0 4.3 5.2 4.4 3.Il :1.7 3.0 5.0 
1951 4.4 4.3 2.1 1.1 2.0 3.2 4.$ 4.0 3.9 '.3 4.$ 4.6 3.7 
1951 3.5 3.2 4.1 '.9 4.4 4.3 1.8 J.8 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.1 3.0 
19S9 2.1 2..5 1.1 -0.1 -0.1 -o.a 0.5 0.9 0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.6 
1960 10-' -0.4 -0-' 0.7 1.1 U 1.9 1.0 1.7 2.0 1.7 t.I 1.0 
1961 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.2 '.1 '.$ 3.9 '.$ 4.4 3.4 
1962 '.6 4.7 '.1 5.6 5.7 5-' 5.1 3.2 3.3 2.9 2.3 2.6 '.2 
1963 2.7 3-' 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.0 o.a 1.4- l.a 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.0 
1964 1.9 1.2 1.' 2.0 3.0 3.' 4.0 '.7 '.4 4.1 '.6 '.8 3.3 
1965 4.6 4.$ 4.5 5.6 $.0 ,.9 '.9 '.7 ,.a '.1 ,., 4.5 '.a 
1966 4.' ,.5 4.3 3.6 3.Il 3.!1 3.5 3.9 3.6 3.1 ,.0 3.7 3.9 
1967 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.0 2.2 2.4 2.2 1.4 1.$ 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.5 
1961 2.6 3.0 3.4 4.' '.6 ,.6 5.3 $.7 $.9 5.6 5.2 U '.7 
1969 6.2 6.2 6.3 S.S S.3 B 5.3 '.9 S.1 5.4 5.4 '.7 5.4 
1970 $.0 4.9 S.1 S.6 6.1 5.9 6.7 6.a 7.0 7.4 7.9 7.9 6.4 
1971 1.5 B U 9.4 9.1 10.3 10.1 IO.~ 9.9 . 9.4 9.2 9.0 9.4 
1972 a.2 1.1 7.6 6.3 6.1 6.1 $.8 6.6 7.0 7.9 7.6 7.7 7.6 
1973 7.7 7.9 1.2 9.2 9.S 9.3 9.4 1.9 9.3 9.9 10.3 10.6 9.2 
1974 12.0 13.2 13-' 15.2 16.0 ·16·5 17.1 16.9 17.1 17.1 la.3 19.1 16.1 
1975 199 19.9 21.2 21.7 25.0 26.1 26.3 26.9 26.6 25.9 2$.2 24.9 24.2 
1976 2' 22.9 :1.2 18.9 15..1 U.S 12.9 13.8 14.3 14.7 1$.0 IS.I ICI.~ 
1977 \6.6 16.2 16.7 17.5 17.1 17.7 17.6 16.$ 1S.6 14.1 13.0 12.1 IS.& 
1971 U 9.$ . 9.1 7.9 7.7 7.4 7.1 1.0 7.1 7.1 1.1 8.4 1.3 
1979 9.3 '.6 9.' 10.1 10.3 11.4 15.6 \S., 16.5 17.2 17.4 17.2 13.4 
1_ 11.~ 19.1 19.8 21.8 21.9 21.0 16.9 16.3 15.9 IS.' 1S.3 IS.I 18.0 
1911 13.0 12.5 12.6 12.0 11.7 H.3 10.9 11.5 11.4 11.7 12.0 12.0 11.9 
1911 12.0 11.0 10.4 9.4 ,-' 9.2 1.7 1.0 7.3 6.1 6.l 5.' 1.6 
1913 4.9 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.7 3.7 4.2 4.6 5.1 S.O 4.' S.3 4.6 
1914 5.1 5.J 5.2 5.2 5.1 S.1 '.5 S.O '.7 '-0 4.9 '.6 5.0 
1915 H S.4 6.1 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.2 5.9 5.' S.S 5.7 6.1 
1916 5.S S.1 4.2 3.0 2.1 2.S 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.$ 3.7 3.4 
The second recession during the last two decades started 
during the steep decline in GOP, which began in the second half 
of 1979 and continued into the second quarter of 1982 (see fig. 
9.2). Unemployment continued to riae, reaching U.S\ at the end 
of November 1981- The rat. of inflation reached a peak of 18\ in 
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1980. During this period'. th. short-term interest rate went as 
high as 17\ in Rov. 1979 (see table 9.1). The sluggish demand at 
home and the need to remain competitive abroad caused the profits 
of industrial and commercial companies to fall to historically 
low levels. Manufacturing production dropped markedly and in 
September 1980; it was at the lowest level since 1968. 
The rebalancing process of the UK's economy remained gradual 
and uneven in the last few years. Following a decline in the 
second half of 1989, domestic demand picked up markedly in the 
first half of 1990. growing faster than output. Unemployment 
which reached a low in March 1989 at 5.5\ (6\ according to the 
OECD's average) of the labour force, crept up since then. The 
underlying rate of growth of effective earnings reached 10\ in 
the middle of 1990. Excluding mortgage interest, the effects of 
the Conmunity Charge and higher oil prices, the twelve-month 
increase in the retail-price index still exceeded 8\ in 1990. The 
interest rate went up and the short-term interest rate reached 
a peak of 15' in Oct 1989. 
The recovery of the UK's economy in the 1 ast two decades was 
quite strong. especially in the last decade. After the recession 
from 1979 to 1981, there was a strong growth from 1982 to 1988, 
when the rate of growth (GDP at market prices) reached 4.6\ in 
1988. But the growth declined si~ce then. It has been predicted 
that the growth rate for 1991 may be as low as 0.7\ or even less 
and that economic activity was projected virtually to stagnate 
up to mid-1991, possibly declining a little in one or two 
quarters, and to recover only slowly thereafter. 
All the Os were affected by the recession in the mid 1970' s 
and early 1980's, when the industrial R&D expediture dropped to 
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as low as £3.73 billion and £4.6 billion respectively. The 
following statement reflected the difficult state in which the 
RAs had to operate during these periods7: 
"During the past year BClRA has had to operate against 
a background of depression in much of manufacturing 
engineering industry, which has had a profound effect 
on most sectors of the foundry industry. Demand for 
iron castings was at the lowest level since the end of 
the second world war, giving rise to continuing 
closure of foundries ( .•• ). All of this indicates a 
changing climate of operations such that British 
manufacturing industry may never be the same again. 
( ... ) the circumstances of the foundry industry have 
forced us to examine our activities in the light of 
this climate of change." 
9,2 Political, Legal ADd Goyernment Pore •• 
Table 9.3 shows the various government policies and DTl 
reviews that affected the RAs from 1972 to 1988. They are shown 
in chronological order. Most of the factors discussed below have 
already been dealt with in detail in Chapters 4 to 6. 
'.2.1 The Rothschild Principle 
Over the last two decades, the Rothschild Principle has 
been one of the main changes in government policy which affected 
the RAs most and will continue to do so. With the implementation 
of this principle, the RBs were set up. 
~he RAs had to adapt to become more commercially minded and 
less dependable on government funding. It also changed their 
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Table 9.3 Government policy and DTI reviews that affected RAs 
from 1972 to 1988. 
Sources: DTI; Annual Reports of RAs. 
Policy that affected RAs 
Rothschild Principle 
- Setting up of RBs. 
Progressive ending of levy 
Moratorium on Defence contracts 
Privatisation 
DTI Review on RAs 
- Support on individual project 
basis. 
- Maximum support of 50' 
- A ceiling of of one third and 
shortly after to one quarter 
of turnover. 
DTI White Paper on Enterprise 
- Difficult transition period 
- Emphasis on collaborative 
research and technology transfer 
- Not funding "near market" 
research 
Continuous contraction 
of DTI support; greater 
stringency. 
Year 
1972 
from 1970s 
onwards 
1980 
from 1979 
onwards 
1983 
1988 
Note: A review on RAs carried out by DTI in 1988 
recommended that the maximum overall support for RAs to be 
increased from one-quarter to one-third of individual 
turnover. It was turned down by the Secretary of State 
then. 
profile of research activities towards one that was more market-
oriented. This principle had fundamentally changed the mission 
of RAs in the last two decades. 
A survey was carried out on RAs in 19858 to find out their 
views on the Rothschild Principle. The outcome of the 
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implementation of this principle was reflected by the following 
comment9: -
contract work (from RB) forms an increasingly important 
element in the programmes, leading to greater emphasis on 
commercial analyses, to a search for new customers, 
particularly overseas, to new lines of work, and to internal 
changes in organisation and management. Basic research and 
exploratory research, at all 1 evels, have suffered, and 
financial pressures have increased. Cash flow is a problem 
for RAs with low reserves when contract payments are settled 
on receipt of the final report. 
These views were also expressed by the RAs' Directors when they 
were interviewed (see appendix 1.6). One setback of the RBs was 
the di versi ty and width of research programmes under thei r 
responsibi I i ty and furthermore, they did not set any priori ty for 
the research programmes under their control. Nevertheless, the 
support from RBs, though representing a progressively reducing 
proportion, was vital to maintain the RAs' technical skills at 
the highest levelslO as well as to maintain their core research. 
This was reflected in the statement made by BHRA's Chairman11 : 
"As in our general research programme, Government support through 
this and other Requirements Boards has been basic to our ability 
to maintain ourselves in the forefront of our technology." 
Prior to the implementation of the Rothschild Principle the 
government used to match every pound which the RAs raised. RAs 
had to be organised in such a way that a council was needed to 
interface with the government as well as to account to the 
government,Oradually, the role of the council changed when the 
mechanism of funding changed. The survival of the RAs rested on 
184 
the shoulders of the research 'directors when RAs were forced to 
the market place to market their expertise. RAs had to 
restructure in order to be able ,to respond to the market needs. 
A "council" type of structure with numerous committees was not 
suitable to respond to the market place. In the case of PIRA, a 
board of management was set up in 1986 because the success or 
failure of the RA depended not on the council but on the 
capability and calibre of the staff. The role of the council has 
been limited to Policy, Politics and Public Relations. 
9.2.2 Goyernment Funding Policies Towards BAs 
A review was carried out by DTI in 1983 on the future role 
of the RAs and this brought about another difficult period for 
RAs with regard to DTI funding. The review was strongly 
supportive, setting the scene and providing new ground rules for 
a constructive relationship between the RAs and the Department, 
in support of industry. But one of the major implications of the 
review in 1983 was the reduction of the DTI's support. The RAs 
felt the reduction quite strongly as shown by the statement made 
by Chairman of PIRAI2 :-
"Necessarily the cutback will lead to less cooperative 
research for members, and we may not be able to make 
up the loss in income very quickly. We shall become 
less dependent on Government support, obviously, and 
must respond by being more competitive and active in 
our market place." 
After the review, groups of individual research projects were 
submitted to the RBs. seeking funding at a level appropriate for 
each project, but generally at not more than 50\ of total cost. 
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The industrial income came mainly from Consortia and, to a 
limited extent, from the RAs' own funds. Overall, the DTI placed 
a one-third of turnover cei I ing on the total funds it was 
prepared to make available to an individual RA (it was later 
reduced to one quarter). In another review that was carried out 
by RTP in 1988, it was recommended that the maximum overall 
funding be raised from one quarter to one third of each RA's 
turnover, provided that any increase over one quarter was 
associated with support for projects mainly of benefit to 
independent firms with fewer than 500 employees13 • The Secretary 
of state decided against it. 
In 1985, the DTI adopted the practice of Market Related 
Pricing. Already in use for BHRA's MoD contracts, this enabled 
RAs to price government work on the basis of a "best customer" 
commercial rate and greatly simplified and sped up the 
Government auditing procedures. It brought about a beneficial 
effect on the RAs' cash flow. 
Another difficult period for RAs with regard to the DTI's 
support was from Autumn 1987 to December 1988 when the 
Enterprise Initiative was launched. This was reflected by the 
following statement14 : 
"The Board and Council have to report that although 
much effort has been put into complying with the new 
DTI schemes, it is unrealistic to assume that we will 
recover this income quickly" 
There were a lot of changes going on wi thin DTI as it was 
setting out new guidelines for the approval of funding and in 
the meantime only the Secretary of state was allowed to approve 
the funding for the projects until the guidelines were set. Some 
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RAs (eg. BHRA) went through a difficult period then because most 
of their programmes with the DTI ended during that period and it 
was awaiting the approval from the DTI for the funding of its 
new programme. Furthermore, there was no clear signal from the 
DTI as to the kind of R&D programmes that it would fund. 
Consequently, there was a big reduction in the DTI's support. 
For example, in the case of BHRA, it received about £l.Sm at the 
end of 1987 but in 1988 it received only £O.Sm and £0.S6m in 
1989. During that period, BHRA faced a cash flow crisis and in 
effect, the uncertainty within the DTI had wiped out about 20-
25' of its income. It resorted to gaining more research 
contracts from industry as well as to cut costs. By the end of 
the 1987/88 financial year, it ran a loss of over £0.2m. 
9.2.3 white Paper: DTI - the department for Enterprise 
The implementation of this White Paper 'added to the 
difficulties encountered by the RAs (especially smaller RAs with 
a large membership of SMEs and serving mature industry) in the 
following waysI5:-
(1) The White Paper emphasised collaborative and played down 
cooperative research. The main criteria16 (see appendix 9.1) that 
distinguished cooperative from collaborative research were:-
(a) the number of companies involved (e.g. over SO for 
cooperative research); 
(b) the median size of company (e.g. not exceeding 250 
employees) for cooperative research; 
(c) that funding for cooperative research was for a programme of 
research rather than a single project (refer to table 9.4). 
Consequently, this policy affected RAs where most of their 
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Table 9.4 The difference between programme based cooperative 
research involving mainly SMEs and project based 
collaborative or contract research involving mainly large, or 
at least scientifically literate companies. 
Usual customer 
type 
Number of firms 
supporting 
Expertise exists 
in company to 
interface with 
research staff 
Development stage 
required for 
commercial 
acceptance 
Implementation 
resources and 
skill available 
in company 
Commercial 
assessment of 
economics of a 
single R&D 
project 
Programme Based 
Cooperative Res. 
(Normally 
membership or 
industry supported) 
90\ SMEs 
Can reach several 
hundred. 
Practical factory 
management 
Available for 
fairly trouble 
free implementation 
onto factory floor 
without major 
production hold-ups 
Very limited, 
usually part time 
and additional 
responsibility on 
managers' shoulders 
Required skills 
and information 
not normally 
available 
Project Based 
Contract Res. 
(Can be single 
company or 
collaborating club) 
Large companies 
1 - 10 
Scientific or 
strong technicall 
engineering 
Can be picked up 
at working 
prototype stage 
or even earlier. 
Usually have qualified 
staff that can be 
seconded full time 
to project 
implementation 
in many SMEs. A 
small group of 
selected individuals 
from different 
companies give 
balanced judgement 
on each project 
A necessary skill 
requirement for 
the funding of 
any contracted 
research 
and or complete 
programme 
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members were SHEs (e. g. SATRA). These RAs organised research 
programmes which were cooperative in nature rather than 
collaborative. 
(2) The principle of "innovation" was present in DTI funding 
decisions and some RAs were concerned with the concept of 
innovation i.e. a concept very dependent on the type of industry 
concerned. What is highly innovative for a medium size 
manufacturer could be mundane for British Aerospace. 1 f a 
reasonable judgement of innovative contact was not present in 
DTI, this policy could cut government support for R&D in the 
lower technology SHE type industry17 (see appendix 9.1). 
(3) The concept of "distance from the market" could be 
interpreted so narrowly that co-operative research was defined 
as "non-pre-competitive" (i.e. near-market) research and would 
therefore not qualify for government support. 
The White Paper emphasised the transfer of technologies and 
collaborative research. This policy could create more 
opportunities for the RAs because they were effective agents in 
transferring technology18 and collaborative research was nothing 
new to them. 
Another problem faced by RAs due to the increase in 
stringency for government-financed R&D was the new audit system 
which evaluated government-funded research prograrmnes every three 
months. This was thought to be ridiculous because research was 
a long-term business and it took some time before it could be 
evaluated. Furthermore, the administrative costs in preparing 
the documents for auditing were costly and are shouldered by the 
RAs (see App.1.6, LEA). 
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The RAs continued to get funding from the DTI for their 
research projects (but with growing stringency) and there may 
come a time when the DTI stops their funding because of not 
wanting to fund research where industry can undertake it 
themselves. 
9,3 Instability g£ the DTI 
The DTI did not have a clear role since it was formed in 
1970. In the last 8 years alone, there were seven Secretaries of 
State. Without a clear role, the DTI has been at the mercy of the 
ministerial whim. The RAs in turn have had problems in trying to 
adapt to the changing policy of the DTI towards R&D. Por example, 
when the DTI's Enterprise initiative was launched in 1988, the 
RAs had to adapt to this new environment as reflected by the 
statement made by the Chief Executive of AMTR119: 
"Such a major change in policy and the associated 
considerable personnel changes in those Divisions of 
. 
the Department with whom we have traditionally dealt, 
have inevitably had an adverse effect on negotiations 
and on the placing of contracts." 
This was particularly difficult in the last 4 years, when 
a considerable number of changes took place. Among them were 
the: 
(1) Usage of the ROAME statement to evaluate projects. 
(2) Funds being controlled by the Secretary of state - causing 
a huge back-log. 
(3) Revamping of the marketing divisions. 
(4) Abolishing of the RB. 
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(5) Introduction of the White Paper in the Department for 
Enterprise • 
(6) Publication of the Next Steps, which brought about the 
agency status for GIREs. NEL was also given an agency status 
with the goal of achieving commercial viability as soon as 
possible. This would bring about increasing competition for some 
RAs. 
With all these changes going on, it was difficult for RAs 
to plan on a long-term basis. Since, however, R&D is a long-term 
business for the RAs, it is important for them to have stability 
within the DTI. 
9.4 The Shrinking R&D Budget 
Since the Conservative Party came into power in 1979, 
there was a continuous cut in government spending on R&D in real 
terms. Because of historical reasons, the UK's R&D resources 
were skewed towards defence. Of late, there has been a move away 
from defence spending towards civil research20 • RAs which 
historically used to obtain a large proportion of their income 
from defence research have had to diversify into civil research. 
As defence contracts were usually quite substantial, some RAs 
fell into the danger of over-depending on defence contracts 
(e. g. FULMER). An exampl e of the outcome of a reduction of 
defence spending on an RA is the case of BHRA during the 
recession in the early 1980's21: 
"This year saw increasing financial stringencies in 
industry, a continuing death of major civil 
engineering projects and the moratorium on defence 
spending (my highlighting); all factors which made 
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business more difficult for the Association." 
The reduction in defence spending could affect RAs which are 
traditionally dependent on defence research. On the other hand, 
the shift towards civil research could help provide more 
resources for the RAs. 
Industry, too, received less government support in the last 
two decades. In 1967, the Government paid for 29\ of the 
industry's R&D. By 1987, this fell to 20\. Inevi tabl y, this 
reduction affected the DTI's innovation budget and it resulted 
in the reduction Qf support for the RAs' programme under the 
General Industrial Collaboration Budget. The following statement 
by ERA's Chairman reflected the feelings of the RAs towards the 
reduction in government spending on R&D22 :-
"However, it became apparent early in 1985 that ERA's 
plans were under threat from unexpected reduction (my 
highlighting) in Government expenditure on research 
and development and that the company was faced with a 
challenging problem." 
The RAs did not see why the UK Government was reducing the 
already small contribution towards industrial R&D as shown by 
the following statement23 :-
"( •.. ) the attitude of the UK Government to research 
and development remains an enigma. The public 
adndssions of ministers that the level of civil 
research and development in the UK falls seriously 
short of our main industrial competitors, is in 
contradiction with the current policy of further 
reducing the Government's small contribution to 
industrial R&D, and is therefore hard to comprehend." 
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The RAs have over the last two decades learnt to depend less and 
less on the government for financial support mainly by 
increasing the volume of business of their industrial contracts. 
9.5 Implications o£ Priyatisation and 
Sstahlishing p£ Agencies 
The privatisation of the water and electricity industries 
would bring about more opportunities as well as threats for the 
RAs (e.g. in the case of WRc). The newly privatised industries 
could contract out more of their research instead of increasing 
their own research capacity, since this helps them to cut down 
research costs and to tap readily available research facilities 
and expertise. On the other hand, the privati sed industries 
could seek to carry out more strategic research in their own 
laboratories instead of out-sourcing it because of the fear that 
the information may fall into competitors' hands. 
The privatisation of GIREs (in the case of NEL) and the 
creation of an agency status (WSL, NPL, LGC) would also create 
more competition in the research market within the UK. When the 
decision to privatise NEL was made, many RAs' directors 
expressed their fear of unfair competition from NEL. Another 
example is to look at the effect of the privatisation of the 
Hydraulic Research Station. When the Government planned to 
privatise HRS in 1980, there was a fear of increasing 
competition as expressed by the Chairman of BHRA's Council 24 : 
"( ••• ) as required by Members, the Counci 1 has been 
keeping a close watch on developments. This will 
continue to avoid any adverse effects on the interests 
of the Association." 
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In April 1986, OKAEA was placed under a trading funds basis 
and in May 1989, it changed its status to an agency under the 
name of AEA Technology. OKAEA will seek to fight off its money 
problem by winning more non-nuclear R&D contracts, possibly at 
the expense of the RAs. 
9.6 Termination of statutory Levy 
In 1972, five RAs received income through a statutory 
levy25. The nature of the levy subscription was attractive to 
many RAs because of its greater certainty and it reduced the 
need to canvass and administer a large number of member 
subscriptions. 
There were few industries whose members would willingly 
agree to the imposition of a levy and, to a lesser extent, the 
block funding system did not accord with the customer-contractor 
principle. By 1990, none of the five RAs received any income 
from statutory levy anymore. The government revoked the last 
Research Levy (the Iron Castings Scientific Research Levy) in 
June 199026 • After the levies were revoked, all subscriptions 
from members were voluntary. 
There was of course strong resistance on the part of the 
RAs to the stopping of the levies, especially from those with a 
high dependence on income from levy. For example, 38\ of PIRA's 
income in 1981 (when its levy was revoked) came through the 
levy. FlRA had to make dramatic changes to meet a completely new 
category of membership and markets for its programrne27 . And in 
the case of BATRA, the termination of levies was one of the main 
reasons of its downfall. 
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9,7 The Industry 
9.7.1 Termination of Ilock Grant from Trade 
Associations 
In a survey carried out by The Council of Directors of RAs 
(CDRA) in 1972, it was shown that up to 10 RAs received money 
from trade associations and in five of these it was the largest 
source of income28 • As inthe case of the statutory levy, few 
industries were willing to agree to the continuation of block 
grants and again, it did not accord with the customer-contractor 
principle. Towards the end of the 1970's, all block grants from 
trade associations were stopped and replaced by voluntary 
membership subscriptions. 
9.7.2 Industry Investment in R&D 
The industry in the UK did not see the period the last two 
decades as one where consumer demand or international 
competition required an increased investment in R&D. Industry in 
competitor countries like Germany, USA, France and Japan more 
than doubled their R&D spending from 1969-1983 whereas the 
increase in the UK was only 20\, In the last few years, however, 
there have been encouraging signs that the UK's industry is 
slowly addressing this problem, 
Growth in R&D expenditure differs from one industry to 
another. Over the last decade, there has been substantial growth 
in electronics, some growth in the chemical sector declines in 
other areas especially mechanical engineering, 
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9.7.3 out-sourcing of Research 
There was an increasing trend in out-sourcing of research 
by industry. For example, in 1985, industry contracted out over 
£332 million on research and development 29 • Some R&D policies of 
companies have moved towards favouring the view that R&D was 
better commissioned as and when needed, and from the best 
available contractor, and this would consequently increase the 
funds for external institutions like RAs and HEls. 
The increasing need for industry to contract out research 
could be due to:-
(1) The need to ensure a long-term competitive edge through 
innovation and the incorportion of new technologies. 
(2) The sophistication of research and inadequate access to new 
technologies, particularly for SMEs. For example, the automotive 
industry became more complex and the pace of automotive 
development increased dramatically. Even the largest automakers 
found themselves driven by free market forces to develop more 
new or revised models than their own resources (people and 
facilities) would allow~. 
(3) Not having their own in-house R&D resources. A good example 
was the shoe industry where the majority of the manufacturers 
did not have their own in-house R&D. 
(4) A realization of the high real cost and sometimes uncertain 
economics of internal R&D work with its fixed costs. 
The terms of contract research were stiffened by industry 
and sometimes contracted out on a fixed-cost basis and at times 
risky for the RAs (see Case study on SIRA). 
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A recent postal questionnairea survey of 100 innovative UK 
SMFs showed that:-
(1) 40 companies contracted out a proportion of their R&D to 
other fi~; 
(2) 27 companies engaged in collaborative inter-firm R&D 
ventures; 
(3) 16 companies manufactured other firms' products under 
licence .. 
In addition, in some industrial sectors, most notably 
semiconductors, joint R&D ventures and other forms of corporate 
alliance grew in both number and strategic importance. Among the 
most significant factors underlying this increased interest in 
inter-firm collaboration were: 
(1) the rising costs and high risks of investment in some high 
technology areas; 
(2) the convergence of technologies; 
(3) the need for capabilities that span both scientific 
disciplines and business experience. 
The universities built up their industrial relationships 
and experience and as a result, the competition for research 
contracts is becoming steadily tougher. In addition, the 
research charges made by the universities were significantly 
lower than those which an RA could economically accept. 
aM Beesley & R Rothwell; Small Firm Linkages in the UK in 
R Rothwell & J Bessant (Eds), Innovation: Adaption and Growth: 
Elsevier 1987. 
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9.7." Mature Inciuatrie •.. 
Industry-based RAs, especially those serving mature 
industries, were more badly affected than those serving 
industries like electronics or technology-based RAs. Among those 
which were affected by the declined in R&D expenditure by 
industry were BCIRA and BRF (serving the foundry industry), BMT 
(shipping industry), and SI, WIRA, and HATRA (serving the 
clothing industry). 
In the case of BHT, the reduction in the market for 
shipbuilding research and development was compounded by 
reduction in offshore model testing work31 : 
"( ••• ) the financial position of that industry 
(shipping) and the intense competition for the work 
that was available resulted in material losses." 
The decline of BRF was partly triggered by the inadequate 
support of its member. in the early 1980's as reflected in the 
following statement32 : 
"At the end of the day, however, the abi 1 i ty of 
industry to spend money on research, even though it 
may be highly relevant, is limited and this picture is 
Dot expected to change (my highlighting) rapidly as 
far as the OK is concerned." 
At the peak performance of the knitting industry (1974), it 
employed over 135,000 workers and now it employs less than 
70,000. HATRA never recovered from that difficult period in the 
mid 1970's when the knitting industry went into decline. 
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1.7.5 Short-Siqhte4nes. of Industry 
The sbort-te~ financial outlook believed to be 
characteristic of the City could have prevented British industry 
from investing enough in R&D to keep its products competitive in 
the marketpl ace. This probl em was al so compounded by other 
problems as shown in a study conducted by NEDC33 . In this study, 
managers in government laboratories, commercial research and 
technology organisations and technology brokers note:-
(1) a reluctance among UK companies to take up external 
technology; 
(2) an inability to view technology transfer and accumulation as 
a long-term process. 
Bri tish industry tended also to be slow in expl oi ting 
research, probably due to an unwillingness to commit resources 
to do so. 
Takeover. and mergers decreased the R&D investment of 
industry. In the case of the automotive industry, takeovers or 
mergers decreased the amount of research out-sourced and might 
even compete with an RA like MIRA for contract research. Another 
example of an RA which was affected by mergers is the SRAMA. 
This is reflected in a statement made by its President34 : 
"Bowever, we have lost only 10\ of our Members, not 
all of these losses being due to the change in the 
membership structure, as some companies amalgamated 
and others no longer produce springs". 
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'.7.6 race of Technology 
In the last few decades, the pace of advance in 
technologies and in the science which underlies them has been 
extraordinary. This has also led to the wide applicability of 
new technologies, not only in manufacturing, but also in 
communication, banking and insurance. 
In some advanced technologies, the resources required to 
stay in the front rank are beyond the individual capacity of 
even the largest firms International collaboration, especially 
within Europe, can therefore be essential if OK firms are to be 
competitive in world markets. This creates opportunities for RAs 
especially so with their vast experience in carrying out 
collaborative research. 
The whole of the information scene has also changed drasti-
cally since the early 1970's. New technology, new information 
systems, cheap packages, all these have made it possible for 
those who at one time depended on the Us for up-to-date 
specialist technical information within their area of interest, 
to attempt their extraction for themselves. Expert 
interpretation and evaluation of information remain valuable 
assets of the RAs and are widely called upon. 
9.7.7 Global Competition 
Industry has to compete globally and in order to do so, it 
has to invest in R&D globally, too. In the last 20 years, there 
has been a tremendous growth in overseas-funded R&D programmes 
in the UK. In 1987 alone, it accounted for up to 12\ of the 
total R&D spending of industry. 
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Global competition can also increase the necessity for 
industries from overseas to become members of RAs in order to 
keep them informed about the latest technology as well as to tap 
the research potential of the RAs. Overseas membership is 
increasingly important to RAs as shown in a statement made by 
the Director General of PERA35 : 
"Overseas membership is important to PERA. It allows 
us to keep overseas industry and competitive issues in 
perspective and provides good opportunities for our 
British members to collaborate with overseas 
companies. particularly within the various European 
funded collaborative programmes." 
9.7.8 Unfair Competition From The EC 
The annual cash handout to manufacturing industry between 
1981 and 1986, the most recent years for which figures can be 
compiled, was Ecu 13 billion in Italy. Ecu 7 billion in West 
Germany, Ecu 7 billion in France and Ecu 5 billion in the UK 
(one Ecu =73p). Per manufacturing employee, this works out to an 
Ecu 6200 in Italy, Ecu 1650 in France, Ecu 980 in west Germany 
and Ecu 970 in UK36. 
Among the types of subsidy that need cutting are general 
discretionary aid not tied to particular industries or regions, 
and government-funded R&D which would have been funded anyway 
for commercial reasons. Soft loans, capital restructurings of 
nationalised industries and other techniQues which may be used 
to disguise aid need to be looked into, especially where more 
obvious handouts are banned. 
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A survey conducted by The European Commission on contract 
research associations37 showed that direct funding by the state 
is virtually sero in the UK, whereas in other major European 
countries such organisations receive up to 51\ of their income 
as aid. 
The survey also showed that the UK, France and Germany have 
by far the strongest research sectors and that the UK is unique 
in providing no public funds. 
9.7.9 Hyman Resources 
The greatest single challenge facing the manufacturing 
industry in the 1990's will be the chronic shortage of science 
and engineering skills38 • Training and re-training will be a 
priority. RAs are well placed to run a range of courses tailored 
to the needs of individual companies and to work closely with 
company managers to implement successful long-term human 
resource strategies. 
Another area of growth for retraining is the Enterprise 
Initiative Scheme (initiated by DTI), which is targeted at SMEs. 
The scheme seeks to help the SMFs in retraining through the help 
of consul tants. Once again, the vast experience of RAs in 
dealing with SMFs would put them in a good position to exploit 
this opportunity for retraining. 
9.8 Competitors 
"Future availability of contract research funding may 
be eroded partly by changes in Government policy 
( ••• ), where industry is expected to pay its own way, 
and partly by increased competition from other 
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research organisations including 
laboratories, other 
universities and 
laboratories39 ." 
some 
research 
members' 
government 
organisations, 
own research 
The Government is trying to encourage the academic world to 
move closer to industry by decreasing its support to HEls. But 
in doing so, the BEls end up competing against the RAs for 
research contracts. The HEls are able to bid at a lower price 
(their over-heads being covered by government funds) in 
comparison to RAs in bidding for research contracts. Some RAs, 
for example LEA, avoid having to bid against the HEls for 
contracts. The advent of University Science Parks introduces 
another competitive element in the marketplace40 • 
For the year 1986/87 universities were awarded '70 million 
by UK firms, the main part of which (in excess of 95\) was in 
the form of research contracts. This figure represents 22\ of 
contracts awarded by firms and an increase of 16\ compared with 
the year 1985/86, due to the effort of, inter alia, the Research 
Councils which encouraged uni versi ties to become more sel f-
financing and gradually to reduce their dependence on grants. 
These contracts now represent sizeable resources amounting to, 
on average, 15\ of university revenues. 
Another competitor for RAs are the Interdisciplinary 
Research Centres (IRCs). Since 1988, 13 IRCs have been set up in 
the UK·l . Three more will most probably be approved by 1991. To 
support the first nine centres £60 million of extra government 
money has been provided for the first six years of their 
existence. Funds for another four years are available if they do 
well. 
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Al though the kind of research carried out at IRCs is 
further away from the market in comparison to the majority of 
the RAs' activities and therefore not in direct competition, the 
BAs Ddght need to compete with IRCs for government support in 
the future. But they can also be collaborators in certain areas 
of strategic research. Nevertheless, the RAs ought to be aware 
of the activities of the IRCs. 
The most important publi~ research establishment accepting 
research contracts is Harwell Research Establishment (now AEA 
Technology), which was· a part of the United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority (UKAEA) and handles some £30 million worth of 
outside contracts. The four GIREs under the DTI which were given 
agency status also compete with the RAs for research contracts, 
especially goverment contracts where the bids are open to all. 
Out of the four GIREs, three are allowed to carry out repayment 
work of up to 10\ of their individual turnover. In the case of 
NEL, however, it is encouraged to obtain as much income from 
industry as possible. 
The other competitors of RAs incl ude the RAs' members 
themselves, RTOs like PA Technology and CROs in the EC. 
9,9 cgllaborators 
Over the last 10 years, the HEls have been encouraged to 
seek industrial support for their research. Thus, HEIs have 
naturally been attracted to RAs which have been close to 
industry for decades, since RAs can help them to look for 
industrial sponsorship. The RAs, too, have good reasons to 
foster a good working rapport with the HEIs. For e.g. RAPRA 
considers two of its collaborative programmes with two 
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universities as important because these programmes attract 
funding both from the Government and industry. The regional 
factor is also important i. e. it is considered important to 
attract regional funding as well as to be close to industry. 
Among the other advantages for the RAs in collaborating with 
BEIs are:-
(1) Access to a level of a more fundamental research. 
(2) Lower costs for certain work. 
(3) Ongoing training for research staff. 
For their part, the universities acquire:-
(1) Knowhow in applied research. 
(2) Work for their research workers and postgraduate students. 
(3) Training for students in industrial applications. 
This mainly involves the biggest RAs which subcontract part of 
their work to universities or publicly funded centres. 
Another form of collaboration that is of growing 
importance is the collaboration among CROs in the EC. For the 
past few years, the EC has been trying to encourage 
collaboration among CROs in the EC (including RAs) in order to 
promote technology transfer and the dissemination of innovation 
within the EC with the ultimate objective of making European 
industries technologically competitive. This would also enable 
RAs and especially the less advanced ones to acquire and update 
their technological base. 
A survey carried out by Bossad42 showed that 98\ of CROs in the 
EC are interested in~ooperation. It showed that:-
(1) 92\ would like to cooperate with another eRO. 
(2) 81\ would like to cooperate with another university. 
(3) 54\ would like to cooperate with another engineering firm. 
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(4) 46\ would like to cooperate with another consultancy firm. 
But the survey also showed that only:-
(1) 65\ of CROs stated that they were cooperating on R&D work. 
(2) 36\ stated that they were cooperating on the technical 
level. 
(3) 32\ stated that they were cooperating on the marketing 
level. 
One possible interpretation of the result is that there is a 
willingness to cooperate but that there are nevertheless dif-
ficulties in effective collaboration between CROs in the EC. 
Among the problems faced are:-
(1) The high cost that would be incurred in trying to land a 
EC collaborative research contract. 
(2) The long lead time from the announcement of a contract to 
the actual award. 
(3) The problem of getting an appropriate European partner. In 
most cases the contract insists that partners must be found in 
less developed European countries. 
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c::tJAeTeiR 1.Q: - THE IN'X-tiBNBT, AUPIT OF HAs 
10.1 Organisational structure 
. 
10.1.1 The COuncil 
In the original constitutions of the RAs, the governing 
bodies were defined as councils composed of members of the RA 
with power to co-opt, Though differing somewhat in their 
functions from one RA to another, the Counci I was normal I y 
concerned with the overall policy decisions. The Council size 
varied considerably, from 11 (Shipowners Refrigerated Cargo RA) 
to 50 (Leatherhead RA) - both 1982 figures. Over the period 1972-
82, more RA Councils decreased in size than increased, and the 
total membership of the Councils fell by 12' (110 people). 
One of the most important tasks of the Councils was to carry 
out corporate planning for their respective RAs. Planning is 
often considered to be the foundation of management. Planning 
increases the likelihood that desired results will be achieved, 
Organisations that use formal planning approaches are generally 
more profitable than those that do notl. Among the reasons are: 
(1) that planning allows an organisation to identify and take 
advantage of envi ronmental opportuni ties; it allows an 
organization to minimise the impact of environment threats. 
(2) that an organization can achieve synergy through planning. 
(3) that planning allows an organisation to adapt to changing 
environments, and thus to shape its own destiny, 
--
After interviewing RAs on their approach to planning and 
after analysing their annual reports and accounts for this piece 
of research, it became clear that the RAs had no clearly stated 
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goals and objectives, no overall strategy for competing and no 
written mission statements. A survey carried out on RAs in 19852 
also showed that not all RAs subscribed to the idea of planning. 
One of the main reasons identified for the lack of planning 
especially at top management level was the absence of continuity 
of the Council as shown by the following statement3: "( ... ) in 
recent years, some Council members thought its structure to be 
unwieldly and outdated, suffering from a lack of continuity." 
A second reason was that the Council, which,was normally 
drawn in the main from members, was too large (e.g. 50 members 
in the case of LEA in 1982). Also. the Council structure 
consisted of too many committees e.g. BCIRA's Council had 5 
committees and 11 sub-committees in 19824. Furthermore, neither 
the Association's Director nor any of the other full-time 
executives were a member of it! 
Thirdly, the Council structure seemed unsuitable because of 
the shift of accountability of the RAs from the Government to the 
market (see appendix 1.6, PlRA). The Government used to match 
every pound the RAs raised and consequently. RAs had had to be 
organised in such a way that the Councils both interfaced with 
and accounted to the Government. Gradual 1 y. the rol e of the 
Council changed when the mechanism of funding changed. RAs were 
forced to the market place to exploit their expertise. This was 
triggered by the Rothschild Principle. 
Later on a ceiling support figure of 25\ of turnover was 
imposed on the RAs. Consequently, they had to restructure in 
order to be able to respond to the market. 
Another difficulty encountered with the Councils was 
membership restrictions which prevented the RAs from expanding 
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its membership base as well as from recruiting overseas members. 
Thus, it was only in 1990 that SATRA's membership was opened to 
foreign firms from countries with low labour costs (see appendix 
1.6, SATRA). 
BNF is an example of an RA which'suffered partly from the 
inability of its Council to plan effectively (see Case study on 
BNF). Its income dropped from £3.8 million (1988 prices) in 1970 
to £2.6 million in 1988 and its staff number dropped from 180 to 
90 during the same period. 
In the last two decades, most RAs have transferred the 
working power to a smaller Board, operating on lines of a Company 
Board of Directors. 
10.1.2 Diyisional structure 
The most common organisational structure among the RAs is 
the divisional structure e.g. BHRA. A divisional structure has 
some clear advantages. Among them are: 
(1) A clear accountabity. 
(2) The creation of career development opportunities for 
managers. 
(3) Allows local control of local situations. 
(4) Leads to competitive climate within the RA. 
(5) Allows new businesses to be added easily. 
On the other hand, the divisional design is not without some 
limitations. Among them are:-
(1) A divisional structure is costly. 
(2) There is a duplication of staff services, facilities and 
personnel. 
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(3) Managers must be well-qualified in order to use the 
divisional structure to promote effective delegation of 
authority. 
(4) Special treatment sometimes given to certain regions, 
products or customers makes it difficult to maintain consistent 
practices within the RA. 
(5) With the Council structure, the chain of command is longer 
and therefore communication becomes more difficult 5• 
The RAs are aware of the advantages and disJdvantages of 
this structure as shown by the following statement6: 
"The present PIRA structure makes a Divisional 
Director accountable for all activity in an industry 
sector. The advantage is sharp accountability via an 
individual for a discrete sectoral area of business 
operation. The disadvantage is duplication, conflict 
between divisions and sub-optimisation of PIRA's main 
assets, its people and expertise. Activities which sit 
between two divisional areas are ignored to the 
disadvantage of PIRA's members. The present divisional 
structure also makes it almost impossible to operate 
across (my highlighting) PlRA activities such as 
environmental research and consultancy." 
10.2 Cultural/Individuals 
10.2.1 Leadership Style 
The leadership of the RAs tended to be more "academic" in 
style, which was useful before the RAs became more commercially 
minded in the mid 1970's. Today, the RAs need leaders who are 
veIl aware of the needs of the market they serve. Besides this, 
) 
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the leaders need to:-
(1) establish and maintain stable, reputable and creative teams 
with the ability and desire to operate as a group and as 
individuals in the world of R&D and consultancy. 
(2) strongly promote the personal identification of staff with 
the overall activities and interests of the RAs by improving 
internal communications and encouraging collaboration between 
divisions. 
(3) develop and sustain a winning attitude by. raising the 
morale, emphasising teamwork and establishing greater confidence 
in the RAs' abilities through positive recognition of technical, 
managerial and business achievement. 
(4) focus investment in training upon a balance designed to meet 
the RAs' technical, managerial and business needs and ensure 
that the skills gained are fully utilised by the effective 
delegation of tasks and responsibility. 
(5) strive to create a work environment where change - a fact of 
life in RAs due to diverse internal and external forces - is 
recognised as necessary and beneficial, so that individuals can 
adapt more easily. 
(6) change the civil servant culture of those RAs which were 
formerly GIREs e.g. BMT and HR Ltd. 
Fai lure to provide effective I eadership in the time of 
change can be disastrous as in the case of HATRA (see appendix 
1 • 6, HATRA). 
10.2.2 Research Culture 
The research culture of the RAs was formed mainly on the 
old concept of an RA which was largely concerned with the 
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general programme of cooperative work determined by its Council 
and financed by membership subscriptions and general government 
grant. The RAs also provided technical services for members and 
sometimes carried out a relatively small amount of directly 
commissioned work. This concept was appropriate from the 1920's 
to the 1970's, but it seemed far less relevant by the end of the 
1970' s. Commentators on the RAs found that the RAs had been 
suffering from the weaknesses of this concept as early as the 
1960'S. Among the weaknesses then were7:-
(1) The fact that most firms would carry out R&D because it 
yielded an advantageous commercial benefit to them. For this 
reason, the most exciting and rewarding industrial research was 
usually undertaken in firms' private laboratories rather than 
under the cooperative auspices of an RA. 
(2) The results of cooperative research could not equally be 
utilised by all companies because of their different sizes, 
management skills, goals and objectives as well as their 
resources. Firms of different sizes and in-house resources may 
require widely differing services from their RA. 
(3) The discrimination of certain sections of an RA's 
membership, since it was impossible to run programmes of 
interest to everyone all the time. 
(4) Large, successful innovative firms may eventually reach a 
point when their subscription becomes so 9reat that they 
question whether the money could not be more usefully spent 
internally, rather than in bolstering the position of their 
weaker rivals through the RA's general programme of research. 
(5) The RA research programmes were sometimes dominated by the 
wishes of strong personalities, by bigger and more influential 
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members, by the highest common factor of the Council, or by 
sectionalism prevailing within the industry. 
(6) The RA Councils that control the cooperative programmes did 
not necessarily comprise the people best qualified to contribute 
to commercial decisions. Constitutionally democratic, they may 
in fact become self-perpetuating as members lose commitment for 
other reasons, and so member control may break down. 
It was widely recognised, not least among RAs themselves, 
that the traditional RA formula of activity suffered from these 
and other weaknesses. Therefore the RAs had to change their 
research culture which was:-
(1) built on a specialised or multidiscipline team which was not 
accustomed to an interdisciplinary form of research. 
(2) confined to a narrow idea zone. 
(3) forming its staff into individual specialists with a narrow 
band of expertise. 
(4) technology-driven and therefore over-looking the market 
needs. 
10.3 staffing 
The analysis of the average size of RAs indicated that some 
RAs could fall below an optimum size which might prevent them 
from offering a wider range of services to the market (e.g. 
BATRA) and consequently they might have to close or merge (e.g. 
BNF) as reflected in the decreasing number of RAs in the 10-150 
range (see Chap. 8). Although there are no rigid criteria for 
defining the optimum size of an RA, the following criteria might 
be helpful (see appendix 1.6, PIRA):-
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(1) the optimum size for market credibility is a minimum size of 
200. 
(2) the size should be big enough to form clusters of experts, 
which also helps to boost the morale of the staff. 
"A concern for us and for the whole foundry industry 
is the short supply (my highlighting) of competent and 
qualified engineers and technicians and we have still 
not achieved our full staff campI ement needed to 
undertake the work which our Members believ.e to be 
necessary"a. 
The problem of recruitment is still a difficult one for 
RAs. They have to compete with industry for staff9: "Skill 
shortages in the 1990s (my highlighting) will mean consideration 
being given to job sharing and greater attention must be given 
to well-planned staff training and development". Besides the· 
problem of recruitment, the RAs encounter di fficul ties with 
regard to a hiqher turnover of staff in comparison wi th the 
industry they serve. One of the reasons was the limited career 
paths for the staffs in the latter part of their career within 
the RAs. 
10.4 Marketi..rul 
To operate successfully as a viable RA, there is a need for 
a fundamental change in its business objectives and strategies. 
The marketing strategy has to be clearly focused on maximising 
sales and revenue by identifying more hiqh-value income 
opportunities, converting these into sales and efficiently 
operating the resul ting projects to a hiqh 1 evel of qual i ty. 
Everybody in the RA. led by senior management, must recoqnise 
216 
these requirements and be motivated to maximise sales and 
revenue. Selling and marketing must be given a very high 
visiblity, including the setting of individual sales and revenue 
targets to marketing staff and technical centres, and rewarding 
people for meeting their targets. In this context, government 
departments should be regarded as clients in exactly the same 
way as commercial clients. 
The strategy outlined above does not imply that commercial 
consideration will be substituted for technical excellence. The 
maintenance of a high standard of technical excellence will be 
.... 
essential to sustain a long-term commercial success. The 
business must, however, be market-led and not technology-led. 
The RAs have recognised that increasing commercial revenue 
and a move towards higher value services will require 
considerable cultural changes, which again is critically 
dependent on the attitudes and leadership of the RAs' magagement 
team. 
The RAs encounter many difficulties because:-
(1) of the uncertainty of their role in the 1970's, which has 
prevented a definitive commercially focused corporate strategy. 
And it follows that there has been no demonstrable marketing 
strategy. 
(2) of the lack of clear quantifiable objectives and industry 
focus. 
(3) operating and marketing staff do not always work closely 
enough to develop commercial opportunities. 
(4) poor inter-divisional communication and awareness has meant 
that major opportunities for interdiscipl inary work have not 
developed significantly. 
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(5) responsibilities are diffused and ill-defined. 
(6) client targetin9 is poor and often aimed at too Iowa level 
or at the R&D function rather than at strategic decision makers. 
(7) of too much concentration on the RAs' capability rather than 
industry needs. 
10.4.1 Information Sy~~ 
A proper management of information system is essential to 
support sales and marketing of an RA; a particularly good 
• 
exampl e occurs in WRc. The system typicall y consists of a 
central integrated database linked to a number of peripheral 
modules (e.g. financial, project costing, personnel, sales and 
marketing). As an enquiry or lead proceeds through the proposal 
phase to become an active project which must be controlled and 
invoiced, so the sales and marketing information system might 
need to inte9rate with the project management and financial 
module of the system. 
10.4.2 Quality As~urance 
The establishment and maintenance of adequate quality 
standards is just as important in a business del i vering a 
service like an RA as in a business delivering manufactured 
products. Al though qual i ty assurance must run through every 
facet of a business, nowhere is its presence (or absence) more 
apparent than in the relationship between the organisation and 
its cl ients. Therefore, it is appropriate that RAs consider 
quality assurance in the context of their marketing plans. 
RAs do not have an organisation-wide accreditation. More 
importantly, there is no quality manager, quality policy or 
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quality plan. This does not mean that work is not undertaken to 
a high standard. However, it does mean that quality relies on 
the attitudes, levels of training and professionalism of 
individual staff rather than a coherent and uniform 
organisation-wide policy. It also means that quality is not seen 
by clients and potential clients to be an important issue to an 
RA. Although it would be impossible to quantify the effect of 
this on commercial (and public sector) sales, it is certain to 
be significant, whether or not deficiencies in quality are real 
or only imagined. 
10.4.3 Income From Government and Industry 
Government income, whether in the form of grants or 
contracts, has always occupied an important place in the RA 
world, and for most RAs, it still does. Even for those in which 
government income accounts for a relatively small proportion 
(say under 20%) of their total income, it is general I y of a 
sufficient magnitude to be of importance in the balance of the 
RAs' incomings and outgoings, at least in the short term. To a 
certain extent RAs still rely on the presence of government 
income in planning the scale of their activities. 
RAs used to depend heavily on government income but this 
has changed considerably, especially in the last two decades. In 
1970, 32% of the RAs' turnover came from government sources but 
by 1988, it had reduced to onl y 17%. Al tQough the overall 
dependence on government income has decreased, there are still 
RAs which reI y heavi I y on government funding~O, for exampl e 
CATRA (31\) and WIRA (30\)(1985/86 figures). In real terms (1988 
prices), the total government income decreased sl ight 1 y from 
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£30.8 million in 1970 to £26 million in 1988. The RAs will have 
to prepare for the eventuality of further cuts in government 
income. The DTI, which is the greatest source of government 
income for most RAs has cut its innovation budget and plans have 
already been announced for further cuts. 
RAs will have to become less dependent on this segment of 
their market and be prepared for more competi tion especially 
after all government contracts have now been opened to 
competitive tendering. The uncertainty of government income is 
one of the main worries of the RAs, especially of those which 
are accustomed to a long-term programme of strategic research 
e. g. HR Ltd. (see Case study on HR Ltd.). Neverthel ess, the 
Government remains the RAs' biggest single customer and 
therefore there is a great need to exact greater influence on 
the Government especially through the DTI. 
The RAs' income from industry, which used to account for 
68\ of their total turnover in 1970, increased to 83\ by 1988. 
In real terms, the total turnover increased from £63 mi 11 ion 
(1988 prices) to £128 million in the same period. Over the last 
two decades, the RAs have played a more pro-active role rather 
than being reactive to the needs of industry. 
~---S_KAJ:"ket_iDg ___ F.l,lru:_ti_Qn 
10.5.1 Pricing 
There are two types of markets:-
(1) those in which the basis of competition is price and 
(2) those which provide opportunity for differentiation and 
which tend to be value-driven. 
220 
Unless RAs have uniquely differentiating features, they 
will often be competing in price-driven markets. Routine testing 
is an example of a price-driven market, where it is necessary to 
undercut competitors to secure a job which then has to be 
operated at low (or even negative) margins. Unfortunately, 
contract R&D in general has many of the characteristics of this 
type of market. Very often the potential client judges costs on 
his own internal R&D costing system, which usuall y underestimates 
its true costs. That is why it is essential for RAs to develop 
higher value-driven markets. Only then will they have control 
over pricing and margins. 
10.5.2 Overseas Market and Regional Presence 
In 1970, only 4\ of the RAs' total turnover came from 
overseas; by 1988, it had increased to 13.5\. Now that the 
initial resistance to overseas membership has been overcome, the 
RAs will have to increase their marketing efforts overseas. Some 
RAs have set up regional offices overseas (RAPRA has set up new 
US joint venturesll ) and have appointed overseas agents e.g. HR 
Ltd. RAs have found it difficul t to obtain a siqni ficant European 
Commission income without incurring high marketing costs but it 
remains an important lonqer-term opportunity. 
Within the UK, it is also important for an RA to strengthen 
its regional presence. For example, BHRA has set up CALTEC in 
Aberdeenl2 ; RAPRA has set up an office in London, Optimat Ltd. in 
scotland and a testing laboratory in Teesidel3 • 
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1Q.5.3 Publicity 
One of the aims of publicity for an RA is to dispel the 
image of an academic centre and to project the image of a centre 
of excel I ence with expertise to offer to industry. This is 
reflected in the following statement14 :-
"It gives us some cause for concern to find out that 
in spite of a main move towards work for individual 
members over the past years we are still looked upon 
as a Research Institute (my highlighting). It will be 
part of the objective of our future promotional 
activities to try to change this image in order that 
potential members, especially, think of us as an 
organisation with practical skills to offer, rather 
than merely as an academic institute " 
Among the other aims of publicity is the promotion of its 
activities and the building up of trust among its customers 
("commercial-in-confidence"). 
The most common forms of publicity used by the RAs are 
discussed below:-
(1) Exhibitions 
They place a demand on personnel resources within an RA. 
Two key questions arise in this context: how effective is an 
exhibition for marketing R&D, and how effectively could the 
resources (operating and marketing) be used in other marketing 
areas? 
At an exhibition, companies that manufacture hardware or 
process products can gain by meeting existing customers and some 
new customers. However, for a contract R&D organisation, the 
customer base is smaller and very few purchasers attend the 
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exhibition. which limits sales prospects. In such circumstances, 
exhibitions are of less use and, moreover, require continual and 
effective monitoring (using carefully structured questionnaires 
at the exhibition with follow-up activity by operating and 
marketing staff, as appropriate) to ensure that the effort is 
worthwhile. They should be limited to the main market sectors of 
an RA. 
Exhibitions can be used to expose operating personnel to 
the buying customer, although they are not regularly attended by 
the latter. The operating personnel should be present at 
exhibitions, but they gain far more experience by being involved 
directly in face-to-face meetings with prospective clients 
during focused selling and marketing initiatives. 
(2) Conferences 
By themselves, conferences can be effective forms of 
marketing, but again, they can easily place a heavy demand on 
the operating resource. Club meetings should continue, but 
attempts should be made to target senior attendees for future 
follow-ups with wider discussions. The organisation of 
conferences should continue but should be self-financing. 
Chairing conference sessions and presenting papers at selected 
conferences should also continue and be encouraged from within 
the various divisions of an RA. 
(3) Videos 
They have a limited impact except for internal training and 
awareness. Production for external audiences should be carefully 
targeted since they can prove very useful for club activities, 
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but they should be paid for by the club. They should not be used 
for cold selling or awareness activities with top executives. 
(4) Brochures 
They are required to inform generally potential customers 
about the RAs: what products are offered, and what benefits the 
the company will gain by working with the RAs. Some of the RAs' 
brochures need to be redesigned as they only tell industry what 
the RAs do but make little mention of the potential benefits of 
their developments to industry. They should all be produced by, 
or at least coordinated through, a group to ensure consistency 
of presentation of material. 
Decision makers will not be swayed by a technical brochure. 
The brochure is necessary to stimulate their imagination into 
seeing a potential match for some requirements to solve their 
problems with the general expertise offered. Face-to-face 
meetings are necessary to sell project work. 
(5) Press 
The RAs can gain a lot of publicity through the press via 
authors of articles in the technical press or by mention-in-
passing in the general press. The articles which are collected 
should be actively used to improve the morale within the RA. 
(6) Advertising 
Advertising capability in specific technical areas in 
contract R&D is not the most efficient means of publ ici ty. 
Corporate advertising is used by organisations to raise the 
level of awareness with prospective customers. Unfortunately, 
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this form of advertisement is expensive. Advertising should be 
highly focused on strategic market areas. 
10.6 Industry-Based and Technoloay-Based BAs 
Technology-based RAs seem to have a particular advantage in 
that the diversity of their membership means that they can avoid 
the need which confronts the industry-based RAs to keep all its 
membership contented, giving rise to an inward looking attitude 
since dictated by a particular industry. 
The smaller RAs tend to serve a very narrow niche of a 
particular industry e.g. SRAMA. They could be too closely 
dependent on one industry and be affected by its fortune. A 
single down-turn could prove too much for that particufar RA. 
Many of these smaller RAs serve mature and declining industry 
(e.g. BATRA). Unl~ss they are able to diversify in the future, 
they might risk closure. On the other hand, diversifying into 
other areas could be difficult because of their size. The other 
option could be a merger (in the last 2 years, 3 RAs merged i.e. 
SI merged with WIRA to form BTTG and BNF merged with FULMER to 
form BNF-Fulmer). 
Appendix 8.2, which shows the annual growth rate of RAs 
from 1980 to 1988, suggests that there may be some truth in the 
notion that technology-based RAs perform better than industry-
based ones, at least as far as the rate of growth is concerned. 
Many of the fastest growing RAs were not industry-based e.g. 
SIRA with 13\ growth per annum, while at the other end of the 
scale, the majority of the RAs experiencing negative growth were 
e.g. Batra and Bnf with -8.26\ and -2\ growth per annum 
respectively. This is perhaps not surprising. Moving away from 
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a single industry base, as for instance the BHRA had done, 
should almost inevitably open up a wide market for an 
association's services. But the distinction should not be given 
too much stress; it is possible for an RA to do quite well 
within a closed industry and in any case, there may be other 
objectives than growth. 
10.7 BAa - Membership-Based Orqa.n.i •• tiQD. 
Is the concept of membership still relevant to RAs then? 
Apart from its money-raising function, the original objective of 
membership was to encourage companies to involve themselves in 
technical improvement: that RA results were only available to 
members was intended to act as a spur to other companies to take 
out membership. 
However, it was probably in the RAs' interest that the 
basis of membership remained. It provided an element of 
continuity in an otherwise rapidly changing world and from an 
organisational point of view, this was important. Most firms 
regarded withdrawal from their RA as a significant step and were 
reluctant to undertake it except under extreme circumstances. 
The subscriptions attached to membership also provided some 
financial bedrock. For most RAs, this is declining in 
importance. Keverthel e8S, subscription income is 8ti 11 more 
reliable over a longer term than money derived from specific 
work. (In many non-profit private contract research institutions 
endowments provide a parallel small but relatively constant 
source of income). Then, however far an RA goes in charging 
specifically for services delivered, there are alwaY8 some 
services - particularly information, library and 8mall technical 
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services - which are administratively absurd to demand for 
separately. A membership subscription provides a sensible way of 
paying for these. Though it is prudent for RAs to retain the 
idea of membership it does not mean that they should work only 
for their members. 
10.7.1 RA control 
The member company had a share in the definition of the 
RA's general technical programme although the programme 
concerned was usual I y a small er proportion of the RA' s total 
activity. This share of control was normally exercised through 
the right of members to elect their representatives who 
constitute the majority of the .RA Councils. But it is a 
perennial fault of this type of democratic system that, 
especially if it is weighted in any way according to 
contribution levels, it fails to give proportionate 
representation to the requirements of minority sections of the 
constituency. And this had certainly happened over the years in 
most RAs. It had allowed the growth of a fatalistic view, 
particularly among smaller member firms, that there was little 
point in their requesting an item of work to be incl uded on 
general programmes since they believed from past experiences 
that the RA would not in fact pay anything more than lip service 
to the general programme request of a small member firm. 
Under no conceivable system could the individual 
requirements of all members be satisfied at once, or even over 
a reasonable term, by a relatively small institution which 
operated on a general programme basis. And it was perhaps 
inevitable that historically in many RAs the larger member firms 
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have tended to dominate research programmes. But if the 
signifance of general programme work diminishes, and that of 
directly commissioned work increases. the fact is that for many 
members programme control by a minority of members will decline 
in importance. 
The replacement by a more practical membership whose prime 
right was simply preferential access to RA services, could prove 
beneficial. 
10.7.2 SHEs - Membership 
In no industry was more than a small proportion of small 
companies in membership of an RA. Taken with the observation 
that the RA concept was originally introduced to widen the 
application of technical skills among industry at large, this 
seems to imply that RAs have in general failed to achieve a 
fundamental objective. It could be argued that because the RAs 
received contributions from the Government, they ought to have 
helped out the SMEs in promoting the application of new 
technology. On the other hand, the RAs had a contribution to 
make to companies which were already receiving such help (e.g. 
active members). 
The SHEs were hesitant to become members because of:-
(1) the not-invented-here (NIH) syndrome. 
(2) their short-time horizon. 
(3) they Could not afford it. 
(4) confidentiality i.e. it was too risky to receive outside 
help. 
(5) their research and development needs were different from the 
big firms i.e. they were oriented more towards the development 
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side. Purthe~ore, they were outnumbered by the bigger firms and 
therefore their needs were not catered for. 
(6) running collaborative research with SMZs was more difficult 
since their needs differed from one to the other and they were 
more demanding for the amount of money they put in. 
The problem of giving each member a feeling of value was, 
under the traditional RA formula, particularly acute in the case 
of small firms. It was likely that the demands of a small firm 
on a technical institution were different from those of a large 
firm. SMEs would be interested in less sophisticated information 
and troubleshooting services rather than in extended programmes 
of technical development.They had received these services from 
RAs, but their subscriptions had also been contributing towards 
general programme work which, because of the inherent inequity 
in the traditional control system, and because of small firms' 
lack of capital to invest in the application of RA results, had 
often been regarded by them as irrelevant to their needs. 
The RAs need to make a sufficient effort to analyse 
systematically the technology of the various industrial sectors 
wi thin its industry, with a view to reveal ing the technical 
needs of their members. The SHEs that operated in unstable 
technical conditions do not recognise that technical 
improvements were required. Under this condition, there must be 
• particularly strong effort on the part of the RA to reveal 
hidden possibilities for cost-saving programmes. On the other 
hand, a certain amount of activism on the part of any member was 
necessary to maximise its value for money from its RA. It was 
feasible in many cas.s for small firms with common low-level 
technical problems to join together in presenting a proposal to 
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their RA. But SMEs were not prone to take this kind of 
collective action. Perhaps the responsibility did ultimately lie 
back with the RA to take the initiative by making it clear that 
this kind of approach was open to SMEs and by encouraging them 
to present their technical needs accordingly, through regular 
opportunities for requesting work and assistance in the 
formulation of demands. 
10.7,3 Members' Perception of RAs 
In the shorter term, the RAs benefit from adopting a more 
sophisticated approach to member and public relations in order 
to dispel the misconceptions and ignorance of their activities. 
The members, too, in the short term review their relation to 
their RA. 
There seemed to be a widespread feeling in industry that 
the payment of a membership subscription itself ought to yield 
technical results of immediate benefit to the firms. The 
absolute level of membership subscriptions had in the past led 
to the development of this attitude. The decline in the 
importance of general progranune work after the earl y 1970' s 
meant that there was less validity for this idea, but it had 
been in existence during the sixties. It had been intensified by 
the fact that many members themselves had not much direct say in 
what was done with their money, and had to take on trust that it 
was, in the long run, applied in their benefit. Yet many firms 
were dissatisfied and this situation prevailed for years without 
anything much being done to tackle it. 
Thus it was sensible for the member firm itself to 
investigate the situation in a systematic way to see what the 
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situation was like and if it could be improved by any exertion 
on its part. A review of this type might lead to the definite 
conclusion that membership was not sufficiently attractive, and 
hence to withdrawal. Unless it happened on a wide scale, this 
might not in the long run be a bad thing for the RA itself, in 
that it would help to clear the air and give an indication as to 
where its areas of failure lay. 
10.8 R&D Programme/Products 
There is a need for RAs to engage in either forward 
integration or backward integration of their research programmes 
i.e. rather than just dealing with a particular kind of 
equipment, the RA can consider forward integrating by marketing 
the product or backward integrating by looking into the process 
the equipment operates in. SIRA is an example15 : 
"On the R&D side, SIRA is increasingly developing a 
vertical integration of its activities within major 
business sectors, producing hardware and products to 
meet clients' needs as well as initiating R&D. This 
provides not only extremely valuable experience and 
feedback to the research and development staff but, 
where required, a route for clients through from 
concept to production wi thin the one company. This 
philosophy is designed to enhance SIRA's abilities to 
win the initial R&D contracts and to provide a 
sensible route for growth and development of the 
organisation." 
On the other hand, there are some RAs which have too wide 
• focus. Por example, MIRA is worried about its breadth of 
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services and facilities, which is costly to maintain and spread 
too thinly (see appendix 1.6 on MIRA). PERA, too, will need 
greater focus because production engineering is not a core skill 
and the manufacturing sector which it serves is too broad an 
industry. 
Some RAs tend to carry out research which is in support of 
the development and application of products and systems, rather 
than undertaking the development themselves. They undertake 
research and testing and develop design data and methodologies 
to underpin development and application. Longer-term pre-
competitive research has limited opportunities for attracting 
higher fee rates but product development, which is much closer 
to the market, can bring in significant income. Furthermore, the 
former type of research tends to be run as club projects which 
have high hidden sales and marketing costs. This does not mean 
that RAs should neglect research which is in support of 
development and application in order to concentrate just on 
product development because they need to secure their core 
research programme. The pre-competitive research programme 
differentiates them from other research organisations besides 
creating opportunities for follow-up research. 
Some RAs, for example SI, had great difficulties in 
securing matching industrial funding for thei r colI aborati ve 
programme as shown by the following statementl6 :-
"The provision of matchinq industrial funding usually 
poses a problem since it normally falls to the 
Insti tute to initiate the earl y stages of process 
work. Expressions of interest in projects help to 
secure a positive adjudication but it is rare for an 
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expression of interest to be accompanied by 
sponsorship money until there has been some 
quantifiable and positive output from the project 
work." 
The difficulty of insufficient support from industry arises 
possibly because the prime impetus for the oeneration of project 
ideas comes from the RA. The RA might be able to obtain better 
support if it encouraged potential sponsors to be initiators. 
If . an RA is not able to secure sufficient industrial 
support for its general programme, it may have to subsidise it 
from its surplus income but this is a questionable practicel7 : 
"The significant, and seemingly ever increasing, loss on 
research and development available to all members by virtue of 
subscriptions clearly could not be allowed to continue." 
10.9 Pinapcial A~ 
The profitability ratio helps to measure the RAs' overall 
management effectiveness as shown by the returns generated on 
sales and investment. Table 10.1 shows the net profit/turnover 
ratio (1988) for a selection of RAs: In 1988, MIRA made a profit 
of 13 pence per pound of turnover, which is the highest among 
the RAs. 
Appendix 8.2 shows the comparison of a selection of RAs' 
growth in turnover from 1980 to 1988. Among the RAs with the 
biggest annual growth were SIRA (12.92\), LEA (10.51\), WRc 
(10.32') and PlRA (8.42\). Some RAs had negative growth. Amono 
them were HAT (-8.26\), BOI (-3.62\), BClRA (-3.4\) and BNF (-
2.04\). HAT's turnover in 1988 shrunk to about 1/3 of its 
turnover in 1980 and BClRA's fortune reflects that of the steel 
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Table 10.1 Profitability Ratio 
of Selected RAa industry it serves. 
Sources:- RAs' Annual Reports 
RAs Profit / Loss <\) 
1988 
12.99\ 
1.60\ 
6.54\ 
5.18\ 
4.55\ 
4.35\ 
3.14\ 
3.01\ 
2.35\ 
2.00\ 
1.92\ 
1.89\ 
1.18\ 
0.50\ 
0.23\ 
-2.06\ 
-3.06\ 
-4.11\ 
The turnover to staff ratio 
hel ps to give an indication 
about the RAs' effectiveness. 
Table 10.2 shows the 
comparison of the turnover to 
staff ratio for 1980 and 1988 
for a selection of RAs (see 
appendix 10.1) . The "table 
shows that for most RAs, the 
ratio increased over the 
period with the exception of 
MIRA 
PIRA 
BCR 
ERA 
SIRA 
PERA 
Lea 
HRC 
BRA 
FIR 
WRc 
BTTG 
CAT 
RAPRA 
TRA 
BLC 
BHRA 
AMTRI 
BMT -12.21\ BCIRA, where it dropped from 
£19,000/employee to 
£18,000/employee. The biggest increase was in the case of PERA 
i.e. from £25,000/employee to £44,OOO/employee. 
10.10 P~cilitY-Audit 
The majority of the RAs are located in the South East and 
the Midlands, where most British manufacturing industries are. 
The close proximity with the industries is important in order to 
maintain close contacts. 
One of the difficulties faced by RAs is the shortage of 
space. Some of their facilities and offices are located in listed 
buildings with very limited options for expansion or renovation 
e.g. the Shirley Towers. SIRA for example has many difficulties 
with its site for these reasons l8 : 
"We are exploring with some urgency various options 
for providing additional working space without which 
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our growth will be restricted." 
LEA is another example for a site being fully utilised and it 
might encounter some probl ems in the future if it were to 
expand. 
Table 10.2 Turnover to Staff Ratios of RAs (£100,000) 
Sources:- RAs' Annual Reports 
Turnover to 
RAs'/Year 
AMTRl 
BCIRA 
BHRA_ 
BNF 
BCR 
BGI 
BLC 
BMT 
BRA 
CIRIA 
CAT 
ERA 
FCR 
FIR 
HAT 
HRC 
LAM 
MIRA 
PR 
PERA 
PIU 
RAPU 
SAT 
SI 
SIU 
SRA 
SCR 
TRA 
WRc 
WI 
WIRA 
BTT 
CAMP 
Lea 
staff ratios 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 
ERR 0.000 0.017 0.018 0.023 
0.019 0.019 ERR ERR 0.019 
0.019 0.019 0.020 0.026 0.028 
0.021 0.018 0.024 0.024 0.033 
ERR ERR 0.019 0.021 0.020 
ERR 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.018 
ERR ERR ERR ERR 0.018 
ERR ERR ERR 0.025 0.029 
0.018 0.020 0.021 0.023 0.027 
ERR ERR 0.045 ERR 0.044 
0.016 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.019 
0.023 0.023 0.029 0.030 0.027 
ERR ERR 0.015 ERR 0.021 
ERR 0.022 0.025 0.024 0.025 
ERR ERR ERR ERR 0.025 
ERR 0.023 0.026 0.027 0.028 
ERR ERR ERR ERR 0.013 
0.023 0.021 0.027 0.034 0.034 
0.015 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018 
0.025 0.029 0.052 0.051 0.044 
0.019 0.019 0.024 0.028 0.028 
0.017 0.016 ERR ERR 0.021 
ERR ERR ERR 0.018 0.016 
ERR 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.017 
0.020 0.020 0.027 0.031 0.031 
ERR ERR ERR ERR 0.025 
ERR ERR ERR ERR 0.035 
ERR ERR ERR ERR 0.022 
0.023 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.033 
0.021 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.029 
ERR ERR ERR ERR 0.022 
ERR ERR ERR ERR ERR 
ERR ERR ERR ERR ERR 
0.016 0.018 0.022 0.023 0.027 
1989 
0.016 
0.018 
0.026 
0.031 
0.018 
0.016 
0.017 
0.044 
0.022 
0.042 
0.020 
0.025 
0.020 
0.024 
0.019 
0.026 
0.015 
0.028 
0.017 
0.049 
0.037 
0.025 
0.015 
ERR 
0.034 
0.028 
0.037 
0.026 
0.033 
0.024 
ERR 
0.024 
0.018 
0.026 
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Some RAs' facilities are spread out and consequently the 
overhead costs as well as the costs of administration are higher. 
Furthermore, there are less possibilities for synergy. In the 
case of WRc its facitities are spread out in three sites i.e. 
Swindon, Stevenage and Medmenham. For the past few years, it has 
been trying to consolidate its activities and centre them on two 
si tes i. e. Stevenage and Medmenham. When it changed its corporate 
status in March 1990, it decided to close its site in Swindon. 
One of the difficulties BTTG (formed in 1989) is still facing now 
is the location of its faci 1 i ties, which are spread out in 
Manchester and Leeds. 
Among the other problems faced by RAs with regard to their 
facilities are: 
(1) obsolete facilities. 
(2) high overheads in maintaining big facilities e.g. BMT had to 
close down certain testing sites. 
(3) dealing with the problems of peaks and troughs in demand. 
{4} too wide a range of faci 1 i ties e. g. MIRA is considering 
narrowing down its range of facilities. 
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Rl\§ 
11.1 strengths I Weaknesses I Opportunities 
I Threats (SWOT) Analysis 
To plan the course of development of an RA, it is essential 
not only to know what it is aiming for, but where the RA is 
starting froml. The planning process must begin, therefore, with 
an assessment of the internal strengths and weaknesses of the RAs 
and the external opportunities and threats facing the RAs in 
their business environment by carrying out a SWOT analysis. SWOT 
or the Harvard approach is a more focused form of planning and 
has a record of success2. It encourages managers to consider the 
changes which may be necessary in the RA if it wants to maximise 
its opportunities and to minimise the threats it faces. 
The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats have 
already been discussed in detail in the two preceding chapters 
(The Environment and The Internal Audit) and will now only be 
highlighted in point forms:-
11.1.1 strengths 
(1) Experienced and competent staff in many areas. 
(2) Established track record and good technical reputation. 
(3) A wide and potentially complementary range of technologies 
and facilities. 
(4) Relatively stable ownership and good connections with the 
DT!. 
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(5) Greater freedom by being accountable to a Board of Directors. 
(6) More commercially minded. 
(7) Less dependent on government income. 
(8) Close rapport with industry through membership and formation 
of clubs. 
(9) Services/products more in tune with market needs. 
(10) The RA that has changed its status to one limited by share 
is allowed to raise capital. 
11.1.2 Weaknesses 
(1) The RAs operate within an unstable political environment and 
are subject to the changing and sometimes unpredictable demands 
of the Government. 
(2) Resources are spread too thinly. 
(3) Insufficient cohesion across different divisions or areas of 
business, and failure to exploit fully the collective technical 
strengths of the RA. 
(4) The objectives of an RA do not, in general, provide a single 
focus for internal commitment or external recognition. 
(5) Personal performance yardsticks and incentives are weaker 
than in the private sector. 
(6) Management constraints by having to account directly to a 
council. 
(7) An organisational structure that does not encourage synergy 
between divisions in an RA. 
(8) Resistance to change. 
(9) Having to shed the civil servant culture (for privatised 
GIREs e.g. HRc and BMT). 
(10) Unable to raise capital because of corporate status. 
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11.1.3 Opportunities 
(1) Greater industry R&D investment in the UK. 
(2) out-sourcing of research in industry is gaining popularity. 
(3) R&D income from overseas. 
(4) Increased funding from the EC. 
(5) A rapidly growing pace of technology which forces industry 
to invest sufficiently to keep abreast. 
(6) In order for industry to compete globally, it has to invest 
adequately. 
(7) Deregul ation, particul arl y post 1992 wi 11 offer greater 
opportunities for collaborative ventures, increasing the RA's 
share in the R&D market as well as opportunities tor standards 
work. 
(8) Greater awareness among the public about environmental 
issues, which helps to create R&D opportunities for RAs. 
11.1.4 Threats 
(1) Instability of the DTI. 
(2) The DTI's support for RAs is limited by a ceiling figure of 
25\ of the total turnover of the individual RA and there is a 
continuous reduction in the DTI's Innovation Budget. 
(3) competition from HEls, IRCs, RAs' members, CROs in the EC, 
privatised GIREs, AEA Technology. 
(4) Fierce competition from industry for staff in fashionable 
areas of technology. 
(5) The pattern of the RAs' markets will continue to change and 
requires constant vigilance on the part of the RAs. 
(6) Threat of recession world-wide {in particular within the UK}, 
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high interest rates and unstable exchange rates. 
(7) Cut in the overall government R&D budget. 
(8) Privatisation and formation of agency status for public 
bodies. 
(9) Short-termism in the City, take-overs and mergers. 
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A SWOT analysis can be used as a strategy formulation tool 
to develop four types of strategies3 as shown in figure 11.14:-
(1) strengths-opportunities strategies: 
Any RA would like to be in a position to use its strengths 
to exploit external opportunities. For example, SATRA uses its 
resources and expertise to exploit the R&D opportunities that 
exist in industry because the majority of firms do not have their 
own in-house R&D facilities or know-how. 
(2) Weaknesses-opportunities strategies: 
These strategies are directed towards improving internal 
weaknesses by taking advantage of external opportunities. 
Sometimes external key opportunities exist, but the RA has 
internal weaknesses that prevent it from exploiting those 
opportunities. For example, there are opportunities in the R&D 
market for materials but BNF could not exploit it fully because 
of its lack of expertise in the field of materials R&D except for 
non-ferrous metals. It was logical therefore for BNF to merge' 
with FULMER, which specialises in materials research, in order 
to exploit the opportunities in the materials R&D market. 
(3) strengths-threats strategies: 
These strategies are based on an RA using its strengths to 
avoid or reduce the impact of external threats. The aim is to 
capitalize on the RA's strengths in order to minimize external 
threats. Most RAs are using their expertise and resources to gain 
as much income as possible from industry and thereby to reduce 
their dependence on government income. 
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(4) Weaknesses-threats strate9ies: 
These strategies are directed at overcoming internal 
weaknesses and avoiding environmental threats. The attempt is to 
minimize both weaknesses and threats. These forms of strategies 
are defensive. An RA facing many external threats and internal 
weaknesses may indeed be in a precarious position. It may have 
to fight for survival by merging or retrenchment or choose 
liquidation. For exampl e BMT had to reduce its staf f after 
privatisation as well as to liquidate some of its assets. 
11,3 Eyaluation of strategy OptiODS 
The major difficulty faced in evaluating strategies is the 
need to use a number of different measures or criteria that 
cannot all be satisfied simul taneous 1 y. There are three main 
classes of criteria which can be used for strategy evaluationS: 
(1) Criteria of suitability: 
This attempts to measure how far proposed strategies fit in 
with the situation identified in the strategic analysis. This 
involves providing a clear picture of the organisation and the 
environment it operates in. A useful summary of this situation 
might include a listing of the major opportunities and threats 
which face the organisation, its particular strengths and 
weakneses and any objectives which seem to be a particularly 
important influence on policy. 
After thus identifying the organisation's si tuation, certain 
questions need to be asked about the proposed strategy such as: 
(1) To what extent does it overcome the difficulties identified 
in the strategic analysis (internal weaknesses and environmental 
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threats)? 
(2) Does it exploit the RA's strengths and environmental 
opportunities? 
(3) Does it fit with the organisation's objectives and values? 
(2) Criteria of Feasibility: 
It assesses how any strategy might work in practice. For 
example, whether the strategy's goal is achievable in resource 
terms. There are a number of fundamental questions to be asked 
when assessing the feasibility of any strategy:-
(1) Can the strategy be funded? This can be examined by producing 
a future funds flow forecast showing the estimated sources and 
uses of funds. 
(2) Is the RA capable of performing to the required level (e.g. 
quality level, service level)? 
(3) Can the necessary market position be achieved and will the 
necessary marketing skills be available? 
(4) Can competitive reactions be coped with? 
(5) How will the organisaton ensure that the required skill on 
both the managerial and operative level are available (training 
and recruitment)? 
(3) Criteria of Acceptability: 
It tries to assess whether the consequences of proceeding 
with a strategy are acceptable. For example, will it be 
profitable or generate the growth expected by the senior 
management, members or the Council? One important measure of 
acceptability is the level of risk involved in any strategy. 
The assessment of whether the consequences of proceeding 
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with a strategy are acceptable or not is difficult since 
acceptability is strongly related to people's values, and 
therefore the issue of "acceptable to whom" requires the analysis 
to be thought through carefully. Some of the questions that will 
help to identify the likely consequences of any strategy are:-
(1) What will be the financial performance of the company in 
profitability terms? 
(2) How will the financial risk change? 
(3) Wi 11 any proposed changes be acceptable to the general 
cultural expectations within the RA (e.g. attitudes to greater 
levels of risk)? 
(4) Will the function of any department, group or individual 
change significantly? 
(5) Will the RA's relationship with members, Council, DTI or 
customers need to change? 
(6) Will the strategy be acceptable in the RA's environment (e.g. 
will it face resistance and competition from its members)? 
(7) Will the proposed strategy fit in with existing management 
systems or will it require major changes? 
11.4 strategy Selection 
It is important to recognise that the selection of one or 
more strategies by the RA occurs by a number of very different 
processes. They are:-
(l) Selection against objectives: 
This is a common view of how a rational choice of future 
strategies should be made, although it is normally impracticable 
to proceed in this way. This method of selection uses the RA's 
objectives, quantified where possible, as direct yardsticks by 
245 
which al ternati ves are assessed. Eval uation methods are therefore 
central to the decision-making process and are expected to 
provide quantifiable answers regarding the relative merits of 
various al ternatives and to indicate the right course of action. 
(2) Reference to a higher authority: 
One form of selecting future strategies is to refer the 
matter to a higher authority. The managers responsible for 
eval uation may not have the authori ty to give the go-ahead to the 
solution. Equally the senior managers (e.g. in the Council) who 
must decide on a strategy may not have participated in the 
evaluation of alternatives. It is unlikely that senior managers 
will have the time or inclination to unravel all the detailed 
implications of an evaluation. They are more concerned with using 
their judgement of the available facts to decide on strategies 
and seeing how well these strategies fit in with the overall 
strategy of the RA. Thus the evaluation process is seen as a 
means of raising the level of debate which occurs amongst senior 
managers when they are using their judgement on the selection of 
a strategy. 
(3) Incrementalism: 
This takes place when strategic decisions are made in small 
steps, in isolated parts of an RA or as a reaction to events 
(usually outside changes). In these circumstances the selection 
of a strategy tends to result from experimenting with strategic 
changes in parts of the RA (e.g. in a division or area). It may 
well be that the initiative for such activity comes from 
decisions made in the various parts of the organisation and 
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through the political processes occurring between those parts. 
(4) Using outside agencies: 
Sometimes within the RA there are potential disagreements 
on a strategy between parties who have similar amounts of power 
within the RA. In these circumstances it will not be unusual for 
an outside agency, such as a consultant, to evaluate the 
situation for the RA. Very often this process of evaluation is 
described as an objective, rational process by virtue of the 
consul tant' s detachment from the si tuation. In practice, of 
course, all good consultants are aware of the political reasons 
for their involvement. To a large extent their role is one of an 
arbitrator and the evaluation must reflect those circumstances. 
11.5 strategies Adopted by RAs 
11.S.1 Merger 
The following are some of the circumstances in which an RA 
would consider merger:-
(1) when it falls below a critical size. 
(2) when a synergy is possible. 
(3) when it is in difficulties e.g. financial ones. 
The advantages of mergers are as foIl ows:-
(1) Synergy of strengths. Creation of new ideas, new thinking, 
new blood, new projects etc. 
(2) Complementarity of resources. Por example in the merger 
between FULMER and BNF, FULMER had enough cash and BNF had the 
site. 
(3) Helps to diversify e.g. it helps BNF to diversify from Non-
Ferrous into Materials. 
(4) Creation of new expertise. 
(5) New resources. 
(6) New markets. 
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(7) Lower overheads - making it more competitive. 
(8) Better image - bigger, stronger. 
(9) Undertaking bigger and riskier projects. 
(10) Possibility of future mergers or takeovers of other research 
establishments. 
(11) Wider scope for overseas collaborations. 
Among the disadvantages are:-
(1) coping with cultural changes. 
(2) leadership clashes. 
(3) loss of staff during negotiation (e.g. BTTG). 
In the last decade a few RAs opted for this. Mergers took 
place between BNF-FULMER and SI-WIRA. Among the possible mergers 
in the future are BCIRA-SCRATA6 and LEA-Campden (see appendix 1.6 
on LEA). 
11.5.2 Forward Integration 
An RA can integrate forward, by acquiring another 
organisation' or setting up a subsidiary. Among the RAs that 
chose this option are BMT and SIRA. 
SIRA for example, forward integrated by forming subsidiaries 
to market and exploit its research (see Case study on SIRA). This 
strategy is useful when:-
(1) there are no firms which are willing to take up the research 
further and to exploit it. 
(2) if its research programmes (contracts) are not earning enough 
revenue, forward integration might help to increase its revenue 
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especially if there is a growth market for the product. 
(3) the RA has the capital and human resources needed. 
(4) the product has a high profit margin. 
11.5.3 Concentric Diyersification 
This strategy is used to add new but related fields of 
research activities or products and is practically used by all 
RAs to widen their market base. This can be achieved within the 
RA by greater synergy among the divisions. For example, most RAs 
are diversifying into:-
(1) new but related areas like environmental issues. 
(2) selling products like software programmes. 
(3) services like consultancy, testing, accreditation and 
database retrieval services. 
(4) training, conferences and publications. 
This strategy is useful when:-
(1) the RA is competing in a slow growth research area. 
(2) the adding of new but reI ated products or services can 
significantly enhance the sales of current product or services. 
(3) the new but related services/products can be offered at 
highly competitive prices. 
(4) the new, but related services have cyclical sales levels that 
counterbalance the RA's existing peaks and troughs. 
(5) the RA's services/products are currently in the decline stage 
of the service/product life cycle. 
11.5.1 Conglomerate Diyersification 
This strategy involves diversifying into new areas of 
research which are unrelated to its existing portfolio of 
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research. For example, BTTG diversified into biotechnology (see 
appendix 1.6 on BTTG), SATRA into textile and BMT into Fluid 
Mechanics. This strategy is useful when:-
(1) the industry which the RA serves experiences declining annual 
sales and profits e.g. the declining shipbuilding industry in the 
UK which forced BMT to diversify. 
(2) the RA has the capital needed e.g. BMT liquidated its assets. 
(3) the RA has the opportunity to purchase a research 
organisation/consultancy that is an attractive investment 
opportunity. 
(4) there is fierce competition in an existing area of research. 
11.5.5 Joint Ventures. Agents 
Joint ventures are a strategy where an RA works with another 
organisation on specific projects. It will be a popular strategy 
after 1992, when RAs will be encouraged to enter into joint 
ventures with their European counterparts. 
This is a strategy adopted by MI8 when it formed 
partnership with Edison Welding Institute in the USA to:-
(1) assert its influence. 
(2) recruit more members. 
(3) sell its services and products. 
This strategy is useful when:-
a 
(1) the RA forms a joint venture with a foreign organisation, 
thereby providing the RA with local management in a foreign 
country. 
(2) the distinctive competences of two or more of the research 
organisations complement each other. 
(3) the project is potentially profitable, but requires a lot of 
2S0 
resources and risks. 
(4) two or more research organisations have trouble competing 
with a large organisation. 
(S) the RA wants to introduce a service or product in the market 
quickly. 
11.S.6 Market Deyelopment 
This strategy is used when an RA wants to introduce its 
existing products o~ services into new geographic areas. It is 
a common feature among RAs to form a subsidiary, setting up of 
a regional office or appoint agents in new geographic areas where 
the RA wants to enlarge its market. Two examples of this are the 
setting up by BRc of regional offices in the Far East9 and RAPRA 
setting up offices lO in the USA. 
This form of strategy is useful when:-
(1) the RA is successful. 
(2) new untapped or unsaturated markets for the RA's 
services/products exist. 
(3) the RA has the needed capital and human resources to manage 
expanded operations. 
(4) the demand for the RA' s services/products are growing rapidl y 
and globally. 
11.S.7 Market Penetration 
This strategy is used when the RA seeks to increase its 
market share of its present services/products in present markets 
through greater marketing efforts. This strategy is used by RAs 
to compete in the local market (within the UK). For example, BHRA 
.et up a testing centre known as CALTEC in Aberdeen!! and RAPRA 
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set up regional offices in London and in Teeside12 , 
This strategy is useful when: 
(1) the current market for the RA's services/products is not 
saturated. 
(2) the market shares of major competitors have been declining 
while the demand for the services/products has been increasing 
(3) when increased economies of scale provide competitive 
advantages. 
11.5.8 Retrenchment 
Retrenchment is a strategy used by the RA when it needs to 
regroup through cost and asset reduction in order to reverse its 
declining state. This is a strategy used by most RAs during the 
recession in 1979-1982. Thus WRc reduced its staff from 535 in 
1980 to 478 in 1982 through retrenchment and BMT reduced its 
staff from 456 in 1986 to 340 in 1988 (This was necessary after 
its privatisation in 1985 in order to stay competitive). 
This strategy is used when:-
(1) the RA has a clearly distinctive competence, but fails to 
meet its objectives and goals consistently over time, 
(2) the RA is a weak competitor in the market it serves. 
(3) the RA is plagued by inefficiency, low profitability, poor 
employee morale, and pressure from members to improve its 
performance. 
(4) the RA's management has failed in planning strategically for 
the RA. 
(5) the goals and objectives set by the members differ from those 
of the management team. For example, MIRA replaced its Managing 
Director because of conflicting objectives (see appendix 1.6 on 
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MIRA) • 
(6) the RA has grown so large so quickly that major internal 
reorganisation is needed. 
11.5.9 Liquidation 
Liquidation is a strategy used by an RA to sell off parts 
of its assests for their tangible worth which occurred when BNT 
sold off its Feltham site to finance its diversification 
programmel3 and also when BNF sold off part of its assets and 
converted the remaining part of its property into a Business Park 
(see Case Study on BNF). A further example of the same strategy 
being used was the sale of BTTG of part of its property in 
Didsbury for development and the renting out of part of its 
existing site. The proceeds raised were used to help cash flow 
as well as to help it diversify (see appendix 1.6 on BTTG). 
This strategy is useful when:-
(1) the RA has pursued both a retrenchment strategy and a 
divestiture strategy and neither has been successful. 
(2) the RA's only alternative is bankruptcy. Liquidation 
represents an orderly and planned means of obtaining the greatest 
possible cash for an RAts assets. 
(3) the members of an RA want to minimise the losses of the RA 
by selling its assets. 
11.5.10 Diyestitur, 
This strategy involves the RA selling a division or part of 
its set-up. For example, WRc was considering the selling of its 
Stevenage site to raise capital14 and to consolidate its 
position. 
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This strategy is useful when:-
(1) the RA has pursued a retrenchment strategy and it failed to 
accomplish the improvements needed. 
(2) a division needs more resources to be competitive than the 
RA can provide. 
(3) a division is responsible for the RA's overall poor 
performance. 
(4) a division is a misfit with the rest of an RA, which can 
result from radically different markets, customers, managers, 
employees, values or needs. 
(5) a large amount of cash is needed quickly and cannot be 
reasonably obtained from other sources. 
11.5.11 Combination 
An RA usually does not pursue one strategy onl y but a 
combination of two or more simultaneously. For example, BMT 
adopted a strategy that was a combination of diversification, 
integration and liquidation. 
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CHAJ?Te:R 12: CH.l\NGES IN TfIE 'Rl\s 
12 
12.1 Ownership/Corporate status 
12.1.1 Limited by Guarantee 
This is the corporate status most commonly adopted by 
Research Associations which have no capital and where liability 
is very limited since it is the members who are liable up to a 
maximum' indi vidual I iabi 1 i ty of £5. (There are, however, two 
exceptions, viz BHRA and WRc). This means that most RAs generate 
profits but cannot distribute them. They are managed by councils 
elected by the members. It is possible to maintain this form of 
status and yet retain staff control of the RA through the 
appointment of a Board of Directors to which management 
responsibilities are delegated. The Council on the other hand 
remains a body that represents the members. Among the RAs which 
have set up a Board of Directors, SIRA has gone the furthest 
towards staff control with up to five staff directors (see case 
study on SIRA). 
One of the disadvantages of this status is the inability to 
to raise risk capital. One way of raising capital is through the 
Equity Participation Cooperative (EPC) (see appendix 12.1). It 
is not a popular option among the RAs because of the difficulties 
in administrating it although it can have the following 
advantages:-
(1) help transfer control of the RA to the staff. 
(2) financial participation by the staff. 
(3) optional equity ownership by member companies. 
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(4) opportunities for raising additional capital from outside 
investors. 
12.1.2 Limited by Shares 
This form of status is relatively new among RAs. The RAs 
that have adopted this status are WRc (now WRc PIc) and BHRA (now 
BHRA Ltd) in which cases the status change was carried out 
through management buy-outs. RAPRA is current 1 y thinking of 
adopting this status. 
In the case of WRc, some of the shares were bought over by 
the various water Authorities, whose purpose was to show their 
commitment for the support of WRc under this new status. The 
water Authorities also gave an undertaking that they would 
continue to fund NRc's core programme for the next five years. 
This acts as a safety net for NRc as well as to give it time to 
go through a transitionary period. In the case of BHRA Ltd, the 
RA (i.e. the old BHRA) bought part of the shares and the rest 
were taken up by the management. The "old BHRA" can still award 
research contracts to BHRA Ltd. 
By adopting this status, the RA will lose its tax-exempt 
status (see appendix 12.2) but it benefits from:-
(1) being able to raise share capital. 
(2) the possibility of being listed in the market. 
(3) having greater freedom to give incentives to its staff. 
(4) having financial participation by the staff. 
(S) having greater control of the management of the RAs by the 
staff. 
One major disadvantage of this status, however, is the 
possibility that the clients may not consider the RA to be 
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independent anymore and fear that a possible rival of the clients 
may one day take over the RA and have access to all the 
confidential info~ation. 
Adopting this status might signal the beginning of a 
compl ete break from the "RA principl e" of a non-profi t-making 
organisation that carries out collaborative research for its 
members. It might put pressure on the rest of the RAs to adopt 
a similar status because of the advantages it brings especially 
in being able to motivate the staff with financial incentives. 
12.2 RA Ob;ectives 
An organisation's objectives specify the actions and 
commitments made to achieve its purposes and, in the long term, 
result in the organisation taking steps to realize those 
objectives. 
Many problems are superficial compared with those of 
determining what objectives an RA can most profitably pursue in 
the 1990's. Most RAs operate to a memorandum of association which 
is relatively unspecific, defining their prime object as "to 
promote research and other scientific or technological work in 
connection with (their particular) trade or industry" (see 
appendix 7.1). The tradition of the RAs, dating back to 1917, 
enshrines a number of working objectives which can be summarised. 
They are as follows:-
(1) To encourage cooperation in R&D between individual members 
of an industry, and to make the industry research-conscious. 
(2) To investigate problems of interest to a major sector of 
industry, which cannot convenient I y or economical I y be undertaken 
by any single member; and as a corollary of this, to realise 
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economies of central operation, especially in the use of 
scientific manpower. 
(3) To transfer new research ideas and technological know-how 
from a variety of sources into industry. 
(4) To stimul ate and assist small er fi rms wi thout research 
facilities of their own. 
RAs still operate to these sorts of objectives, although 
they are to a signi ficant extent outdated. The pursui t of 
objectives like these led to the weaknesses experienced by the 
RAs and to many of the difficulties which RAs have suffered since 
the beginning of the 1970' s with the change in government 
attitudes towards R&D. 
The above set of objectives contains a real conflict. 
Although not specifically enjoined to do so, there was, and often 
still is, a prevailing impression that it is an RA's duty to 
operate in the interests of its industry at large and to improve 
its overall level of technical competence. But at the same time, 
RAs are, and always have been, exclusive organisations; that is, 
their benefits are basicall y avai I abl e onl y to member 
organisations. It seems odd that the RAs should be operating in 
the direct interests of precisely those companies least likely 
to take advantage of their existence by joining i.e. the members 
of the industry, usually in a majority, who were too small or 
technically too backward to regard an RA membership as relevant 
to them. If the objective of improving the technical level of an 
industry in a general way was taken to involve the recruitment 
of large sections of the more backward, smaller members of an 
industry, the RAs as a whole have not been conspicuously 
successful in achievino it over the period of their existence. 
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While all RAs have small firm members. only in few cases are 
these more than a small fraction of all the small firms in the 
industry. "( ... ) A proportion of those small firms which are 
members are unconvinced that their association has their 
interests at heart."l 
The objectives of the RAs are still evolving from the ones 
set when they were established. In order to prepare themselves 
for the 1990' s and beyond. they wi 11 have to re-state their 
objectives. They have to start by asking what their organisation 
should be doing and why it exists and by redefining what the 
organisation's business is. The following is a set of criteria 
derived from this research which summarises the goals which any 
RA is aiming for:-
(1) To be one of the foremost membership-based international 
research, consultancy, training and information centres in 
Europe/the world. 
(2) To be a financially independent surplus-generating. non-
profi t distributing centre able to fund and sustain its own 
growth and development. 
(3) To be a financial and intellectual attraction to talented 
persons for employment in the marketplace. 
(4) To be an essential source of techno-economic strategic 
information and consul tancy to management in the industry served. 
(5) To be an agent-for-chanqe through research to stimulate 
innovation, improve profitability and international 
competitiveness of the clients served. 
(6) To be a prime source of policy advice to the Government and 
the relevant European Commission Agencies. 
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(7) To be a centre of influence for business synergy between the 
sectors of industry served, and the related suppliers and 
equipment manufacturers. 
12,3 Marketina Factors 
12.3.1 Less Dependence on Qovernment Income 
Table 12.1 The RAs' Income 
Government Sources in 
(£100,000) 
From 
1988 
RAs 
AMTRI 
BCIRA 
BHRA 
BNF 
BCR 
BGI 
BLC 
SMT 
BRA 
CIRIA 
CAT 
ERA 
FCR 
FIR 
HAT 
HRC 
LAM 
MIRA 
PR 
PERA 
PIRA 
RAPRA 
SAT 
SI 
SIRA 
SRA 
SCR 
TRA 
WRc 
WI 
WIRA 
BTTG 
CAMP 
Lea 
Total 
Source: 
Govt. 
1.15 
6.70 
10.87 
3.36 
9.41 
2.04 
1.94 
30.00 
4.97 
0.63 
31.50 
0.98 
4.60 
0.63 
35.00 
1.75 
10.00 
1.45 
12.30 
9.06 
2.45 
5.44 
7.76 
1.44 
7.26 
2.77 
21.00 
30.00 
9.00 
Total 
14.10 
26.81 
47.13 
24.00 
46.31 
6.80 
9.70 
100.00 
22.60 
17.50 
2.55 
105.15 
6.50 
24.04 
4.21 
80.04 
7.00 
90.86 
9.67 
154.40 
72.11 
39.91 
27.20 
77.63 
7.20 
29.04 
30.20 
231.20 
120.00 
53.00 
As \ 
8\ 
25\ 
23\ 
14\ 
20\ 
30\ 
20\ 
30\ 
22\ 
0\ 
25\ 
30\ 
15\ 
19\ 
15\ 
44\ 
25\ 
11\ 
15\ 
8\ 
13\ 
6\ 
20\ 
ERR 
10\ 
20\ 
25\ 
9\ 
9\ 
25\ 
ERR 
17\ 
ERR 
66.80 0\ 
265.46 1553.66 17\ 
RAs' Annual Reports 
In the last two 
decades, the RAs in general 
have become less dependent 
on government income. In 
1970, 32\ of the RA's total 
income carne from government 
sources: by 1988, it had 
corne down to onl y 17\. In 
real terms. it carne down 
from over £30 million in 
1970 (1988 prices) to £26.5 
million in 1988. One of the 
RAs with the lowest 
proportion of income from 
the Government is SIRA with 
less than 6\ of its turnover 
in 1989 (see case study on 
SIRA). The RAs have also to 
be less dependent on MoD 
contracts. FOLMER for 
example had to merge with 
BNF and had to make 
redundant all its support 
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staff after going through a difficult time brought about by its 
over-dependence on MoD contracts. 
There are some RAs Tabl e 12.2 RAs' Overseas Income 
(1988) (£100,000) 
which were over-dependent on 
government income and 
statutory levies e.g. BCIRA 
where in 1988 over 25\ of 
its total income came from 
the DT1-and 28\ came from 
statutory leviesa (see table 
12.1). If RAs like BClRA do 
not become less dependent on 
government income, they will 
face a very di fficul t time 
ahead due to the 
Government's attitude 
towards the funding of R&D. 
1 2 3 2 
. 1 . t· Internat10na lsa 10n 
In 1970 only 4\ of the 
RAs' total income came from 
overseas sources but by 
RAs overseas Total As \ 
AMTR1 0.50 14.10 4\ 
BCIRA 2.09 26.81 8\ 
BHRA 8.84 47.13 19\ 
BNF 4.32 24.00 18\ 
BCR 3.80 46.31 8\ 
BGI 6.80 0\ 
BLC 0.40 9.70 4\ 
BMT 18.55 100.00 19\ 
BRA 1.20 22.60 5\ 
CIRIA 17.50 0\ 
CAT 2.55 0\ 
ERA 16.63 105.15 16\ 
FCR 6.50 0\ 
FIR 1.80 24.04 7\ 
HAT 4.21 0\ 
HRC 30.04 80.04 38\ 
LAM 7.00 0\ 
MIRA 24.00 90.86 26\ 
PR 0.05 9.67 1\ 
PERA 6.00 154.40 4\ 
PIRA 10.82 72.11 15\ 
RAPRA 8.57 39.91 21\ 
SAT 2.72 27.20 10\ 
SI ERR 
SIRA 33.62 77.63 43\ 
SRA 0.05 7.20 1\ 
SCR 2.97 29.04 10\ 
TRA 1.58 30.20 5\ 
WRc 10.00 231.20 4\ 
WI 18.22 120.00 15\ 
WIRA ERR 
BTTG 53.00 0\ 
CAMP ERR 
Lea 66.80 0\ 
Total 206.77 1553.66 13\ 
Sources: RAs' Annual Report 
1988, it has increased to 13.5\. In real terms (1ge8 prices), it 
increased from £3.75 million to £20.7 million. Table 12.2 shows 
the percentage of RA income from overseas sources in 1988. SIRA 
a The Scientific Research Levy has been abolished in 1990. 
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for example had over 40\ of its turnover from overseas sources 
in 19892• The trend towards increasing overseas income among RAs 
is reflected by the following statement3:-
"The growing internationalisation of our activity is 
evidenced by the many overseas contacts made by our 
staff in order to enhance AMTRI' s visibi 1 i ty - not 
only in the Community but in the world at large. As 
1992 approaches, Europe will become increasingly 
important as a market for our activities ( ... )." 
This trend is expected to continue into the 1990's because of 4: 
(1) the increasing competition in the UK market. 
(2) deregulation, in particular after 19925: "In recent times, 
as technology has become an international commodity and trade 
barriers (my highlighting) have started to come down, technical 
excellence has become a prerequisite for survival in the world 
market." 
(3) the increasing global competition and the pace of 
technological change. 
(4) the UK's government and industry attitudes towards R&D. 
But the cost of marketing overseas is high and there are 
RAs which are not very keen to obtain an EC funding because of: 
(1) the high marketing costs. 
(2) it only funds 50\ of the total co=t. 
(3) the problem in finding suitable EC partners. 
(4) the bureaucracy - it sometimes takes more than a year for 
the project to get off the ground after it has been approved. 
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12.3.3 Reaional Presence 
The importance of regional presence (wi thin the UK and 
Overseas) is growing. This is essential if the RA wants to 
embark on a market development strategy or a market penetration 
strategy (see chapter 11). The following are some examples of 
increased RA presence within the UK and abroad:-
(1) SIRA - set up Ometron Ltd. in the USA in 1982 to market its 
products. 
(2) RAPBA - set up offices in London (1988). the USA (1987). 
Billingham (Teeside)(1989) and Optimat in Scotland (1989). 
(3) PERA - set up CALTEC in Aberdeen. 
(4) WI - joint venture with Edison Welding Institute (1984). 
12.3.4 Adopting a Hiaher Profile 
The BAs are aware of the need to adopt a higher profile. WI 
for example puts special emphasis on selling (over 1800 visits 
a year), visits from clients and members (7000 a year) and 
encouraging its staff both to attend and organize conferences. 
The BAs in general have improved their publicity campaign 
through:-
(1) Promotions which are more focused. They are concentrating on 
the industry sectors and technologies which they have targeted 
including those of strategic importance. 
(2) Promoting the awareness of the importance of marketing 
wi thin by using training programmes and involving operating 
staff. 
(3) Greater emphasis on on-site exhibition areas stressing 
commercial benefits arising from the work of the RA. 
(4) The usage of conferences and training as a form of 
publicity. These activities are usually self-financing. 
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(5) The usage of publicity brochures that address industry needs 
and issues rather than technological capabilities. The target 
audience and objectives are taken into account when planning 
videos. 
Among the other areas of publicity the RAs can improve are: 
(1) The liaison between publicity and operational staff in 
covering strategic issues. 
(2) Developing a new corporate image and logo at the appropriate 
time. 
(3) Continually assessing the effectiveness of activities and 
improving their policy accordingly. 
(4) Developing new promotional activities and eliminating or 
reducing less effective ones. 
12.3.5 Proactive Attitude 
The RAs are aware of the need to be more proactive than reactive 
to opportunities6: "To become pro-active in our approach to the 
world rather than merely reactive." There is a greater awareness 
of the necessity to influence their clients whether from industry 
or from the Government. 
12.3.6 Open Membership 
The RAs' total income from membership did not change too 
much between 1970 and 1988. In 1970, it constituted about 23\ of 
the total turnover and in 1988 it dropped to around 17\. In real 
terms (1988 prices) it increased slightly from £25 million in 
1970 to £27 million in 1988. Table 12.3 shows some RAs' 
membership income as a percentage of their total turnover. 
265 
Table 12.3 RAs' income from membership subs (1988)(£100,000). 
As 
RAs subs Total Percentage 
Amtri 0.71 14.10 5% 
BC1RA 10.39 26.81 39% 
BHRA 0.92 47.13 2% 
BNF 4.80 24.00 20% 
BCR 12.41 46.31 27% 
BGI 6.80 0% 
BLC 9.70 0% 
BMT 100.00 0% 
BRA 2.94 22.60 13% 
CIRIA 17.50 0% 
CAT 0.40 2.55 16% 
ERA 105.15 0% 
FCR 6.50 0% 
FIR 5.04 24.04 21% 
HAT 4.21 0% 
HRC 80.04 0% 
LAM 7.00 0% 
MIRA 3.64 90.86 4% 
PR 9.67 0% 
PEn 18.90 154.40 12% 
PIRA 7.21 72.11 10% 
RAPRA 2.90 39.91 7% 
SAT 8.98 27.20 33% 
SI ERR 
SIn 77.63 0% 
SRA 7.20 0% 
SCR 29.04 0% 
TRA 9.26 30.20 31% 
WRc 148.21 231. 20 64% 
WI 30.00 120.00 25% 
WIn ERR 
BTTG 4.00 53.00 8% 
CAMP ERR 
Lea 66.80 0% 
Total 270.71 1553.66 17% 
Source: RAs' Annual Reports 
The RAs are aware of the need to open their membership door 
and to attract more members. PERA for example has up to 12 full-
time staff members whose duty it is to recruit members. In 1988 
alone, PERA's income from membership exceeded £1 million7. The 
benefits Qained by the RAs through the increase in membership 
include:-
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(1) income from the subscriptions. For some RAs, it constituted 
only a very small percentage of their turnover e.g. 1\ of SIRA's 
turnover in 1974. 
(2) contacts and an easy access to them. 
(3) an increase of the RA's credibility. 
(4) keeping in touch with industry needs. 
SATRA was one of the lastRAs to open its membership door 
in 1990 to members from low labour cost countries (see appendix 
1.6 on SATRA). 
12.3.7 Pricing 
The RAs are learning to exploit their individual 
differentiating features in order to add more value to their 
services or products. Only then will they be able to have control 
over pricing and margins. 
They are aware that in a price-driven market, competition 
is very keen and they often have to undercut their competitors 
(especially HEls) to secure a job. 
The RAs have also to ensure that a proposed project is not 
being over-resourced especially in price-sensitive projects. The 
projects could be lost because of unnecessarily expensive staff 
included for some activities or because more work was proposed 
than necessary to meet the client's needs. 
Marketing overseas is expensive. RAs may have to charge a 
higher fee rate for overseas clients to cover additional 
marketing costs. 
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12.3.8 Collaboration with HEls 
Rather than to regard the HEls as competitors, the RAs are 
learning to view them as collaborators. The HEls have the 
advantage when they compete in a price-sensitive market i.e. the 
HEls are able to undercut the RAs. LEA for example, would as far 
as possible avoid a direct competition with the HEls. 
Most RAs like RAPRAb would collaborate with the HEls. The 
RAs benefit because:-
(1) they get value for money. 
(2) the collaborative programmes complements their own research. 
(3) the programmes can attract funding e.g. industrial, regional 
or government funding. 
(4) they can keep abreast with the latest development. 
12.3.9 Wider Market Base 
RAs that appear to have a firm future are those working in 
fields such as production engineering, hydromechanics, materials, 
joining, food and electrical engineering. These RAs offer expert 
R&D and technological guidance in subjects which have wide 
appl ications across industry, and are not confined to one sector. 
For example, the goal of the new organisation, BNF-FULMER, is to 
extend its activities to the wider field of materials (see case 
study on BNF) instead of confining itself to metals only. Another 
advantage of a wider market base is that it helps to even out the 
peaks and troughs in the demand for services and products. Other 
examples of RAs widening their marketing base are:-
(1) BTTG - expanding into biotechnology. 
b Rapra is involved in a Research and Materials Centre based 
in South Wales, involving University College, Swansea. 
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(2) RAPRA - widening its activities beyond rubber and plastics 
into materials. 
(3) SATRA - started a Clothing Technology Centre. 
(4) WI - expanding beyond welding into joining. 
The RAs that started life serving some narrow sectors well 
realised that the change to a technology (or set of technologies) 
base is the most promising way to go, but overall rationalisation 
on these lines could certainly result in fewer institutions. 
12.4 The RAs· Services and Products 
The RAs' services and products can be broadly be divided 
into collaborative research, general programme and near-market 
services/products (this includes contract research, consultancy, 
training, conferences, testing, accreditation, selling database, 
marketing softwares and exploitation of research). In 1988, the 
RAs received more than £130 million from industry in comparison 
to only £66 million (1988 prices) in 1970. This increase of 
industry income came mainly in form of near-market activities. 
The RAs' biggest increase of income came through contract 
research, which rose from 22\ in 1970 to over 56\ in 1988 of its 
total turnover. 
12.4.1 Collaborative Research 
Collaborative research is growing in importance. 
Coll aborative projects are executed on the basis that the finance 
is contributed speci ficall y , rather than subscribed wi th no 
particular objective in view. These acitivities help RAs to 
respond to industrial demand within their broad statutory limits 
of operation. They enable member companies to tie their financial 
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suppport for RAs to particular items of work which seem desirable 
to them. The increasing acceptance of collaborative projects have 
formed part of an overall policy of RAs which embraces also new 
ideas of membership and of the subscription basis. 
The relative suitability of collaborative projects to 
individual RAs depends very much upon the history of the RA, the 
type of work its members require, and the likely acceptability 
of the different formulae to members. 
The collaborative project is favoured by RAsS because of 
the following advantages:-
(1) It fosters closer links between RAs and interested industrial 
members. 
(2) It helps to bring about a greater participation of members 
through joint project management. 
(3) It allows the demonstration to members of a more direct 
return on money spent than the RA general programme did. 
12.4.2 General Programme 
Most RAs still carry out a programme of general work - R&D 
projects selected and defined by an association's representative 
bodies and executed in the belief that they will be of value to 
the membership as a whole, or to a large part of it. In many 
cases, such work is of diminishing significance, being replaced 
by directly commissioned (individual contract or collaborative) 
research. There is, nevertheless, a strong current of opinion 
among the member firms and the RAs themselves, that however far 
the RAs go in making their work directly-commissioned there 
should always remain a certain core of quite basic work not 
executed in response to direct industrial demand. Without the 
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core programmes, the RAs would soon be reduced to consultancy 
firms. Furthermore, they would lose their competitive edge over 
other R&D contractors as well as their reputation as centres of 
excellence. They have to maintain their technical 
competitiveness. For an RA to abandon all speculative or non-
mission oriented work would lead to a situation in which, however 
successful it is in the short term, it would be living off its 
technical capital. Keeping the core programme would also serve 
the purpose of conveying some scientific satisfaction to 
association staff, who may be disenchanted if opportunities for 
undertaking work other than at the applied or development end of 
the technical spectrum were entirely closed. Another factor is 
the need for the association to remain a source of technical 
original i ty for its industry i. e. to be abi e to sugqest new 
project ideas for potentially profitable investigations to its 
member firms, most likely some kind of core programme of 
relatively open-ended technical work. 
12.4.3 Near-Market Research 
A recent survey carried out on CROs in the EEC9 (most of 
the RAs in the UK were in the sample size), showed that over 80\ 
of the respondents' main activities were applied research 
(general or client-related) and only 6\ basic research. Applied 
research is closer to the market, higher value and less risky to 
carry out. 
In the last two decades, the RAs' activities have shifted 
from being technology-driven to being customer-driven mainly 
because of the changing attitudes of the Government and Industry 
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with regard to R&D and because of the need to be commercially 
viablelO • 
"A key feature is that HATRA, whilst attracting as 
many members as possible, must not become reliant on 
membership income, on grants or Government support (my 
highlighting) but must be financed primarily by its 
income from fee-earning aci ti vi ties and sal es (my 
highlighting). ,,11 
The RAs are active in product development on behal f of 
clients. Since these activities are closer to the market, they 
attract a significant income for the RAs. Some RAs have been 
successful in using their existing resource base by 
interdisciplinary working and objectivity in the selection of 
technologies to provide solutions for clients. The RAs have also 
been successful in developing software products in collaboration 
with their clients or software houses e.g. BMT and BHRA. 
The RAs are also actively involved in testing, 
accreditation and consultancy i.e. activities which are closer 
to the market and with tighter deadlines on short-term projects. 
RAPRA's order book for example is only 6-8 weeks. WlRA 
experienced a 20\ increase in consultancy income, 24\ in 
instrument sales and 30\ in testing in 198712 • The RAs' 
expertise built up in testings and accreditation enable them to 
carry out consultancy and the development of test regimes and 
testing systems for clients. Consultancy adds value to testing 
on its own. Though consultancy may not generate higher fees it 
can be a good marketing tool. 
The Us are interested in increasing the number of new 
commercial opportunities as well as those with higher value or 
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fees. In order to achieve this, the RAs' approach towards 
research has shifted from:-
(1) one that is just interested in explaining what the 
technology is all about to one where they ask themselves how 
they/clients can best exploit it. 
(2) a skill-oriented to a task-oriented one. 
(3) one that is used to carrying out long timescale programmes 
to one that takes on shorter timescale programmes. 
(4) one. that analyses the components in a system to one that 
analyses the system. 
(S) being a sub-contractor to being the main contractor. 
12.4.4 Consolidation of RAs Services/Products 
The RAs have been consolidating their position by selling 
existing services to a broader client base as reflected by the 
following statement made by AMTRI' s Chairman after a major 
restructuring programme in 198613 :-
"Members will be well aware of the reasoning behind 
the decision for the change of name, organisation 
structure, and operating strategy ( ... ). Thus today, 
AMTRI is well embarked on a new direction, with a much 
broader client-base (my highlighting) than in the 
past." 
Another example is BMT, which sold off its old facilities and 
si tes and used the capi tal raised to di versi fy beyond its 
traditional market e.g. into environment and transportation. 
MIRA on the other hand is thinking of consolidating its 
position by cutting down its range of facilities and services 
and thereby bringing down its overheads as well as providing a 
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greater focus. This has to be achieved without sacrificing its 
flexibility for research. 
The RAs' core programme (especially those attracting 
support from the DTI) has been more focused14 : 
"Over the years. we have developed into an extrememl y 
diverse organisation serving virtually every sector of 
indusry. At a practical level this has given us a unique 
blend of skills and experience, but modern technology 
requires continuous investment both in people and 
facilities. Realistically, we cannot expect to operate at 
the leading edge of every technology and difficult choices 
have to be made." 
These programmes are not meant to generate income in their own 
right but as vehicles to develop technologies that can be 
exploited as single client projects at a later date 15 : "( ••• ) we 
invest in research to ensure the retention and enhancement of 
our technology lead". Some RAs are finding difficul ties in 
funding their core research prograrnmes 16 : "( ... ) industrial 
support has been lower than expected. We clearly have much to do 
to persuade our industry to fund this activity, which is the 
nucleus of our operation." 
12 .•. 5 Quality A'~Q~ 
RAs are increasingly aware of the need to up-grade their 
services to clients. RAs have to implement and communicate a 
quality policy among their staff to address the following 
issues:-
(1) a successful and consistent management of the proposal 
submission and selling process. 
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(2) the consistent application of best practices and procedures 
to project management. 
(3) modifying attitudes and behaviour within RAs to ensure the 
total support for a long lasting quality improvement. 
One way of achieving this is the appointment of a quality 
manager that would:-
(1) give a clear focus for the development and implementation of 
an RA-wide quality policy, which must also have a top level 
management commitment. 
(2) give a clear signal to existing and prospective clients that 
the RA makes the achievement of quality a high priority. 
12.5 Manaqemen~ 
12.5.1 Flexibility in the Oraanisational structure 
The RAs are aware of the constraints of an organisational 
structure that is too rigid and does not enable them to respond 
to the changing environment. The Divisional Structure has its 
advantages but on the other hand it cannot respond quickl y 
enough to the internal and external forces that affect the RAs. 
The matrix form of structure is a popular one among the RAs 
and has been adopted by RAs like WRc. PERA and BTTG. ERA was the 
first RA to introduce this structure in 1980. It is a complex 
structure with a high dependence on both vertical and horizontal 
flows of authority and communication as shown in figure 12.1. 
LEA and SIRA for example, tried it but had to abundon it because 
of the complexity. Introducing the matrix structure requires 
quite a cultural change in the organisation. In contrast, the 
divisional structure depends prirnari lyon vertical flows of 
~ Progranme 
Manager 1 
Programne 
'--- Manager 2 
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Chief 
Executive 
. .. I Dlvls10n 
Manager A 
Division A 
Engineer 
Division A 
Engineer 
Figure 12.1 Matrix Organisational structure. 
I I 
"Di vis ion 
Manager B 
Division B 
Engineer 
Division B 
Engineer 
authority and communication. In order for a matrix structure to 
be successfully put in place, great attention should be paid to 
such things as thorough participative planning, training, clear 
mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities, excellent 
internal communication, and mutual trust and confidence. Another 
important condition is that the RAs must be of a certain size so 
that there is a big enough pool of human resources to go around 
and to justify the cost of setting up the support systems for it 
(e.g. the management system). Despite its complexity, the matrix 
structure is useful when the RAs need to add new 
services/products, customer groups, and technology to their range 
of activities. 
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Whatever organisational structure the RA adopts, it needs 
one that can bring about the following benefits:-
(1) reduction in costs involved in senior management posts. 
(2) elimination of activity duplication. 
(3) increase in the minimum size work uni ts together with 
improved back-up. 
(4) greater flexibility in the use of resources. 
(5) reduction in the tendency to protect an "empire". 
(6) devolvement of responsibility to front-line management. 
(7) better career opportunities and more flexibility in working 
practices. 
12.5.2 Marketing structures 
In the divisional structure used by RAs, selling and 
marketing are done by individual divisions. This places a very 
clear focus and responsibility for the divisions to sell their 
individual capabilities. However, it has the serious disadvantage 
that opportunities for selling the combined resources of more 
than one centre may be missed. It also means that marketing to 
major clients is diffused and not targeted at the appropriate 
decision makers. 
Another form of marketing organisation adopted by most RAs 
in the last decade (e.g. by WRc) is the matrix marketing 
structure, whereby all responsibility for marketing is placed on 
marketing executives who link with the operating staff required 
to pursue particular oppportunities. This overcomes the 
disadvantages of the first approach, but removes some of the 
involvement and responsibility for marketing from the divisions. 
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A third structure adopted by RAs is a compromise between the 
two above. It enables synergy and places clear responsibility on 
the divisions for marketing and selling their own services (see 
appendix 1.6 on PIRA). 
Another major change in the organisational structure of the 
RAs which reflects the importance placed on the marketing 
function is the creation of posts and teams like:-
(1) Marketing Director 
Some RAs have created the post of a Marketing/Commercial 
Director to give sales and marketing a higher profile. The status 
of the person is usually of that of a Research Director 
responsible for the operating resource. This helps to give a 
clear signal, internally and externally, that the RA is 
corrmercially-driven and that sales and marketing are given a high 
priority. It is essential that other responsibilities which need 
managing at a senior level, incl uding administration, finance and 
personnel, should not dilute sales and marketing by combining 
these activities. These administrative duties should be the 
responsibility of the Head of Administration. The role of the 
Marketing Director is to:-
- ensure that a credible marketing strategy is in place, which 
is effectively implemented and clearly communicated internally 
and externally. 
- have overall responsibility for formulating and meeting the 
RA's sales budgets. 
- promote the image and capability of the RA at a senior level 
in major client organisations. 
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(2) Marketing Manager 
In areas where there is a clear need for marketing the 
combined capability of the RA, a Marketing Manager would need 
to:-
- develop and maintain high level contacts in major client 
organisations. 
- understand the commercial issues causing the change in these 
sectors. 
- identify major opportunities for the RA in addressing these 
issues. 
- coordinate an appropriate response. 
- increase the income in these sectors. 
Marketing managers should have a clear annual sales target for 
their industry sector. 
(3) Business Development Manager 
The key responsibilities of the Business Development Manager 
is to:-
- in conjunction wi th the Division Manager, develop roll ing pi ans 
for selling services provided by the division (across a broad 
range of industry sectors). 
- assist the Division Manager and operating staff in his centre 
to identify opportunities for selling services and for developing 
new services when a market need has been identified. 
assist the Division Manager in ensuring that potential 
opportunities are prioritised and followed up. 
- coordinate and focus all sales activities within the division. 
- provide focus of communication between divisions and the 
Marketing Director. 
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(4) Project Teams 
Small marketing project teams can be established for each 
of the industry sectors identified as having significant growth 
potential. These teams would be led by the nominated Marketing 
mHanager for the sector and would comprise an appropriate 
representative from each division on a temporary basis. Apart 
from fulfilling their prime marketing objectives, the teams would 
have the additional benefit of developing a greater breadth of 
technical and commercial awareness in industries outside the 
previous direct experience of individual participants. 
An area which an RA has to look into is its relationship 
wi th the DTI. There is a need to be more proactive in the 
relationship with DTI HQ Divisions, and particularly in 
establishing good personal relations with individual HQ Officers 
and assisting the DTI to formulate their objectives. Rather than 
to have a fragmented approach to the DT1, a senior member of the 
marketing staff can be appointed as a DTI co-ordinator, with the 
responsibilities of: 
- developing and maintaining the contact with the most important 
HQ Divisions. 
- assisting in setting up and maintaining a database giving 
details of RA-DTI contacts, current requirements, attitudes of 
key DTI Officers and early warning of new policies, activities 
and opportunities. 
- a co-ordinate response to new opportunities identified. 
- ensuring that DTI Officers have a favourable view of the RA's 
capabilities. 
- maintaining an up-to-date view of future DTI spending. 
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other members of the RA's management staff will also have 
contacts with DTI staff. The role of the co-ordinator should not 
be to by-pass or undermine these relationships, but to make the 
overall communication with the DTI more effective and proactive. 
12.5.3 Shifting of Control from the Council to a Board 
of Directors 
There is a growing shift of the control of an RA from the 
Counci 1 . to a Board of Di rectors especial 1 y so since RAs are 
becoming less dependent on member subscriptions (around 20\ of 
the RAs' turnover in 1988). If the Council is still the body 
constituting the legal directors of the company, the staff 
obviously have minimal control. The RAs that have progressed well 
come closer to being run in the style of contract research 
insti tutes and it is inevi tabl e that such changes wi 11 be 
reinforced with the passage of time, with the membership side of 
the house fitted in differently and the membership's position in 
respect of policy much reduced. 
Among the Os that are run by a Board of Di rectors are 
BICERI, RAPRA, MIRA, BMF-FULMER, CERAM, ERA, ANTRI, PIRA, MIRAc 
and SIRA. The Board of Directors has sole control of the business 
management of the RA, with the Council being retained as the body 
representing the members. 
Among the RAs that adopted this change, SIRA appears to 
have gone the furthest towards staff control in 1982, now having 
a Board of Directors consisting of five staff (including the 
Managing Director) and five non-executive directors, all elected 
CChanged took placed in 1989. 
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by members of SIRA, pi us a chairman (see appendix 12.1). It 
appears that the furthest one could go while retaining basically 
the Memoranda and Articles of the Association like the existing 
RAs, would be a Board comprising a majority of executive 
directors, no Council, a minimum of two members who would, of 
course, have basic control by their ability to appoint and 
dismiss board members (see appendix 12.1). 
12.5.4 InfOrmation Systems 
It is important for RAs to have good information systems, 
whatever organisational structure they adopt. RAs like WRc, HR 
Ltd., LEA and SIRA have their own form of management information 
system. The system can assist the RAs in:-
(1) becoming commercially driven. 
(2) providing interdisciplinary support. 
(3) giving a rapid and professional response to enquires. 
(4) helping to act rather than react to opportunities. 
(5) improving the coordination of operating and marketing 
activities. 
It ia particularly important to respond quickly and 
efficiently to telephone enquiries. A well designed and properly 
used sales and information system is an essential tool in making 
the RA more commercial in terms of how it is run internally and 
how it is perceived externally. 
Beaides being used in support of sell ing and marketing, 
information syatems can also help to generate a high profile for 
selling and marketing .s an essential core activity in an RA. The 
latter objectiv.s can be achieved by circulating, on a weekly 
b.sia, aelected information on the progress of leads and 
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submdssions to operating and marketing divisions as it affects 
the individual staffs' areas of responsibility, but also in 
summary fo~. on the progress of the whole RA against budgets. 
Finally. however well the system is designed and used, it 
can only be successful if it supports a management-led commercial 
culture. 
12,6 Culture 
12.6.1 Corporate Culture 
The RAs are projecting an image of independence from any 
single source and to stress their ability to carry out R&D 
contracts in strict confidence. MIRA emphasises the fact that it 
is an independent financial unit without stockholders, and not 
controlled or influenced by anyone major manufacturer, but 
instead is used by all of them17 • Another example is BHT as 
reflected by the following statementl8 : "As a commercial 
organisation, independent of Government or other vested interests 
" . . 
The RAs are stressing: 
(1) their impartiality and confidentiality. 
(2) the change of their "academic image" to a centre of 
excellence tailored for industry. 
(3) its multidisciplinary approach; being task-oriented rather 
than skill-oriented. 
(4) that they are market-driven rather than technology-driven. 
(5) quality .ssurance. 
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12.6.2 Indiyidual Culture 
On an individual staff basis, the culture is changing: 
(1) from one that is narrow in concept zone to one that is wider 
and more flezible. 
(2) from an I-shape (deep specialist) to a !-shaped one (with 
breadth and depth). 
(3) towards one that can tackle inter-disciplinary problema. 
(4) from one that is technology-driven to one that is 
commercially driven. 
(5) from a civil servant culture to a commercial one (applies to 
former GlREs like 8M! and HR Ltd.). 
The leadership style of an RA is crucial. It needs to be 
more commercially ndnded, which is essential for the survival of 
the RA in the 1990' •• Por example, MIRA replaced its Managing 
Director in 1987 by one who was more commercially oriented and 
who brought in a few key people from industry to hold management 
positions in MIRA (see appendix 1.6 on MIRA). Th. reason for this 
was to instill a new working culture within the organisation. 
12,7 '1'UrnQ yer 
Th. chang.sin the RAs' turnover has been dealt with in 
detail in chapter 8. The following is a summary of the major 
changes:-
(1) In 1988, the RAs' total turnover accounted for 1.5' of the 
total R&D expenditure in the OK in comparison wi th 1.65' in 1968. 
(2) In 1988, the total RAs' turnover to total industry 
expenditure on R&D expenditure dropped to 2.26' from 2.19' in 
1968. But in real terms (1988 prices), it increase4 from £95 
IIdllion in 1970 to £155 million in 1988 i.e. there was an 
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increase of over £60 mdllion. 
(3) In 1970, onl!' 4' of the ItAs' total turnover came from 
overseas in comparison to 13.5' in 1988. 
(4) The income from the Government dropped from 32' of the ns' 
total turnover in 1970 to only 17' in 1988. In real terms (1988 
prices), it dropped from £30.8 million to £26 million in the same 
period. 
(5) In 1970, 68' of the ns' total turnover came from industry; 
.by ~988 it had increased to over 83'. In real terma, it increased 
from £63 .illion to £128 Ddllion over the same period. 
(6) contract research acoounted for only 22' of the RAs' total 
income in 1970 and it increased to 56' in 1988. In real terms 
(1988 prices) it increased from £20.8 million to £87 million. 
12.8 . sta££i,nq -
The ohan~es in the staffin~ level of ItAs has been dealt with 
in detail in chapter 8. The followin~ is a summary of the major 
chan~e.:-
(1) The overall total of staff numbers of RAs decreased sli9htly 
fram 5957 in 1970 to 5515 in 1988. 
(2) The avera~e number of employees per RA increased from 138 in 
1970 to 167 in 1988. 
(3) The top five employers in 1988 were WRc(667), "1(520), ERA 
(388), PERA (350) and 8MT (340). Amon9 the smallest RAa in 1988 
were SRA (20), BAT (16) and CAT (14). 
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12 .9 CODcln.i.OD _h, 
~he RAa are going through a period of critical change. It 
-mar be that the late 1960's and the 1970's will be regarded as 
a critical turning point in their history, when the historical 
DotioD of cooperative research of the old style lost its 
supremacy to be replaced bJ that of directlJ-commissioned work 
(contract research) in its various forms. 
RAs as a whole are far from being dying institutions. R&D 
expenditure in RAa had expanded in real terms in the last two 
decades. But to improve their efficiency and their value to 
induatrr, RAa are to adopting new principles of operation. Many 
options are open to them - the days of the standardised formula 
organisation are gone. Some RAs have merged with complemetary 
RAs. 80me are attempting to become centres of excellence within 
a specific technical field, or to adopt a functional approach in 
order to break awaJ from over-dependence on a single industrJ. 
Activities from directly commissioned projects - whether 
group or repa,ment work - is increasing. The importance of a 
general programme determined by an elected Councilor research 
commdttee is diDdnishing. 
The idea of membership has ceased to 1nvol ve programme-
control as one of its central benefits. Membership conveys the 
~ight of preferential, though not necessarily exclusive access 
to RA services. 
Associations have reduced subscriptions levels to accord 
with these changes and simplified bas.s. Member subscriptions do 
not give right of access to all RA services or free access to 
.ervices at the information end of the spectrum. All other 
services are now paid for at the time of receipt. The 
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remuneration ma:r range-from -contributions for participation in 
a group project to-fee-payment for a specific piece of 
confidential contract work or for an item of information service 
eKceeding the basic mdnimum co~ered by subscriptions. 
At the centre of RA affairs there should be a core programme 
of Don-mdssion oriented work to serve as the source of technical 
stimulation or simply creativity for the RA as a whole. 
-Membership subsoriptioDs should not be eKpected to pa:r, if at 
all~ for more than a proportion of this. It ought to be supported 
fro. surpluaes generated from commissioned projects and/or 
specific government contracts. 
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CHAE""X'e:R 13: CASE S~ 
13_._L~~ ___ S.tJ.!.~_ - ___ ~-HRA 
The British Hydromechanics Research Association (BHRA) was 
set up more than 40 years ago (1947) and its main objective then 
was to disseminate information to its members (from the pump and 
valves industry). 
During the 1960s, it was one of the fastest growing research 
associations. It had an income of £363,000 in 1970 (£2.1m in 1989 
prices). Among its early members were ICI and BP located at 
Cranfield. It is now a contract research organisation which still 
supplies information and data for its members but which has 
expanded into the off-shore industry and into the mechanical and 
civil engineering field. 
In 1989, it changed its corporate status to one limited by 
shares through a management buy-out. This move meant that BHRA 
broke away completely from the RA principle and is now a profit-
making contract research organisation. 
13.1.1 Range o~.ti vili_~_~ 
BHRA's activities cover:-
information, consultation, design and development services for 
the mechanical, civil and offshore engineering industries 
(covering all aspects of fluids enqineering) 
- problem solving 
- contract research 
- field investigations 
- physical and mathematical modelling 
- computer software development 
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- publications 
- conferences 
- fluid engineering databases. 
13.1.2 Statistiqal Comparisons 
staff number 
staff number ranking 
Turnover (1988 prices) 
Ranking of turnover among RAs 
\ Income from government sources 
1971 
122 
*13 
£2.19m 
K.A. 
36 
\ Overseas income less than 5\ 
* Estimated; N.A.= Not available 
Sources:- BHRA's Annual Reports 
13.1.3 lIIBA's Enyironment 
1988 
192 
11 
£4.7m 
10 
23 
19\ 
- BHRA was affected by recession from 1974-1976 and 1979-1982. 
Tbe effect of tbe current recession bas not been ascertained. 
- An international isation of researcb is goin9 on. There is scope 
for increasing overseas income especial I y in carrying out! 
collaborative research. 
-There has been an increased demand for contract research and 
consultancy, for software, database, accreditation, training and 
.conferences. 
Its core research has been threatened by reduction in 
gove.rnment income especial I y after tbe DTI review in 19832: "This 
shortfall (RBs support) in turn had an adverse effect on cash 
flow." 
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- It benefited when the OTI adopted the Market Related Pricing 
in 1985. 
- It is affected by the instability of the DTI and the launching 
of the Enterprise Ini tiati ve Scheme3: "The Board and Counci I have 
to report that although much effort has ·been put into complying 
with the new DTI schemes, it is unrealistic to assume that we 
will recover this income quickly." Its income from the OTI 
dropped dramatically from £1.5 million in 1987 to £0.5 million 
in 1988 and £0.56 million in 19894• 
- BHRA is threatened by the privatisation of HRSS: n( ••• ) as 
required by members, the Council has been keeping a close watch 
on developments. This will continue to avoid any adverse effects 
on the interests of the Association." 
- There is increased competition from HRS, GIREs (NEL) and IRCs 6: 
"Greater competition from the proposed multi-disciplinary 
university research centres seems likely." 
- There is a good working relationship with the Cranfield 
.Institute of Technology. 
13.1.' Internal Audit 
- BBRA ia over-dependent on government income. 
- There is a· need to-widen its mal"ket beyond the pump· and val ves 
industry. It has to break away ·from being a particular industry .. 
based RA. 
- There is a potential for obtaining overseas income. 
~.BBRA should exert more influence on the DTI in the shaping of 
the projects it will support. 
- It experienced the disadvantages of being run by a Council 
until 1986. 
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- Its span of control is too wide, caused by too many· divisions 
in the structure. 
- There is a need to project an image of a centre of excellence 
in the field of fluid engineering. 
- Its membership was discontented with the high subscription 
rates. The subscription system was obsolete and the benefits of 
membership needed to be redefined. BHRA had to become less 
dependent on membership income. 
- BBRA was over-staffed prior to the management buy-out. It 
.required to increase its turnover to staff ratio. 
- staff appraisal and remuneration needed to be introduced and 
more emphasis put on training especially with its difficulties 
of recruitment. 
- Its style of leadership required·a change after the BBRA review 
in 1985. 
- There was a need to set up· a mangement system • 
. -13-;1.5 -stra·teqiea .Adopted 
BHRAadopted·a combination of the following strategies:-
(1) Market development: This is a strategy planned to move away 
from . dependence on 90vernment . funding and to expand 
internationally to obtain more funding from the overseas market. 
(2) Diversification: As early as the mid-sixties, BHRA expanded 
from catering for pump manufacturers -alone to serving any 
organisation with an interest in the broad field of fluid 
engineering. 
By the late 1970s, it had started to diversify into new 
areas7: "( ••• ) there are cl ear signs of increasing contract 
business and opportunities for diversification." 
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It is now involved in the Offshore, Process and Manufacturing 
Industries. 
One consequence of the change in the DTI's funding was that 
the traditional areas of BHRA business which used to enjoy DTI 
support became unprofitable and over the coming years efforts 
will have to be made to diversify and improve their market 
relevance8• 
Its strategy in the 1980's was to diversify into new areas 
outside its traditional market9:. lilts new aim is to be able to 
. .respond rapidly to new technology and new business opportunities, 
taking an entrepreneurial role to expand into areas outside its 
traditional market of industrial contract R&D" (Annual Review of 
BBRA, 1987; Foreword from Chairman, pp 1). 
(3) Retrenchment: BHRA had to make· redundant over 30 (out of 
220) of its staff in 1986. 
(4) Forward integration: BHU tried to take overHEL when it was 
put up for privatisation. Among the advantages were:-
- their ·expertise complemented eaoh· other ·especially the Plow 
Measurement Division of KEL. 
- the benefits derived from taking over a possible competitor. 
- BBU needed a site in scotland to. be near the Petroleum· 
.Industry. 
13.1.6 . Chana"' ·in ·UD ........ . 
(1) Organisational structure 
BHU was organised along a divisional structure by services. 
In 1986, it was restructured. BHRA redeployed its technical 
stafflO into Business Groups, broadly based on:-
(1) new technology, fluid sealing and fluid power 
(2) industrial fluid dynamics 
(3) multi-phase flow. 
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Three support groups provide financial, commercial and 
general services, while the information service has been placed 
in Business Group 3 to assist in the closer integration of its 
work with BHRA's engineering interests. 
(2) ownership/Corporate status 
~he Council considered the change of its corporate status 
in 1988, which would. enable BHRA to -tackl e the increasingl y 
fierce competition both at home and abroad. It also contemplated 
new ventures and collaboration with other research institutes 
overseas. 
The reduction in subscription of course helped to reduce 
·thepower or -influence of the Council and gave ;reater authority 
to the Executive Board. Finally, it paved the way for the 
·.management buy-out of BHRA in 1989. One of the reasons why BHRA' s 
members were convinced of the change in status was the 
diffuseness of its membership (due to the widening of its 
membership base). Another possible reason is that most of its 
-__ members were SHEa which t-ended to be less involved in the running 
of the RA. 
The status change was finalized at the end of 1989. In the 
old· structure,·· BHRA· ·was· responsible both for the control of 
membership and its reaearchactivities as shown in figure 13.1.1. 
: ··-1& the ,Jlew structure, -membership andreaearch activities are 
separated. BHRA continues to monitor the membership and the "Hew 
BHRA" takea over t.he research side as shown in figure 13.1.l. 
BHRA still has interests in the "New BRRA" through share 
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I~HHA S I" s ~r 
BHRA 
Members Research 
IBHRA · s New St.ruct.ure 
BHRA 
1 • 
1.-------1 __ _ 
I 
Members 
- BHRA has shares in the "New BHRA", 
-• 
• 
• 
• "New BHRA" 
- BHRA still contracts out its research to "New BHRA", 
- Greater freedom for "New BHRA", 
- "New BHRA" can raise capital, 
Figure 13,1,1 BHRA s structure 
Management-Buy-out, 
before and after the 
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ownership and the contracting out of research to the "New BHRA". 
The "New BRRA" has the abi 1 i ty to raise capi tal and greater 
freedom in deciding the direction it will take in the future. 
(3) BBRA's Goals 
BURA started looking into its l~ng-term prospects as early 
as 1971 when the objectives and structure of the Association 
were redefined, and membership rules changed. In 1979, it also 
collllissioned a study into its future in the mid 1980's. 
In 1985, the Council approved a 5-year Business Plan for 
-the Association which set ambitious targets of further growth 
and diversification, including growth of membership, and 
confi~ed its basic aims1l :-
(1) to be a centre of technical expertise, providing cost-
effective engineering and information services which contribute 
to industry's strength. 
(2) to be a viable business which makes and uses disposable 
margins effectively. 
(3) to provide a pleasant and challenging working environment in 
-which .taff have worthwhile jobs which-extend them fully. 
'l'he key elements of its strategy were to market its services 
.-with a highly coamercial approach and to emphasize the 
exploitation of its technol09y12: "To become a profitable 
company, BRItA has also to make changes in its commercial policy 
.and procedures, enhancing its management information systems in 
order to improve business efficiency and profit margins alike". 
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(1) culture 
When BHRA decided to diversify into other areas, it had to 
.. implement a policy that encouraged an attitude among all the 
staff of versatility and sensitivity to market opportunities. By 
1985, it had introduced staff grading, an appraisal and 
remuneration structure, aided by job evaluation to improve 
employe. pol-ieiea -further. 
In 1987, a new staff reward scheme was formulated which was_ 
performance-oriented, and included personal, group and company 
performance factors. ~his new salary structure and staff 
appraisal system was implemented and following this change, a 
career development scheme was put into action. These actions were 
necessary in order to helpin--recrui tment as well as to keep 
existing staff satisfied. 
It is also interesting to note- that most of BHRA' s promotion 
came from within its own ranks, with the exception of the post 
of the Director of Research. The new Director of Research was 
formerly the Deputy Director of WRc (WRc changed its corporate 
status to one limited by shares in April -1989). One possible 
re.son for this appointment waa to-guide BHRA towards a change 
-ini,u .OVll corporate status. Another ·reason was the need to 
instill a new culture that was more- commercially minded. 
(5) staffing 
Pig. 13.1.213 is a bar chart which shows the growth in staff 
awabersof BHRA from 19-70 to 1988. In 1970, it had only a staff 
number of 122. This figure continued to grow until it reached a 
peak of 247 in 1985 i.e. the year before the review on BHRA was 
implemented by the Council. Right after the review, the staff 
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Figure 13.1.2 Bargraf showing the trend in staff numbers from 
1970 to 1988. 
Source: BHRA Annual Report (1980) 
number decreased gradually to 192 in 1988. 
Human resources are always a matter of prime consideration 
in an -o-rganisation like -anRA. Like any other RA, BHRA tends to 
have a high turnover of staff and therefore it has to maintain 
- recruitment at - -a - -level -to keep pace with -its expanding and 
diversifying business. Recruitment has always been a problem 
- --experi-enced·by-BHRA especially SO in -the early 1970's when it was 
experiencing growth. A typical statement made durina the 1970s 
with regard to recruitment was as follows 1:-
"This year it has been a matter of some concern that 
-recruitment of bright young people has proved particularly 
difficult: so much so that we have fallen short ot our 
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man;ower targets des~i t~ il sustained recrui tm~nt camPiligr.". 
During the recession in the late 1970's and early 1980's. 
BHRA had fewer probl ems wi th recrui tment as there was amp 1 e 
supply of engineers and scientists. But during the upturn in 
industrial activity in the mid 1980's, it was inevitable that the 
Association experienced some increased turnover among its 
research staff, with some of the able younq research engineers 
decidinq to move to enhance thei r careers. The probl em of 
recruitment is still a difficulty experienced by BHRA. 
Implementing its own review (carried out in 1985) in 1986, 
it had to reduce the number of its support staff by 34, and this 
was achieved by a combination of redundancy and early retirement. 
This was the first time in the last two decades that it had to 
make redundant a relatively high percentage of its staff (close 
to 14\ of its total staff in 1985). 
BHRA greatly emphasized training especially so since it was 
so difficult to recruit the people that matched its requirements. 
In 1985 alone, its external expenditure on in-service training 
exceeded 0.5\ of its total turnover, which is believed necessary 
to maintain a viable training policylS. 
After the imp! ementation of the review in 1986, group 
accountabi 1 i ty was faci 1 i tated by a revised management accounting 
structure which is aimed at making it easier to channel human and 
financial resources into the promising areas. 
(6) Turnover 
Table 13.1.1 shows BHRA's sources of income for 1971 and 
1988 respectively. The most apparent increase in income came from 
industry where it increased from 35% to 60\. The most significant 
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decrease in income came from gover nment sources where the 
percentage dropped from 36% to 12%. Figure 13.1.3 shows that by 
1983, its income from industrial research contracts had exceeded 
its government contract income16 • Its income from other sources 
(which includes income from conferences and publications) dropped 
from 22% to 12% of the total income and so did its income from 
membership subscriptions which dropped from 7% to 3%. 
Table 13.1 .• 1: BHRA'·s incoMe -aecoTding to aOUTces for 1971 and 
"1-988.-C in 1988 price.). 
1988 1971 
f (m) as % f (m) as % 
Industrial income 2.81 60 0.774 35 
OTl contracts plus 
000 income 1.09 23 0.79 36 
publications and 
confeTenees 0.6 12 0.48 22 
. --MembeTships 0.13 3 0.156 7 
Total 5.6 100 2.19 100 
Sources BHRA's Annual Reports 
. .fable 13.·1.1 shows that over the last two decades, BHRA had 
more than doubled its income from f2.19m in 1971 to £5.6m in 
1988. In -realt-erms, -its· income from· ·industry increased from 
fO.774m to £2.81m i.e. theTe was an increase of over £2m. Its 
·incomefrom government -sources also increased by £0.3m from 
£O.79m to f1.09m and its membership subscriptions dropped from 
£156,000 to £130,000 over the same period. 
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Figure 13.1.3 Distribution of BHRA s Income from 1976 to 
1984. 
(7) Membership 
BHRA has been maintaining if not decreasing its membership 
subscriptions so as to attract as many members as possible. 
Between 1966 a·nd 1976. the·membership subscriptions dropped 
by ,over 70% .in real·terms. The Council .nevertheless recommended 
no increases in-the subscription· rate in order to continue to 
.provide t.hestrongestpossible incentives for membership. Its 
membership scheme-diversified into new industries and-moved 
.towards larger member companies. By 1980, overseas members alone 
constituted 23% of the total. 
- rhe or i9inal and complex turnover-based subscr iption system 
was replaced by a simple system which for nearly all members 
mea.nt a considerable reduction in the amount paid. It thus 
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represents good value even to small firms; and perhaps 
particularly to the large firms where for a minimal amount they 
have access to information services as well as BHRA literature. 
The value of access to centrally organised information. 
abstracting and library service can easily exceed the relatively 
small subscription entailed. Beyond this, all services are paid 
for directly. 
(8) Services/Products 
One of the main reasons·why BHRA has been successful in 
developing new markets over the last two decades is because it 
was less oriented towards a specific indUstry than some other 
RAs. Having moved away from a link with pump manufacturers alone, 
it is now angled towards users of the technology concerned. that 
is all companies and-organi·satio·ns applying ·pr..inciplesof fluid 
, • .&nglneer Lng· ... -which embraces a ·largenumber -of very different 
industries. The RA has thus got out of the danger.-which stalks 
the strongly industry-OT iented RA of becomi ng a ·pawn of its 
industry·. The diffuseness of -BHRA's membership means that there 
-is lesaneed to _. keep everyone happy •. or to tread a careful path 
through the-bickerings of an enclosed industry. 
:One-af its most important·decisions in the last two decades 
was to diversify into areas like the marketing of computer 
so.ftware • .-setting up its -own data base (as early as 1978) and 
seeking financial support to identify and exploit its skills and 
knowledge (eg OIAJET-andNIMIX). Presently. nearly a quarter of 
its staff are involved in collection and dissemination of 
technical information in the field of Fluid Engineering. It is 
also placing emphasis on activities like conferences, seminars 
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and publication activities. They are important if it wants to 
project an image of a ·centre of excellence- in the field of 
fluid engineering. The advantage of this achievement is se1f-
generating. Its reputation ensures that meetings and conferences 
are of sufficient status to attract -experts" both to address 
them and to attend. Even larger member companies. who quite 
possibly have more qualified staff in the teohnical areas 
concerned than -the RA. can nonetheless recognise the value in an 
Association if its technical quality is sufficient. 
The growth-in straightforward -contract work for individual 
sponsors has been particularly rapid - so much so that today the 
BHRA -makes more sense-if regarded-as a specialised consultancy 
working for a wide range of clients rather than an RA (certainly 
a ~raditional RA). This 1s also one of the main reasons why the 
Council agreed to change its status to one limited- by share 
through -a iftsnageme-nt buy-out in 1990. 
BHRA is also aeekingto increase its influence within the 
~TI and help shape the kind of projects which the DTI plans to 
support •. This is important because~-
- the DTI is its biggest single customer. 
- of the considerable personnel ·changes in the DTl that may have 
... _ .an-adverse effect on negotiations and on placing of contracts. 
- of the shrinking R&D budget of the DTl and competitive· 
tendering. 
(9) Core Programme 
Although the profit margin in research is a lot smaller 
than in development contracts. BHRA still feels very strongly 
that it has to continue its core programme of research with the 
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financial support from the DTI. Wihout its core programme, BHRA 
.. ·.ight lose its cOMPetitive edge (this came out very strongly in 
the new Board of Directors' meeting after it changed its 
corporate status in 1989 )17. 
BHRA is also aware of the need to maintain a good portfolio 
of research programmes. Part of it is the General Research 
Programme. which is more speculative in nature. In the process 
of obtaining as much industrial contract work as possible, there 
is also a need to update its core research as expressed by the 
.following statement 18: "While we have been successful in 
attracting contract R&D, it is important to remember that to 
maintain and update our technical base. we need to continue our 
General Research Programme at a high level." 
Over the last two decades, BHRA's research has moved away 
from basic or fundamental research to one which is of interest-
to specific members and strategic or applied in nature. The 
control of the research programmes shifted from the Council to 
the Executive Board ·becauseit was better placed (knowing the 
market needs) and with a shorter response time. 
( .10) Oyer seas Income 
Because of the adverse situation in the UK,. increasing' 
attention was ·paid to marketing its services overseas. BHRA 
decided to· concentrate on the USA market in the early 1980's by 
setting up a joint marketing agreement with an American firm. By 
1988 alone, 32% of its industrial contract income came from 
overseas (22% came from Europe). 
In 1987, BHRA made special efforts to expand its overeas 
.arket by concentrating on the European markets in both the 
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Community and industrial sector~. This area of its business has 
.shown steady improvement and is likely to increase in importance, 
particularly when.·collaborati-ve projects are concerned. 
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Figure 13.1.4 BHRA's turnover trend from 1980 to 1989 (1988 
prices). 
Source: BHRA's Annual Report from 1980 to 1990 . 
. ' figure 13.-1.4 shows a line ·graph of the trend in BHRA's 
turnover from 1980 to 1989.' Its turnover continued to ·grow from 
.1980 to 1986,r-eachi.ng a peak of over ·£5.6 million (1988 prices) 
in 1986. from 1986 onwards, it declined to £4.8 million"in 1989 •. 
. fIgure 13.1.5 shows -the trend in ·the· surplus (or def ici t ) 
of income from 1980 to 1989. BHRA continued- to show a surplus in 
income from 1980 to 1984. It was in deficit from 1985 to 1986 
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before it recovered in 1987 with a surplus of £0.189 million 
(after having made redundant 34 of its staff in 1986). In 1988, 
it was in deficit, mainly due to the reduction in DTI funding. 
Figure 13.1.6 shows the trend of the turnover/staff ratio 
from 1980 to 1989. It grew from £19,000 per employee to a peak 
of £28,OOO/employee ·in 1988. Its ratio for 1988 was still 
slightly below £31,OOO/employee- i.e·. the 1988 average for the 
overall turnover/staff ratio of RAs. 
13.1.7 Conclusion .... -
Over the last two decades, the Rothschi ld Pr i nciplehas been 
one main change in government policy which affected BHRA most. 
SHRA had to ·adapt -,to become· more commeTcially mi nded and less 
~ependable on government funding. This principle has 
fundamen-tally changed the mission of BHRA . 
. ·After '-changing i.ts corporate status· in 1989, profit making 
is explicitly· its goal. This· change in. status -involves taking··· 
.oreat ·risks-but- on .. the other hand it brings along many 
advantages·, for· example. t.he·abili-t.yto raise· cap! tal. BHRA has 
too.- .anageltself~ -carefully- especially when the UK is going 
through a recess-ion -or w-ith high· interests Tates .• , BHRA w-illhave· 
.to mal-ntain ·8 close rapport with the ·oldBHRA· as well as the 
OTI. 
BHRA may have -to consider -changi .. ng its divisional form· of· 
organisational· structure to a matrix form i norder to respond 
more quickly to the changing environment. It ought to look at its 
portfolio of ·research programmes carefully and not neglect its 
core research. 8HRA has been carrying out its business review 
periodically and with the change in its corporate status, 
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defining its prime object is a lot clearer. 
The organisation's culture will need time to change to one 
that is versatile and sensitive to mar ket opportunities. Over 
this period of change, the leadership provided is crucial. BHRA 
is now able to offer greater incentives in order to retain its 
sta·ff as well as to attract br ight young recrui ts . 
TheRAs whose status rema-ined limited by guarantee are 
keeping a-close watch on BHRA. If 8HRA is successful, other RAs 
may well consider very carefully whether or not to change·their· 
status. 
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Source:- BHRA's Annual Reports from 1980 to 1989. 
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Figure 13.2.1 shows the most important milestones in SIRA's 
evolution. SIRA Ltd. originated in 1918. It was known then as the 
Scientific Instrument Research Association. In the late 1960's, 
. lt changed its name to SIRA Institute Ltd. The change of name was 
significant for it marked the transition of SIRA from an 
organisation oriented towards a.specific industry (namely. the 
scientific instrument manufacturers) to one which aims to promote 
the use of instrumentation and control methods in all industry. 
The event which is most closely identified with the change of 
SIRA's emphasis was the setting up of the Industrial Measurement 
and control's (IMe) activity in the late 1960's. The IMC's 
programme was formulated with the simple objective of improving 
the utilisation of scientific control and automation procedures 
in production by· technically less advanced industr ies. The 
launching.of this programme could have represented a move by SIRA 
away from·its traditioRal base within the scientific instruments 
manufacturing industry i.e. SIRA could be said to have changed 
·from.an.i.ndustry~based ·toa technology-oriented RA. 
Another significant milestone in SIRA's evolution was when·· 
its Articles of Association were changed to permit SIRA to hold 
a majority stake in an external companY.·This move cleared the 
.way for .the formation of subsidiaries. 
1918 
cit"ca 1939/45 
194; 
circa 1950 
1966 
1969 
19;0/80 
1974 
1981/82 
1983 
1986 
1988 
1989 
1990 
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MlLESTO~ I~ SI~~ EVOLUTION 
Established as 3t"itish Scientific Inst~~ent Reseat"c~ 
Association [an exclusive collabot"ative t"esearch organisation 
for the British scientific instrument industry]. 
Non-instrument makers (t"e:~c:antly) allowed into membership. 
Moved from London to Chis:e~urst; majot" staff expansion. 
Instrument uset"s form col:acorative project at Sir'a to evaluate 
process instruments. 
Open door policy introduced. membership exclusivity declining. 
Collaborative t"esearch prcgramme abandoned. membership fees 
cut. 
- Sira moves to pOSition of financial independence 
- Business based on contract R&D and test set"Vices with 
some group-sponsot"ed projects 
- No safety net in the event of failure. 
Contract research thrives; Sira starts to bid competitively 
for contracts and develops overseas business. 
Board structure replaces ~ember Council as ultimate management 
body; Sira achieves management independence. membership 
subscription accounts for less than 1% of turnover. 
Articles of Association changed to permit Sira to hold a 
majority stake in an external company; way is clear for 
formation of subsidiaries. 
Ometron Ltd and Sira Safety Services Ltd formed. 
Ometron Inc formed. 
Image Automation Ltd formed. 
Sira Electro-optics Ltd and Sira Precision Ltd formed. 
Sira Holdings Inc, Sira Inc and Sira Communications Ltd formed. 
Sira Group Board structure introduced. 
Sira R&D and Sira Test & Calibration Centre managed as 
autonomous enterprises. 
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13.2.1 Banse of Actiyities 
SIRA's acitivities comprise:-
- measurement, instrumentation, control and optical systems 
technology 
research. development, design. testing, evaluation, 
cal ibration,' safety· .. assesstRent a·nd··trai ni.ng services 
- production of prototypes. and specialist products. 
It has specialists in automatic inspection, test equipment, 
expert systems. process control. infrared optics, fibre optic 
sensors, space instrumentation and engineering stress 
measurement. SIRA operates internationally. 
staff number 
Staff number ranking 
Turnover (1988 prices) 
Ranking of turnover among RAs 
, Income from government sources 
, Overseas income 
* Estimated·; "N.A .-Not-available 
SOUTces: SIRA's Annual-Reports. 
'13 ;2.3· SIRA·'. Environment_ 
189 
*9 
£3.4m 
N.A. 
48' 
*4% 
1988 
250 
8 
£7.76m 
8 
6% 
43' 
- The introduction·of the IMC programme in SIRA by the Government 
helped to shift SIRA activities from purely scientific toward 
applied research and engineering. 
- The implementation of the Rothschild Principle was seen as a 
threat to SIRA. 
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- The scientific instrument industry began to diversify in the 
1960's. SIRA's limited resources could not cope with the range 
of resources required to meet the needs of the industry. 
- The demand for collaborative research dropped in the early 
1970·S. 
- There is a niche market for SIRA's products and services. 
- SIRA was affected by the recession between 1974 and 1976 and 
between 1979 and 1982. 
- The single market in 1992 will increase opportunities for 
testing and legislative work. 
13.2.4 Internal Audit 
- There are opportunities for it to exploit its research and 
patents. 
- One possible problem encountered among the subsidiaries within 
SIRA Ltd. is the rivalry·between them. Another difficulty is the 
cost involved in preparing the accounts of these subsidiaries. 
- There is a possible danger of being too diversified. 
- Its product lines are doing well with a niche market. 
- It is non-dependent on government income. 
_ SIRA suffers from the peaks and troughs of demand for· its 
services. 
It experiences difficulties using a divisional form of 
organisational structure. 
- It uses the facilities and expertisei n HEls and GIREs to 
complement its own facilities. 
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13.2.5 Stratesies Ado~ 
In the early 1970's. SIRA's strategy was a combination of 
concentric diversification and market development. In the early 
1960's, it pursued a strategy of forward integration and at 
present. it adopts a combi nation of mar ket development and 
concentric diversification. 
(1) Concentric Diversification 
SIRA adopted this strategy in the early 1970's to add new 
but related fields of research activities to its existing ones. 
It decided to abandon collaborative research and diversify into 
contract research and development. test services and some group-
sponsored projects. This strategy was useful because:-
- collaborative research was a slow growth area. 
- services like contract R&D and testing were in demand. 
(2) Market Development 
SIRA started to introduce its services/products into new 
geographic areas as early as 1970. SIRA was successful in 
developing its market overseas because its services were of high 
quality and the market was relatively new and untapped for them. 
This form of strategy is still adopted by SIRA. 
(3) forward Integration 
SIRA changed its Articles of Asociation in 1981 to enable 
it to hold a majority stake in an external company. This paved 
the way for it to forward integrate by acquiring another 
organisation or setting up subsidiaries. This strategy helped· 
SIRA to market and exploit its research e.g. by marketing SPATE 
through Ometron Ltd. SIRA adopted this strategy because:-
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- of the negative response from firms to exploit its research. 
- it helped to generate revenue. 
- it had the capital and human resources. 
- of the high profit margin. 
Fig. 13.2.2 shows the subsidiaries controlled by SIRA Ltd. 
Once these subsidiaries are set uP. they are supposed to survive 
on their own. Each of them is a profit centre with its own 
autonomy and the responsibility to improve its individual 
products/services or offer new services lies with the subsidiary. 
13.2.6 Changes in SIRe 
(1) Sybsidiaries Controlled by SIRA Ltd. 
In the early 1970's, the members felt that they could not 
manage SIRA and that SIRA was in direct competition with some of 
them. ln 1972, the Council set up a committee to look into the 
running of SIRA. The committee recommended that the Council be 
dissolved and be replaced by a Board of Directors. The members 
of this Board did not need to be members and could be anyone from 
industry. The recommendation -was accepted and the members became 
guarantors. 
This move gave SIRe the independence it needed, greater 
flexibility and speed in responding to the needs of the members, 
as well as greater freedom in planning for the future and greater 
control of its destiny. The line of command was shortened with 
the elimination of the Council. 
The subsidiaries of SIRA Ltd. are as follows:-
SIRA R&D handles contract research and development; 
applications, consultancy, design; and specialist system supply. 
SIRA R&D 
SIRA LTD 
• Sc:emiiic and industrial instrumentation 
• Measurement, control and information technology 
SIRA MEMBERSHIP 
SCHEME 
• Contract research 
and deveiopmenr 
• Awareness and 
promotion of new 
technology and 
instrumentation 
SIRA TEST AND 
CALIBRATION 
CENTRE 
• Evaluation, calibration, 
testing • Applications. consultancy, design 
• Specialist system supply 
SIRA SAFETY 
SERVICES LTD I OMETRON L TO 11----+----.., 
~------------------~ 
• Instrumentation for 
engineering'stress and 
vibration anaiysis 
• Services in design and 
installation of electrical 
equipment in potenrially 
explosive atmospheres 
IMAGE 
AUTOMATION 
LTD 
SIRA 
t----i------;COMM UN ICATIONS 
LTD 
• Automatic inspection and 
process control systems 
SIRA 
ELECTRO-OPTICS 1+----+----1 
LTD 
• Optical quality assurance 
instrumentation 
• Conferences & Courses 
• Technical Training 
• Technical administration 
services 
SIRA 
PRECISION L TO 
• Manufacture and assembly 
• Optics, electronics, 
mechanics 
• Complete systems 
I SIRA HOLDINGS INC I 
OMETRON 
INC SIRA INC 
..... _L.l .... _ '13 2 2 !II. 
.. ~ .. 
.. .-Lt;d· 
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The subsidiaries of SIRA can contract out research to SIRA Ltd. 
in the process of product development. SIRA Ltd. generates ideas 
or new products for its subsidiaries. 
- SIRA Membership Scheme handles the awareness and promotion of 
new technology and instrumentation. 
SIRA Test and Calibration Centre handles evaluation, 
calibration and testing. 
SIRA R&D accounts for about £3m of SIRA's turnover and SIRA 
Test and Calibration Centre for £lm. The income from its 
Membership Scheme is negligible. 
The product 1i ne of SIRA Ltd. is run by three of its 
subsidiar ies each of which contr ibute about f2m to SIRA's 
turnover:-
- Ometron Ltd. markets equipment like the Stress Pattern Analysis 
by Thermal Analysis (SPATE) or the Vibration Pattern Imager 
(VPI) . 
Image Automation Ltd. markets equipment for automatic 
inspection and process control systems. 
- SIRA Electro-Optics Ltd. supplies equipment for optical quality 
assurance instrumentation. 
The rest of SIRA can be divided into 2 groups of 
subsidiaries. The first group consists of:-
_ SIRA Safety Services Ltd .• which was bought over from ICI in 
1981. It offers services in design and installation of e1ectr ical 
equipment in potentially explosive atmospheres. 
_ SIRA Communications Ltd., which handles conferences. courses 
and training. 
_ SIRA Precision Ltd .• which handles most of the manufacturing 
and tooling needs of SIRA's manufacturing subsidiaries. 
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The second group of subsidiaries deals with the marketing 
of SIRA's products and expertise in Amer ica. This group is 
controlled by SIRA Holdings Inc .• which controls Ometron Inc and 
SIRA Inc. 
(2) Ownership/Status 
SIRA's members chose to retain its limited by guarantee 
status with its members as guarantors. The advantage of this 
status was that the members felt less threatened by SIRA and that 
it could not be taken over by another organisation. This form of 
corporate status will remain unless the Board of Directors sees 
a need for a change e.g. the need to raise share capital. 
(3) Staffing 
Figure 13.2.3 shows a bar chart of SIRA's staff number from 
1970 to 1988. It shows that SIRA's staff number peaked at 250 in 
1988. In the last decade, its staff number increased·except for 
1982, when it dropped to 158. which was brought about by the 
recession in the UK. The figure shows that between 1970 and 1988. 
its staff number increased by 60 i.e. more than 30". In the last 
two decades. it has grown to a size that is large enough to form 
clusters of experts. which helps to boost the morale of the 
research staff as reflected by the ratio of 1:2 of scientific to 
support staff in 19891 • 
Just like most RAs. SIRA faces problems with regard to 
recruitment and the high turnover of staff. It has to compete 
wi th industry in attracti ng capable young recrui ts. The di versi ty 
of SIRA's activities and the problems arising from high staff 
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Source: SIRA Annual Reports. 
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turnover mean that consideration has to be qiven to job sharing. 
Greater attention must also be given to well-planned staff 
traininq and recruitment. 
(4) Turnover 
Table 13.2.1 
Industrial income (£m) 
Income from govt. sources 
Total (£m) 
(all in 1988 prices) 
Table 13.2.1 SIRAs Income 
1970 as % 1988 as % 
1. 77 52 7.3 94 
(£m) 1. 63 48 0.466 6 
3.40 7.766 
in 1970 and 1988. 
Table 13.2.1 shows that SIRA' s percentage of industrial 
income increased drama tical I y from 52% to 94% of its total 
turnover between 1970 and 1988. In real terms, it increased 
from £3.4m to £7.766m. Its income from gove,rnment sources 
decreased from 48% to 6% over the same period. In real terms, it 
dropped from £1.63m to'£0.47m. 
SIRA's present income from the DTI is far below the ceiling 
figure of 25% of turnover set by the DTI which reflects SIRA's 
pol icy of not being dependent on DTI income since the earl y 
1970's. 
(5) Membership 
In 1966, SIRA introduced an open door policy towards 
membership, which caused membership exclusivity to decline. It 
was one of the first few RAs to do this. Membership fees were cut 
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drastically and by 1974, they accounted for less than 1% of its 
turnover. Consequently, the members had very little control over 
the running of SIRA and it was taken over by a Board structure 
in 1974. 
SIRA's open door policy helped it to get a head start over 
other RAs in obtaining income from overseas. In 1988 alone, more 
than 48% of its turnover came from overseas and this percentage 
was one of the highest among the RAs. 
(6) Services/products 
SIRA abandoned collaborative research as early as 1970 and 
started concentrating on contract R&D, testing and some group-
sponsored projects. Contract research is risky as it tends to 
be contracted out on a fixed cost basis. 
Figure 13.2.2 shows the set-up of SIRA Ltd. and the range 
of services/products offered by them. These enable the company 
to integrate its activities within major business sectors, 
producing hardware and products to meet its clients' needs as 
well as initiating R&D2. This provides not only extremely 
valuable experience and feedback to the staff in SIRA but, where 
required, a route for clients through from concept to production 
within the one company. The range of services/products enhances 
SIRA's ability to win the initial R&D contracts and to provide 
a sensible route for its growth and development. SIRA needs to 
guard from being too thinly spread and having too broad a focus. 
Like most RAs. SIRA suffers from the peaks and troughs of 
demand for its services. It has responded by having a wide spread 
of clients from different regions of the world and by serving a 
wide range of industries. 
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(7) Core programmes 
1989 
SIRA places great emphasis on its core research. which is 
carried out by SIRA R&D. Though it is not an explicit policy, 
SIRA would ploughbackapproximately 10% of its turnover into its 
core research. This is important if it wants to conti nue to 
exploit its research and furthermore, some of the 
products'/services' life cycle may be coming to an end. 
(8) organisational Structure 
In each of the subsidiaries. the organisational structure 
is organised along a divisional line. SIRA tried to introduce 
Matrix Management but conflicts arose in the allocation of 
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resources among managers. It finally abandoned Matrix Management. 
(9) Finances 
Figure 13.2.4 shows SIRA's turnover trend from 1980 to 1989. 
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Abb. 13.2.5 Sira's trend in turnover to staff ratio from 1980 
to 1989 
Source: SIRA's Annual Reports 
The trend increased in the last decade. On the average, its 
turnover increased by 10\ per annum. In 1980. its turnover was 
£3.8m; by 1989, it had increased to £7.76m i.e. it more than 
doubled. 
Pigure 13.2.5 shows the trend in the turnover to staff ratio 
from 1980 to 1989 (in 1988 prices). The ratio increased from 1980 
to 1989, reaching a peak of £34,OOO/employee in 1989. The 1989 
ratio ranked number seven among the RAs. 
Pigure 13.2.6 shows the-operating profit (loss) of SIRA over 
the last 10 years. In the last decade it made a profit every 
year with its biggest profit margin in 1985 (£0.914m) and the 
smallest in 1988 (£O.044m). 
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Abb. 13.2.6 Sira's operating profit (loss) from 1980 to 1989 
Source: SIRA's Annual Reports. 
13.2.7 Conclysion 
S1RA was the first RA to achieve management independence 
by being independent of income from membership subscription. It 
was one of the first RAe to abandon collaborative research and 
concentrate on contract research. It pioneered the introduction 
of a Board structure to replace Member Councils as ultimate 
management bodies in 1974. 
This independence helped it to be more versatile and 
responsive to market needs. It is not encumbered by the long 
chain of command experienced by most RAs. SIRA has to consider 
the recent changes in DTI policy l which encourages collaborative 
1. The Secretary of State for the DT1: QJJ~~~~~m~nt for 
~DterRrise . London: HMSO January 1988. em. 278. 
324 
research. for this policy could create a good market tor 
collaborative research - an area which SIRA has abandoned since 
the early 1970·s. SIRA might have to increase its membership 
drive in order to help it to find partners for collaborative 
projects as well as to gain more contacts. 
The present set-up of SIRA Ltd. is diversified. Any future 
plan for diversification will have to be looked into very 
carefully to avoid being spread too thinly. 
One of the consequences of the Single Market will be the 
increased opportunities for testing and legislative work. SIRA 
has been marketing its services and products in the EC and with 
the coming of the Single Market, this is eXpected to intensify. 
The difficult circumstances experienced by SIRA over the 
years have forced it to change from being too narrowly focused 
to being multi-disciplined and responsive to the market needs . 
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1.3.3 Ca.e S..t.-Y.4Y .. =-It.Y.!:lJ::._1.ll.i~.8.~~ .. ~:.9_b. .. L..i;._4..~-'-8B 
LJ;~.1 
The Hydraulic Research Station (HRS) was established by the 
Ooverzunent in 19.7 and moved. to its pres.ent site, Wall.ingford, 
in 1952. BRS was established to provide a· national centre of 
expertise in civil engineering hydraulics. During its 35 years 
under government patronage r it developed a substantial programme 
of basic research which achieved international recognition. 
Durin~ the 198Q's, political philosophies which favour a 
freer uae ofaar.ket for.cesdirectl.y confronted the issues of 
flexible resource aepl O-yment. Increasingl y, the. "automatic" right 
of funding.was . .removed from HRa. 
When the. UK Government started its programme of 
privaU.ation .inthe late 1970' s ,HRS was one of the candidates. 
It was the result of a policy .of shifting financial burden of 
"near-market" r-esearch·away from the public purse. The decision 
to privatise BRS was. announced in.July .1979 and in April 1982, 
~ vas. launched as a private companyl. 
. .' --13rl,.1,Jlan9 •. of ..ser.vi.ces2 
BR Ltd. does .. cOIltract..researcband consulting services in 
. ·hydraul ies· for· .the Oov.ernment and the ci vi 1 engineering industry. 
It also markets packaged computer software for the water industry. 
and for civiL engineering applications. 
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13.3.2 Statistical Comparison~ 
Staff number 
Staff member ranking among RAs 
Number of engineers/scientists 
Former civil servants 
Direct appointment 
Turnover (1988 prices) 
Ranking of turnover among RAs 
, Income from government sources 
, Overseas Income 
N.A.= Not available. 
Sources:- SIRA's Annual Reports 
77\ 
14\ 
1982 
255 
4 
N.A. 
255 
\ 
£5.94m 
5 
(£4.6m) 
13.3.3 The Privatisation Process 
1988 
285 
6 
150 
120 
165 
£am 
7 
44\ (£3.5m) 
30\ (£1. 2m) 
HRS is an interesting case where a GIRE was privatised and 
converted to an RA style of organisation. It was one of the 
Government's more successful attempts to privatise GIREs whereas 
the privatisation of GIREs like NEL and WSL was more ambiguous. 
The following is a brief account of the privatisation process. 
In July 1981, the Government appointed a "Shadow Board of 
Directors" to help steer HRS into the private sector. Its main 
purpose was, on the one hand, to negotiate with the Government 
on behal f of the future company on the financial and 1 egal 
aspects of the transfer and, on the other hand, to negotiate with 
the staff of HRS on various issues associated with the terms of 
employment. The Board's report to the Government stated that 
HRS could be privatised successfully provided the following 
conditions were fulfilled:-
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(1 ) Financial 
- The assets of HRS should be transferred free of charge. 
- Sufficient working capital should be provided to meet the cash 
flow needs. 
- The Gover nment should fund ani ni tial capi tal investment 
programme to ensure the company was well funded. 
(2) Staff 
There should be a sufficient number of HRS staff agreei n9 to 
transfer to the new company. The staff union's response was that 
the terms and conditions of employment offered by the company 
should be no worse than those the staff enjoyed as government 
employees. 
(3) Research 
The Government should underpin a programme of strategic research 
for at least the medium term (5 years). 
In order to allow time for the parties to reach a negotiated 
agreement without delaying the launch of the new company 
unnecessarily. a two-year transitional agreement was made. The 
company was formed. the assets of HRS were loaned to it free of 
charge and staff were seconded to the company on a voluntary 
basis. This enabled the company to continue the work of HRS but 
now trading as a private commercial company. At the end of the 
two years, offers of employment were made to and accepted by a 
sufficiently large number of the staff to satisfy both the 
Government and the Board of the company. The assets were 
transferred to the company. now known as Hydraul ic Research Ltd .• 
thus completing the privatisation process in April 1984. 
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13.3.4 Environm~ 
- The income from government sources is decreasing and harder to 
secure. 
- There is growing competi tion. M( ••• ) the i ncreasi n9 competition 
from overseas laboratories is a challenge that will demand new 
and more vigorous mar keti ng efforts if we are to retai n or 
recapture the UK share of the world market"3. 
- There is a wide market for its services/products especially in 
Asia and Latin America. 
- It was affected by the economic restraints in the UK and 
worldwide especially after its privatisation. 
13.3.S Internal t\l,lc;U-t. 
- From the start HR Ltd. was over-dependent on government sources 
for income. There was a great uncertainty as to what level of 
funding it could expect from the Government when the five-year 
period ended in 1987, and this uncertainty has remained. 
- There is a need to change the civil service Culture to a 
commercial one. 
- It has had to cope with a high turnover of staff especially 
during the first two years after privatisation. 
- There is a need to focus on the profit performance of the 
organisation without jeopardising its scientific capabilities. 
- There is a need to develop a new mar ket for its services/ 
products. 
13.3.6 Strategies Adopted 
The strategies adopted by HR Ltd. are a combination of 
concentric diversification and market development. It is 
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diversifying by exploiting spin-offs from its research. This is 
done through the development of specialist instrumentation and 
laboratory equipment and the development of computer software. 
But the success of this strategy is cr itically dependent on 
adequate fundi ng of its basic research by the DoE. As the 
organisation's commercial position strengthens. it will need to 
devote an increasing proportion of its funds to in-house R&D 
projects. 
HR Ltd. is developi ng new mar kets through establ ishi ng links 
in Asia and China and some middle eastern countries partly 
through direct mar keti ng and through tr ai ni n9 and technology 
transfer arrangements. 
A software house, Wallingford Software. was formed to sell 
commputer software developed within the organisation (or acquired 
through special contracts). HR Ltd. has also entered into 
marketing agreement with two instrument and equipment 
manufacturers to sell its specialised equipments worldwide. 
13.3.7 Changes in HR Ltd. 
(1) Organisational Structure 
The organisation has four main divisions: River Engineering, 
Tidal Engineering. Maritime Engineering and an Overseas 
Development Unit. Each division is lead by a Head of Division and 
in each division. there are units lead by programme managers. 
When HRS was privatised. it was necessary to recruit new 
blood at senior level in two important areas of discipline. 
Firstly, a Finance Director was brought in to provide the 
essential exper ience of pr ivate sector accounti ng and cost 
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control as well as to lay down the vital framework tor the 
introduction of commercial project management and an improvement 
in productivity. SecondlY. a new Marketing Manager was 
introduced. His function was to head the marketing and business 
development of the new organisation. He was to provide a 
framework which would enable HR Ltd. to be more proactive. The 
needs of its clients were to be identified by him and the 
necessary tools or services developed. 
(2) Qwnership/Corporat~~.~ 
The legal constitution of HR Ltd. is that of a company 
limi ted by guarantee. This is simi lar to the normal pr ivate 
company limited by share holding except that the members of the 
company (-guarantors·) do not receive any dividends i.e. the 
company is non-profit distributing. Thus. in effect. the assets 
of HR Ltd. have been put in trust with the members of the company 
acting as trustees. Apart from this the company operates like any 
other private company. The members are responsible for electing 
the Board of Directors. appointing auditors and receiving the 
published accounts annually. The main focus of attention in the 
published accounts is on the performance of the company and 
within commercial success there is considerable freedom of 
action. There is a great contrast with the position before 
privatisation, when control was excercised through manpower and 
capital spending budgets to meet the objectives of the 
departmental or central government regardless of the financial 
success of the organisation. 
The board members of HR Ltd. are corporate bodies selected 
to represent a cross section of the industry that the company 
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serves. They currently include two government departments (the 
founder members), three professional insti tutions (e. g. the 
Institution of Civil Engineers), five trade associations (e.g. 
the Association of Consulting Engineers) and three public 
utilities (e.g. British Gas). In addition to these thirteen 
corporate board members, the staffs of the company elect two 
members. Consequent I y, the company constitution is a subtl e bl end 
of private company, charitable trust and worker cooperative. 
(3) culture 
For the future success of HR Ltd. the appropriate launch 
condi tions were essential. However, the true work of 
"privatisation" really began after the launch. There was a need 
to transform the cuI ture of the organisation and to repl ace 
bureaucracy wi th modern business management. The organisation had 
to become proactive in its approach to industry rather than 
merely reactive. It had to become more conscious of cost and time 
constraints and had to respond more prompt 1 y to its cl ients' 
needs. 
HR Ltd. had to shake off the inevitable weaknesses of a 
public sector organisation. It had to become an efficient 
commercial company without losing the best qualities of the old 
HRS, in particular the ability to apply scientific research to 
the solution of real engineering problems. 
(4) staffing 
No member of staff was obliged to join the privatised HRS. 
Therefore it was necessary to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of employment with the staff unions. 
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Figure 13.3.1 The staff numbers of HR Ltd. from 1982 to 1988. 
Sources: HR Ltd. Annual Reports. 
The most difficult issue 
to resolve was the pension scheme, which required two full years 
of transitional period. A funded pension scheme was established 
that offered benefits identical to those of the civil service 
scheme, the main difference being that, as a commercial company, 
HR Ltd. could not guarantee inflation proofing of benefits quite 
as firmly as the Government can. The rest of the terms and 
conditions of employment {hours of work, annual leave etc.} were 
taken over largely unchanged. A new grading structure was 
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introduced in which the multitude of different civil service 
grades that existed at HRS were projected onto a single universal 
pay spine. The new pay structure was designed to provide greater 
flexibility to adjust the rewards of staff as befits a commercial 
company. 
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Figure 13.3.1 shows the staff numbers of HR Ltd. from 1982 
to 1988. In 1982, its staff number was 255 and it increased to 
28.s i n 1 988. Its s t a f f numb e r dip p edt 0 the lowes tin 1 984, w hen 
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steadily. 
The biggest turnover of staff took place during the 
transition period between 1982 and 1984, when more than a hundred 
o fit sst a f f 1 eft tor ema i n i nth e c i v i 1 s e r vic e 0 r due t 0 
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Figure 13.3.3 Sources of HR Ltd. Income. 
Sources:- HR Ltd. Annual Reports. 
natural wastage. 
Ii. Tota' turnover 
After privatisation, the total number of former civil 
servants decreased from about 150 in 1984 to about 120 in 1988. 
In 1984, the former civil servants constituted 65% of the total 
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number of staff, in 1988 onl y 43\. Wi th the dec::-ease in the 
percentage of former civil servants, it ought to be easier to 
inculcate a new culture within the organisation. 
(5) Turnover 
Figure 13.3.2 shows a bar chart of HR Ltd. 's turnover from 
1982 to 1988 in 1988 prices. The figure shows that its turnover 
increased continuously with £Sm as its highest turnover in 1988. 
In real terms, it increased from £S.94m in 1982 to £Sm in 1988, 
i.e. there was an increase of over 30\. 
Figure 13.3.3 shows a line graph of HR Ltd. 's income (1988 
prices) according to sources. Its biggest single customer is the 
DoE, the income of which decreased from £2.9m in 1982 to £1.lm 
in 1988. In the near future, this income is expected to remain 
constant or to decrease slight I y. The income from the eGD 
increased slightly from £1.8Sm in 1982 to £2.5m in 1988. 
The biggest increase in income comes from project work 
carried out for industry. It increased from £1.2m in 1982 to 
£4.4m in 1988. In 1982, it constituted only 20\ of its turnover 
but by 1988, it had increased to 55\. This shi ft away from 
government sources of funding, in particular from the DoE, 
reflects the policy of the management to become less dependent 
on government funding. Nevertheless, the percentage of the 
turnover from government funding is still relatively high in 
comparison to other RAs and this is mainly due to the nature of 
its activities where its main customers are public bodies. 
(6) Services/Products 
HR Ltd.'s expenditure on marketing and publicity is about 
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3\ of their turnover annually, which is modest compared to many 
businesses but vastly more than was spent prior to privatisation. 
Among the marketing efforts is the direct communication to 
their clients through courses and seminars and the exposition of 
the kinds of techniques available to clients through HR. 
HR Ltd. has also extended its range of services by 
associating with various organisations in related fields. For 
exampl e, "Wall ingford water" is a joint venture bet'.oleen the UK 
Institute of Hydrology and HR to offer a combined hydraulics-
hydrology consul tancy. It al so markets HR instrumentation and 
equipment in association with Armfield Technical Education, a UK 
firm supplying laboratory equipment, which helps to give HR a 
ready access to a worldwide network of local agents. 
HR Ltd. has established its own software house, Wallingford 
Software, which is responsible for the marketing, release and 
support of all packaged software. It extended the range of 
products to include software originally developed by one of their 
associates (e.g. a water treatment package which was originally 
produced by Severn Trent Water Authority). 
It has also set up a number of joint venture companies to 
increase its range of services and to extend its geographical 
base. For example, it has set up a partnership with a Hong Kong 
based company. 
In 1988, HR Ltd. 's income from overseas sources constituted 
14\ (£1. 2m) of its overall turnover. There is sti 11 a lot of 
scope for it to develop new markets for its services/products 
overseas. 
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(7l Core Programmes 
As a government laboratory HRS was accustomed to lonq-term 
progranwnes of strategic research, the direction of which was 
largely at the discretion of HRS, and the cost of which was met 
by the Government as deficit funding. This arrangement had to 
cease on privatisation and any research funding by the Government 
had to move to a contract basis. To ease the transition to the 
new arrangement a minimum level of contract research was 
guaranteed for the first five years after privatisation. It was 
understood that the Government was looking for an improvement in 
the efficiency of the privatised organisation and that this would 
permit a reduction in the level of government-funded research 
required to maintain the scientific base. At an unspecified level 
it was agreed, however, that the Government would continue to 
accept responsibility to support some long-term research. The 
lack of a firm guarantee of support for the scientific research 
base of HR Ltd. was and still is the most worrying aspect of the 
privatiaation. 
In 1981/82, the government-funded strategic research 
programme at HRS amounted to 35\ of its turnover and it decreased 
to 18\ in 1988/89. The turnover grew significantly in real terms 
during this period, but it is clear that the level of government 
sponsored research was reduced, as expected, after privatisation. 
An additional factor is that all of the research for the 
Government is in response to government needs and on a strictly 
contractual basis - it is not a subsidy for HR' s commercial 
operations. This presents an obvious risk to HR' s scientific 
base, a risk that has been countered in a number of ways. The 
pressure on external sources of research funds encourages a more 
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careful and selective use of these funds. Targets for strategic 
research are set more clearly and progress is monitored regularly 
to gi ve bet ter val ue ~or money as a resul t. These funds are 
increasingly supplemented by support from industry, HR in-house 
funds or contributions in cash or in kind from other industrial 
partners (e.g. water authorities). 
There is a closer collaboration between researchers at HR 
and researchers in the university sector, from which beth benifit 
greatly. 
HR is looking for ways and means to make the reducing level 
of government support for strategic research stretch further in 
terms of the science base generated. However, there is a limit 
to how far this squeeze can continue and this remains an area of 
great concern to HR Ltd. 
(8) Financial 
The financial package agreed with the Government was 
designed to ensure that HR Ltd. would be launched as a well-
funded independent commercial company. The working capital was 
drawn down over the fiist year according to the company's cash 
needs. In addition, the Government consented to meet those major 
items of capital investment that had already been in the public 
expenditure plans for HRS before privatisation. These included 
the replacement of the mainframe computer and the construction 
of a building to provide additional office space. It was also 
necessary for the Government to make a financial provision to set 
up a separate pension fund for those staff who chose to transfer 
their accrued pension rights to the new company. Once founded, 
it was to be the responsibility of HR Ltd. to maintain the 
339 
pension fund through annual contributions. 
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Sources: HR Ltd. Annual Reports. 
A monthly accounting procedure was introduced from the 
outset to help focus on the profit performance of the company. 
The monthly management accounts report the following:-
- profit and loss 
- overhead expenditure 
- staff time utilisation 
- balance sheet and cash flow 
- staff numbers 
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- order book level. 
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Figure 13.3.5 HR Ltd. operating profit (loss) from 1983 to 
1988. 
Sources: HR Ltd. Annual Reports. 
Figure 13.3.4 is a bar graph showing the trend of the 
turnover to staff ratio of HR Ltd. It increased gradually from 
£23,OOo/staff in 1982 to £28,OOO/staff in 1988 (1988 prices). 
This could indicate that it has become more eff ieient si nee 
Pl' ivatisation. 
Figure 13.3.5 is a bar chart showing its operating profit 
(loss) from 1983 to 1988 (in 1988 prices). During the transition 
period (1982-84). it made a 103s of £239,000 in 1983 and £134,000 
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in 1984. From 1985 onwards. it started makin~ profit from its 
operations and by 1988. it had made a profit of £246.000. The 
reduction of government income in the near future will have an 
impact on its profitability unless it can develop new markets 
for its products/services. 
-1..3,.~: ,.-e._.~ I:l~ l\..\~:i9..o. 
The study shows that HRS was successfullY privatised. The 
transition process was crucial but it enabled it to change and 
to adapt to its new status. 
One of the greatest fears of HR Ltd. is the lack of a firm 
assurance by the Goverment to support its scientific research 
base. This policy of the Government is not expected to change in 
the forseeable future and this remains the most worrying aspect 
of the privatisation4 : "The Board and management of the Company 
remain concerned about the level of support that can be expected 
from the Government for the strategic research programme that is 
the essential seed corn for the Company·s future". 
Because of the nature of HR Ltd.·swork. its main customers 
wi 11 always remai n publ ic bodies. The present policy of the 
Government of not funding what it "defines" as near-market 
research could affect HR Ltd. if it could not argue its cause 
with the DoE. 
There is great scope to market its services worldwide. It 
will need to step UP its marketing effort internationally 
especially so when threatened by the reduction in government 
income in the UK. 
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Privatisation may not be the only way to achieve management 
eff iciency in the publ ic sector al though accordi ng to some 
criteria. it may have worked for HR Ltd. Llke any change. It is 
not without its price and the greatest is probably the threat to 
scientific excellence and impartiality. 
Beference...l. 
1. T Weare. "Privatisation of HRS Wallingford." Presented at 
International Association of Hydraulic Research Congress. 
ottawa. August 1989. 
2. AIRTO: aIB.LQ_...Qirect...QXY_ ... L1,9~.9.l_ ... London: AIRTO Publications 
1990. 
3. Chairman Statement in: HR Ltd. Annual Report 1985. P. 5. 
4. Chairman Statement in: HR Ltd. Annual Report and Accounts 
1985, p. 4. 
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BNF was established in 1970 and it had over 400 members in 
1970/71 including 76 overseas. BNF tried to broaden its marketing 
approach in the late 1960's to keep pace with the changing 
industrial climate it was confronted with. It saw that there was 
no longer the scope for the sort of basic injection of science 
into industry which had had a rapid and large pay-off before the 
war. The old concept of membership to support a general whole-
front advance of technology had to change especially because 
industry was aware of the need to assure appropriate returns on 
expenditure. In 1990. BNF merged with FULMER to form BNF-FULMER. 
1.~---4,..l_~ n9.~LQf __ ~9ti..vj,J;.j,--es 
BNF's activities are:-
- contract research 
surface engineering~ corrosion 
- procesS and quality control and testing 
process development (powder metallurgy. metal refining. 
material forming, material joining) 
- material development (magnetic materials, advanced alloys) 
- casting technology (continuous casting. shape casting. metal 
matrix composites). 
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J._~~~j;,i~t ica L_ C_QIJI..P.u.i_SQD.S 
Staff number 
% scientists/engineers 
Staff number ranking 
Turnover in £m (1988 prices) 
Ranking of turnover among RAs 
% income from government sources 
% overseas income 
N.A.= Not available. 
Sources: BNF's Annual Reports. 
13.4.3 Intern~l-A~ 
1971 1988 
180 90 
N.A. 53% 
9 21 
3.88 2.6 
N.A. 20 
20% 14% 
15% 18% 
- BNF was overly dependent on membership subscription as a source 
of income. In 1970. over 50% of its income came in this form and 
was later reduced to around 19% in 1988. 
- BNF was an industry-based RA and could therefore be affected 
by the performance of industry. It experienced difficulties in 
planning because it was influenced too much by the state of the 
industry it served. 
- It had a narrow client base. 
- It would need to increase its efforts in obtaining contract 
research and consultancy work and not over-emphasize speculative 
research. 
- There was a need to consolidate its activities. There were 
areas to abandon and new ones to invest in. 
- BNF was managed by a council structure that was outdated and 
suffered from a lack of continuity. 
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- BNF has a good source ot income trom the leasing of its 
property. 
- BNF was reactive rather than proactive. 
~ .4 .4 .E J1vj,n~nme_nJ;, 
- BNF served an industry (non-ferrous metals) where most of the 
members have their own in-house R&D facilities. 
- It was badly affected by the recessions in the mid 1970's and 
the early 1980's and did not recover from them. "In a year in 
which UK industrial activity slid sharply into recession. BNF's 
income rose by only 6%. Employment costs ( ... ) rose by 17%"1. 
- It was affected by the Rothschild Principle. which stopped the 
automatic grant. 
- It was affected by the value of the pound which went up as well 
as the interest rate. "Interest payments are becoming a 
significant item M2 • 
~ .5 St r ll.e..91~j:l_aQQp.t.~d 
One of the difficulties experienced by BNF was the lack of 
decisions made wi th regard to its strategies. Throughout the last 
two decades. there was no concerted effort made to pull it out 
of the difficulties it was facing. The actions taken were to 
achieve short term 90als and were incremental in nature rather 
than strategic. For instance. the decision to reduce staff was 
not coupled with longer-term plans as to what direction the 
organisation should aim for. Basically, the strategy it adopted 
in the 1970's and 1980's was one of retrenchment, which was used 
to regroup through cost and assets reduction in order to reverse 
its declining state. The savings from redundancies could have 
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been used to invest in new and more profitable areas and to 
diversify into areas like software, database, testing and 
accredi tat ion as ear 1 y as the the 1970' s. 5i nce it did not 
diversify into other areas. it was difficult tor it to develop 
new markets for its products/services. 
Towards the end of the 1980·s. it was falling below a 
critical mass with only 90 staff out of which half were support 
staff and its only steady source of income was from the leasing 
of its property. If this situation had persisted. it would soon 
have had to liquidate itself. 
In 1990. BNF made the decision to merge with FULMER. This 
strategy was suitable for BNF because:-
(1) It had fallen below a critical mass. 
(2) A synergy was possible and could bring about the creation of 
new ideas. 
(3) It would enable BNF to diversify into the broader areas of 
materials. 
(4) With BNF having the site and FULMER, the cash. resources were 
complementary. 
(5) It would open up new markets. 
(6) There would be lower overheads. 
(7) It would enable it to take on bigger and riskier projects. 
It is yet too early to tell whether the merger has been a 
success or not. But among the difficulties it will have to face 
are:-
(1) the disruption during the transition period. 
(2) changes in the organisation culture. 
(3) leadership clashes. 
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l.~. 4 ..• 6 _C_llanges_ ~ n 6NF 
( 1) Or 9a n ls.9. t . .lQD§.L SJ~·Ll,I.G t\,lr ~ 
Before the merger. BNF had a div~sional form ot 
organisational structure which had advanta~es such as clear 
accountability and local control of local situations. But on the 
other hand. it was costly because of the duplication of staff 
services and facilities. BNF could have adopted a more flexible 
structure like the matrix form of management. but there was no 
need because of its small staff number. There was no problem of 
mobility and a task force could have been formed quite easily. 
After the merger. the new organisation will have to consider 
which form of organisational structure to adopt bearing in mind 
its goals and the complexity of reorganising. 
BNF used to be managed by a Council which suffered from a 
lack of continuity and was unable to respond quickly to market 
needs and the changing environment. The Council failed in one of 
its most important functions i.e. to plan strategically. Planni ng 
was important to identify and take advantage of environmental 
opportuni ties and it would have allowed BNF to mi nimise the 
impact of environment threats. 
After the merger. a Board of Directors structure was 
introduced. The Board consists of the Chairman of the old BNF 
Council, the BNF and FULMER research directors. the company 
secretaries and non-executive directors. The research shows that 
those RAs that have progressed well adopted a Board of Directors 
structure that came closer to being run in the style of contract 
research institutes. Adopting the Board Structure was inevitable 
with the membership side of BNF being fitted in differently and 
its importance in respect of policy much reduced. Now that the 
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new organisation has been forced to the market place to exploit 
its expertise. the staff ought to be delegated the authority to 
respond quickly to the market to take tull advantage of the new 
constitutional arrangement. 
(2) Leader..§..biE Pro-Y...i.q~~ 
The leadership provided in this newly merged organisation 
will be crucial. It will need to establiSh and maintain stable 
and creative teams in the world of R&D and consultancy. It will 
need to promote the personal identification of its staff with the 
overall activities and interests of the RA by improvinQ internal 
communications and encouraging collaboration between divisions. 
Due to diverse internal and external forces. change will 
remain a fact of life for the new organisation. The leadership 
must create a work environment where change is recognised as 
necessary and beneficial. so that individuals can adapt to change 
more easily. 
(3) ReSeaL9~ultur~ 
The research culture of BNF was formed mainly by the old 
concept of an RA which was largely concerned with the general 
programme of cooperative work determined by its Council and 
financed by membership subscriptions and general government 
gr ant. This concept was appropr iate from the 1920' s to the 
1970's. but it seemed far less relevant by the end of the 1970's. 
Most member firms of BNF would carry out R&D because it 
yields an advantageous commercial benef it to them. For this 
reason. the most excitinQ and rewardinQ industrial research was 
3 i }9 
usually undertaken in their prlvate .laboratories riJther than 
under the cooperative auspices of BNF. 
The results of cooperative research could not equally be 
utilised by all member companies because at their different 
sizes. management skills. goals and objectives as well as their 
resources. Firms of different sizes and in-house resources 
required widely differing services from BNF. 
The discrimination of certain sections of BNF's membership 
was inevitable. since it was impossible to run programmes of 
interest to everyone all the time. 
BNF has recognised that the tradi tioniJl RA formula of 
activity suffered from these and other weaknesses. It will need 
to change its research cul ture from one that was built on a 
specialised team to one that is accustomed to an 
interdisciplinary form of research. It will need to broaden its 
idea zone and the staff will have to be able to tackle 
interdisciplinary problems. BNF will need to change a research 
culture that is technology-driven to one that is commercially 
driven. 
(4) Staffing 
Figure 13.4.1 shows the trend in staff numbers of BNF from 
1980 to 1988. From 1980 onwards. its staff number decreased 
continuously, falling from 170 in 1980 to 90 in 1988. due to the 
failure to recover from the impact of the recession in the early 
1980's. BNF had to make redundant over 40 staff in 1984 and 
another 20 in 1987. Its staff number rankin~ amonQ the RAs fell 
from number 9 in 1971 to number 21 in 1988. 
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Figure 13.4.1 The trend in BNF's staff number from 1980 to 
1988. 
Sources: BNF's Annual Reports. 
After the merger in 1990. the staff number increased to 180 
and its ratio of scientists/support staff is expected to increase 
beyond 1:2. The increase in staff number could help to provide 
the nucleus for growth. BNF-FULMER is big enough to form clusters 
of experts and this would help to boost the morale of the staff. 
The new organisation would need to focus on investment in 
training; the training programme ought to meet its technicaL, 
managerial and business needs and ensure that the skills ~ained 
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are fully utilised throuqh the effective delegation of tasks and 
responsibility. 
(5) Turnoyer 
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Figure 13.4.2 BNF's turnover trend from 1980 to 1988. 
Source: BNF's Annual Reports. 
Figure 13.4.2 shows a bar qraph of BNP's turnover (in 1988 
prices) from 1980 to 1988. It decreased continuously from 1980 
onwards, falling from £3.58m in 1980 to £2.6m in 1988, i.e. there 
was a drop of over 27\. Its turnover in 1971 compared to 1988 
fell by over 32\. 
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To operate successfully as a viable RA, the trend in the 
decreasing turnover has to be checked. It will necessitate a 
fundamental change in the business objectives and strategy of the 
newly merged organisation. Its marketing strateay will have to 
be more clearlY focused on maximisinq sales and revenue by 
identi fying more high-val ue income opportuni ties, converting 
these into sal es and efficientl y operating the resul tinq pro jects 
to a high level of quality. Everybody in the new organisation, 
led by its senior management, must recognise these requirements 
and be motivated to maximise sales and revenue. Selling and 
marketing must be given a very high visiblity, including setting 
individual sales and revenue targets to marketing staff and 
technical centres, and rewarding people for meeting their 
tarqets. In this context, government departments should be 
reqarded as cl ients in exact 1 y the same way as commercial 
clients. 
(6) Membership 
BNF-FULMER needs to evaluate its concept of membership which 
was centered on the fund-raising function. In 1988 alone, BNF's 
membership subscription amounted to 20% of its turnover in 
comparison to the average among RAs of 10%. 
membership is becoming less important than 
For most RAs, 
in the past. 
Nevertheless, subscription income is still more reliable over a 
longer period than money derived from speci fic work. The function 
of BNP's membership would need to be questioned in the light of 
the difficult years its members went through during the last 
decade. 
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BNF-FULMER will need to chanqe the idea ot membership which 
gave an apparent, but no real right of control. Its replacement 
by a more practical membership where the prime riqht is simply 
preferential access to RA services, coul d prove beneficial. 
Membership subscription could provide basic services like 
particular information, library and small technical services. 
Beyond these, the members would have to pay individually for 
them. BNF(-FULMER) might need to broaden its membership base to 
cover a wider range of industries, review its subscription rates 
and not overly depend on these subscriptions to fund its 
research programme. 
(7) Services/Products 
Before the merger in 1990. BNF was an industry-based RA and, 
in comparison to other such RAs, could not overcome the 
disadvantages of being one. One of its failures was not to widen 
its market or create its own niche markets. For example it did 
not invest in areas like computing software or database. Another 
area it failed to diversify in was the area of 
testing/accreditation and it was not a NAT LAS accreditated centre 
until its merger. 
BNF-FULHER will need to consider integrating its research 
programmes e.g. rather than just dealing with a particular kind 
of equipment, BNF-FULMER could consider forward integrating by 
marketing the product or backward integrating by looking into the 
process the equipment operates in. This will provide not only 
extremely valuable experience and feedback to the R&D staff but, 
where required, a route for cl ients through from concept to 
production within the one company. This could help BNF to secure 
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the initial R&D contracts and to provide a sensible route for 
growth and development. But it would need to avoid having too 
wide a focus. which could incur high maintenance costs, or being 
too thinly spread. 
BNF concentrated too much on the longer-term pre-competitive 
research funded by subscriptions and aovernment income. This form 
of research has limited opportunities for attractin~ higher fee 
rates. Product development, however, which is much closer to the 
market, can attract significant income. Furthermore, this form 
of research tends to be run as club projects which have high 
hidden sales and marketing costs. This does not mean that BNF-
FULMER should neglect research which is in supcort of development 
and application and concentrate just on product development 
because the former differentiates BNF-FULMER from other research 
organisations besides creating opportunities tor tollow-up 
research. 
18) Marketing Function of BNF-FU~~ 
BNP-FULMER needs to adopt a higher profile through publicity 
campaigns. These campaigns require greater focus and should 
concentrate on the industry sectors and technologies it has 
targeted including those of strategic importance. It is essential 
that the awareness of the importance of marketing within the 
organisation is promoted through training programmes and 
involving operating staff. 
Unless BNF-PULMER has unique, differentiating features, it 
wi 11 often be competing in pri ce-dri ven markets. Routine testinq 
is an example of a price-driven market, where it is necessary to 
undercut competitors to secure a iob which then has to be 
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Figure 13.4.3 BNF's turnover to staff ratio from 1980 to 1988 
(1988 Prices). 
Sources: BNF's Annual Reports. 
operated at low (or even negative) margins. Unfortunately, 
contract R&D in general has many of the characteristics of this 
type of market. Very often the potential client judges costs on 
his own internal R&D costing system, which usuall y underestimates 
his true costs. This is why it is essential for BNF-FULMER to 
develop higher-val ue driven markets. Oni y then wi 11 it have 
control over pricing and marqins. 
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One important marketinq function which it will need looking 
into is its publicity. It will have to project the imaQe of a 
centre of excellence with expertise to offer to industry and to 
dispel the imaQe of an academic centre. 
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Figure 13.4.3 shows the trend in the turnover/staff ratio 
of BNF from 1980 to 1988 (in 1988 prices). The ratio dropped to 
its lowest point in 1982 with £18,OOO/emplovee and increased to 
£24,000/employee in 1984 after having made 40 staff redundant in 
that year. By 1988, it had increased to £26,OOO/employee atter 
making redundant another 20 staff. 
Figure 13.4.4 shows the trend in operating profit (loss) of 
BNF from 1976 to 1986. BNF made a profit from 1976 to 1980 but 
suffered losses continuously thereafter. Once again it manifests 
that BNP did not recover from the impact of the recession in the 
early 1980's. There are no figures to show its operating 
profit/loss in 1987 and 1988 but it is estimated that it broke 
even in these two years, brought about by the reduction in staff 
number in 1987 and the income from leasing its property. 
13.4.7 Conclusion 
BNF was overly dependent on the non-ferrous metal industry 
and was thus affected by the difficul t period that hi t the 
industry. The merger with FULMER could help it to widen the range 
of industries it serves and transform it from an industry-based 
RA to a technology-based one. 
One of its failures was that it did not create a niche 
market of its own within the industry it served. Instead, it 
tried to cover the whole spectrum of the research needs. 
The maintenance of a high standard of technical excellence 
will be essential to sustain long-term commercial success. The 
business must, however, be market-led and not technology-led. On 
an individual staff basis, the orqanisation culture will need to 
change from one that is narrow in its co~cept zone to one that 
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is wider and more f 1 exibl e , commercial! y dr-i ven and abl e to 
tackle interdisciplinary problems. 
BNF was one of the few RAs manaaed bv a counc11 structure 
unti 1 it merged with FULMER. After the meraer, a Board of 
Directors was appointed. gi vina it greater control and the 
ability to respond more quickly to market needs. 
BNF will need to review the function at its membership in 
line with its decision to serve a broader range of industries 
after the merger. This could be a good opportunity to widen its 
membership base. review its subscription rates and be less 
dependent on subscriptions to fund its research proaramme. 
There is a short supply of competent and qualified enqineers 
and technicians especially so in the 1990's and this will mean 
that job sharing and greater attention must be given to well-
planned staff training and development. One area which the newly 
merged organisation will need to look into is the limited career 
paths for its staff in the latter part of their career within the 
organisation. 
The new leadership will need to develop and sustain a 
winning at ti tude by raising the staff's moral e, emphasisinq 
teamwork and establishing greater confidence in its abilities 
through positive recognition of achievement technical. 
managerial and business. 
futf..erenc e,A 
1. Chairman statement in: BNF Annual Report 1979. P. 5. 
2. Chairman Statement in: BNF Annual Report 1979. P. 5. 
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Hostile Government Policy 
(a) ~ncome from Government has been increasingly difficult to 
secure, causing uncertainty among RAs (see 9.2.2 and 9.4). 
Some RAs have moved away completely from being dependent on 
government support. 
(b) Government pol icy, in particular the Rothschi ld Pr i nciple and 
the DTIWhite Paper on Enterprise, has forced the RAs to be more 
commercially minded and brought about greater accountability to 
their customers (see 9.2). These have changed the mission of RAs 
fundamentally (see 9.2.1). 
(c) The launching of the Enterprise Initiative in 1988 brought 
about great difficulties for the RAs in the initial stage when 
the OTIwasadjusting to the new guidelines for the approval of 
funding (see 6.4 and 9.2.2). 
(d) The Enterprise Initiative emphasised collaborative.research 
and played down cooperative research with the consequence that 
the smaller.RAswith a large membership from SMEs were affected 
(see 9.2. 3 ) . 
(e) The speed of change of government policy towards RAs has 
prevented RAs from planning strategically (see 9.2 and 9.3). 
(f) Defence contracts have become uncertain. The RAs dependeding· 
on them have been severely affected (see 9.4). 
(g) Privatisation has brought about more competition as well as 
opportunities (see 9.5). 
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Instability Within DTI 
(a) The instability within oT1 has made it more difficult for RAs 
to plan on a long-term basis (see 9.3 and Chapter 6). 
(b) One major setback of the RBs was the diversity and width of 
research programmes under their responsibility (see 9.2.1 and 
6.3) . 
(c) The implications of replacing general grants by money given 
for specific contracts for the Government have made the RAs more 
competitive and responsive to the market (see 9.6). 
The Industry 
(a) The private industry in the UK did not see the period 1967-
1985 as one where consumer demand or international competition 
required an increased investment in R&D. Only from 1983 to 1988, 
there was a continuous increase in industrial R&D expenditure 
(see 9.7.2 and 5.3). The RAs had to compete very hard to obtain 
industry income. 
(b) There has been an i ncreasi ng trend in out-sourci ng of 
research by industry and this has benefited the RAs (see 9.7.3). 
< 
(c) The short-term financial outlook has prevented the British 
industry from investing enough in R&D. This has made the task of 
securing research contracts from industry more difficult for the 
RAs (see 9.7.5). Takeovers and mergers have affected the RAs as 
well. 
(d) The area of training and retraining will be an area of growth 
for the RAs (see 9.7.9). 
(e) RAs serving mature industries have not performed well (see 
9.7.4). 
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Competition And Collaboration 
(a> The RAs in the UK have faced unfair competition from CROs in 
the EC (see 9.7.8). 
(b> The RAs' competitors have been research organisations. 
government laboratories, universities and members' own research 
laboratories (see 9.8). 
(c) Collaborative research with universities has been important 
for the RAs (see 9.9). Collaboration with CROs in the EC is of 
growing importance. 
General Economic Situation 
(a) The RAs were hit hard by the general economic situation e.g. 
the recessions in the mid 1970's and the early 1980's, the 
fluctuation in exchange rates and high interest rates (see 9.1). 
(b) The pace of technology and global competition have helped to 
increase research opportunities for the RAs (see 9.7.6 and 
9.7.7). Global competition has helped to increase the overseas 
support for the RAs. 
RAs' Income 
(a) The first decade after the implementation of the Rothschild 
Principle. the RAs' income from the Government paradoxically 
increased but it gradually dropped after that (see 1.2 (c». 
Income from government sources dropped from 32% to 17% of their 
total turnover over the last two decades. In real terms (1988 
Prices). it decreased from £31m to £26m (see 8.2.6). 
(b) The income from government has been crucial for RAs (see 
10.4.3). The bid for income from government sources has become 
more competitive. 
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Increasing Support From Industry 
(a) Income from industry increased dramatically from £63m (1988 
Prices) in 1970 to £128m in 1988 (see 10.4.3 and 8.2). In terms 
of percentage of turnover. it increased from 68% to 83%. 
The Weaknesseaof The Councils 
(a) The Councils did not undertake the task of planning well, 
they were too large and suffered from a lack of continuity (see 
10.1.1). The structure of the Council was also unsuitable due to 
the change of accountability of the RAs from the Government to 
the market (see 10.1.1). 
(b) The RAs were prevented by the Council from expanding their 
membership base (see 10.1.1). 
The Clearer Role Of Membership 
(a) The concept of membership is still important to RAs (see 
10.7) . 
(b) The member companies have lost control of the RA's research 
programme (see 10.7.1). 
(c) Only a small proportion of SHEs were members of RAs (see 
10.7.2). 
RAe' structure· ·And- Leadership . 
(a) The most common organisational structure that has been 
adopted by RAs is a divisional structure (see 10.1.2). This form 
has not made optimised use of the RAs' assets. 
(b) The leadership provided by the RAs' Directors helped the RAs 
through in the last two decades (see 10.2.1). 
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RAs' R&D Programmes 
(a) The general programme of cooperative work determined by the 
Council became insignificant (see 10.2.1). 
(b) The RAs did not e)(ploit their R&D programmes or products 
fully (see 10.S). 
(c) Collaborative research has been easier to organise among 
companies who are familiar with research. Among SHEs. this form 
of research has been less popular and cumbersome to organise (see 
12.4.1 and 9.2.3). 
(d) The RAs faced problem in obtaining industrial support for 
collaborative projects (see 10.8). 
staffing Difficulties 
(a) The size of some RAs has fallen dangerously below an optimum 
size (see 10.3 and S.15). 
(b) The RAs have encountered problems of recruitment and a high 
turnover of staff (see 10.3 and 8.14). The single market in 1992 
could create even greater shortages brought about by the greater 
financial incentives of working in Continent Europe. 
Marketing 
(a) The concept of Quality Assurance was new to RAs. They did not 
consider Quality Assurance in the context of their marketing 
strategy (see 10.4.2 and 12.4.5). 
(b) The RAs did not develop higher value-dr iven markets and 
consequently did not have control over pricing and margins (see 
10.5.1). 
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(c) The RAs have dispelled the image of an academic centre and 
have projected an image of centres of excellence with expertise 
to offer to industry (see 10.5.3). 
(d) Technology based RAs performed better than industry based RAs 
(see 10.6 and 8.15). Smaller RAs risked closure. 
(e) Some RAs were in danger of over-diversifying (see 10.8). 
(f) The RAs have not changed their marketing structure in order 
to capi tal ise on the opportuni ties of sell ing the combined 
resources of more than one division within the RAs (see 12.5.2 
and 10.4). 
(g) The RAs did not have an effective information management 
system (see 10.4.1). 
RAs' Facilities 
The problems of space and location of RAs' facilities have been 
quite acute for some RAs (see 10.10). 
14.1.3 RAs' strategic Choices 
strategies Generated 
The strategies that have been avai 1 abl e to RAs are merger, 
forward integration, concentric diversification, conglomerate 
diversifiation, joint ventures, market development, market 
penetration, retrenchment, liquidation, divestiture and a 
combination (see 11.5). 
Evaluation And strategies Adopted 
(a) The RAs that merged have performed better than having to 
remain on their own (see 11.5.1), Merger is a good strategy for 
the smaller RAs i.e. those whose staff number is below 100 
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(see S.l.S). Mer~ers are inevitable in the near future. 
(b) Forward integration has been rarely adopted. It appeals only 
to the stronger RAs with good cash flows (see 11.5.2). It is a 
worthwhile strategy to consider for the future among the stronger 
RAs. 
(c) Concentric diversification has been adopted by all the RAs 
in attempting to exploit their potential fully (see 11.5.3). 
(d) The RAs that served a particular and problematic industry 
have had to diversify conglomerately (see 11.5.4). This is a 
riskY strategy. The smaller RAs, among them. would need to merge 
before adopting this strategy. 
(e) Joint ventures have been a good strategy in venturing into 
new overseas markets (see 11.5.5). 
(f) A combination of market development strategy and joint 
ventures has been an effective way of expandi ng into new 
geographic areas. The RAs would need to have the necessary 
capital and human resources to implement this strategy (see 
11.5). 
(g) It has been difficult for RAs to adopt the market penetration 
strategy in a saturated market like the UK (see 11.5.7). This 
strategy has not been popular among RAs. 
(h) Retrenchment has been carried out by every RA (see 11.5.S). 
This strategy has been i nevi table due to the problematic and 
uncertain environment it has been operating in. 
(i) Liquidation has been adopted by RAs with fixed assets to 
improve their cash-flow (see 11.5.9). The cash generated has been 
crucial in some cases to keep the RAs going or to fund their new 
strategies. The divestiture strategy has been used to eliminate 
a misfited division within an RA. 
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(j) The RAs have not adhered to only one particular strategy but 
to an amalgation of two or more concurrently (see 11.5.11). 
(k) The selection of strategies among RAs has been carried out 
on an incremental basis and sometimes with the help of outside 
consultants (see 11.4). Planning has been an important function 
of the executive. especially so in the last decade. 
1.ft~ft. ChaM Fa Tn The RAe 
Major Organisational Changes 
(a) The RAs have been given a considerable amount of freedom and 
autonomy by the Councils to take specific steps to ensure that 
the RAs would be able to compete in the market (see 12.5.3). 
(b) Some RAs e.9. WRc have adopted structures. e.g. Hatr ix 
Management. that have enabled them to operate across their 
activities (see 10.1.2). 
(c) The responsibility for the management of the RAs was shifted 
from the Councils to Boards of Directors (see 12.1.1; 10.1.1 and 
12.5.3) . 
(d) Some of the organisational structures of the RAs have not 
changed in response to the changing environment. Consequently, 
they have not been able to respond quickly to the market needs 
(see 12.5.1). 
RAs' Status 
The majority of the RAs have maintained their Limited by 
Guarantee status (see 12.1.1). Only two RAs changed their status 
to one that is Limited by Shares (see 12.1.2). which signalled 
the complete break from the MRA principle" for them. If these two 
RAs are successful. others might be pressured to change their 
status as well. 
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Outdated Objectives 
The RAs' objectives are outdated (see 12.2). The pursuit of these 
objectives have caused difficulties for the RAs. Some RAs have 
begun restating their objectives. 
Alteration In RAs' Income 
(a) The dependence of government income has been reduced 
significantly (see 12.3.1). Some RAs have over-depended on 
government income. 
(b) The income from overseas has increased significantly from 
£3.7Sm in 1970 (1988 Prices) to £21m in 1988 (see 12.3.2). This 
reflects the internationalisation of the RAs' activities. 
(c) In real terms, the turnover of the RAs increased 
significantly but it dropped slightly in terms of the percentage 
of total R&D expenditure in the UK and the total industry 
expenditure in the UK (see 12.7). 
RAS· Attitude Towards Marketing 
(a) The RAs have adopted a higher profile (see 12.3.4) and have 
been more proactive (see 12.3.5). The RAs have been aware of the 
need to influence their clients. 
(b) Some RAs have exploited their individual di fferentiati ng 
features to add more value to their services or products (see 
12.3.7). 
(c) The RAs have widened their market base (see 12.3.9). They 
would have faced difficulties serving only their traditional 
market sector due to intense competition. 
(d) The RAs' activities have moved towards near-mar ket (see 
12.4). The biggest increase of income has come from contract 
research. 
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(e) The RAs that had over-diversified have been consolidating 
their position to avoid spreading their resources too thinly (see 
12.4.4). 
(f) Some RAs have introduced a custom-made information system to 
cope with the growing complexity of their operations (see 
12.5.4). 
(g) The RAs have projected an image of being independent from any 
single source and able to carry out confidential research (see 
12.6.1). 
(h) Some RAs have intensified their regional presence (within the 
UK and overseas) (see 12.3.3). 
Changing Concept Of Membership 
(a) The RAs' total income from membership did not change too much 
between 1970 and 1988. In 1970, it constituted about 23\ of the 
total turnover and in 1988 it dropped to around 17\. In real 
terms (1988 prices) it increased slightly from £25 million in 
1970 to £27 million in 1988 (see 8.3 and 8.2.6). The role of 
membership as a source of income has declined (see 12.3.6). 
(b) Although the concept of membership has no more solely a fund-
raising function, it helps to provide an element of continuity, 
some financial bedrock and helps in marketing purposes. 
RAs' Research Programmes 
(a) Collaborative research is increasingly important to help 
boost their core research (see 12.4.1) and the general programme 
of R&D has become less significant (see 12.4.2). 
(b) The general research programmes of the RAs which have helped 
to form their core research programmes have been threatened by 
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the uncertainty of government income and a shift towards near-
market research by the RAs (see 12.4.2 and 12.4.3). 
(c) The activities of RAs have changed from being technology-
driven to being customer-driven (see 12.4.3) and the RAs have had 
to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to meet these demands. 
(d) Testings. accreditation and consultancy have become 
increasingly important as vital sources of income for the RAs 
(see 12.4.3). 
(e) The RAs have begun to treat HEls as collaborators rather than 
competitors (see 12.3.8). 
RAs' Culture 
The culture of the RAs' staff members has changed to one that is 
more commercially minded and flexible (see 12.6.2). 
Staffing 
(a) The overall staff numbers changed slightly but the average 
number of staff per RA increased from 128 to 167 (see 12.8 and 
8.1.1). 
(b) The average turnover to staff ratio of RAs increased from 
£16.000/employee in 1970 to £28.000/employee in 1988 (see 8.1 and 
10.9). This indicates that the RAs are becoming more efficient. 
(c) The number of RAs employing 10-150 employees decreased 
significantly due to the difficult environment they were 
operating in. The numbers might continue to decrease in the 
future (see 8.1.7). 
( d) In 1971. 63% of the number of RAs employed 33% of the 
workforce. In 1988, 52% of the number of RAs employed only 19% 
of the workforce. This reflects the widening gulf between the RAs 
(see 8.17). 
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14.2 RecQmmendatiQn~ 
14.2.1 A More Encouraging DTI's Pol~ 
(a) The DTI ought to have a clear and stable policy towards RAs, 
recognise that the RAs are effective agents of technology 
transfer and encourage them to play that role (see Central Unit 
Report in appendix 14.1). 
(b) The RAs have had problems trying to adapt to the changing 
policy of the DTI towards R&D. Since R&D is a long-term business 
for the RAs, it is essential that there is stability within the 
DTI and OGD (see 9.3). 
(c) Now that most of the PTI research contracts are open to 
competitive tendering, the maximum support of up to 25\ of the 
RAs' turnover by DTI ought to be scraped (see 9.2). 
(d) The PTI could assist in increasing its funding beyond 50\ of 
the cost of a feasibility study (see App. 1.6, MIRA). If the 
outcome of this study shows a high probability of success, the 
DTI could fund up to a maximum of 50\ for the follow up research. 
(e) Support cooperative research in RAs which are catered for the 
SMEs. 
14.2.2 RAS' Position Towards Goyernment Funding 
The RAs should prepare themselves for further contraction of 
government support and greater stringency in the future mainly 
by increasing the volume of business of their industrial 
contracts. 
14.2.3 Impact Of Privatisation 
The RAs should carefully study the impact of privatisation on 
them and identify the possible opportunities and threats (see 
4 .7) . 
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14 .... 2_~_4.. Tbe. Ma.nagelT.l~nt .ofRAs 
(a) The decision by RAs to shift the manaqement responsibilities 
to Boards of Directors has helped to tackle the question of 
accountability. RAs which have not done so should consider this 
decision seriously. 
14.2. 5 At~~_nt.,i.OJL...I Q_J;.Qr..§..._Re.~ . e.qr~b 
(a) In the last two decades. the RAs' core research has been one 
of the areas most threatened (see 12.4.3). No matter how far the 
RAs go in making their work directly commissioned. there should 
always remain the need for a certain core of quite basic work not 
executed in response to direct industrial demand. 
(b) Collaborative research could form part of the core research 
programmes of an RA. 
14.2,6 Cnange ID-_C .. Qn'-Qr~t~ __ S.ta.ty~ 
In planning strategically, the RAs ought to consider a possible 
scenario where they might have to change their status to Limited 
by Shares (see 12,1). 
14.2,7 RAs' products And .sJ~r_vj,s::~§...1..§.U.... .. l2...._4J_ 
(a) In order for the RAs to increase their commercial 
opportunities, they should: 
- not just confine themselves to explaining the technology to 
their clients but to also to assist the clients in exploiting it. 
- be task-oriented rather than skill-oriented. This would mean 
having to tap the capabilities across the RA rather than within 
the individual division. 
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accustom themselves to carrvinq out =horter time~cale 
programmes. This would mean havinR to cope with a hiRh turnover 
of contracts and beinR able to deliver these contracts on time 
and give value for money. 
- expand their capability beyond one that is confined to 
analysing the components in a system to one that analyses the 
system. 
(b) consider combining testings and consultancy work since 
consultancy adds value to testings on its own. 
(c) exploit the market for testings and accreditation of 
materials and equipments since the RAs are reco~nised as 
independent laboratories. the results of which can be quoted. 
1.4.1 ~ ,8 A CQIDID.K.c;l.~1. __ W.o.r.IL.CJ41 t.J.l.r~t 
(a) The RAs should continue building UP a commercial culture 
among their staff members that emphasizes an interdisciplinary 
approach to solutions which is task-oriented rather than skill-
oriented. They should encourage greater flexibility rather than 
to remain confined to a narrow concept zone and be commercially-
driven rather than technology driven. 
(b) The RAs ought to set up creative teams. promote the personal 
identification of staff with the RAs' activities. raise the 
morale of the staff, focus investment on training and help the 
staff to adapt to the changing environment (see 10.2). 
(c) RAs which were formerly GIREs would have to discard the civil 
service culture and inculcate a commercial one. 
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1~_~.4._9. J?l . . Stronger Representation 
The RAs would need to maintain a hi~h profile within the DT! and 
AIRTO could play this role (see 7.8.12.3.5 and 12.3.4). Althouoh 
AIRTO may be a good representative. the RAs have to be aware that 
the AIRTO members are divided into two camps i.e. the eROs which 
are profit-making and RAs which are not profit-making. 
1_4....~_._1.Q_E..f_fe9tiy~ .. J1~.r ketingStr.~.t;.J9gy_Cs.~e 12 ..•. :3) _ .. 
(a) The RAs should continue to internationalise their market 
especially so when the competition in the UK market is 
increasing. The overseas link will also be of great importance 
to RAs because of the nature of R&D which is becoming global. 
(b) The RAs should playa more pro-active role in the market and 
try to influence their clients more. 
(c) The RAs should build a good portfolio of near-market 
research. 
(d) The RAs should emphasise and capitalise on their 
differentiating features with other competitors in order to add 
more value to their services and products. 
(e) They could widen their membership. 
(f) The RAs could expand their market base. In the case of RAs 
which are too diffused. they would need to focus their activities 
instead. 
(g) The RAs should consider implementi ng a qual i ty pol icy to give 
a clear signal to clients that it makes the achievement of 
quality a high priority (see 10.4.2 and 12.4.5). 
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l.!....._2 ..... 1_1_.R~y.j,ewin9 RA~·. Objectives 
In order to prepare themselves tor the 1990's. the RAs will have 
to re-state their objectives. They have to ask them3elves what 
their organisation should be doing and why it exists and redefine 
the organsisation's business (see 7.2 and 12.2). 
1~~...L12~..£Qrt,'yJlit...i~~ ._for.BA..~ 
Training and retraining will be a priority for industry in the 
1990's (see App. 1.6, PERA). The RAs should capitalise on this 
opportunity and organise a range of courses tailored to the needs 
of individual companies and help industry to implement long-
term human resource strategies (see 9.7.9). 
1.!."-2-,,.l..~.-.Ap..2.r..oach_.J OWctr d.s.HE I $.. 
(a) The RAs ought to avoid activities that come into direct 
competition with HEIs and GIREs because the latter can bid for 
contracts at lower prices (see 9.8,9.9 and App. 1.6 on LEA). 
(b) Collaborative work with the HEIs should continue as it can 
attract government and industrial funding. It gives the RAs 
access to a level of a more fundamental research. lower costs for 
certain work and ongoing training for research staff (see 9.8 and 
9.9) . 
14 .2 .14 I ~..I2§.M..~J.jL~.~.~~.F Qr_.l.rtf.2.rm.4t i .. 2.D ... ~Y._$t§ID_s_ 
The RAs ought to examine the viability of setting UP information 
systems to cope with the demand on their services (see 10.4.1 and 
12.5.4)' . 
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1~.2~1~Org~nisation~1 Structure 
(a) The divisional structure is the most common amonq RAs and it 
has serious disadvantages (see 10.1.2). In reviewinq their 
organisational structure. the RAs should consider a structure 
that offers them: 
- greater flexibility in the use of resources 
- the elimination of activity duplication 
- the reduction in the tendency to protect an empire 
- the development of responsibility to front line mana~ement 
- better career opportunities 
- more flexibility in workin~ practices. 
(b) Problem of peaks and troughs could be eliminated through 
proper project management or the introduction of matrix form ot 
management (see 12.5.1). 
14_3 Fu*' 're e·· •• r.::oh, 
Future research could have the following goals: 
* to investigate how the RAs can improve their role as a bridge 
between universities and industry. The role of RAs as agents of 
technology transfer could also be examined. 
* to analyse how the RAs can improve the collaborative activities 
with their EC counterparts. The role of the European Commision 
can also be examined within this context. 
* to explore the attitudes of the RAs' members towards the RAs. 
It would also be interesting to find out how the industrY view 
the RAs as R&D contractors in comparison with other contractors. 
* to study in detai 1 the impact of the DT I Whi te Paper on 
Enterprise on the RAs. 
376 
* to investigate the viability of RAs adopting the Limited by 
Shares status and the impact this action has on the R&D market 
in the UK. 
* to look into the possibility and the viability of merging the 
smaller RAs. 
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Appendix 1.1 
List of Non-Grant-Aided RAs and 
Contract Research Organisations (1971) 
Non-Grant-Aided RAs 
(1) Cement and Concrete Association 
(2) Aircraft Research Association 
(3) Natural Rubber Producers Research Associations 
(4) Tin Research Institute 
(5) British Internal Combustion Engine Research Institute Ltd. 
(6) The Motor Insurance Repair Research Centre 
(7) Shipowners Refrigerated Cargo Research Organisation 
(8) Institute of Brewing 
(9) Permanent Magnet Association 
(10) La Mont International Association Ltd. 
(11) Microsurgical Instrumentation Research Association Ltd 
(12) UK Panel on Gamma and Electron Irradiation 
Contract Research Organizations in the UK (1970) 
(1) Huntingdon Research Centre 
(2) Ricardo and Co. Ltd. 
(3) Fulmer Researc Institute Ltd. 
(4) Inveresk Research International 
(5) Hazleton UK 
(6) Cambridge Consultants 
(7) PA Technology 
(8) LIFE Science Research 
(9) NEI International 
(10) W S Atkins Engineering 
(11) Smiths Associates 
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Sources: (1) The Report of the Commi t tee of Enqui ry into the 
Research Association: Industrial Research Development. 
London: Conference of Industrial Research Associations 1973, 
p. 194f. 
(2) Commission of The European Communities: Contract 
research organizations in the EEC. Luxebourg: Commission 
Of The European Communities 1989, p. 54. 
ASLIB 
BBMRA 
C~P 
BCIRA 
BCR 
CTRA 
BCO 
CIRIA 
51 
CAT 
DFRA 
DCRA 
ERA 
FMBRA 
LEA 
FIRA 
BGI 
BRA 
HATRA 
BHRA 
BIG 
BLRA 
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Appendix 1.2 
List of Grant-Aided RAs in 1970 1 
Association of Special Libraries 
British Brush Manufacturers Research Association 
Camp den Food Preservation Research Association 
British Cast Iron Research Association 
British Ceramic Research Association 
Coal Tar Research Association 
British Coke Research Association 
construction Industry Research and Information 
Association 
Shirley Institute (Cotton, Silk, Man-made Fibres 
Research Association) 
cutlery and Allied Trades Research Association 
Drop Forging Research Association 
Dyers and Cleaners Research Organisation Ltd. 
Electrical Research Research Association 
Flour Milling and Baking Research Association 
Leatherhead Food Research Association (British Food 
Manufacturing Industries Research Association 
Furniture Industry Research Association 
British Glass Industry Research Association 
Building Services Research Information Association 
(Heating and Ventilating Research Association 
Hosiery and Allied Trade Research Association 
British Hydromechanics Research Association 
British Industrial Biological Research Association 
Lamberg Industrial Research Association 
British Launderers Research Association 
1 The former names of the RAs are indicated in bracket. 
BLC 
AMTRI 
MIRA 
NIIP 
BNF 
PR 
PIRA 
PERA 
RAPRA 
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British Leather Confederation (British 
Manufacturers Research Association) 
Leather 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology Research Institute 
(Machnine Tool Industry Research Association) 
Motor Industry Research Association 
National Institute of Industrial Psychology 
British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association 
Paint Research Association 
Paper and Board, Printing and Packaging Industries 
Research Association 
Production Engineering Research Association 
Ruber and Plastics Research Association 
BMT Bri tish Maritime Research Association (a merger of 
British Shipping Research Association and the 
National Maritime Institute) 
SATRA Shoes and Allied Trade Research Association 
SIRA Scientific Instruments Research Association 
SRA Spring Research Association 
SCRATA Steel Castings Research and Trade Associations 
TRADA Timber Research and Development Association 
WRC Water Research Centre (Water Research Association) 
WI Welding Institute 
WHRA Welwyn Hall Research Association 
WIRA Wool Industry Research Association 
List of Grant-Aided RAs in 1988 
CAMP Campden Food Preservation Research Association 
BCIRA British Cast Iron Research Association 
BCR British Ceramic Research Association 
CIRIA 
CAT 
ERA 
LEA 
FIRA 
BGI 
BRA 
HATRA 
BHRA 
LAM 
BLC 
AMTRI 
MIRA 
BNF 
PR 
PIRA 
PERA 
RAPRA 
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Construction Industry Research and Information 
Association 
cutlery and Allied Trades Research Association 
Electrical Research Research Association 
Leatherhead Food Research Association (British Food 
Manufacturing Industries Research Association 
Furniture Industry Research Association 
British Glass Industry Research Association 
Building Services Research Information Association 
(Heating and Ventilating Research Association 
Hosiery and Allied Trade Research Association 
British Hydromechanics Research Association 
Lamberg Industrial Research Association 
British Leather Confederation (British 
Manufacturers Research Association) 
Leather 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology Research Institute 
(Machnine Tool Industry Research Association) 
Motor Industry Research Association 
British Non-Ferrous Metals Research Association 
Paint Research Association 
Paper and Board, Printing and Packaging Industries 
Research Association 
Production Engineering Research Association 
Ruber and Plastics Research Association 
BMT Bri tish Mari time Research Association (a merger of 
British Shipping Research Association and the 
National Maritime Institute) 
SATRA Shoes and Allied Trade Research Association 
SIRA Scientific Instruments Research Association 
SRA Spring Research Association 
SCRATA steel Castings Research and Trade Associations 
TRADA Timber Research and Development Association 
WRC Water Research Centre (Water Research Association) 
WI 
B'!'TG 
BNF-
FULMER 
FMBRA 
FCR 
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Welding Institute 
British Textile Technology Group (merger of S1 and 
W1RA) 
a merger of BNF-FULMER 
Flour Milling and Baking Research Association 
Fabric Care Research Association 
Sources: (1) The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the 
Research Association: Industrial Research Development. 
London: Conference of Industrial Research Associations 1973, 
p. 194f. 
(2) AIRTO: A guide to the members of the Associaton 
of Independent Research and Technol 09Y Organi zati ons (989). 
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Appendix 1.3 
List of RA Director I Representatiye interviewed 
RA Represented by Position 
WI Mr. A Braithwaite Managing Director 
Dr. R Dolby Director, Research 
BMT Mr. Dennis Jeffrey Commercial Dir. 
HR Ltd Dr. T Weare Managing Director 
WRC Mr. R Fellow Asst. Director 
Mr. D Procter Contract Manager 
BHRA Mr. J Muir Finance Director 
BNF Dr. C t' , S e1ner- Marketing Manager 
SATRA Mr. J Butlin Director and Chief 
Executive 
SIRA Mr. S Cole Director, Research 
LEA Dr. A Holmes Managing Director 
PIRA Mr. B Blunden Managing Director 
PERA Mr. B Blackwell Business Manager 
MIRA Mr. R Stirley Head of Business 
Development 
BTTG2 Dr. D Jones Business Manager 
RAPRA Dr. B Lindley Director 
SRAMA Mr. J Bennet Director 
JUTERA Dr. H stout Director 
lWho is also the Marketing Manager of BNF-FULMER. 
2A merger of SI and WIRA. 
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List of RAs' Representative interviewed by phone 
RA Represented by Position 
HATRA Mr. B Johnson Dir. of 
Commercial Ser. 
AMTRI Mr. I Bruce Dep. Chief Exe. 
List of UK CROs' Representative Interyiewed 
eRa Represented by Position 
FULMER Dr. E Duckworth Managing Director 
HAZ Dr. T Houseman Head of Business 
Development 
RIC Dr. C French Vice-Chairman 
ARRL Dr. B Lindley Chief Executive 
List of EC CROs' Representative Interviewed 
eRa 
FhG 
Represented by 
Dr. A Imbush 
Consultants Interyiewed 
(1) Prof. Charles Suckling 
(2) Mr. M Fox, PA Technology 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Division 
Central Unit 
RTP 2 
Represented by 
Dr. B Dobbie 
Mr. I Coveney 
Position 
Strategic Planning 
Topics discussed 
GIREs, Privatisation 
Role of ABRC and SERC 
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RTP 1 Dr. T Connors RF.s 
RTP Mr. S Dennings LINK Programme 
RTP Dr. G Jordan Industry view on 
collaborative R&D. 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Division Represented by Topics discussed 
RTP 2 Dr. M Porteous CEST 
RTP 2 Mr. B Bunce Innovation Budget 
Marketing Mr. R Holmes Marketing 
RTP 2 Dr. R Aram strategic Planning 
Requirements Boards (RB) 
Mr. M Shirley - Secretary to RB (Vehicles) 
Mr. Jack McKinley - Secretary to RB (Textiles) 
Dr. Brian Lindley - Member 
Dr. A Holmes - Member 
Mr. G Butlin - Member 
Members of ACOST interviewed 
Prof. S Metcalf 
Prof. R Williams 
Dr. Brian Lindley 
Representative of Government Industria Research Establishments 
interviewed 
Mr. Andy Mcclintock - Head, Economic Assessment Unit, NEL 
Dr. 0 Watson - strategic Planning, WSL 
Dr. I Aitken - Director, Morebun Research Institute 
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other Organisations interviewed 
Org. Represented by Position 
AIRTO Hr. G Butlin President 
Hr. J Bennet Hon. Secretary 
IPCS Hr. J Stephen Researcher 
PREST Prof. H Gibbons Director 
Dr. L Georghiou Programme Coor. 
SEPSU Hr. H Ringe Researcher 
1 Staff 
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Appendix l.4 
Interview Questionnaires 
1.1 What is the trend in staffing numbers? 
l.2 what was the staff turnover? 
1.3 What was the morale of the staff? 
1.4 What forms of motivation were used? 
1.5 What was the ratio of scientists to support staff? 
l.6 How did the staff view the change of status? 
1.7 What kind of skills were they lookinq for in the 
recruitment process? 
1.8 What is the staff age profile like? 
2 Onions 
2.1 What was the reaction of the Union during the critical 
period of the RA? 
2.2 Did the RAs recognise Unions? 
2.3 Any single or in-house union deals? 
3 R&D Programmes 
3.1 Was there a move towards concentration or specialisation 
of research? What were the difficulties faced in its project 
management? 
3.2 What was the change in its R&D programmes in terms of 
strategic, applied or experimental research? 
3.3 Was there a vacuum created in the R&D market brought 
about by its change in emphasis? 
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3.4 Was there a move towards Collaborative Research or the 
management of satellite research centres? 
3.5 Did they concentrate on testing or experimental work? 
Consultancy? Turnkey Projects? Information services and 
Technology transfer? Publications? Products e.g. software? 
3.6 Any problem with the peaks and troughs of demands? 
3.7 Do the RA till carry out a core research programme? How 
important is it. 
3.8 What level of Government funding is deemed as relevant 
and appropriate in a strategic sense? 
4 Competition 
4.1 Who are their competitors? 
4.2 Are HEls considered as competitor or collaborators? 
4.3 How do they view Interdisciplinary Research Centres 
(IRCs)? 
4.4 What forms of collaboration do they have with HEls? 
other RAs? GIREs? 
5 Transition Period (apply only for former GIREs) 
5.1 What was the transition period like? 
5.2 When was the transition period? 
6 Pinancial resources /expenditure 
6.1 Resources 
6.1.1 What was their turnover? 
6.1.2 What is their' breakdown of income? 
6.1.3 What are the main government policies over that 
period that affected their income most? 
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6.1.4 What were the changes in the fundina mechanisms 
of RAs that affected it? 
6.1.5 What was its ratio of Income to staff number over 
that period? 
6.2 Expenditure 
6.2.1 What is its breakdown in expenditure? 
6.2.2 What is the percentage of resources allocated for 
the different type of research? 
7 Government policies that affected its funding 
7.1 Did the funding changes give them greater autonomy? 
7.2 Did the policy improve their efficiency and 
competitiveness? 
The following two questions applies only to former GIREs 
7.3 Any problem of Gross Accounting? 
7.4 Any government control over recruitment? 
8 Autonomy 
8.1 Did the changes in funding give them greater autonomy? 
8.2 How did the change of status affected the autonomy of 
the organisation? 
9 Organisational structure 
9.1 Was there a change in the organisational structure? If 
yes, in what forms? Matrix management? Project management? 
9.2 Was there a change in leadership style? 
10 Mission statements/objectives/goals 
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10.1 How did their mission statements/objectives/goals 
change? 
10.2 What is their present short. medium and long term 
goals? 
11 Size 
11.1 What would be the critical/optimum size of the RA? 
11.2 Is it considering a merger? 
12 customer /Marketing 
12.1 Customer 
12.1.1 With all the chanqes in the funding mechanism, 
how does the RA view DTI's programme e.g. collaborative research? 
12.1.2 What is their level of work for government 
departments, industry, overseas clients? 
12.1.3 Does it collaborate with European RAs? 
12.1.4 What forms of links does it have with industry? 
13 Marketing 
13.1 What is the size of its market? 
13.2 What is its attitude towards marketing? Does it have 
a marketing department? 
13.3 What is its marketing programme like? 
14 Location 
14.1 What are the advantages of its location? 
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Appendix 1.5 
Characteristics of RAs chosen for interviews 
WI. It is relative new and its limited by guarantee. It has De 
of the highest turnover among the RAs with a high percentage of 
its turnover from industry in form of contract research. Its a 
horizontal technology based RA and its expanding its interests 
beyond welding into the broader field of joining. It has one of 
the biggest staff number among the RAs. 
~. It is a particular industry based RA serving mature 
industry. It was a merger of a formera GIRE i.e. NMI and BSRA. 
It went through a difficult period after it was privatised in the 
mid 1980's. A high proportion of its income came from government 
sources and since privatisation, it has been trying to diversify 
its activities to gain a greater amount of industrial funding. 
HR Ltd. It was formerly a GIRE. Income from government sources 
is still vital although since privatisation it has become 
significantly less dependent on government income. The majority 
of its customers are public bodies. It has an average staff 
number and turnover in comparison with the rest of the RAs. 
HRQ. It is the largest RA in terms of turnover and staff 
numbers. It recently changed its status to one that is limited 
by shares through a management-buy-out and it is the first RA 
that changed its status. It went through a lot of restructuring 
and consolidation in the last decade. It derives its main source 
of income through contract research for the various privatised 
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water authorities. It has a matrix fcr!'!1 J::-;;anisational 
structure. 
BHRA. It is one of the two RAs which changed its status to one 
that is limited by share. It has an average turnover and staff 
number in comparison with other RAs. 
~ It went through a very difficult period in the 1980's and 
had to reduce its staff numbers drastically. Its staff numbers 
has fallen dangerously closed to being below a critical mass. 
Recently, it merged with FULMER to form BNF-FULMER. 
SATRA It is one of the oldest surviving RA. A membership based 
RA which started diversifying its activities in the 1960's. It 
is one of the few successful RAs which serves a mature industry. 
The majority of its clients are SMEs. 
~ It is one of the most successful RAs. It was the first RA 
to move to a position of financial independence from membership 
fees and government income. 
~ Its turnover has been growing consistently in the last two 
decades. Its staff numbers have doubl ed over the 1 ast two 
decades. Over 40\ of its income come from overseas sources. 
It is one of the most progressive RAs with a balanced 
portfolio of research. It is one of the few RAs that adopted a 
matrix form of management. 
3 Q " J') 
PERA It has one of the biggest turnover among t !:e i\As . ! t s s t aff 
numbe rs ha ve b een cu t down d r amati ca l ly i n th d l ast two de cades . 
In the 19 80 ' s, it made a s ignificant change towards de velopmen t 
of management cons u lt anc y s erv i ces . 
MIRA Over the last two decades, its cooperative research has 
decreased significantly. The majority of its income is now 
derived from individual contracts and testing services. One of 
its diff i culties in the 1990's will be to cope with the diversity 
of its facilities and research. 
Its a merger of SIRA and WIRA. Both SIRA and WIRA wer e 
badly affected by the lost of levy in the 1970's. 
RAPRA Its growth in the last two decades has been steady . In the 
1980's, most significant changes have been the introduction of 
a board of management and the possibility of a management-buy-
out. 
SRAMA It is one of the smallest RAs which serves a very sp e cific 
industry ie. the spring industry, 
JUTERA It was liquidated in the early 1970's and this was mainly 
due to t he introduction of synthetic fibres. 
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Appendix 1.6.1 
Visit to BHRA in Cranfield on 29/1/90 
The person interviewed:- Mr.Muir, The Finance Director. 
I .A. Introduction 
Bri tish Hydromechanics Research Association was set up about 
40 years ago (1947) and its main objective then was to 
disseminate information to its members (from the pump and valves 
industry). Among its early members were ICI and BP. It is now a 
contract research organisation which supplies information and 
data for its members and has expanded into the off-shore 
industry, mechanical and civil engineering field. 
In the mid 1960's, it began to carry out a small amount of 
R&D in fluid engineering. It moved to Harlow in Essex and then 
to Cranfield in 1967. The facilities were then been built by DES 
and the condition was that at the end of the lease period, the 
property would belong to Cranfield Institute of Technology. 
II.Goyernment Funding 
When it first carried out contract research for DTI, it was 
fully funded by DTI. In the late 70's and early 80's, OTI decided 
to fund its research programme onl y partiall y and BHRA was forced 
to obtain the rest of its funding from its members. 
One of its most difficult periods was from autumn 1987 to 
December 1988 when the Enterprise Initiative was launched. At 
that time, it received about 25-30% of its funding from OTI. At 
that time, there were a lot of changes going on wi thin OTI 
amongst which it was setting out the guidelines for the approval 
of funding. In the interim, onl y the Secretary of State was 
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allowed to approve the funding for ~rojects. This was a most 
difficult period for BHRA because most of its proqramme with DTI 
were coming to an end. Waitina the approval from DTI for the 
funding of its new programme was a matter of urgency, 
particularly as there was no clear signal from DTI as to the kind 
of R&D programmes that it would fund. The outcome was that its 
income from OTI was about fl.Smillion in 1987. But by the end of 
1988, it received only £0.8 million and £0.56 million. During 
this period, it was facing a cash flow crisis and in effect, the 
uncertainty wi thin OTI had wiped out about 20 - 251\ of its 
income. It had to resort to gaining more research contracts from 
industry as well as to cut cost. By the end of the 1987/88 
financial year. it made a loss of over £200k. BHRA must have 
learnt an important lesson. Its present strategy is to try to 
move away from its dependence on Government funding and to expand 
internationally to obtain more funding from its overseas market. 
BHRA also seeks to increase its influence in DTI with regard 
to the kind of project which DTI plans to support. Mr.Muir also 
felt very strongly that there is not much profit in Research and 
that BHRA should have more Dev~~nt contracts for he thought 
that is where the money lies. But on the other hand. it has to 
continue its core programme of research wi th the financial 
support from DTI and industry. Without its core programme. BHRA 
will lose its competitive edge (this came out very strongly in 
an early meeting of the new board of directors). BHRA's strategy 
would be to continue its core research and t.~L.e.X12Joi t._fJ.tUy .. i_y. 
research prQgra~ by re-packaging it or to apply the research 
finding. BHRA seeks to use its reputation. expertise and its wide 
contacts to sell its development research faclities - in other 
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words, BHRA will need to know its clients needs. to meet these 
needs on time at a competitive rate. Another thinq is to seek big 
projects and not small ones with small profit margin or better 
still, to work on a project on a turnkey basis or being the main 
contractor. Furthermore BHRA has to operate at an international 
level. 
BHRA still depends siqnificantly on Government 
(DTI) funding to carry out its core research prOQrammes. At 
present about 30\ of its income comes from Government sources. 
The civil servants in DTI also face problems when it comes 
to funding. DTI has to spend whatever budget it has been 
allocated by a specific time. Sometimes, it overspends and there 
are other times when it rushes to use up all its budqet before 
the end of the financial year. 
III.Manaqement Buy Out 
BHRA (the research facilities) has now been bought by the 
Management. The association still maintains an interest in the 
new company in form of shares and it contracts out its members 
research progranune to t.he new company. The new company is not now 
limited by guarantee but is limited by shares. This new set-up 
gives "new BHRAn greater freedom (especially from the Council), 
greater range of activities ar1d the ability to raise greater 
capi tal to carry out bigQer projects and expansion. I t is 
currently on a recruitment drive. 
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IV.Staffing 
At present, it has a staff number of 163 and last year it 
has a staff number of 199. Its highest staff number was four 
years ago (1985) with a number of 225. Over the past four years 
it has been trimming down its number after a continuous increase 
since the early 70's. It plans to increase its staff number in 
the next few years. 
Y.Others 
BHRA doesn't have a person based permanently in Brussels but 
it has a representative who pays constant visits to Erussels to 
establish contacts and to find out the requirements for European 
contracts. 
European funding is still costly to obtain especially for 
a relatively small organisation like BHRA. It takes a long lead 
time before a project is approved. But there is a possibility 
that an increasing percentage of the UK Government's allocation 
to R&D will be channelled through EEC ( one source has suggested 
that this may be as high as 40% of UK's R&D budget l ). 
An opinion expressed during the interview on the reasons why 
UK's industry is reluctant to spend money on R&D was that 
institutional (investors) in UK expect a high rate of return from 
their investment whereas say the institutions in Germany 
{e.g.Deutsche Bank} do not expect a high rate of return in the 
short run. 
Its turnover for the 1988/89 financial year was 
approximately £6 million. Mr.Muir said that BHRA will be setting 
up a testinq site in Scotland soon tor the offshore industry. 
1 Mr. Glynn Ford. A research director of GEe seconded to 
RTP. 
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BHRA has no subsidiary. It seems to oraun~se relat~velv more 
conferences than most RAs (In 1989/90 alone, it orqanised about 
12 conferences out of which tive of them were international). 
They are a source of income as well as to improve its reputation. 
Marketing is not done centrally. It is the responsibility 
of every research director to bring in research contracts. 
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Appendi JL..1-,--6 . 2 
V~si t tJ~_J3NF ,_~~~_!;t9I}. j.n..t.erv .~ .~we(t :.=-.. P.t' ... St einet: , .M.a.).:-.k~. tj,.ngJ1~n<!g~J:: ..... 
Da te. .. _o .. t.. . .-Yi_~.it . .!.. .. . £O_._6_ .. 1_~_~0 
I.Backqroun~to BNF 
It was established in 1920. Its turnover in 1970 was 
£3.8million (1988 prices) and its turnover in 1988 was £2 . 6mil. 
Its one of the few RAs where its income droP?ed ove r t he last t wo 
decades. It could be one of the reasons why it merged with 
Fulmer. 
In 1970 , its income was very dependent on s ubscriptions 
(50%) and Govt. Grant (20%). 
Its staff number decreased from 180 in 1970 to 90 in 1988. 
II.BNF Toq~'y 
One of the possible reasons in the decline of BNF was the 
fact that the members it served had their own R&D facilities. 
BNF was not able to create the niche market or help to supplement 
the research facilities of its members. It could be possible that 
it concentrated too much on speculative research and didn't build 
up its contract research activities or consultancy. 
BNF, like any RA depended on the health of the industry it 
served. The industry went through a difficult period in the early 
1980's and BNF suffered consequently. 
During this difficult period, it did not take drastic 
actions to cut cost particularly through reduciuq staff leve l 
well as to abandon certain areas of research. This indecisiveness 
contributed to its difficulties. 
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Among the austeri tv measures it took was to a.oandon the 
computing division. This was a mistake it made ~n tryinq to cut 
cost bv cutting investment in a vital new area. 
111.Mh! Merae with Ful~ 
Both Fulmer and BNF were going through a difficult time i.e. 
both of them were falling below the critical mass. One of the 
reasons why Fulmer was undergoina difficulties was because it 
depended on too few clients to provide bia contracts but with a 
high uncertainty considering the fact that most of its clients 
were in the Defence Industry. Fulmer had to make redundant all 
its support staff i.e. about a 100 and move its research base to 
BNF. The possible advantages for this merger are as follows:-
(1) Synergy of strengths. Creation of new ideas, thlnking, new 
blood, new projects etc. 
(2) Complementarity of resources. Fulmer has enouah cash and BNF 
has the site. 
(3) Helps to diversify BNF activities from Non-Ferrous into 
Materials. 
(4) Creation of new expertise. 
(5) New resources. 
(6) New market. 
(7) Lower overheads - making it more competitive. 
(7) Better image - bigger, stronger. 
(8) Undertaking bigger and riskier projects. 
(9) Possibility of future mergers or takeover of other research 
establishments. 
(lO) Wider scope for overseas collaborations. 
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The disadvantages could be outweighed by the advantages. Among 
the Disadvantages are the disruption: changes in culture: 
leadership clashes. 
IV. Important Turning hlUll.s. 
Late 50s'. Membership limited to British and Commonwealth 
countries (where grant was concerned). I t never had to be 
commercially minded. 
In the 1970's it strove to build up its membership. By 1973, 
40' of turnover was from subscriptions. It was also during this 
period that the automatic grant was stopped. It had to appl y 
through the RB. 
It went through a difficult period in 1973/74 caused by 
the Oil Crisis which caused the first wave of contraction of the 
Industry. But during the Labour Government. it benefited from the 
generous govternment support. 
In 1980/81, the second oil crisis took place. The Industry 
suffered, value of pound went up. which resulted in industry not 
being competitive and consequently cuts in R&D. Furthermore. it 
was then that the conservative Government came into power and it 
adopted a policy of distancing itself from government support of 
R&D. BNF had to contract its activities leaving out key areas 
e.g. computing. 
Redundancy in 1987,89 staff left. Merger with Fulmer as of 
J n '91. After the merger. BNF will still retain its Council. a . 
A Board of Directors was appointed to run the merced company. It 
consisted of the chairman of the Council (Mr.Watson); Mr. Bowyer 
(of Fulmer who was appointed the manaaing d1rector); Mr. 
Brightman (Former MD of BNF); the company secretary: and non-
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executive directors. There is also talk of a possible investment 
from staff from time to time. 
y.Difficult~es faceg by BNF 
One of the problems it faced was its narrow client 
membership. Membership subscriptions accounted for only 15% of 
turnover (1990)' The industry it served was cutting its R&D 
budget further. Most had no in-house R&D but many did carry out 
their own applied research and product development. ~~ong ~ts 
members were BP; Cookson and Johnson Matthey. BMF's contract 
research could be divided into small contracts and a few large 
ones; few MOD and a small number of multi-client programmes. 
About 80\ of its subscription plus 80% of government support went 
to core research (the total amounts to £600 - £700k in 1989 
prices). Government support amounted to about 14% of turnover. 
The remainder of 20\ of the subscriptions were allocated to 
membership services. 
It had difficul ties in planning because it was greatl y 
affected by the environment of the industry it served i.e. it 
sailed too close to the industry. In order for it to compete. its 
future strategy would be to d,~Y~J:.v..f.y_j.n.t_o __ .th_e .. jl;i..(je.r. .... f.i.9LQ~ .. .JU. 
materials i.e. camposit~n«-~~r~m~ and be more pro-active 
rather than reactive. 
It did carry out collaborative programmes with Cambridge 
and LOughborough Universities but no collaboration with GIREs. 
Its biggest competitors in EC were TNO and FhG. It obtained its 
first EC programme funding in 1990. 
BNF's organisational structure was divided into divisions: 
it enabled the movement of staff across. 
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BNF felt that though i~ serve~ a m~re ~pec~f~c ~ndustrv it 
had less problems with the ranae at proaramrne~ In compar~son with 
an RA that served a wide range of industry. 
It had difficulties durina recent chanaes within DTI. But 
in the long run, it did not ?lan to move away from government 
funding. 
VI.1992 
No sudden impact, chanqes had been aradual. 1992 will bring 
more business in legislation and standards work. But the sad 
thing was that BNF was not accreditated by NAMAS or NATLAS. Once 
aqain, it had left out an important area of growth. But the 
merqer would help because FULMER was NAMAS accredited. 
VI I .MemberGiP. 
Firms joined BNF because of the following benefits:-
(l)Access to R&D facilities. 
(2)Access to core research. 
(3)Access to individual contract research. 
(4)Access to past research. 
(5)Keeping abreast with technology. 
(6)Technical info~ation. 
(7)Contacts/Broker 
(8)Influence on core research programme. 
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Appendix 1.6.3 
Visit to BTTG (1'Cl~J;§l§.r __ ~.t-'s'I_., ~n.c:i_tUJU\L 
Person interv_:i.til§d: -:_1k.f--PJlD_c;L!l.cm~.$_, __ ~~ .. jJU~~LKiln..G.~):".!. 
Date of yi,it: 24/8J~ 
I.Background Information to 51 and JUU 
LH 
1. Established in 1919. Turnover for 1988 was £3.2mil. 
Income in 1970 (1988 prices) was £4.5mil. It had a staff number 
of 180 in 1988. 
2. Loss of levy in mid 1970's and it did not recover 
from it. Most members are SMEs. In 1971. it lost over 1/4 of its 
income and 1/4 of its staff were made redundant. 
3. Introduced Overseas membership in the 1970's. 
4. Loss of levy forced 61 to :-
S.IURA 
a. Obtain more contract work. 
b. Have a more focused programme ie for membership 
rather than for the industry as a whole. 
c. Opened its doors to Overseas membership. 
d. Lately, it is trying to diversify into areas 
like Quality Assurance and Biotech. 
1. Established in 1918. Turnover for 1988 was £2.24mil 
and a staff number of 100. 
2. Its levy for 1970/71 amounted to 50% of its 
turnover; Government grant amounted to 22\. 
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ll.DeVJ:loment _~~....t}),~ __ Jne~r..L 
A.BacM1;:.9.Ynd to mex.gJ~~ 
1. Firstly. 51 changed its name to BTTG and then it 
took over MIRA. 
2. Not much resistance from both the Councll s with 
regards to the merger. Membership was at all time low just before 
the merger, a possible why there were not much resistance. 
3. The newly merged organisation was run by an 
Executi ve Board. The Director for 51 was repl aced and the 
Director of MIRA maintained his post in Leeds. 
4. There is a possibility of a manaaernent buyout in 
the near future. This would probably meet resistance from the 
Council. 
5. The merged organisation adopted a matrix style of 
manaqement. 
I.Problems with merger 
1. Loqistics. It has 4 sites. 
2. Leadership. 
3. Shifting about durina transition brought about a 
loss of income which is of equivalent to 4 months work. 
4. Poor overall manaqement. 
5. Problem of staff movement - control of staff. 
6. TOP heavy organisation. Older staff had to take 
early retirement. 
7. Average age was too hiQh ie at 50. Now with new 
recruits, it dropped to about 40. 
8. Communication and renumeration is still a problem. 
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C.Stati. 
1. Present statt number ~s 2~O. 
O...J..n.L-Y..tt";:.~ ~'- p~..J.:fQJ;;'.m~nce ... o.f_.the_.new organi.sa ti on 
1. It broke even during the first year's trading. 
Clearly, it was diversifyinq from the traditional areas of 
research. The instruction from the director was to work on any 
job that brouqht in income. 
2. Improved its cash flow by sellina off its land in 
Didsbury. The rest of the site has been rented out which brinqs 
in an annual income of over SOk. The proceed from the sales went 
into a new building and equipment. 
3. It cut off non-profitable business and moved into 
growth area like Biotech. It is also buildinq UP its CA services 
by increasing its staff number from 6 to 40. 
4. Overall strategy was to move away from textile to 
materials. 
5. Membership number was maintained. Fees were 
increased but membership services improved. 
E.2nd Year's Pe~formance 
1. Performance improved with a surplus of turnover of 
120k. 
2. Predicted a significant growth next year especially 
in the areas of :-
a. Ouality/Assurance con~ultancy. 
b. Training and conferences. 
c. Biotech. 
d. Testing and services. 
e. Carpeting. 
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3.Turnover (£5.3mil) :-
(l)Govt £0.9 
(2)Sponsor/Club £0.3 
(3)Contracts £O.S 
(4)Testina /investiaation £1.9 
(5)Sales of equipment £0.15 
(6)Dyeing & process £0.6 
(7)Training £0.1 
(S)membership £0.4 
(9)Rent from properties. 
4. Core research still essential. 
I I I . Govt Fungj..ng 
A. still essential. The main diff~culty has been to 
formulate proQrammes that meet the requirements of OTI and at 
that of industry. It also has faced problems of having to prepare 
proposal for submissions since DTI insisted on a 3-year rolling 
plan. 
B. Money from DTI comes rather late .. 
.4.Q8. 
Appendix 1. 6.L-4 
Y.i.U...L-tQ Hydraulic~L.Resea_~~ L.j;.d. .•. SJ.n .. SI81.89 
Person~t.Y.ti_~w..~clL.Dr. Wea~~';t'b..e_M.ana~_ng. _Pi r_~.~j;_Q.;: 
Historical Background 
The Hydraulics Research Ltd. CHR Ltd.) was the outcome of 
the privatisation of Hydraulics Research Station (HRS). HRS was 
founded in 1947 to provide a national centre of expertise in 
civil engineering hydraulics. 
On April 1982, HRS was privatised after a number of studies 
were done to confirm that a sufficient market existed to support 
a privatised HRS. During the transitionary period. a Board of 
Directors was set up to negotiate on the financial and legal 
aspects of the transfer. The Board also negotiated with the staff 
the issues associated with terms of employment. 
The government met the condition set by the board in order 
for HRS to be successfully privatised. The assets of HRS were 
transferred free of charge and sufficient working capital was 
provided to meet the cash flow needs. It was also crucial that 
the government decided to fund a programme of strateaic research 
for at least 5 years. 
Corporate status of HR Ltd. 
The legal constitution of HR Ltd. is that of a company 
limited by guarantee. The members of the company (guarantors) 
do not receive any dividends - that is the company is non-profit 
distributing. The members elect the Board of Directors. appoint 
auditors and receive the published accounts annually. 
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HR Ltd. After Priv~i~~9~ 
There was a need to chanae the culture at the oraanisation 
and to replace bureaucracy with modern business management. It 
had to be more pro-active and conscious of cost and time 
constraints. It had to let go the inevitable weaknesses of a 
government research laboratory without losing the best qualities 
of HRS. 
It restructured itself into four main divis10ns i.e. River 
Engineering, Tidal Engineering, Mari time Enqineerina and Overseas 
Development. Each Division was lead by a manager and within each 
divisions were units lead bv prOgramme manaqers. It brought new 
commercial know-how through the appointment of a finance director 
from the private sector and a marketing manager. 
Marketina 
HR Ltd. has spent about 3\ of its turnover on marketina and 
publicity annually. This was rather small in comparison with many 
businesses •. It organised courses and seminars to acquaint its 
clients to the state of the art techniques available through HR 
Ltd. 
It also expanded its range of services and products. It 
started marketing a combined hydraulics-hydrol oqy consul tancy and 
HR instrumentation equipments in association with other firms. 
It established its own software house to market and support its 
software products. It also formed jOint ventures with overseas 
companies e.g. with a Hong Kong based company. 
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staffinG 
Durina the transition ~eriod. ever 100 ztaft left. Since 
then, the staff number has been increasina steadily from 231 in 
1984 to 281 in 1988. The amount of former civil servants droDDed 
from 150 to 120 over the same period. With the decrease in the 
percentage of former civil servants, it was easier to inculcate 
a new culture within the organisation. 
HR Ltd.'s Turnoyer 
In the first year of trading, it lost £200k and broke even 
in the following year. In 1984/5. it made a profit of £lSOk and 
it increased to £350k in 1987/88. In 1983/84, its turnover was 
£Sm and it increased to £9m in 1987/88. Since privatisation. the 
amount of contracts from DoE have decreased. This has been the 
biggest worry of HR Ltd. Ways and means have been created to 
offset this loss and to stretch as far as possible the science 
base it gener-ates. But-there is a limit to how far this pressure 
can continue. 
Appendix 1.6.5 
Visit to Leatherheadrood SA 
Date of visit; 7/10/1999 
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Person Int.ryiewed; - Dr. Bolme.; Managing Dir.ctor. 
I.Background to L.atherh.ad·Pood RA (LIA) 
It was established in 1919. It serves a big industry where 
most firms bav. no in-bouse R&D tb.ir own. Looking at its 
turnover trend over tbe years, it bas be.n growing consistently. 
In 1989, it has a turnover of over £6 million out of which 40' 
was from Overseas. Its strengths lie in its world wide contacts 
and it. unbias.d and independent view on R&D. Staff number 
doubled between 1970 (120) and 1990 (230). The line graph at the 
end of this report .bows tbe breakdown of its income from 1967 
to 1989 (in 1989 prices). 
II,Qoy.rpmont support 
Tbe gov.rnment bas signalled its intention of withdrawing 
from near market researcb. This will be be a problem for LEA 
because its biggest single client is still MAPP which contribute. 
up to 16' of it. -turnover. 
III,LIA" .trat'ay 
It is trying to go into product development; .etting up 
joint consultancy with Peat Marwick, a consultancy firm, but it 
was not successful in trying to offer consultancy services to 
SMEs, on training and technology transfer and market research. 
Over the years,it had built up a very strong data base and it is 
an area of growth. It is aiming to expand both its confidential 
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research and collaborative research. I t is also moving into 
legislation work. 
A change of status to one that's limited by share may not 
be appropriate with its present objectives where public interests 
and not necessary profit come first. It could be possible for LEA 
to change its management structure i. e. adopting a board of 
management to run the RA rather than the Council - a very likely 
move soon. 
An important objective of LEA is to maintain the ski 11 base 
of its staff and to build up its resources. It did try a matrix 
form of management but it was too complicated and it was given 
up. 
Its nearest rival, though not an immediate threat is 
CAMPD!N. There is a possibility of a merger in the long run with 
CAKPDEN. A merger would help to bring down its overheads and 
bring about synergy of stren9ths. The possible disadvantages are 
the fear from members that the newly merged or9anisation will 
then have the monopol y of research and the possibi 1 i ty of 
leadership squabbles. 
One of the problems it faced was the problem of recruitment 
and retaining them. Great emphasis was laid on staff training. 
It experienced some coompeti tion from HIEs with lower 
overheads. LEA Organised itself in groups i.e. a functional 
structure. LEA was able to move people across groups. It faced 
the problem of peaks and troughs. 
Iy.Needs of Members 
LEA is the biggest information centre for the food industry 
in the UK and it provides a broad range of advice and services. 
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These are two main reasons why firms in the food industry are 
members of LEA. 
Y.Goyernment Support 
Government support in 1989 came to about £lmil. Out of this, 
lOOk was used for the support of government policy and 900k was 
for public safety/ public goods as well as to support 
collaborative research on a 50/50 basis. When the government 
income became harder to obtain, it supplemented its income from 
membership fees from overseas. 
It finds that the government policy is erratic with no 
consistency. This is a problem highlighted by most RAs. Since 
research is a long term business it needs consistency in 
government policy. Though recent policy did not affect them much 
but the recent audit system was felt to be ridiculous i.e. an 
audit is carried out once a quarter. Another difficulty it faces 
is the time it takes for the government grant to come through 
i.e. from submission through to the arrival of the first cheque. 
LEA finds that IC money is hard to obtain and the grant does 
not cover the overheads. LEA did not show much interest in EC 
funding. 
VI.Researqh Aqtiyities 
There was a lot of resistance when contract research was 
introduced in the 1970's because of the fear of confidentiality. 
Now it is the main stream activity LEA. Sales of information is 
also a growth area ie its Computer Assisted Information Retrieval 
Systems (CAIRS). It was a good move to move into database systems 
in the 1970's especially so when there was an explosion of 
414 
information systems. It has one of the most comprehensive 
information on food in the world. Sales alone on databases for 
1989 exceeded £l.Smil. Its broad base research is its strength 
i.e. being able to tackle anything in the food industry. 
It is one RA which has a group of people that deals with 
the needs of SMEs alone - unique. 
VII ,Other. 
Felt that RB was not very effective - nobody took no notice 
of it. Its members didn't represent the needs of the industry. 
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Persons Int~r~~w...~d: - (1) ML_..B.i£.b_C!.rsL_~U.ix_le.Y.,H.e_(l~·t o.f __ e.u~.i D.es~. 
~elopment-L 
I.Background To MIRA 
(2) Miss Gerald.~..nLIS!tn.t.J_S..ll.4te~'p..l..~n.ru..n.a 
Unit. 
Its income in 1970 amounted to £3.6 mil (1988 Prices). In 
1988 its turnover was £9mi1 out of which 70% was from members and 
25% of it was from Overseas members. In 1970. it received UP to 
45% of its income from Trade association (Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders). another 11% from subscriptions and 
20% from repayment work. It received UP to 19% from Government 
Grant. In 1970, MIRA carried out up to 30% of its activities in 
cooperative research. It is interesting to note that cooperative 
research has decreased significantly since then. In 1990. the 
majority of MIRA's income was derived from individual contract 
research and testing services (About 70% of its turnover ie 
£7mi1) and subscription only accounted for 4% (360k in 1988). The 
high percentage could be due to the nature of the industry it 
served i.e. one that was mature and where there was a need to 
contract out research in order to be more compet! tive. The 
industry was not too interested in unproven technology and their 
R&D budget was too tight to invest too much in cooper ati ve 
research. MIRA was looked upon as an important centre for 
"outsourcing" of design and development work by its members. 
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In the early 1970's. the trade association decided to phase 
out block grant to MIRA and that trade association members were 
given the choice of becoming member on an individual basis. It 
was a difficult period for MIRA because the government was also 
tightening its financial support for RAs. 
MIRA had always operated in an uncertain climate. Most of 
its members had their own R&D facilities and they would prefer 
to carry out as much R&D as possible in-house. For the last 
decade, there has even been competition from its members who were 
bidding for R&D contract in the market. 
MIRA was one of the RAs which resisted overseas membership 
until the late 1970's. Since then. major overseas motor 
manufacturers had been encouraged to take up membership. In 1990. 
MIRA's overseas income constitute a sizeable % of its total 
income. 
II,problems Facing MIRA 
One of the strengths of MIRA was the range of services and 
facilities it offered. It was able to meet the demand for 
independent tests, development and validation services. But of 
late, it was worried about its breadth of services and facilities 
which was costly to maintain and it may spread its resources too 
thinly. It was in the process of carrying out IS strategic 
analysis and formulating its business plan. 
MIRA faced staffing problems. Old exper ience staff were 
leaving and new recruits specialised more in tests rather than 
research. MIRA had to face difficulty in competing with members 
for staff. A high turnover of its staff joined member firms. MIRA 
had to recruit senior and experienced staff rather than fresh 
graduates. 
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There was a possible danger of concentrating too much on 
testing rather research. It was beneficial in the short-term but 
a disaster in the longer term. In the second half of the 1980's, 
collaborative research was on the decrease. Core research was 
ingnored until a conscious effort was made since 1997 to reinvest 
in core research - DTI as well as EC support was deemed to be 
important in maintaining core research. UK's motor industry were 
more interested in short term gain. DTI could help boost its 
core research by providi ng funds for feasibi I i ty studies and when 
the probability of success was higher. industry would be 
attracted to carry out collaborative research. MIRA also felt 
that the DTI-enterprise policy will not be effective if OGD in 
particular Dept. of Transport did not have a transport policy. 
There were also fears that government laborator ies e.g. TRRL 
might be allowed to carry out commercial projects and cosequentl y 
coming into direct competition. 
Heavy investment by MIRA could upset member companies as 
they might see it as a threat. MIRA. like most RAs faced problems 
of peaks and troughs. Members would probably not support a 
management buy-out. BHRA has been able to proceed along this 
route because the majority of its members were SMEs whereas MIRA 
members are large firms. In 1990, a management buyout was 
difficult because of the high interest rate. 
~ Changes 
The following were some of the major turning points of MIRA 
in the last two decades:-
Allowing overseas membership in the mid 1970·s. 
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- Phasing out of trade association's income in early 1970's 
and withdrawal of government grant forcing MIRA to become more 
commercially minded. 
- Motor industry 'outsourcing' R&D in the early 1980·s. 
Leadership change in 1987 from "academic" type 
leadership to ·commercial "type. Introduction of project 
management and more aggresive marketing. Management 
responsibilities shifted from the Council to the Board of 
Directors bringing about greater focus and accountability. 
IY...Q.tJ1~. 
- The differences between Food RA and MIRA:-
- MIRA has less collaborative research. 
- MIRA members have own in-house R&D expertise. 
- Leatherhead's research is broader base. 
- Motor industry is mature and growth stagnated whereas food 
industry is mature but growing. 
- Both industries need testing, legislative. and testing 
facilities. 
- Most of its Govt funding is from DTp - on legislative work and 
lesser government support for collaborative research. In 1990. 
it received about 15-18% of its turnover from government 
contracts. 
-20% of its sales were generated from Business Development unit 
and 80% from Operations departments. Each department had a quota 
to fulfill thereby generating keen competition. Each of them had 
a cost centre. Over the years. it had improved its project 
management thrugh networking. 
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V.Nature of Industry 
The following were some of the character istics ot the 
industry it served:-
- Big auto manufacturers taking over smaller ones (Lotus part of 
GM) and setting UP of links (Honda - Rover). 
- Motor industry restructuring world-wide. Problems of peaks and 
troughs. 
- A recession will cause reduction in extramural research. 
VI.CompetiW.n 
MIRA's biggest competitor were its members. It would need 
to differentiate itself by:-
- Speialising in contract research. 
- Being commercially independent. 
- Flexibility with a broad base of research and facilities. 
- No significant RA competitor in EC though there are parallel 
organisations e.g. TNO and TUV - but they are not industry based. 
Unfair competition from HIEs but there is scope for 
collaboration. 
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Appendix 1.6.7 
Visit to PEBA - 29/8/90 
person interviewed:- Mr.Bernard Blackwell.aysiness Managor.PERA 
I. PEBA's Activities 
PEBA carrys out multi-disciplinary research. design. 
development and consultancy. It majors in new materials, 
manufacturing methods and business management. It manages several 
DTI iniltiatives including the Enterprise Initiative. 
II.pERA:- from 1960 to 1970 
PERA was established in 1946 and it was the second largest 
BA in term of membership. It underwent a tremendous growth record 
in the 1960'S. Its income in 1970 was £11.54million (in 1988 
prices). It had a staff number of 550 in 1970. Its main income 
was from contract work for the government which accounted for 37% 
and for industry which accounted for 21% in 1970 (see figure 1). 
The subscriptions plus the government grant accounted for 27% of 
its income. It had one of the highest percentage of contract work 
and one of the lowest percentage of government grant (9%) to 
total income as compared with the rest of the RAs in 1970. In 
relation to thi~ trend was the fact that PERA's research 
activities were biased towards consultative work paid for by 
members and non - members (accounted for 45% of its activities). 
cooperative research accounted only for about 25% of its 
activities and government contracts accounted for 20% of its 
activities. 
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III.pERA - In The 1980s' 
Figure 2 shows its turnover trend in the 1980's. It reached 
its peak in the mid 1980's. Its turnover for 1968 was £15.5mil 
and by the end of 1988. it had a staff number of over 350 in com-
parison with a figure of 550 in 1970. The contraction in staff 
number was due to 2 factors:-
(l)The end of government grants in 1978. This factor didn't 
affect PERA as much as the second factor because it obtained only 
about 9% of its turnover from government grants then. 
(2)The British economy as a whole in the late 1970's and early 
1980's affected PERA. During these period. it had to cut down its 
staff to make itself more competitive. 
In the mid 1980's, the British industry recovered and it 
started to invest in plant. machinery and into systems and 
information technology. PER A capitalised on this growth and 
started relying heavily on consultancy work. The appointment of 
a new Director General was a major factor in causing a 
significant change towards development of management consultancy 
services and developing core technologies in the late 1980·s. The 
high interest rate had also benefited PERA because of its high 
surplus in income (its income from investment alone amounted to 
£700k per annum in 1989). 
In 1989 (see figure 3). its turnover amounted to about 
£17million. Note that the income from DTl amounted to only about 
9% (£1.5mil)of its income. Another f2.5mil or 15% of its income 
was from subscriptions. About fO.7mil or 4% of its income was 
from investment and the rest ie about £12.3 mi 11 ion was from 
contract work-out of which f1mil was from training (PERA turnover 
on training was one of the highest in comparison to most RAs). 
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£7mil was from contract work e.g. PERA-OTIS. and £4.3mil came 
from contract research out of which 25% was from collaborative 
research (Collaborative research in EC account for about 5 - 10% 
of its turnover) and the rest from individual members. Its over-
seas income constitiute about 5% of its turnover. Majority of its 
clients were from UK and most of them were medium size firms. 
In compar ison with other RAs. the percentage of 
collaborative research was relatively lower; its individual 
contract income was one of the highest (from consultancy) and its 
R&D activities were skewed towards consultancy services. 
IV.Organisational structure 
PERA was run by a Council. The member of Council consisted 
of the 3 directorsi the company secretary of PERA and another 14 
were elected by the members. This organisational structure still 
posed a problem because it was not flexible and it took a long 
time to implement ideas. There were tal ks about changi ng the 
structure into one where it was governed by a board of directors 
rather than a Council. 
Matrix management was introduced back in 1986 when a new 
di rector general was appointed. This form of management structure 
provided PERA with the flexibility it needed and it improved its 
effectiveness. The introduction of project management and 
computer network helped its efficiency. 
Marketing was tackled by the following group of people:-
- A small unit that consisted of 3 persons that carried out the 
selling of the corporate image. 
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- A highly professional group of 12 persons that specialised 
in selling membership. Note that its membership had been 
increasing rapidly for the last five years. 
- A lead generating unit whose task was to establish contacts 
with clients or potential customers. 
- Selling was done by every individual. 
The present strategy of PERA was getting more and more short 
termed i.e. it was lop-sided towards consultancy services and 
very near market. It was trying to obtain greater stability by: 
- Going into areas of human resources i.e. training. 
_ Emphasising on Strategic services especially for bigger clients 
and phasing out operational management consultancy services. The 
latter will be built into membership services. 
_ Development of Key-Technologies to maintain its leading edge 
and to differentiate itself. It is of importance to PERA in the 
long term i.e. moving from being too heavilY dependent on 
consultancy services which was short term to R&D which was longer 
term. A balance needed to be struck. 
V.Others 
Recruitment was one of its biggest problem which was also 
a problem faced by practically every RA. PERA had a higher staff 
turnover in comparison with other RA simply because their career 
paths were very limited in the latter part of their career. Like 
most RAs. staff will usually leave the organisation upon better 
offers from the industry. 
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Mr .Blackwell felt that the strongest motivation of an RA was 
still the exemption from being taxed. The surplus income was 
ploughed back into the organisation. The disadvantage was that 
being a company limited by guarantee, it could not raise capital. 
PERA strengths lay in its breath of expertise and it was task 
oriented rather than skill oriented. Its strengths could turn 
into its weaknesses in the long run. Being spread too thinly. it 
could not maintain a leading edge in all fields. It has decided 
to invest in a few key technologies. Its future strategies would 
evolve by concentrating on a few key technologies but still 
maintaining its broad expertise; concentrating on human resources 
.management; building up its quality management services and 
strengthening its membership base. 
There was no tal k of merger with another RA (AMTRI ). It was 
not feasible for a very much stronger RA to take over a weaker 
one. 
It ran the following programme for OTI:-
- Manufacturing and Quality. 
- PERA-OTIS. 
- com-Centre. 
It was proud of its link with OTI and the link was used as 
a marketing tool. Quite a substantial amount of its income was 
obtained by carrying out consultancy services for SMEs which were 
partly being financed by OTI. 
PERA differentiated i tsel f from its competitors (one of its 
competitors was PA technology with its wide range of service) in 
terms of its:-
- Scope of services and being task oriented. Its competitors were 
more skill based. 
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- Non-region based i.e. it is national. 
- Non-industry based - horizontal techonology. 
PERA was unique in comparison to most RAs because it did 
not experience as many problems arising from peak demands and 
slacks. It could be due to the fact that it was skewed towards 
consultancy services rather than R&D and the wide range of 
industry it served. 
It was interesting to note that the average age of staff was 
between 36-40 years. which was low in comparison with most RAs. 
Again, it could be due to the high turnover of staff and its 
consultancy based services rather than the nature of its R&D. 
YI.Summary 
The following diagram was an attempt to place PERA on the 
two extreme spectrum of research in comparison with other RAs. 
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of leadership in PERA in comparison with other RAs. 
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Appendix 1.6,8 
Visit to PIBA to interview Mr, Blunden. MD of PIBA 
oate of visit: 20/1/90 
Introdyction 
It is one of the most progressive BAs that I have visited. 
It had a balanced portfolio of research and a capable leader. The 
leadership would Ii ke to model it after an organisation 1 i ke 
Battelle. In the case of Battelle, it was answerable to the board 
of trustees whereas in the case of PIBA it was answerable to the 
Council. 
I,Background to PIBA 
It was established in 1967 by the merger of the two BAs 
handling paper and printing. The merger was meant to create a SA 
wi th a cr i tical mass and creati ng synergies. It carr ied out 
research for non members as well but at a higher price . 
. 
II.Critical Size of an BA 
He believed that there wa. no rigid criterion that defines 
whether an BA was of a critical size or not but he suggested the 
following guidelines to test the efficiency of an,BA :-
I (1) The fixed cost should not above 20% of the turnover. If it 
were above, then it was below its optimum size. 
(2)Minimum size for market credibility. He suggested a minimum 
staff number of 200. 
(3)A need for a minimal size to form a cluster of experts in 
particular fields. It would also help to boost the morale of the 
staff-pride of competence. 
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III.pIRA - Today 
It was i nteresti ng to note that the appoi ntment of the 
managing director was from within. Mr. Blunden has been with 
PIRA for over 28 years. This was also the same case with WI but 
in the case of MIRA, an outside candidate was brought in together 
with a new set of middle management. 
From Oct'1990 onwards, it restructured itself i.e. it 
replaced its division form of management with the matrix form 
management. The reasons for these changes were in the printed 
leaflets attached. This new struture would enable the staff to 
be seconded to any project. This would also allow line and task 
accountability. It would also provide a mixture of acountability 
and flexibility. 
Staff resourcing would be carried out by the Director of 
Research and the consultancy manager. Their job was to match in-
house resources with external demands. The consultancy manager 
had two graduates to carry out the in house operations and to 
handle enquiries from clients. This would enable an interchange 
of staff and resources between consultancy and research. 
Marketing responsibility was deemed to be the responsibility 
of the board of management but selling was the role of everyone. 
Each director was given a target to achieve and it was up to the 
director to achieve the target. 
It was interesting to note that sales of conferences, 
training programme and database was done through mail. It was 
very sophisticated and targeted but cheap form of marketing. 
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A further point of interest was that PERA recognised two 
broad categories of staff i.e. those with managerial skills and 
those with technical skills. On the same rank with the research 
managers were chief scientists or specialists. 
As of next year, it was going to change its name to PIRA 
International and it would start to offer full membership to 
overseas members. Even now, up to 50% of its income from paper 
and board division was from overseas. It organised conferences 
internationally. At present, total overseas income accounted for 
15% of its turnover. 
Majority of its members were SMEs (about 70%) but they only 
accounted for about 30% of its turnover and the rest was from the 
big firms. 
IV.Accoyntability 
20 years ago when the government used to match every pound 
wh~ch the RAs raised, RAs had to be organised in such a way that 
a council was needed to interface with the government as well as 
to account to the government. Gradually, the role of the Council 
changed when the mechanism of funding changed. According to Mr. 
8lunden. the RAs were forced to the market place to sell its 
expertise. This was brought about by the Rothschild Principle. 
Furthermore a ceiling figure of 25% of turnover of support was 
imposed on RAs. Consequently. RAs had to restructure in order to 
be able to respond and be accountable to the market needs (in 
1989 only 10% of turnover is from subscriptions and 12 % from 
government). A ·Council· type of structure with many committees 
was not suitable for it to be responsive to the market place. In 
the case of PIRA a board of management was set up in 1986 because 
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the success or failure of the RA depended not on the council but 
on the capability and calibre of the staff. The role of the 
council now was 
I 
limited to Policy, Politics, and Public 
Relations. 
The new structure of PIRA is sui table for the present 
envi roment it operates in. In the future, there could be the 
possibili ty of a management buyout which could be a big 
incentive for the staff. 
V.Govt funding 
It viewed government funding as critical because :-
(1) It gave RAs enhanced credibility - a mar'keting advantage 
over other non-RA consultancy firms. 
(2)Important for high-risk programmes or missionary programmes. 
A good ratio of support from government was deemed to be 
around 12 to 15% of turnover of RAs. It experienced difficulties 
in obtaining government support last year because of the changes 
that went on within OTI. The changes in policy regarding multi-
client projects and stoppage of SF! scheme affected its income 
from DTI. He felt that R&D was a long term business and it needed 
stability of government policy. He felt the changes in policy was 
to encourage the industry to be more innovative but the short-
sightedness of industry was a big stumbling block. 
VI.Research Activities 
As a policy, it would like to devote about 30% of its 
turnover to research. 
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Appendix 1.6.9 
Person Interviewed : - Dr .. BryaJLl,J..JJ.sU.eY._LOJr.~c::;j;.Q.·cof..J3AeHA. 
Date of interview: 20/~Q 
I.Background to BAPBA 
Established in 1919. Its turnover in 1970 was £3mil in 1988 
pr ices. Its turnover for 1988 was £4 .Smi 1. It had a strong 
leadership in the early 1970's. In 1985. a board of directors was 
introduced to run the organisation. It was felt that the Council 
was too cumbersome to run the orqanisation besides being been 
static and cumbersome and rigid. It took a long time to introduce 
the board of management and a lot of lobbyi ng was needed. A 
leadership change was made in 1986. wi th the app'oi ntment of a new 
MD. Amonq his strategies were:-
- Regional dimension - setti ng UP off ice in London. Research base 
in Wales. Tee-Side and USA. 
- Collaborating with HIEs - value for money. 
- Consultancy 
. 
- Collaborative research - involving SMEs. 
- Own design company. 
According to Dr.lindley. there seem to be a trend whereby 
the British RAs are moving or converging towards a US stYle of 
contract research organisation. The other model which was quite 
opposite was the FhG model where it obtained a substantial amount 
of government income. But the two model differs in its objectives 
i.e. the FhG goal included training whereas the RAs were more of 
contract research organisation. 
When the Rothschild Principal was introduced. it took a long 
time for the RAs to adapt to it. possibly over a period of ten 
years. 
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One problem with the RB was that it did not prioritise the 
research and there was no long term plan - it merely reacted to 
proposals. It tried to prioritise research but it was not done 
systematically. The government tried to devolve the R&D 
responsibility to the industry but the industry was too near-
sighted. The UK needed a more strategic view of carrying out R&D. 
II.A.Chanse in Status 
The latest and most significant move by RAPRA was the 
decision to change the status of RAPRA i.e. from one that was 
limited by Quarantee to one that would be limited by share. This 
was going to be a very significant move for RAPRA and one of the 
main reasons for it was the need to raise capital for expansion. 
It aimed to become The Centre for Rubber and plastics Research 
in Europe. But this idea was to meet strong resistance from its 
members of which the majority of them were SMEs. The model it 
was going to adopt was similar to the BHRA model where RAPRA the 
as~ociation remains but the research arm was sold. 
RAPRA underwent a difficult spell in the early 1980's due 
to the recession but research activities picked up from the mid 
1980's. 
The members remai ned in RAPRA because they were getti ng 
value for money and they were considered preferred customers (a 
secondary reason). RAPRA sti 11 carr ied out research for non-
members but at a higher price. Members had access to information 
and other services as well as having a R&D resource . 
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Appendix 1.6.10 
Visit To SAIBA on Zth.Sep.1990. 
person interviewed:- "r.Graham Bytlln. pirector of SATRA as well 
as the president of AlBTO. 
"r.John Bennet. SecretarY of AlBIO. 
I.Backgroynd to SATRA 
It was established in 1919 and it was one of the oldest 
surviving BA. Even back in the early sixties. it defined its 
brief very widely to cover areas like process and management; 
product and processes besides study and testing of materials used 
in the industry. 
Back in 1970, it had a income of £2.16mil (1988 prices) and 
a staff number of 165. Between 1960 and 1970, its income from 
government grant dropped rapidly. About 46% of its income in 1970 
came from membership subscription. Its turnover in 1990 amounted 
to £3.5mil. It has been a membership based BA and it has carried 
out R&D work for members. Around 14% of its income has come from 
Government Grant. 
It is one of the few successful BAs which has been serving 
a mature industry where most of its members have been SHEs with 
no in-house B&O of their own. 
One of its strengths is no doubt the capability of its 
director. He has kept a very close rapport with its members and 
anticipated the needs of its members. The BA itself is looked 
upon as a centre of expertise and a resource for their 
activities. He has maintained a high profile in the industry as 
well as within OTl. 
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The industry it serves is horizontally organised and 
fragmented. Its members consisted of shoe manufacturers. mater ia1 
suppliers, machine manufacturers as well as component 
manufacturers and retailers. Nearly half of its members are shoe 
manufacturers and the other hal f consists of retai lens and 
machine suppliers/manufacturers. The majority of its members do 
not have the size or the over-head capscity to employ in-house 
R&D facilities. Therefore SATRA has been the first place to seek 
out R&D capabilities or testing of materials. 
SATRA was one of the most proqressive RAs in developing 
links overseas. Its members which consisted of over 1000 came 
from over 22 countries especially those from ~igh labour cost 
developed countr ies. In the past. the counci 1 did not allow 
membership from low labour cost countries. But as of this year. 
the policy was changed - membership from these countrles would 
be accepted. 
In the past, there was talk about a merger with either the 
Br i tish Footwear Manufacturers Federation (BFMF) or Br i tish 
leather Mnufacturers RA (BlM). SATRA conti nued to get very strong 
support from BFMF and it was mandatory that all its members 
became members of SATRA until the beginning of 1990. SATRA felt 
that a merger with BFMF would limit its activities within UK and 
very inhibiting because of its overseas membership (40% of its 
overseas membership was from EC). A merger with BlM would also 
limit its activities to one material i.e. leather. It would also 
lose its credibility as an independent assessor. It would also 
find itself in conflict with retailers and sythetic materials 
supplier. 
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II.MaJor Government PQlj,~Y-S_h~ng~t$_T.h-at __ ~_ff~9_t:._~cL$Al.BJ.\ 
I n the first place. SATRA was set UP because of the 
encouragement of the Government after wor ld war one. I n the 
1930's. it was affected by the depression when it was nearly 
wound up. 
After the 2nd. wor ld war in 1946. a levy was made on 
industries that didn't carry out in-house training for its staff. 
The footwear industry didn't want the levy to be applied and when 
it was decided that all members of Br i tish Footwear Manufacturers 
Federation had to become members of SATRA. the levy was 
discontinued in 1990. SATRA was helped by the subsequent increase 
in membership subscriptions. In retrospect. SATRA ~ained because 
income generation from levy was not chosen since it would have 
made SATRA complacent and would not have been able to survive 
once the levy was withdrawn (this was the case of HATRA). 
In the mid 1960's, the government intrOduced earmarked 
g~ants for big projects e.g. 50% grant was given to SATRA to set 
up a computer centre. This centre has been an important asset for 
SATRA. The total government grant then amounted to 12% of its 
turnover. 
The next big major change occured when the Rothschild 
Principle was applied. Government grants were stopped and it had 
to apply for government support through requirements board (RB). 
SATRA was quite successful in obtaining government support 
through the RB until a ceiling figure of 33% of its turnover was 
imposed (it has been reduced later on to 25%). 
And finally, the latest government policy change that 
affected SATRA was DT1's introduction of its 'Enterprise 
Initiative'. DT1 withdrew support for near market research (it 
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used to fund up to 50% of SMEs cost for carrying out research 
projects (SFI schemes) and started promoting collaborative 
programmes which were of strategic nature. Within the previous 
2 years, government support decreased from 50% of the cost of 
core research progrrammes to 30% (a loss of about £150k). This 
policy did not benefit SATRA where most of its members were SMEs 
and that most of SATRA's research programmes were near market. 
The Enterprise Initiative policy benefits RAs which had large 
members who were used to research and who were involved in 
strategic research. The decrease in government income had to be 
met from income generated from subscriptions. 
DTI's support was getting harder and harder to obtain. The 
reduction of support from DTI would have a wave effect on SATRA. 
The difficulties were highlighted by the two documents written 
by Mr.Butlin for the European Commission and Sir.John Collyer 
(see App. 9.1). Therefore another factor that determined whether 
or not an RA was affected during a change in government policy 
. 
was its membership structure i.e. did it consist of SMEs: large 
or small membership; willingness of members to support 
collaborative research: research expertise within member firms 
and the ability of firms to implement the findings. 
Mr . .:John Bennet (who was the former director of Spr i ng 
research RA) commented that over the last two decades, HIEs had 
been forced to carry out near market research and consequently 
they have encroached into the RAs area of research and the RAs 
have been forced ·to carry out strategic research which would be 
better suited to HIEs. These changes have forced the HIEs to 
change.their roles and caused a chaos in the R&D field. 
438 
In order for SATRA to survive. it had to have a balance 
portfolio of activities. It could not concentrate wholly on 
collaborative research which was funded from subscriptions and 
OTI. It had to generate income from selling products and 
services. There was a danger of concentrating too much on selling 
of products and services and this would be disastrous for an RA 
if it neglected its core research. SATRA needed to strike an 
intricate balance. 
III. Implication ofPlI Enterprise policy onSMEs 
Mr.Butlin felt that the OTI-enterprise policy should not be 
applied to the whole spectrum of industry i.e·. the range from 
SMEs right to large firms. He felt that the present policy was 
applicable only to the latter half of the spectrum Ie firms which 
were used to R&D. i.e. those which could afford to capitalise on 
the results of the research. 
He also suggested that one way to encourage SMEs to come 
together to participate in collaborative research (which was 
difficult and costly to organise) by changing the structure of 
.government support. He suggested that the overall government 
support foT. a project remained the same at 50% but the starting 
support i.e. say the first year to be at 75% of that year's cost 
and then it would be tapered. down over the remaining duration of . 
. the project. MIRA also suggested a similar proposal which was 
applicable to large firms .. MIRA suggested that one way of 
encouraging collaborative research was for DTI to increase its 
funding· at ,the exploratory stage of an idea. Once the 
uncertainties were narrowed down, the firms were ·more willing to 
contribute and participate in collaborative research. 
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Mr. Bennet also suggested that government support could be 
channeled to RAs in proportion to the subscription income and it 
was left to the RAs to use the funding as they deem fit. This 
idea could be applicable to smaller RAs which served a particular 
industry or where major i ty of its members were SHEs. This 
suggestion was useful because some RAs felt that the RS or the 
var ious mar keting divisions were not aware of the realistic 
needs of the industry. Nevertheless, this idea was too simplistic 
and there was always the problem of accountability. 
IV.SATRA - .Into the 1990s' 
The success of SATRA could be due to the fact that:-
(1) it served a mature industry with SATRA growing alongside it. 
(2)The capital cost of research was relatively low in the shoe 
industry. SATRA didn't have to invest too heavily in capital 
equipment. 
(3)It served an industry with no in-house R&D (only Clarks had 
. 
its own in-house R&D). 
(4)Most of its members were SMEs. Therefore, SATRA could play the 
role of the industry-champion. 
A recent business plan (to be implemented begi nni ng of 1991) 
revealed that SATRA would be removing barriers to membership and 
that membership fees would be turnover related. It would also be 
.diversfying into clothing. Clothing Technology Centre was set up 
about a year ago in SATRA by the British Clothing Association 
(BCA) •. The R&D needs of the Centre was managed by SATRA. But it 
was governed by a council set up by BCA (Quite similar to the 
.BHRA model). In 1989, the activities of-the centre added up to 
10% of SATRA activities and it was anticipated to expand in the 
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near future. The advantage of setting up that centre was that it 
helped to broaden the activities of SATRA as well as to attract 
more recruits (recruitment was also one of its problems). It also 
helped to create synergy. 
V. Staffing 
Its staff number didn-t change too much over the last two 
decades. In· 1970 it had a staff number of 165 and in 1989 it 
stood at 170. It had a relativley low turnover of staff 
especially at the senior level. But over the years _ grade of 
staff increased significantly. About 70 out of 170 of them were 
scientists/engineers and about 30 of them were'lab technicians. 
VI.Others 
It was interesting to note that within AIRTO there was a 
clear fundamental difference i.e. the profit making RTO and the 
no.n-profi t making ones i.e. RAs. There were bound to be a 
conflict of interests between them. 
The Confederation of British Research Association (CBRA) 
merged with AICRO possibly because of a leadership struggle 
within CBRA. Fur-thermore over the years_ the differences between 
them decreased as the RAs were forced to get nearer to the 
market. One of the reasons why.RAs were interested in becoming 
- .members of EACRO was the possibility of 100% funding of research 
by OG13 of the European Commission and the possibility of funding 
been channeled through EACRO. 
The RAs that I visited so far had a negative opinion of the 
... ..RB. -They felt that ·theywereineffective and that it tried to 
cover an area that was too wide to be of effect. 
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Another. interesting developmen~ was the encouragement given 
by some marketing divisions in DT1 towards RAe to come together 
and formulate research projects. This would avoid duplication of 
projects. Another possible reason was that the various divisions 
did not actuallY have a research budget - all held by RTP. One 
way of obtaining·a research budget of their own was by obtaining 
a lump sum from RTP for a loosely defined programme. 
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SIRA was .stblished in 1918 i ••. it was one of the oldest 
.RA. Its turnover in 1970 amounted to £3. 4mil . (1988 . Prices). In 
1970, its total number of staff was 189 • 
. II.ChaDGe • .,in The La.t 2 Decad •• 
Table 1 (at the end of this report) sh~ws the important 
• 
changes that took place since it was established especially so 
in the last 2 decades. In 1965, the Industrial Measurement and 
control (INC) programme. was started during the term of the Labour 
Government, when· i trecei vedspecial grant (Every pound was 
matched by 3 pounds from the government). Its role then was to 
promote the application of scientific instrumentation and 
automation in industry at large. The achievement of the INC 
programme was minimal but it helped to trigger important changes 
within SIRA. It started shifting its activities from .purely 
scientific and fundamental research towards applied research -
and particularly towards engineering applications. In 1966, it 
introduced.an open door policy and membership exclusivity 
declined •. 
In the 1960's, the scientific instrument industry began to 
diversify. SIRA, with its limited resources could not cope with 
the range of resources needed to meet the needs of the industry • 
. It ~as also during this period t.hat the industry was becoming 
~ 
more and more competitive. Towards the end of the 1960's, the 
industry was going through a recession when the Rothschild Report 
emerged (seen as a threat to an RA). Consequently, the demand for 
collaborative research diminished. SIRA decided to abandon 
collaborative research programmes in 1969 and membership fees was 
cut drastically. As a result, SIRA moved to a position of 
financial independence. The small membership numbers did not 
affect SIRA greatly because of the small fees demanded and the 
abandonment of collaborative research. Although it was still 
controlled by a Council, there was a big shift towards business 
based contract R&D and test services with some group-sponsored 
projects. SIRA also capitalised on the patent rights that it 
had. It was a dangerous and risky step to take which meant havi ng 
to compete with member-firms for research contracts and there was 
no safety net in the event of failure. 
The members felt that they could not manage the RA and 
furthermore SIRA was in direct competition with some of them. 
Thus in 1972,the Council set UP a committee to look into the 
running of the RA. The committee recommended that the Council 
should dissolve itself and be replced by a board of directors. 
The members of this board need not be members of the SIRA and the 
persons could be anyone from the industry. This recommendation 
was accepted. The members became guarantor. This move gave SIRA 
the independence it needed; greater flexibility and speed in 
responding to the needs of the market; a shorter line of command 
with the elimination of the Council; having the ability to plan 
for the future and having greater control of its destiny. The new 
organisation had another advantage i.e. it could be acquired by 
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any company-and the members felt less threatened. By then, 
membership subscr iptions accounted for only less than 1% of 
turnover. 
Throughout the 1970's, SIRA thrived on contract research. 
It capitalised on its intellectual properties. SIRA started to 
bid competitively for contracts and developed overseas business. 
The UK economy underwent a recession in the early 1980's. 
The industry began to abandon in-house research but SIRA didn't 
benefit from this. The research contracts which it obtained were 
few but of substantial amount. They were risky projects to handle 
and they were contracted out on fixed cost and the terms were 
sti ffened. It was dur i ng this per iod that SIRA made another 
decisive move. It made use of its intellectual properties 
through forward integration into manufacturing hardware. This 
move was taken after it failed to licence out its intellectual 
properties. Hence in 1981, the Articles of Association were 
changed to permit SIRA to hold a majority stake in an external 
COmpany and the way was made clear for SIRA to form subsidiaries. 
Table 2 (at the end of this report) shows the the 
organisation as it was in 1989. It consisted of SIRA Ltd. which 
ran SIRA R&D, SIRA membership scheme and SIRA Test and 
Calibration Centre. The subsidiaries consisted of Ometron Ltd .• 
Image Automation, SIRA Electro-Optics, SIRA Safety Services, SIRA 
Communications Ltd., SIRA Precision Ltd. and SIRA Holdi ngs 
Incorporation. ometron Ltd. and SIRA Safety Services Ltd. were 
formed in 1981/82. Ometron Inc. was formed in 1983. Image 
Automation Ltd. was formed in 1986. SIRA Electro-Optics Ltd. and 
SIRA Precision Ltd. was formed in 1988. SIRA Holdings Inc,SIRA 
Inc and SIRA Communications Ltd. were formed in 1989. Once these 
subsidiar ies were set up, they were on their own. They were 
distanced from each other and each of them became an autonomous 
profit centre. They themselves had to improve their products or 
seek to market new products or offer new services. One problem 
that could arise was the rivalry or friction among the 
subsidiaries. Another difficulty was the cost involved in getting 
the accounts of these subsidiar ies in order. Accordi ng to 
Mr .Cole, the present set-up was diversified enough and there were 
no future plans to diversify further. 
SIRA Ltd .• which was the "mother ·can be divided into 3 
areas : 
(1) SIRA R&D was responsible for contract research and 
development; applications, consultancy, design; and specialist 
system supply. The subsidiar ies of SIRA can contract out research 
to SIRA Ltd. in the processes of product development. It 
generated ideas or new products for its subsidiaries. 
(2) SIRA membership scheme was responsible for the awareness and 
promotion of new technology and instrumentation. 
(3) SIRA test and cal ibration centre carr ied out evaluation, 
calibration and testing. 
SIRA Ltd. accounted for about £4mil of SIRA's turnover in 
1989 i.e. £3mil from SIRA R&D and £lmil from SIRA test and 
calibration centre. 
The product line of SIRA was run by 3 of its subsidiaries 
ie: 
( 1) Ometron Ltd. which mar keted equipments 1 ike the Stress 
Pattern Analysis by Thermal Analysis( SPATE) and Vibration Pattern 
Imager(VPI). 
~ 
(2) Image Automation Ltd. It marketed equipments for automatic 
inspection and process control systems. 
(3) SIRA Electro-Optics Ltd. It supplied equipments for optical 
quality assurance instrumentation. 
These 3 subsidiaries contributed about £2m each to SIRA's 
turnover. 
The rest of SIRA can be divided into 2 groups of 
subsidiaries. The first group consisted of :-
- SIRA Safety Services Ltd. which was bought over from ICI in 
1981. It offered services in design and installation of 
electrical equipment in potentially explosive atmospheres. 
- SIRA Communications Ltd. organised conferences and courses and 
training. 
SIRA Precision Ltd. was responsible for most of the 
manufacturing and tooling needs of SIRA's manufacturing 
subsidiaries. 
The second group of subsidiaries dealt with the marketing 
of SIRA's products and expertise in Amer ica. This group was 
controlled by SIRA Holdings Inc. It controls Ometron Inc and SIRA 
Inc. 
III ,Others 
A the beginning of 1990, the SIRA Group Board structure was 
introduced whereby the four executive directors of SIRA Group sat 
on every board of directors of each subsidiary together with 
each individual CEO. 
The product line of SIRA which consisted of 3 subsidiaries 
were doing well because they had a niche market. They marketed 
custom built equipment for their clients. They could be termed 
~ 
as cash cows of SIRA. The profit could be ploughed back to the 
-mother - company to carry out core research. Though not an 
explicit policy, SIRA would plough in approximately 10% of its 
turnover back into its core research (in 1989, it ploughed back 
about £lmil out of a turnover of £12mil.). The activities at SIRA 
Ltd. nurtured the rising stars when it carried out research which 
was risky and which enabled the organisation to mai ntai n a 
leading edge over its competitors. This was a healthy balance 
because SIRA didn't have to depend at all on government income 
to carry out its core research. It was one of the few RAs which 
ploughed back a substansial amount of its turnover into core 
research. It didn't exper ience the uncertainty of government 
funding and had the freedom to determine its future. In 1989, 
Government income consisted only of about 6% of its turnover. 
The group as a whole would be satisfied if SIRA Ltd. were 
to break even because of the risky business it was in - carrying 
out high risk research work at fixed costs. 
SIRA didn't opt for a management-buy-out (MBO) because it 
felt that it could achieve its objectives without one. With its 
present organisation, it had the flexibility and freedom to 
determine its own directions. But a major disadvantage was its 
inability to raise capital. 
Like any other RA. it suffered from peaks and troughs. One 
way to combat this was to have a spread of clients - from 
different regions of the world and serving a range of industries. 
1992 offers many opportunities as well as threats. Areas of 
growth will be in testing and legislation work. SIRA will also 
target the sale of its products in EC. 
44.e. 
One of the strengths of this organisation is that the 
activities of each subsidiary are of the complementary. 
Marketing was not done centrally but by each subsidiary. 
It tried to introduce Matrix Management but it experienced 
conflicts in the allocation of resources among managers. It 
finally abandoned it. 
It did not view HIEs as threats. Quite on the contrary. it 
viewed them as organisations that carry out complementary 
research. SIRA has enjoyed a good wor ki ng rapport with GIREs 
eg.Harwell and Defence Research Establishments. 
The changi ng envi ronmental circumstances over the years have 
forced it to change from having a narrow and, focused area of 
research to one where it consisted of staff with multi-
disciplinary skills. 
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MILESTONES IN SIM EVOLUTION 
1918 Established as British Scientific Instrument Research 
Association [an exclusive collaborative research organisation 
for the British scientific instrument industry]. 
circa 1939/45 Non-instrument makers (reluctantly) allowed into membership. 
1947 
circa 1950 
1966 
1969 
1970/80 
1974 
1981 
. 
Moved from London to Chislehurst; major staff expansion. 
Instrument users form collaborative project at Sira to evaluate 
process instruments. 
Open door policy introduced. membership exclusivity declining. 
Collaborative research programme abandoned, membership fees 
cut. 
Sira moves to position of financial independence 
- Business based on contract R&D and test services with 
some group-sponsored projects 
- No safety net in the event of failure.' 
Contract research thrives; Sira starts to bid competitively 
for contracts and develops overseas business. 
Board structure replaces Member Council as ultimate management 
body; Sira achieves management independence. membership 
subscription accounts for less than 1% of turnover. 
Articles of Association changed to permit Sira to hold a 
majority stake in an external company; way is clear for 
formation of subsidiaries. 
1981/82 Ometron Ltd and Sira Safety Services Ltd formed. 
1983 Ometron Inc formed. 
1986 Image Automation Ltd formed. 
1988 Sira Electro-optics Ltd and Sira Precision Ltd formed. 
1989 Sira Holdings Inc, Sira Inc and Sira Communications Ltd formed. 
1990 Sira Group Board structure introduced. 
Sira R&D and Sira Test & Calibration Centre managed as 
autonomous enterprises. 
SIRA LTD 
• Scientific and industrial instrumentation 450 
• Measurement, control and information technology 
SIRA R&D SIRA MEMBERSHIP SCHEME 
SIRA TEST AND 
CALIBRATION 
CENTRE 
• Contract research 
and development 
• Applications, consultancy, 
design 
• Specialist system supply 
OMETRON LTD 
o . Instrumentation for 
engineering stress and 
vibration analysis 
• Awareness· and 
promotion of new 
technology and 
instrumentation 
• Evaluation, calibration, 
testing 
SIRA SAFETY 
SERVICES LTD 
• Services in design and 
installation of electrical 
equipment in potentially 
explosive atmospheres 
IMAGE 
AUTOMATION 
LTD 
SIRA 
~---+-----tCOMMUNICATIONS 
• Automatic inspection and 
process c?ntrol systems 
SIRA 
ELECTRO-OPTICS H-----+------f 
LTD 
• Optical quality assurance 
instrumentation 
OMETRON 
INC 
SIRA HOLDINGS INC 
LTD 
• Conferences & Courses 
• Technical Training 
• Technical administration 
services 
SIRA 
PRECISION lTD 
• Manufacture and assembly 
• Optics, electronics, 
mechanics 
• Complete systems 
SIRA INC 
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Apeendix 1.6.12 
Introduction :- This is a report on a visit to WRc branch in Beta 
Centre in Stirling on 13/8/89 followed by a visit to WRc Swindon 
on 20/8/89. The asst. director. Mr.Ron Fellow was interviewed in 
Stirling and Mr.David Procter the contract manager, in Swindon. 
I,Location of Researcb 
In future. the laboratory in Medmenham would carry out 
research for NRA works and governmental contracts. The laboratory 
in Swindon would handle the utility part of research. It was 
important that tbe independence of research was safeguarded in 
the two laboratories as not to affect the imag~ their customers 
had on WRc. 
II.WRc - A Brief HistorY 
Prior to 1974, there were three main water research bodies 
in the UK viz. (l)Water Pollution Research Laboratory (WPRL) 
(2)Water Research Association (WRA) 
(3)Water Resources Board (WRB) 
WPRL was originated in the 1920's and was formally set up 
in 1952 as a government establishment which dominated water 
pollution research. It obtained most of its funding through 
government grants. 
WRA was founded in 1953 for the purpose of examining 
technically all stages of the water supply process, the chemical 
and biological analysis of water, the design of treatment plant, 
and leak detection and assessment of new pipeli ne mater ials. 
Membership consisted pricipally of the various water boards and 
local author i ties responsible for water supply. river 
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authorities, consultants, and a number of industrial suppliers. 
The bulk of its income came from membership subscriptions. 
WRB was set up in 1963 to commission and manage research 
into conservation. It was a fully funded government body. 
III.Reorganisation That Took place in 1974 - Formation ofWRC 
In 1971. there were plans to reorganise the water services. 
The reorganisation paid due heed to the need for R&D in the water 
supply field and it was proposed that the Government should 
establish a new industrial research centre. It was felt that this 
would reduce the fragmentation of R&D in water matters which at 
that time was spread out between WRA, WR8 (technical div.) and 
WPRL. 
In 1974, the WRB was disbanded. Ten regional water 
authorities were set UP. WRPL, WRA and WR8 (technical div.) were 
merged and WRc was formed. WRc would continue to get government 
grants. 
The need for WRc in Swindon was identified in 1977 after a 
study by Eric Grades of Thames Water Authority which showed the 
need for a water research centre to look into the needs of the 
water industry, especially the engineering side and the utility 
side. On Apr i 1 1980, the WRc in Swi ndon which was to be an 
engineering arm of WRc was established. Its role was to carry 
out applied research with the water industry's strategic interest 
and needs in mind. 
IV.1984 Onwards 
From 1984 onwards, government grants for WRc ceased. Their 
main source of income now came out of subscriPtions from water 
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authorities and government contracts. In 1980, about 80 % of 
their income came from subscriptions and in 1988, subscriptions 
only consisted of 58% of their income and Government contracts 
amounted to about 9% of total turnover of about f22m. In 1984, 
WRc set UP a branch in USA to try to gain contracts which in 
1989, managed to break even. 
By the end of 1989, the Government planned to privatise the 
water industry with The National River Authority (NRA) as a 
watch-dog wi thin the rationale behind the pr ivatisation plan. the 
government should not fund the research being done by WRc for the 
privatised water industry. And if WRc remained in the public 
sector, the privatised water industry might not fund the research 
in WRc thinking that the Govenment would finance the research. 
In April 1989, WRc was privatised as a staff-management 
buy-out. About 55% of the shares were bought by the staff and the 
rest by the water authorities. By October 1989, WRc operated from 
two centres (Swindon and Medmenham) with a staff of 650. 
V,Saf.ty - Net 
WRc managed to obtain a guarantee from the Government that 
for the next 5 years, WRc will continue to secure contracts from 
Governmnent deapartments. 
VI.Sbare Ownersbip 
About £750k worth of shares were floated among management 
and staff where the directors holds total share worth £200k and 
each share was worth £1. The rest were bought by staff. The only 
incentive for the staff members was the interest free loans of 
up to £250 for two years. In 1989, the shares were traded within 
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the company and there was a possibility that they might be traded 
in the open market in the near future. The response from the 
staff was overwhelming and it was 45% over subscribed and over 
75% of the staff applied for shares. It was believed that the 
shares may be worth 5-10 times its value if offered later on in 
.the open mar ket . 
About 40% of the shares were bought over by various water 
authorities with future options for further share purchases. 
VII.WRc·s Fytyre Cystomers 
After privatisation. WRc's expected customer base would be: 
(1) The privatised water industry. 
(2) NRA 
(3) Contracts from Government departments. 
(4) Local government. 
WRc's main customer would be the privatised water industry, 
which might, in due course, set up independent research 
. 
facilities for competitive reasons. 
A possible competitor for WRc post 1992 might be water 
research associations in Europe especially France. 
HIEs were not viewed to be major competitors because none of them 
were viewed to be capable of handling research covering the whole 
hydrological cycle. They could however compete in specialised 
niches. 
~III.WRc. Marketing Strategy 
WRc was moving towards being a market-led company i.e. 
meeting the R&D needs of their clients. With an emphasis on 
development rather than research. Most probably, it would narrow 
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down its activities and expand its geographical coverage ie 
Europe and other overseas markets. For the European Market, it 
had a function manager who looked after their Europe Market 
especially with regards to EEC regulations. 
The broad strategy envisaged was to move the emphasis from 
small to large contracts which would eventually come from bigger 
clients who were perceived as the most likely source of bigger 
contracts. 
WRc has had quite a good rapport with the WHO which has 
been seen as an important client in the future. In general, 
WRc's contacts has helped them to spread its coverage to a 
wider geographical area and to project an image of a reliable 
and independent assesment body to the public. It say its 
bysiness boyndary expanding from 'water' to 'Enviroment'. It 
had recently embarked on a quite costly advertising campaign 
to promote this new image to the public. 
Its marketing department consisted of six personnel. 
Apart from that it had a customer accounts division which 
implemented the marketing plans. 
An activity which WRc failed to do was to publish 
technical papers or other forms of publications. Consequenly, 
it was not that well known overseas. 
In 1989, WRc had about 10 main customers i.e. all the 
water authorities. Because it had a small number of customers, 
it did not need a big marketing force to sell its products. 
staff from the operations side were seconded over to handle 
the technical aspects of sales to the customers. 
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IXepricing policy and Attitude Towards Customers 
WRc has been learning to adjust accordingly its pricing 
policies even since it was privatised. Its attitude towards 
customer has changed from one of "We'll tell you what to do " 
to ·How can we help You·. The industry too has been coming to 
term with the fact that it has to pay a competitive rate for 
research to be done. 
XeReactions Of Staff Members To Buy-Out. 
The top management seemed to be enthusiastic about the buy-
out and one possible reason was that they had the security of the 
many years of service. They were willing to take the risks and 
the next five years were relatively • safe years". 
The middle ranking staff were less certain. The newcomers 
were the ones that had to make real hard decisions as to whether 
or not to remain in the new orgnisation. 
XI,Staff Numbers 
The total number of staff in WRc numbered 667 in 1988. 
The ratio of scientific staff to the other staff in 1989 was 2:1. 
The income per staff member was £33k. 
The staff at Swi ndon had fewer adjustment di ff iculties 
follow! ng pr ivatisation as compared to those at Medmenham, a 
former Government laboratory, which has retained its Civil 
Service culture. 
XII,Staff Recryitment 
Some highly specialised staff declined the move from 
stevenage to Swindon and therefore created gaps in key areas. 
Recruitment of best available experienced staff accompanied by 
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a 'crash' retraining programme was therefore an immediate 
necessity. Also new graduates recruitment accompanied by a 
dedicated in-house training was seen as essential to ensure the 
development of a new middle management. 
XIII, present R&P programme 
In the late 1970's and early 1980's WRc developed "products" 
from its R&D programmes which were sponsored by members through 
subscriptions. Among the products were softwares, manuals and 
standards. This research was pre-competitive and aimed to meet 
the needs of all members. 
The new strategy used by WRc was to move into exploitation 
of their research into products for individual clients. For e.g., 
WRc implemented a planning document for North West Water 
Authority which WRc devised for the water authority. The 
income ·obtained from services would be eXpected to increase in 
the near future as WRc tr ies to move away from too much 
dependence on .income generated from subscriptions. 
WRc's income from services increased from about £lOOk in 
1984 to over £7m in 1989. This form of income would need to 
increase to compensate for the planned decrease in support by 
water authorities for collaborative research over the next five 
years. 
XIY,The Effects of privatisation On WRc~s R&D proAramme •. 
Although WRc's chairman has stated that it would remain a 
R&D firm, the privatisation of the water industry in the near 
future, might turn it into a consultancy firm. The amount of 
basic or speculative research will most probably decrease quite 
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significantly because the privatised water industry will most 
probably not fund it. But if WRc were not to carry out 
speculative or basic research. it might lose out in the long run. 
It needs to have a core research programme. 
Especially after the privatisation of the water industry, 
WRc would have to convince its customers of its independence 
especially with regard to its research facilities in Swindon 
(which carr ies out most of the applied research wor k for 
individual water authorities) and its facilities in Medmenham 
(which carr ies out collaborative research for all the water 
author i ties) . 
Before privatisation. WRc used to carry out training or 
organised seminar where it was possible to disseminate knowledge 
to a wide audience. After pr ivatisation, this activity would have 
to be conducted on a commercial basis. 
WRc tr ied to gai n i.ncome through patenting but was not 
successful. This form of activities would an unlikely source of 
income in the future . 
. , _ XV.Qrqaniutional Structure 
The organisational structure of WRc Swindon has three main 
branches i.e. customer accounts, marketing and operations. The 
role of the customer accounts (4 members plus support staff) was 
to look into the need of the customers as well as to implement 
the marketing plans and to obtain feed-back from customers to the 
mar keti ng section. The role of the mar keti ng department (3 
members plus support staff) was to implement the corporate plan 
and to formulate an appropriate marketing strategy to meet the 
goals. Their role was to sift through the the market needs and 
459 
match them with their internal capabilities. Their role was also 
to sell the internal capabilities of WRc as well as to prevent 
the organisation from spreading its resources too thinly and to 
narrow down its customer base. The operations side chose the 
contracts (that were vetted through the marketing department) 
managed the contracts and also bought in services. if needed. 
Although WRc used a matrix management structure, not all 
staff members were involved in the matrix system ie. some staff 
members had fixed core programmes to work on; some were 
occasionally. in. the matrix system; and some who remained in the 
matrix system all the time. 
The staff members in the customer accounts and the marketing 
had a separate role completely ie they didn't appear in the 
matrix structure at all. The matrix management system was used 
more in the operations side. 
The role of the marketing and the customer accounts 
departments decided the directions of the WRc's programmes so 
that whichever contract to go for. it had to meet the industry's 
profile. 
WRc had a separate department which managed the corporate 
image of WRc in Swindon and in Medmenham. 
XVI.Tyrnover and Expendityre 
According to WRc's annual report for 1997/88, their annual 
turnover was over f22m. About 67% (f14.8m) of their income was 
from subscriptions. About 23% (£5m) of their income came from 
commercial (services) activities. About 10% (f2.2m) came from 
contracts (sponsored contracts by Dept. of Enviroment). 
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WRc was trying to reduce its dependence on the income raised 
from subscriptions. In 1999. 55% of its income came from 
subscriptions as opposed to 90% in 1996. There was a significant 
increase in income through contract research and especially 
through services (commercial services). 
WRc has felt that multi-client contracts have been di ff lcul t 
to organise and costly. For example, if a multi client contract 
were landed but the smaller water author i ties were very reluctant 
to pay the fee that was equally spread among its members and upon 
paying, they were usually picky and very demanding. Mr Procter 
felt that a contract alone would take 3 to 4 months to sign. Any 
multi-client contract which was less than £100k was not worth 
pursuing because of the high cost involved. 
Whereas single client contracts were easier to handle. With 
the privatisation of the water industry, the various privatised 
water authorities could negotiate individual research contract 
with WRc. 
In 1987/88. over 95% of their income came from within UK. 
and the rest came from Europe. USA and Middle and Far East. The 
short-term strategy was to be more selective in the overseas 
market. The USA was chosen as a primary target and to this end 
WRc Inco~poration· was set up . 
. XVII.Strateaic Move 
The decision to privatise WRc at least two years before the 
privatisation of the water industry was a strategic move by the 
board of directors. WRc needed at least two years to prepare 
itself for the major changes that were inevitable. 
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The decision to privatise WRc received the backing from the 
var lous water author ities. They believed that for their own 
interest, WRc should remain as viable as before. They ensured 
this through buying of WRc's shares (40%) and agreeing to 
subscribe to research been done at WRc for the next 5 years. 
XYIII.Transition period 
WRc in Swindon had a transition period of about 8 years. It 
had been moving towards the private sector since its inception 
in 1980. Its staff members came mostly from the industry. That 
was one of the main reasons why it had been able to adapt itself 
to a privatised enviroment. 
XIX,Unions 
Surprisingly in the new set up ,only about 30%-40 % of 
its staff were unionised. 
XX,Forms of Control 
Among the forms of control used was time sheets and it was 
up dated every week. In implementing the matrix form of 
management, this form of control was important. 
Each contract had a number and each group was given a code. 
Each staff was also given a number. WRc also had a staff 
. resources and rescheduling programme. 
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Appendix 1.6.13 
Visit to Hazleton UK -23/1/90 
person interviewed:- Dr.T .Houseman.Head of Business Development. 
I.Introduction 
Hazleton UK is a part of Hazleton Laboratories Corporation. 
a wholly owned subsidiary of Corning Glassworks. Hazleton 
provides a comprehensive product development and safety 
evaluation service for the pharmaceutical. agrochemical and 
chemical industries, including toxicology. analytical chemistry. 
metabolism, clinical studies and regulatory affairs. 
It was set up in 1947 by Dr .Hazleton in USA. Hazleton 
Lab.Corporation has laboratories in USA. Europe and in Japan. 
I I • Tur nover -
Its turnover for 1988/89 was £16million. In 1987/88 its 
turnover was £11.5million and in 1986/87 it was about £8million. 
Its turnover was increasing rapidly for the last 3 years ever 
since Corning Glassworks tookover Hazleton Laboratories 
Corporation. Its turnover increased by 40% between 1986/87 and 
1987/88 and an increase of about 39% between 1987/88 and 1988/89. 
The majority of its business came from the UK. About 30% of 
its turnover in 1989 was from UK, 44% from continent europe. 6% 
from Scandinavian countries. 16% from Japan and 4% from USA. 
It had such high percentage of income from the EC (about 
70%) and only 6% in USA because Hazleton Europe concentrated on 
. the EEC market. The majority of its customers were from UK 
because of the strong pharmaceutical and chemical industry. Up 
to 70% of Hazleton's income came from the pharmaceutical market, 
20% from agrochemical and 10% from general chemical industry. 
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III .Staffing .. 
Hazleton Laboratories Corporation had a staff number of over 
2300 in 1989. Hazleton in Harrogate had about 500 staff out of 
which 300 of them were scientists or engineers. Another 
subsidiary of Hazleton Laboratory Corporation in Leeds had a 
staff number of over 200. 
Its turnover to staff ratio for 1988/89 was about £50-
£60k/scientist or about £30-35k/employee. 
IV.R&P proJilJ:.U.m.U 
Hazleton didn't receive any Government funding. Its income 
came from biological research contracts and carrying out safety 
, 
evaluation tests. 
One of Hazleton's strong points was that it clearly knew 
what business it was in. It didn't carry out any pure research 
but concentrated on development right up to licensing the 
,product. It was a capital intensive industry but the advantage 
was that it didn't need to carry out any core research 
programmes. Therefore it didn't need to invest in carrying out 
research. but instead investing its money in modernising its 
equipment and training its workforce. Most RAs needed to plough 
in investment to carry out their core researach programme and 
most of the time the investment was too little to achieve 
significant resuslts .. Furthermore. as its development work was 
'near market', there was greater value added with a clear cut 
objective in carrying out the research. 
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V.Contract Research Market 1n UK . 
The pharmaceutical, agrochemical and chemical industry in 
the UK was one of the biggest in the world. On the average ,these 
industries spent about 10% of its turnover on R&D. 
One of the main reasons why they farmed out their research 
was to even out peaks and trough in their own R&D laboratory. 
Another reason was because they might not have the appropriate 
expertise. Hazleton's clients expected a very high standards of 
wor k and that was why Hazleton ploughed back a substantial amount 
of its turnover back into equipment and training. 
One of the main reasons why Corning Glassworks bought over 
Hazleton Lab. Corporation was because it felt that it was one of 
the fastest growing sector in which it was serving. Secondly. 
Corning was then faci ng stiff competition from the Japanese 
competitors in the ceramic industry. Whereas in the areas of 
laboratory sciences, it was an area of growth and less 
competition. 
YI.Management Style. 
Its management stYle was typically American. Hazleton had 
the Total Quality (TQ) performance and it strived to understand 
who the customer was, what the requirements were, and meeting 
those requirements, without error, on time, every time. 
YII.Competitors 
Hazleton's main competitors wi thi n UK were LIFE Science 
Research, Inveresk Research International and Toxicol Lab. Ltd. 
Competi tion in Europe came from a Swiss company, RCC. and 
Battelle in Germany. 
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It had very little competition from universities because it 
was in the development side. 
YIII.SuccessEactor 
Its success factor lay in :-
-Its international reputation and links as well as technical and 
resource support from the sister laboratories. 
-A clear role i.e. it was in the development business. 
-Quality service. 
-Prompt service. 
Furthermore the pharmaceutical industry was not price 
sensitive. It was willing to pay for a good service. 
IX.Organisational structure 
It used the matrix form of management with project teams. 
In each project , there was a project manager who alone was 
accountable for the project. 
X.Long term planning 
Long term planning was carried out on a five year basis and 
each division was given a growth target. 
~I.1992 
Hazleton would not feel the impact of 1992 that strongly. 
It had already been involved in Europe for the last decade. 
One possible danger was the need to carry out testing for 
drugs once the rules were harmonize i.e. instead of having to go 
through stringent tests as required by each individual country, 
the need to carry out tests occurred once only. Consequenly there 
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would be a reduction in the need for carrying out tests. Anyway 
Or.Houseman felt that it was not a big threat. On the other hand 
there would be greater need to carry out more tests on pesticides 
that have been used for a while but about which there have been 
much controversy about safety. 
XII.Others 
The two Hazleton laboratories in the UK complemented each 
other. In fact all the laborator ies of Hazleton complemented each 
other but they did not tackle projects on a corporate level but 
at laboratory level. 
For example the laboratory in Harrogate tackled problems in 
toxicology and chemistry and the one in Leeds carr ied out 
clinical tests on healthy volunteers and the laboratory in 
Virginia. USA tackled the regulatory affairs. 
It was interesting to note that the negotiation of contracts 
was done by the marketing people. And once the contract was 
secured. it was handed over to the project manager who was 
ul timately responsible for the project. Hazleton's mar keti ng 
division consisted of 6 persons i.e. 2 support staff and 4 
.scientists . 
Hazletofl emphas.ized a· lot on training. It had day releases 
for courses-.and specialist courses. About 5% of staffs' time was 
budgeted for training. 
The profit margin which it aimed for was about 20%. If it 
carried out a development programme that was risky, the contract 
would be negotiated on a cost plus basis. 
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Appendix 1,6.14 
Visit to Ricardo Consulting Ensine.r Limited Q~Sth.lan '90 
persons interviewed·: - Or.O.H.C, Taylor .Chai rman. 
-Or.C.C.l.French .Vice - Chairman. 
I.Introduction 
Its basic activities were consulting and contract research 
(which was the main form of activity), design. development and 
production engineering in IC engines and transmissions. 
Industrial design and engineering consultancy in vehicles and 
general engi neer i ng products were also. offered. Ricardo had 
offices in Shoreham. Letchworth. Detroit and Indianapolis. USA. 
Figure 1 (at the end of this report) shows the 1989 set-up 
of Ricardo plc. 
II .HistoricalBackGrouBd ... 
It was founded in 1915 by Sir Harry Ricardo of whose much 
early work· was concerned with inter-relations between engine 
performance and fuel quality, an interest which the Company has 
retained to this day. Sir Harry established Engine Patents Ltd. 
in 1915 and in 1918, Shell awarded the company a research 
contract. This was the first major contract for Ricardo and on 
which the company was built. 
Ricardo was involved in combustion chamber designs. the 
turbulent head side valve engine. various overhead valve petrol 
ensines. the series of Comet diesel combustion chambers and also 
in industrial diesel engines as well as aircraft engines. It went 
_public in 1962. 
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Ricardo started offering consultancy services to the motor 
industry in USA. France and Japan way back in the early 1920s. 
It has built up this image of bei ng an international company 
which gave Ricardo worldwide contacts. Its reputation together 
with its contact worldwide were two of its strong points. 
Ricardo continued to receive income from royalties until the 
early 1970s. The royalties which Shell received were ploughed 
back into research in Ricardo. Throughout its history, Ricardo 
received very little Government funding. The only time when it 
received a substantial amount of Government funding was in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s when it was involved in the 
development of aircraft engines for the Ministry of Defence. 
III.Sources of Income 
Its main source of income (about 80-90%) came from contract 
research ~ight from design through to prototyping engines for 
cars. trains and ships. 
Income from membership fees constitutes about 10 % of its 
total income. The size of its membership is over 100 and for a 
minimal fee. its members are given facilities like access to 
Ricardo's library. answering technical queries, visits by 
Ricardo 'ssta·ff .and access to certain technical reports. The 
main idea of this membership scheme is to establish links and 
contacts with organisations in the transport industry. 
IY.Staffing 
In 1952. it had a staff number of 160. In 1989. it had a 
staff number of 398. This figure excluded those in its subsidiary 
(about 60 members). At its peak, Ricardo Consulting Engineers had 
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a staff number of 545 back in 1987. This was because Ricardo 
decided to sell off one its main subsidiary i.e. G. Cussons in 
1988 in form of a management takeover by G.Cussons (G.Cussons had 
4 staff number of over 150 in 1988). 
Y ,R&O" proAramme., ,', 
Its main source of activity has been in the area of contract 
research. It did very little testing or standards work. 
Legislation work has been increasing especially in the ares of 
exhaust and sound. 
Every year it has plouged back about 10% of its income ie 
about £1.5 million into its core research programme and this has 
been going on for the last 10 years. Every year the research 
director together with the technical directors from other 
divisions would decide on the areas on which they would research. 
This has resulted in a 'rolling programme'. Ricardo's contacts 
in the transport industry in forms of meetings, visits, and 
attending conferences which have helped Ricardo to keep abreast 
in its field of speciality. 
Ricardo didn't have a big workshop facility but it has been 
able to produce prototypes on a small scale basis. For wor k which 
it could not handle, it sub-contracted out. It had over a 100 
test beds for engines. 
YI.Marketing Technique 
It went for contracts and not sub-contracts i.e. Ricardo 
Consulting Engineers was the main contractor and not the sub-
contractor. If necessary, it sub-contracted the part which it 
could not handle. 
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The membership scheme which consisted of over a hundred 
members was a very good source of contacts. For a minimal fee. 
the members got to visit Ricardo to discuss technical problems 
and likewise Ricardo visited the members at least once a year for 
technical discussion. It helped the Ricardo's staff to keep 
·abreast ·with ·the technology as well as being aware of the 
market'S needs. 
Marketing was being done by agents. in Eastern Europe. China. 
Japan. India. Thailand etc. Its two subsidiaries did its 
marketing effort in the USA plus an agent on a part time basis. 
Everyone in Ricardo was expected to do marketing and the 
main coordinator was the business development manager. 
Dr .French felt that cooperative research was cumbersome and 
took a lot of effort to put together. Most of Ricardo's contracts 
were with single clients. 
VII .Organisat.ional· ' structure ." 
It had a matr ix form of management. Each. division was headed 
by a technical director. Projects were runned by a project 
manager who headed a project. team. He was allowed to sub-contract 
wor.kto the -various division or to draw staff from them. The 
project manager was acoountabla for.the project. 
It did not seem· to have marketing executives. All the 
various technical directors and managers did the marketing. The 
business division handled the publicity work. 
YIII.Unions 
It didn't recognise any union although some of its staff 
were union members. It formed a Works Council whereby the voice 
of the staff could be heard. It also had a staff briefing system 
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IX.Success Factor, 
Dr.French felt that the success factors for Ricardo have 
been: 
(1) Specialised niches i.e. the engine industry. 
(2) Supporting core research programme. 
(3) Building up on its international reputation. 
(4) Strong loyal customers e.g. Shell which Ricardo had been 
working with since 1918. 
(S) Improvement in project management e.9. usage of computers to 
check progress of research and cash flow. Especilly useful for 
smaller projects. 
(6) Getting in early ahead of competitors by diagnosing and 
meeting the needs of customers. 
(7) and keeping abreast with technolo9Y. 
X.Competitiors 
Ricardo's main competitior was AVL which was an Austrian 
firm. The other competitors were its own customers. Companies 
that prefered to carry out intramural research and those that had 
excess research facilities were marketing them in the vehicle 
market e.g. Perkins. Lotus. 
XI.Diversification 
In 1964, a year after it became a plc. Ricardo decided to 
divesify into manufacturing of scientific equipment for 
education. G. Cussons. which became the marketing arm of some of 
the products of Ricardo. was not a success and it was sold off 
in 1987. 
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XII ,Profitability 
The worst year for Ricardo since it became plc, was in 
1986/87 when its turnvoer was over £16 million and its earning 
per ordinary share was only 6p, Since G.Cussons was sold back in 
1987, business had been picking up. Dr .French said that Ricardo's 
poor performance was due to poor marketing effort. 
-XIII.1992 
Dr.French felt that 1992 will not impact Ricardo as much as 
other RTOs because it has been involed in R&D activities in 
Europe for a long time. 
He felt that the biggest threat post 1992 will be the 
'poaching' of its staff. 
XIV,Others 
About 10 years ago, it was heavily involved in the power 
train design but it has moved now towards vehicles. About 20 
years ago, Ricardo got involved in lubricants because it felt 
that it ought to deal not only in the engines side but also in 
other parts of the vehicle. 
Although it-did not organise conferences, it encouraged its 
staff to present papers at conferences. 
It didn't seem to obtain much income from investments. 
It recently bought another American firm in Illinois which helped 
to complement Ricardo expertise, in particular to provide engine 
design capability, 
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Appendix 1.6.15 
Visit to WI on 28/3/89 
The Person Interviewed: Mr. A Braithwaite. Chief Executive 
Mr. 3 Kirk-Wilson. Director Finance 
The meeting began by the WI extracting every piece of 
information they could before focusing on the purpose of the 
visit. If they smell a lead, they would pursue it as far as they 
could. I found that they were frank with with their opinions and 
were prepared to face competition from any research 
establishment. There needed to know t.he market and therefore took. 
every opportunity to up-date themselves. This became part of its 
corporate culture and was practised by most. senior members of 
their staff. The leadership style of the institute rubbed off 
on its staff. Mr. Braithwaite encouraged Qreater cooperation. 
coordination and team managemnt and a system for greater 
accountability. 
Competi tion was getting tougher. It did not secure contracts 
as" easily as it could say 10 yearrs ago. It was prepared to face 
the changes and it had a sense of commitment and direction. They 
kept on emphasizing that their business was not only in welding 
but in joining. 30ining has been their focus which encompasses 
_applications of surfacing, and of adhesives and other joioning 
methods. It was trying to encompass a broader caver age ·with 
·greater emphasis on the fundamentals of good joining practise. 
The institut.e had a good network of memberships .. In 1989, 
.60% of its membership came from ·overseas and up to 30% of their 
subscr iption came· from overseas. and the other 30% of their 
subscription came from Europe. ~uite a lot of their members were 
SMEs but all members paid the same amount of subscr iption 
'.' ,' .... 
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regardless of size. Over 60% of its membership had less than 500 
employees. It had about 6 employees looking into this area of 
memberships. It therefore established a network through their 
. membership. This helped them tremendously in their marketing and 
helped to provide a focus on advancement of technology as well 
as the needs of members~ Their subscription plus funding from DTI 
helped to fund cooperative programmes. Therefore the subscr iption 
formed part of the core of WI's business. This would also help 
them to secure collaborative partners in Europe. There was a 
. relationship- establ ished between them. As a resul t. WI could play 
the role of an organiser of collaborative programmes which it 
invites members to take part. Being the or,ganiser had its 
advantagates but extra cost was incurred in organising. The WI 
also invested quite a hugh sum of money in Brussels in trying to 
know its way around. It spent about 1/2 a man year for 4 years 
to establish itself there. Its a big ~nvestment in a way but it 
will payoff in the long run. At present, their success rate is 
lout of 5. Another problem faces was that most European CROs 
which were bidding for contracts were subsidised by their 
gove~nment. They could therefore bid at lower price. 
About £2m of WI's funding was generated through GSP 
'. programmes .which were more or less similar to club activities. 
The programmes did not get much funding from DTI. About £S.9m 
was generated through single sponsor projects and most of them 
were small projects and these projects were clinched through 
aetive selling. WI claimed that it paid about 180 visits a year 
to industry and· it had a small unit whieh did basie market 
. research. Marketing was not done centrally but at departmental 
level. 
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WI encouraged members-and non-members to visit its site and 
it had close to 7000 visits/year. WI was showing typical 
characteristics of industrial marketing with very close contacts 
.with their clients. Its customers were loyal customers or repeat 
buyers who were aware of WI's expertise. Thier guests were well 
treated and given every assistance possible. This helped to 
project a good image and impressed their cl ients to be with their 
profesionalism. 
WI had conference facilities as well as facilities for 
training and seminar. The centre provided board and lodging. It 
would be interesting to find out the feasibility of providing 
this facility and its occupancy rate. The communication and 
training services helped a great deal to develop guest-client 
relationship. 
The institute had about 7 members of their staff handling 
contract work. out of these, 2 of them were front-men who were 
involved in negotiation and pricing. and other legal matters. For 
e.g. Eureka programme involved a lot of paperwork as compared 
with Brite because it was nearer market with many patent issues 
to be solved. 
WI kept on emphasizi ng on its membership which helped to 
generate a core income and equally important were the contracts 
for collaborative work and contract research. 
Mr. Braithwaite felt that the university should not be 
brought closer to industry. Their role was to educate and to 
carry out fundamental research rather than to compete for R&D 
contracts. He felt that it was a mistake to draw the university 
nearer as this would create more competition. 
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The WI"s staff members were motivated by fear as well as 
incentives. Each staff was to account for every hour of their 
time. If the staff member proved himself, he would be rewarded. 
As I walked around, there were tags on their doors to say whether 
they were busy or not. Those who were interested in carrying out 
fundamental research were encouraged to do so. WI allocated about 
5% of their turnovber for fundamental research .. This would help 
motivate those who were interested in research. Through 
publication of their work, the staff member could increase their 
esteem and to obrain recognition from their peers. It could also 
generate income for the writer and the income acts as an 
incentive to write. 
The equipments at WI covered a wide range of welding 
equipment and it chosed to specialise in certain areas of 
joining. Some of the equipment were obsolete and as long as they 
generated income, it would still be utillized. WI optimised the 
usage of their equipments. WI tried to diversify into areas like 
robotics; joinings for plactics; and consultancy work (in 
manufacturing technology). It was thinking of working hand in 
hand with an established consultancy firm. All in all. WI had a 
balanced portfolio of programmes. 
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Appendix 1.6 
Visit to 8MT on 29/9/89 
Person interviewed: Mr. Dennis Jeffrey. Commercial Director 
SMI's Activities 
It is active in the areas of energy. the environment. 
defence, manufactur ing and transportation. It concentrates on the 
development. practical application and enhancement of design. 
safety and technical innocation. With particular skills in fields 
as fluid mechanics. computer technology and control engineering. 
Historical BackAroun~ 
BMT was a merger between NMI (National Maritime Institute) 
which was a government research institute and BSRA (British Ship 
,Research Association). This move was taken at a time when the 
shipbuilding industry faced a stagnant markett and many 
individual yards faced acute economic crises. 
In 1982. NMI was privatised and in 1985. NMI merged with 
BSRA. The merged organisation had to find its role in an industry 
forced by economic circumstances to view its expenditure on R&D 
with some reservation. 
R&P programmes -,',. 
Before the merger. BSRA obtained 50% of its income from the 
government and the other 50% from the industry. It continued to 
charge a 10% surcharge for research ,until 1981 due to intense 
price competition. 
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The newly merged organisation. BMT. had to compete in a 
tough environment for contracts. Consequently. it became 
customer-dr iven rather than technology dr iven. The research 
programmes that were carried out were of shorter time horizon. 
It tried to plough back about 5%-6% of its turnover to its core 
research but this was· close to impossible. BMT reduced 
significantly the areas of specialised research and concentrated 
more on areas which could generate income. 
BMT faced competition from HIEs as the latter were forced 
to carry out more consultancy work for the industry. This made 
the competition more acute especially in a depressed industry 
like shipping. 
Turnover 
In the first year of trading in 1985, it lost over f1m. This 
was due to the depressed market for model testings and the high 
fixed costs inherited from both organisationsr 
It was interesting to note that the main source of profit 
for BMT was from its investment i.e. close to flm. It sold of 
most of its fixed assets and therefore had a good cash flow. The 
cash generated had to be used wisely to help BMT divest into new 
areas. The first few years after the merger was spent on 
minimising costs and achieving the economies of scale anticipated 
-from the merger. 
BMT sold its facilities in Feltham because of the over-
capacity of facilities in a world-wide market. A combination of 
the high fixed costs associated with the provision, operation and 
maintenance of large intensive operations and the artificaially 
low prices that was charged lead to very high losses. 
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8MT developed and successfully marketed its hydrodynamic 
software products with sales in the UK and abroad. It also 
developed and mar keted software approp.T iate to the off-shore 
industry. 
8MT moved away from being a heavily dependent on membership 
subscription. It now has a smaller membership and it carrys out 
more consultancy work for the membership and less research . 
. Future Developments 
_ 8MT has planned to continue its diversification from its 
traditional market base. Considerable progress has been made in 
Offshore Services and Coastal Management and it has intented to 
acquire suitable business. 8MT has decided to restructure into 
a holding company and subsidiaries. The holding company would 
focus on the pr imary role of supporting R&D and the dissemi nation 
of the knowledge. whi 1st each site would become a tr adi ng 
subsidiary with the primay objective of trading at a profit. Each 
subsidiary would reassess the number of preople employed and 
other fixed costs to provide a viable economic basis for the 
operation . 
.other Comments 
Hr. Jeffrey that EC funding was difficult to obtain due to 
the bureaucracy involved. BMT had a personnel based permanently 
in Brussels to look into its affairs in Brussel. It normally took 
up to 2 years from the point of proposal to the award of 
contract. Another difficulty was to obtain a suitable partner in 
the less developed EC countr ies. Furthermore, the fundi ng of only 
50% of the research programmes from EC was not sufficient. 
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One of its longer term strategy would be to move away from 
the UK market and focus more on the international market. This 
was due to the intense home-competition and higher profit margin 
in the international market. 
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Appendi)( 1.6 .17 .lute SA· 
Person interviewed: DT. Harry Stout. Director. Jute RA 
Date of interview: 20.3.90 
Hi.tor ieal Background· .'. ' ... -
The manufacture of jute was introduced into Dundee in 1822. 
when the fibre was processed on the existing flax machinery. The 
industry reapidly expanded up to the end of the nineteenth 
century, when competition from India began to make itself felt. 
The method of production underwent very little change until the 
decade after the 1939-45 war. In the 1950's and 1960's were there 
considerable changes in machinery and management methods. Since 
1945, the industry changed considerably. There were certain 
pressurres to progress. 
The British Jute Trade RA was established in 1946. Prior to 
this. the only opportunities for research were in two of the 
larger firms which set up-research departments in the inter-war 
period. The.RA was the the sole source of scientific information 
which was used by the industry. 
Membership of the RA covers 97% of the producing industry. 
The RA trained people from the smaller firms in the techniques 
of statistical quality control and advises on quality control in 
manufacturing processes. At its peak. Jute RA had over 20 
scientists. The advent of Jute RA in 1946 offset the shortage of 
scientists and technologists in the industry. 
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The Closure of Jyte- RA-- -
The following were the reasons for the closure for the Jute 
RAs:-
(1) It was difficult to apply the RA concept in an industry where 
2 or 3 companies controlled the whole Jute industry. The smaller 
companies could not afford to contribute towards the membership 
subscriptions. The bigger firms monopolised the programmes of the 
RA. 
(2) The industry did not place value on scientific research. 
(3) The decision by the bigger firms to divest into polymers. But 
Jute RA did not diversify into polymers. 
(4) The pace of the polymer technology was very fast. 
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App.nd.i,JL~:l. 
The Customer-Contractor Principle .had a major effect on the 
RAs over the. last 2 decades. With. the implementation of this 
pr.inc.iple, automatic grant-in-aid-was .stopped and every RA had 
to submit p.roposals to the. .var ious. Requ.i.rementBoards.to .seek 
funding. Tne following paragraphs explain briefly the principle 
and the various reviews that were.carried out on it. 
Under the Customer-Contractor .Pr.inciple. substantial amount 
proportions. of the funds previously. received by the AFRC. MRC and 
NERCfrom .the Science Budget ~er,e· .allocated . instead to the 
Departments. concerned· w.ith.research. undertaken by the Councils 
(for_MRC,thesear~angeme.nts were subsequently reversed). 
The customer-contractor p.rinciple was to apply only to . 
. applied .R&D. .it ...was· recognised .. t~t .basic .research . had no 
.' ,.,..A&10g0ua·:.CUet.oae.T~contr:ac·tor ... .basis ... No .prov ision was made for 
at.rate9ic,,. 'Veeear.eh.·,;·, , .. ,._ 
. . 
Howev8l= .. t.he. Rothschild reportrecogn.ised. that .appl ied R&D. 
~aboratorl.s ~enerally-needed to ~ngage in some research not 
directly conce.rned wi,th. commi.ssioned p.roQrammes ... The repo.rt 
.r-~ended an-average surcharge of .10% on R&D contracts to meet 
the. need· for· 9-8Ae.¥'aL .Tesear..ch ..... , 
·The Gover.nment r..eviewedthe changes that flowed from the 
Rothschild repo,:t i.n 1979. It conc.luded.. that:.~ ~ 
.( 1) -The, changes -.appeared .. to· have .stre.ngthened .the .Gove~ nment 's 
R&D machinery. 
(2) If too high- a. propor·tion of .the income of a Research Council 
were to .come from commissioned .r.esearch, the viability of the 
Council. as an. inde.pende.nt .. research organisation would begin to 
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be called in question~ 
(3) Contractors . would .vary. in degree to which they found a 
surcharge useful. in maintaining a general research capability for 
aeeting future needs. 
(4) It had led to additional administrative costs. 
Another review was made in 1963 by Sir Ronald Mason for 
ABRC 1 • The report concluded. that :.-
(1) .The new commissioning arrangements had not provided the 
(2) The new· arrangements had. -led to an increase of bureaucracy. 
(3) u"due emphasis .o.n ... hort~.t.rm -research had caused strategic 
resear:c.h~ .. whieh-·should. be .integral t.o .. commissions, . Rot to. be. 
adequat..ely. c~v.T..~ •.. Taken. with the. failure to implement the. 
gene-ral ... research .. SUTc.ha~ge. the. review considered that this had 
led to strategic .. research • being .increasingly supported from the 
science. vote .• with a conse.quent reductio.n .in funds available for. 
,ba~ic .studies. • 
1. Advisory. Board for The Research. Councils: A Study of 
. Commiss,ioned Research. London: HMSO Nov. 1983. 
2. ibid 9 .paragrap.h 23. 
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Appendix· 4,2. 
Support.. ·for a. Central- Structure .. ·for R&Q .. 
If the support of R&D was regarded. in i tsel f. as an 
objective of national policy. then it could be argued that there 
should be a clearer focus within the government on its 
responsibilities in this field. Sir John Kingman 1 expounded the 
view that Britain urgently needed a Ministry of Science and 
Technology to achieve a coherent policy for the public support 
of sc i.e nee· , a.ndthat .this . could not be realised simply through 
better communica·tions wi·thin the existing. system: "the issue is 
. ..not communications .but power·. S1 r .John argued that the Hi nistry 
should be fairly small and professional. It would have 
responsibilities for policy making over a broad field of both 
pure and applied science and would be able to advise the 
Government as a whole about the balance and the nature of their 
R&D programmes. The ministry would exercise the function of the 
research-councils collectively, supporting research in research 
. 
establishments and in universities. and thereby be responsible 
for the science base and interact with those departments which 
were runni ng their own appl ied research programme. 51 r John 
. attached much . importance both to there bei n9 . at least one 
minister who raised scientific issues at Cabinet level when 
necessary and to the effective presence of science at the top 
layer of officials in Whitehall~-
lscience and the Public Purseil985 Government and 
opposition;Leonard Schapiro public lecture .given by Sir John 
Kinman at the London School of Economics,7th.Nov.1985. 
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Appendix 7.1 
SPECIMEN MEMORANDUM & ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 
FOR RESEARCH ORGANISATIQNS WISHING DEPARTMENT 
OF INDUSTRY APPROVAL UNDER THE INCOME & 
CORPORATION TAXES ACT 1970 
'rhe Companies Act, 1985 
Company limited by Guarantee 
and not having a Share Capital 
MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION 
of 
I The name of the Association. is. 
II The registered office of the Association will be 
situated in. 
III The objects for which the Association is established 
are:-
(a) 
(b) 
RT7AAR 
To promote and undertake research in the field 
of and for that 
purpose to establish, form, equip and maintain 
laboratories, workshops, or factories, and 
conduct and carryon experiments, and to 
'obtain and provide funds for such work and for 
payment to any person or persons engaged in 
such laboratories, workshops, or factories or 
elsewhere. 
To prepare, edit, print, publish, sell 
wholesale or retail, issue, acquire and 
circulate any literary works or matters 
treating of or bearing on the research of 
development activities conducted, promoted or 
financed or which might be conducted, promoted 
or financed by the Association and to assist, 
collaborate in or procure any such work; to 
establish and maintain collections of 
material, literature and scientific data 
relating thereto: and to disseminate 
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(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
( f ) 
(g) 
RT7AAR 
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information obtained therefrom. 
To assist or collaborate with the research 
work of any persons, associations, 
institutions, universities and other bodies, 
incorporated or not incorporated, engaged in 
scientific research. 
To apply for, purchase, or otherwise acquire 
whether in its own name or otherwise or oppose 
the application by others for any letters 
patent or licenses whether exclusive, 
non-exclusive or limited relating to 
inventions, improvements, processes, materials 
or designs whether in the United Kingdom or 
any other part of the world which the 
Association may deem to be useful in 
connection with any of its objects; to acquire 
and register any designs or standardisation 
marks; to assign any such letters patent, 
licences, designs or standardisation marks; 
and to arrange for the development, perfecting 
and testing of the value of such inventions, 
improvements, processes, materials and 
designs. 
To take over, establish, promote, finance or 
conduct or carryon any undertaking prohibited 
from distributing allY of its prof i ts, income 
or property amongst its members to an extent 
at least as great as is imposed on the 
Association by its Memorandum and Articles of 
Association with the primary object of 
promoting the objects of the Association. 
To purchase, feu, take on lease or in 
e~change, hire or otherwise acquire any 
heritable or moveable, real or personal 
property and in particular any land, 
buildings, factories, workshops, laboratories, 
machinery, plant, apparatus, appliances, 
ships, boats, vehicles and any rights or 
privileges necessary or convenient for the 
purposes of the Association and to construct, 
erect, alter, improve and maintain any such 
property from time to time for the purposes of 
the Institute, and to manage, develop, sell, 
feu, demise, let, hire, mortgage, dispose of, 
turn to account or otherwise deal with all or 
part of the same with a view to the promotion 
of the objects of the Association. 
To employ any person or persons or body in 
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(h) 
(i) 
( j) 
( k) 
(1) 
( til) 
(n) 
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connection with the objects of the Association 
and to pay such remuneration as may be thought 
expedient. 
To apply to any Government, public bodies, 
corporations, companies or persons whether in 
the United Kingdon or abroad, for any grants 
of money, and any grants of land, donations, 
gifts, subscriptions and other assistance with 
a view to promoting the objects of the 
Association and to accept the same and to 
conform to any proper conditions upon which 
such grants, gifts or other payments may be 
made. 
To undertake and execute any trusts which may 
be conducive to any of the objects of the 
Association and to act as Trustees and accept 
as such specific tasks or ,responsibilities 
including aavisory functions, provided the 
same shall be for the advancement of the 
objects of the Association. 
To borrow or raise any money that may be 
required by the Association on such terms as 
may be deemed advisable and to grant security 
by way of bond, mortgage, bond and disposition 
in security, charge debenture or otherwise 
over any part of the Association's property. 
To raise funds by subscriptions, levies, or in 
any other way for the promotion of the objects 
of the Association. 
To invest the moneys of the Association not 
immediately required Eor its purpose in or 
upon such investments, securities or property 
as may be thought fit, subject nevertheless to 
such conditions (if any) and such consents (if 
any) as may for the time being be imposed or 
required by law and subjects also as 
hereinafter provided. 
To provide for the welfare of employees or 
ex-employees of the Association or their 
dependants by grants of money, pensions or 
otherwise and to promote or assist in the 
promotion of and contribute to any pension or 
endowment fund or policy of assurance. 
To pay all expenses preliminary or incidental 
to the for:nation of the Association and i t:s 
registration. 
- 3 -
(0 ) 
(p) 
(q) 
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To procure the Association to be registered or 
recognised in any part of the British 
Commonwealth or in any foreign country or 
place. 
To do all or any of the above things as 
principals, agents, trustees or otherwise and 
by or through trustees, agents or otherwise. 
To do all such other lawful things as may be 
incidental or conducive to the attainment of 
the objects specified in this Memorandum. 
Provided that:-
RT7AAR 
(i) In case the Association shall take or hold any 
property which may ~e subject to any trusts, 
the Association shall only deal with or invest 
the same in such manner as allowed by law, 
having regard to such trusts. 
(ii) The Association shall not support with its 
funds any object, or endeavour to impose on or 
procure to be observed by its members or 
others, any regulation, restriction or 
condition which if an object of the 
Association would make it a Trade Union. 
(iii) In case the Association shall take or hold any 
property subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Charity Commissioners for England and Wales or 
Minister of Education, or any Authority 
exercising corresponding jurisdiction outside 
England and Wales, the Association shall not 
sell, ~ortgage, charge or lease the same 
without such authority, approval or consent as 
may be required by law, and as regards any 
such property the Council of Management or 
Governing Body of the Association shall be 
chargeable for any such property that may come 
into their hands and shall be answerable and 
accountable for their own acts, receipts, 
neglects and defaults, and for the due 
administration of such property in the same 
manner and to the same extent as they would as 
such Council of Management or Governing Body 
have been if no incorporation had been 
effected, and the incorporation of the 
Association shall not diminish or impair any 
control or authority exercisable by the 
Chancery Division, the Charity Commissioners 
or the Minister of Education or any such other 
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Authority as aforesaid over such Council of 
Management or Governing Body but they shall as 
regards any such property be subject jointly 
and separately to such control or authority as 
if the Association were not incorporated. 
(iv) The income and property of the Association 
whencesoever derived, shall be applied solely 
towards the promotion of the objects of the 
Association as set forth in this Memorandum of 
Association, and no portion thereof shall be 
paid or transferred directly of indirectly by 
way of dividend, gift, division bonus or 
otherwise howsoever by way of profit, to the 
members of the Association. 
Provided that nothing herein shall prevent the 
payment, in good faith, of reasonable and 
proper remuneration to any officer or servant 
of the Association, or to any member of the 
Association, in return for any services 
actually rendered to the Association, nor 
prevent the payment of interest at a rate not 
exceeding six per centum per annum on money 
lent, or reasonable and proper rent for 
premises demised or let by any member to the 
Association: But so that no member of the 
Council of Management or Governing Body of the 
Association shall be appointed to any salaried 
office of the Association or any office of the 
Association paid by fees, and no remuneration 
or other benefit in money or money's worth 
shall be given by the Association to any 
member of such Councilor Governing Body, 
except repayment of out-of-pocket expenses and 
interest at the rate aforesaid on money lent, 
or reasonable and proper rent for premises 
demised or let to the Association; provided 
that the provision last aforesaid shall not 
apply to any payment to any Company of which a 
member of the Council of Management or 
Governing Body may be a member, and in which 
such member shall not hold more than 
one-hundredth part of the capital, and such 
members shall not be bound to account for any 
share of profits he may receive in respect of 
any such payment. Provided also that nothing 
herein shall prevent the gratuitous 
distribution among or sale at less than cost 
to members of the Association of any books, 
pamphlets or other publications relating to 
all or any of its objects. Provided also that 
nothing herein shall prevent any member of the 
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Association from exercising any processes, and 
making, using, acquiring and vending any 
articles and things in the ordinary course of 
his business for profit or otherwise under any 
licence or permission in respect of any 
discovery, invention or patent resulting from 
the work of the Association. 
(v) The liability of the ~embers is limited. 
(vi) Every member of the Association undertakes to 
contribute to the assets of the Association in 
the event of the same being wound up while he 
is a member, or wichin one year after he 
ceases to be a member, for payment of the 
debts and liabilities of the Institute 
contracted before he ceases to be a member, 
and of the costs, charges and expenses of 
winding up, and for the adjustment of the 
rights of the contributories among themselves, 
such amount as may be required not exceeding 
one pound. 
(vii) If upon the winding up or dissolution of the 
Association there remains, after satisfaction 
of all its debts and liabilities, any property 
whatsoever, the same shall not be paid to or 
distributed among the members of the 
Association, but shall be given or transferred 
to some other institution or institutions in 
the United Kingdom having objects similar to 
the objects of the Association, and which 
shall prohibit the distribution of its or 
their income and property among its or their 
members to an extent at least as great as is 
imposed on the Association under or by virtue 
of Clause IV hereof, such institution or 
institutions to be determinded by the members 
of the Association ac or before the time of 
dissolution, and if and so far as effect 
cannot be given to such provision, then to 
some charitable object. 
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wE, the several persons whose names and addresses are 
subscribed, are desirous of being formed into a Company in 
pursuance of this Memorandum ot Association. 
NAME, ADDRESSES A~D DESCRIPTIONS OF SOBSCRIBERS 
RT7AAR 
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The Companies Act, 1985 
Company limited by Guarantee 
and not having a Share Capital 
ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION 
of 
INTERPRETATION 
1. In these Articles unless inconsistent with the 
context:-
"The Act" means the Companies Act 1985. 
"The Association" means the above mentioned Company. 
"The Articles" means the Articles of Association for 
the time being in force. 
"The Memorandum" means the Memorandum of Association of 
the Association. 
"The Seal" means the common seal of the Association. 
"Governing Body" means the body established in 
accordance with Article 5 hereof. 
"Governing Member" means a member of the Governing 
Body. 
"Month" means calendar month. 
"Year" means year from 1st January to 31st December 
inclusive. 
Words importing the singular include the plural and 
vice versa. 
Word importing the masculine include the feminine. 
RT7AAR - d -
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These Articles shall be constr~ea with reference to the 
Provisions of the Act, and terms used in these Articles 
shall be taken as having the same respective meanings as 
they have when used in that Act. 
PURPOSES 
2. The Association is established for the purposes 
expressed in the Memorandum. 
MEMBERSHIP AND GOVERNING BODY 
3. For the purpose of registration the number of members 
of the Association is declared not to exceed twenty-five but 
the Association may from time to time register an increase 
of members subject to the provisions of Article 6. 
4. The members of the Association shall consist of the 
Governing Members for the time being and accordingly the 
name of e~ery person who accepts and holds the office of a 
Governing Member shall be entered on the Register of 
Members. The signatories to the Memorandum and Articles of 
Association shall be the first Governing Members. The 
majority of the Governing Members shall be British subjects 
resident in the United Kingdom and when necessary the 
Go~erning Members shall take immediate action under 
Article 6 hereof or otherwise to ensure that as far as 
possible this provision is observed at all times. 
5. The affairs of the Association shall be conducted by 
the Governing Body which may exercise all the powers of the 
Association not required by the Articles or by the Act to be 
exercised by the Association in General Meeting. The 
Governing Body shall consist of the Governing Members for 
the time being and shall from time to time elect one of 
their number to be chairman of the Governing Body, and such 
election shall be for a period of three years. A retiring 
chairman may be re-elec~ed as Chairman. 
6. The Association by resolution of a General Meeting may 
add to ~he number of Governing Members and may appoint new 
Governing Members and may remove from office any existing 
Governing Member by a resolution duly passed pursuant to 
Sections 304 and 305 of the Act. The Governing Members 
shall have power at any time to appoint any person to be a 
Governing Member either to fill a vacancy or as an addition 
to the number of existing Governing Members, but any person 
so appointed shall retain his office only until the next 
Annual General Meeting and shall then be eligible for 
re-elec~ion but shall not be taken into account in determing 
RT7AAR 
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the numbers of Governing Members who are to retire by 
rocation at such meeting. No person shall be disqualified 
from being appointed a Governing Member in accordance with 
the provision of these Articles by reason of having atcained 
the age of seventy or any other age, nor shall special 
notice be required on that accounc and no Governing Member 
shall be required to vacate his office or be ineligible for 
re-eleccion by reason of his age. 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNING BODY 
7. The Governing Body may meet together for the despatch 
of business, adjourn and otherwise regulate their meetings 
as they may think fit. Questions arising at any meeting 
shall be decided by a majority of votes. In case of an 
equality of votes the Chairman shall have a second or 
casting vote. All members of the Governing Body shall be 
held in the United Kingdom. 
8. A member of the Governing Body may, and the Secretary 
on the requisition of any such member shall at any time 
summon a meeting of the Governing Body. 
9. The quorun necessary for the transaction of the 
business of the Governing Body shall be three. 
10. The Chairman of the Governing Body may at any time 
instruct the Secretary to send to every Governing Member for 
his approval a minute and such minute if approved by all of 
the Governing Members in writing shall be the equivalent for 
all purposes of a resolution or resolutions of the Governing 
BOQY caken at a meeting duly convened and held. 
DISQUALIFICA'rION OF GOVERNING MEMBERS 
11. The office of a Governing Member shall be vacated if he 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
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becomes bankrupt or ma~es any arrangement or 
composition with his creditors, or otherwise 
becomes publicly insol~ent, or 
becomes prohibited from being a Governing Member 
by reason of any Order made under Sections 295 to 
299 and Schedule 12 of the Act, or 
becomes of unsound mind, or tor any reason 
becomes incapable of managing his affairs, or 
resigns his office by notice in writing to the 
Association, or 
is removed from office by a resolution duly 
passed pursuant to Sections 304 and 305 of the 
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Act. 
ROTATION OF GOVERNING MEMBERS 
12. At the Annual General Meeting in e~ery year one-third 
of the Governing Members for the time being, or if their 
number is not three or a multiple of three the number 
nearast to one-third, shall retire from office. 
13. The Governing Members to retire in every year shall be 
those who have been longest in office since their last 
election or appointment, but as between persons who became 
Governing Members on the same day those to retire shall 
(unles~ chey otherwise agree among themselves> be determined 
by lot. 
14. A retiring Governing Member shall be eligible for re-
election. 
IS. The Association, at the meeting at which a Governing 
Member retires in manner aforesaid may fill up the vacated 
office by electing a person thereto, and in default the 
retiring Governing Member shall, if offering himself for 
re-election be deemed to have been re-elec~ed unless at such 
meeting i~ is expressly resolved not to fill such vacated 
office or unless a resolution for the re-election of such 
Governing Member shall have been put to the meeting and 
lost. 
16. No person other than a retiring Governing Member shall 
be eligible for election to the office of Governing Member 
unless he is reco~nended by the Governing Members. 
17. A Governing Member who vacates his office under Article 
11 or is not re-elected or deemed to have been re-elected on 
his retirement shall cease to be a member of the Associacion 
trom the date of such vacation of office or retirement. 
GENERAL MEETINGS 
18. The first General Meeting of the Association shall be 
held at such time within not less than one month nor more 
than three months after the incorporation of the Association 
and at such place as the Signatories to the Memorandum and 
Articles shall determine. The Association shall in each 
year hold a General Meeting as its Annual General Meeting in 
addition to any other meetings in that year and shall 
specify the meeting as such in the notices calling it; and 
not more than fifteen months shall elapse between the date 
of one Annual General Meeting of the Association and that of 
the next. Provided, that, so long as the Association holds 
its first Annu~l Ge~eral Meeting within eighteen months of 
its incor porat10n, 1t need not hold it in the year of its 
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incorporation or ia the following year. The Annual General 
Meeting shall be held at such time and place as the Chairman 
of the Governing Body shall appoint. 
19. All general meetings other than the first Ganeral 
Meeting and Annual General Meetings shall be called 
Extraordinary General Meetings. 
20. The Chairman or the Governing Body may, whatever he or 
they shall think fit, convene an Extraordinary General 
Meeting, and Extraordinary General Meetings shall also be 
convened on such requisition or in default may be convened 
by such requisitionists as provided by Section 368 of the 
Act. 
NOTICE OF GENERAL MEETINGS 
21. Twenty-one days' notice in writing at the least at 
every Annual General Meeting and of every meeting convened 
for the passing of a ~pecial resolution and fourteen days' 
notice in writing at the least of every other General 
Meeting (exclusive in every case of the day on which the 
notice is served or dee~ed to be served and of the day for 
which notice is given) specifying the place, the day and the 
hour of the meeting and, in case of special business, the 
general nature of that business shall be given in manner 
hereinafter mentioned, or in such other manner, if any, as 
may be prescribed by the Association in General Meeting, to 
the Auditors and to all members of whose addresses the 
Association is aware, but with the consent of all the 
~embers entitled to receive notice thereof, or of such 
proportion of such members as is prescribed by the Act in 
the case of meetings other than Annual General Meetings, a 
meeting may be convened by such notice as those ~embers may 
thinK fit. All General Meetings of the Association shall be 
held in the United Kingdom. 
22. The accidental omission to give notice of a meeting to, 
or the non-receipt of notice of a meeting by any person 
entitled to receive the same shall not invalidate the 
proceedings of that meeting. 
PROCEEDINGS AT GENERAL MEETINGS 
23. All business shall be deemed special that l5 transacted 
at the first General Meeting and at an Extraordinary General 
Meeting and also all that is transacted at an Annual General 
Meeting with the exception of the consideration of the 
income and expenditure account and balance sheet, and the 
ordinary reports of the Governing Body and of the Auditors, 
and the appointment of, and the fixing of the remuneration 
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of che Auditors. 
24. No business shall be transacted at any General Meeting 
unless a quorum of not less than three members is present at 
the time the meeting proceeds co business. 
25. If within half an hour fro~ the time appointed for the 
meeting a quorum i~ not present the meeting if convened upon 
the requisition of members, shall be dissolved: in any other 
case it shall stand adjourned to the same day in the next 
wee~, at the same time and place, or to such other day and 
at such other time and place as the Chairman of the 
Governing Body may determine, and if at the adjourned 
meeting a quorum is not present within half an hour from the 
time appointed for the meeting the members present shall be 
aquorun. 
26. The Chairman of the Governing Body (if any) shall 
preside at all General Meetings or the Association. If 
there be no such Chairman or if at any meeting the Chairman 
is not present within fifteen minutes after the time 
appointed for holding the meeting the Members present shall 
choose one of their number to be Chairman. 
27. In ca~e of an equality of votes whether on a show of 
heads or on a poll the Chairman of a General Meeting shall 
have a ~econd or casting vote. 
28. ~he Chairman of any General Meeting may, with the 
con~ent of a meeting at which a quorun is present (and shall 
if so directed by che meeting) adjourn the meeting from time 
to time, and from place to place, but no business shall be 
~ransacted at any adjourned meeting other than the business 
left unfinished at the meeting from which the adjournment 
took place. 
29. Every question submitted to a General Meeting shall be 
decided in the first instance by a show of hands unless 
before or on the declaration of the result of the show of 
hands a poll is demanded by the Chairman or by any other 
member present in person or by proxy, and unless a poll is 
so demanded a declaration by the Chairman of the Meeting 
that a Resolution has been carried, or carried by a 
particular majority or lost, or not carried by a particular 
majority, and an entry to that effect in the Minute Book of 
Proceedings of the Association shall be conclusive evidence 
of the fact, without proof of the number of proportion of 
the votes recorded in favour of or against the Resolution. 
30. If a poll is duly demanded it shall be taken either at 
once or after an interval or adjournment in such manner and 
at such time and place as the Chairman directs, and the 
result of such poll shall be deemed to be the Resolution of 
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the meecing at which the same was demanded provided always 
that a pollan the ~lection of a Chairman or on a question 
of adjournment shall be taken forthwith. The demand of a 
poll ~hall not prevent the continuance of the meeting for 
the transaction of any business other than the question on 
which a poll ha5 been demanded. 
VOTES OF MEMBERS 
31. Subject to the provisLon~ at Article 27 every member 
shall have one vote at every General Meeting and on a poll 
thac a vote may be given either personally or by proxy. The 
instrument appointing a proxy shall be in writing under the 
hand of the appointer or his attorney duly authorised in 
writing. A proxy need not be a member of the Association 
and the instrument appointing a proxy shall be deemed to 
confer authority to demand or join in delnanding a poll. The 
instrument appointing a proxy and the powee of attorney or 
other authority, if any, under which it signed or a 
notarially certified copy of that power or authority shall 
be deposited at the registered office of the Association not 
less than forty-eight hours before the time for holding the 
meeting, or adjourned meeting, at Which the person named in 
the instrument proposes to vote, or in the case of a poll, 
not less than twenty-four hours before the time appointed 
for the taking of the poll, and in default the instrument of 
proxy shall not be treated as valid. A vote given in 
accordance with the terms of an instrument of proxy shall be 
valid notwithstanding the previous death or insanity of the 
principal or revocation of the proxy or of the authority 
under which the proxy was executed, provided that no 
'intimat~on in writing of such death, insanity or revocation 
as aforesaid, shall have been received by the Association at 
the office beiore the commencement of the meeting or 
adjourned meeting at which the proxy is used. 
32. An instrument appointing a proxy shall be in the 
following form or a form as near thereto as circumstances 
admit:-
I, of 
, being a member of the above-
named Association, hereby appoint 
of 
or failing him 
as my proxy 
for me at the (annual or extraordinary, 
case may be) general meeting of the 
Association to be held on the 
day of 19 and at 
any adjournment thereof. 
Signed this day of 
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COMMITTEES 
33. The Governing Body may appoint such Committees as it 
thinks fit to advise it on any matters concerning the work 
of the Association: and may make such regulations for the 
conduct of the meetings and proceedings of any Committee so 
appointed as it may think fit. A Committee so appointed 
shall have no executive power or authorities other than 
those delegated to it by the Governing Body and any exercise 
of ~uch powers shall be subject to confirmation by the 
Governing Body. 
SECRETARY 
34. The Governing Body shall appoint some person selected 
by them to act as the Secretary of the Association with such 
salary as they consider reasonable. The Governing Body may 
discuss such Secretary and appoint any other person in his 
place. The provisions of Sections 283(1)-(3) and 284 of the 
Act shall apply and be observed. 
DIRECTOR 
35. The Governing body shall appoint a Director to take 
charge ot the work of the Association subject to the 
overriding authority of the Governing Body upon such terms 
as they shall think reasonable and a Deputy Director to act 
as his deputy. 
STAFF 
36. The Governing Body may appoint and remunerate such 
other staff as they may find necessary for the carrying on 
of the work of the Association. 
MINUTES 
37. The Secretary shall keep such books, accounts, minutes, 
and records as are necessary in connection with the business 
of the Association and as may be directed by the 
Association. Such minutes shall be made in books provided 
for that purpose and shall include:-
(a) 
(b) 
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Names of the members present at each meeting of 
the Association, the Governing Body and any 
committees. 
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(=) All resolutions and proceedings at all meetings 
specified in (b). 
SEAL 
38. The Seal of the Association shall not be affixed to any 
instrument except by the authority of a Resolution of the 
Governing Body, and every instrument to which the Seal shall 
be affixed shall be signed by a duly authorised member of 
the Governing Body, and shall be countersigned by the 
Secretary or by a second duly authorised member of the 
Governing Body. 
ACCOUNTS 
39. The Governing Body shall cause true accounts to be kept 
of the sums of money received and expended by the 
Associacion and the matters in respect of which such 
receipts and expenditure ta~e place, of all sales and 
purchases of goods by the Association and of the assets and 
liabilities of the Association. Proper books of account 
shall not be deemed to be kept if there are not kept such 
books of account as are necessary to give a true and fair 
view of the state of the Association'S affairs and to 
explain its transactions. 
40. The books of account shall be kept at the Registered 
Office of the Association and shall at all times be open to 
the inspection of the Governing Members. 
41. The Governing Body shall from time to time, in 
accordance with Sections 229, 235, 239, 245, 261(2) and 736 
of the Act, cause to be prepared to be laid before the 
Association in General Meeting such income and expenditure 
accounts, balance sheets and reports as are referred to in 
those sections. A copy of every balance sheet which is to 
be laid beiore the Association in General Meeting together 
with copies of the income and expenditure account and 
reports shall, not less than twenty-one clear days before 
the date of the meeting, be sent to all persons entitled to 
receive notices of General Meetings of the Association. 
AUDIT 
42. Auditors shall be appointed and their duties regulated 
in accordance with the Act. 
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NOTICES 
43. A notice may be given by the association to any member 
either personally or by sending it by post to him or to his 
registered address, or (if he has no registered address 
within the United Kingdom) to the address, if any, within 
the United Kingdom supplied by hiffi to the Association for 
the giving of notice to him. where a notice is sent by 
post, service ot the notice shall be deemea to oe effected 
by properly addressing, prepaying and posting a letter 
containing the notice, and to have been effective at the 
expiration of twenty-fo~r hours after the letter containing 
the same is posted. A certificate of posting under the hand 
of one officer of the Association shall be conclusive proof 
of posting for all purposes. 
POWERS OF PUBLICATION 
44. Subject to any conditions attached to grants to the 
Association the whole rights of p~blication of all 
information and discoveries made in the course of the 
Association's work shall be vested in the Association and 
any decision of the Governing Body in regard thereto shall 
be binaing on all Members of the Association. 
INDEMNITY 
45. Subject to the provisions of Section 310 of the Act the 
Governing Members and Office-Bearers of the Association 
shall be entitled to be indemnified out of the funds and 
property of the Association for and against all proper 
outlays and liabilities incurred by them on behalf of the 
Association, authorisea and passed by the Governing Body as 
proper outlays and liabilities, and against any loss, costs 
and charges they may incur or be put to in consequence of 
any act, matter or thing done or permitted by them in or 
about the execution of the duties of their office. 
WINDING UP 
46. The provisions of Clause VII of the Memorandum of 
Association relating to the winding up or dissolution of the 
Association shall have effect and be observed as if the same 
were repeated in these Articles. 
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NAMES, ADDRESSES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF SOBSCRIBERS 
RT7AAR - 18 -
505 
. ',-Appendix 8,.1. staff numbers in RAs {1980-1989} 
RAe., .. , 
. , .' .-( 1·980 l (1;.982 ) ..... (lM4)· ( 1986) (1988) . (1989 ) AMTRI . ··NA .. ' 60· ·50" 60·,·· 61 70 BCIRA 193 173 137 135 
BHAA· .. " ... ' 230· 234·· 228 220 199 199 BNF ·171 162 '. 112 110 90 '. 90 BCR .' 217 223 225' 224 BGI- 56 52 48 40 40 BLC 53 54 BMT NA ' NA 456 340 210 
BRA 90 85 84 -. 78· 85 90 CIRIA 43 39 40 
CAT 12 13· 11 12 . 14 14 ERA 298 301 347· 388·· 388 388 FeR '. 3S .. 33 32 
FIR 90 86 83 93 100 
HA-T 16 19 
HRC Nt. 255 230 250 281 281 LM 56 44 
. *IRA 225 2:15· 230 266 266 287 PR 84: 52 50 54 55. 56 P£M. 439 "·1'9 ·4·49 370· 350 360 
P1RA· 15e . 160 .. ' '" " -166-·- .,' 168 .. " ·180 . Net.· o • 
·RAPAA ··195 173 : 165 170 .. SA-T' .. 151 .. 16>5.' ... ··169 
i' SI ··197· 204 196 . 187·NA SIRA 192 158···· 199- . 231 . 250 229· 
SRet. 20 23 SCR· 80., ,. 55· TAA 125 105 WRc ·635 47e. 57!>· .. , 587 667· 650· 
. WI· . '."- .. ' .: .. sa. 538· 548· 539· 520 530 WIRA ~. 100 . Net. .. 
. BTT "a flA 'HA ' NA N· 250 
CAMP #- 152 152 
I' Lea 220' 221 219 245 235 240 
Tota1Sta 3566 4040 . ' . 4-140 4735.'- . 5667·· . 5306·· No.of· RAe 30 . 31 33 33 33 32 . 
Mo·.of· dat.', .... . ·15, .. 
·19 .. 21·· 21' 33 31 Staf f .IRA' . 119 130 12S 143.· 172 166 Staff/dat 238 213· " ·197.···· ·225 172 171 
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Appendix 8.2~ RAs' turnover from 1960-1989 (£m) 
. Appendix 8.2 
RAs'/Year . 
AMTRI. 
BCIRA' 
BHRA 
BNF' . 
8CR 
541 
1980' 1982 1984' ·1966 1966 
0.978 1.104 1.409 
3.632 3.26&--· 3.316- 2.713 2.643 
4.384 4.739 4.918 S.614 4.970' 
1989 
1.131 
2.483 
4.815 
2.778· 3.584 . ~ 2.913 2,.702',·, 2.692· 2.600 
3.920', '3.928·, 4,.'086: 4.764 4.609 
0.9860.880'" 0 .804··; 0".701, 0.700 '. BGl 
. aLe 
BHT 
······,·O.OOG· . "G~~" .. "G~OQ() 10.040' 0.970· 
O.OC» 0.000" 0.000.11.341-"10.024 
.. ,' -BAA 1.603, 1.716 1.776 1.831 2.300 
3.982 
0-.648' 
0.926 
9.260 
1.991 
1,.66,7 
I .J .... ,-" 
: '. 
I • 
CIRIA 
CAT 
EM-
'FCR 
F'lR 
*T 
HRC 
LAM 
KlRA . 
PR 
PERA 
PIRA 
RAPRA 
SAT 
SI 
'-- . 
o .1·94· 1 .;8-20" ,1.920 " ·1 .690 '1 .7GO 
0.195 0.164 0.172 0.204 0.260 
6 . ~ .. -' 7~'0S.1 . 9.,960 '11.46-1.. Hh.SOQ. " 
~""'" ,().418\,,·> 0.411 O~'557 0.000·,· 0.700 
2.323 2.016· 2.11-1' 2.02,(),,2.300 
.. , 1 ~·179' ., ;o·~oee-." . o;;ooo·~ ··,<>.000' O. 4GO 
0.000· '''5,.·94&· ·,,6.01-1·, 6.,863-.. 8.000-
o .OOO"··M' 0,.000 ' 0 .000 0.-000-'" 0.; 700 
5.120 '4.620, 6.120 8.936, 9.082 
., 1.259·' . 0.994" 0 .864 0.928· 1 wOOO 
11.066 12.218 23.179 18·.943· 15.444 
2.987 2.982 3·.~60 4.668 5.000 
3.245 2.827, 3.098 3.150. 3.500, 
, '2.400 2.096· 2.160 2.712' 2.700 
3 .138 2 .936 3.438 ' 3 . 231· , 3 .200 
0.278 
·9.72S 
0.648 
2.408 
0.370 
·7.408 
0.648 
8.056., 
0.926 
17.594· 
6.677 
4.167, 
2'.593 
0.000 
----~ 
SIRA 
SRA' 
seR 
TRA 
WRc: . 
. WI: 
WIAA 
BTT 
CAMP 
Lea 
Total TUl"·nover 
No.of RAe 
No.of dat-a' .... 
Tu.l'ftOver IRA 
lUYlROV&Y'../&ata 
3.818, 3.197· 5,.276· 7.l-95 7.763.. 7.757 
0.000" 0 .000· 0 ~OOO· 0.000 0.500 0.648 
o .000 .. . 0 .000. ' 0 • 000·" o'~ 000 ' 2.800: 2.037 
0.000·,,'" 0.000' 0.000 0.000 2.700 2.778 
12.050,' ,14.541,,· '1,8,.854,·19.942··,22.000 21.298 
11.179···~lt.l884 . 13 .. 013 13",613·, 15.000 12.964 
2.72<> 0.000 0.000·, 0.000" 2 .2000.000 
0·.000" "0.0000.000 0.000 0 .000 6.019 
0.000 0.0000,.000 O.;COO·· 2.700 2.778 
3 '.440· 3,.986 4 .800 5 .668 6 .331 6 .204 
91.62497.120··124.133 ·143.030'156,.705"153.660 . 
'33.000',33.000 .. ·33.000 ,33.000 I 33.000 32.000 
,,22.000·· ,23-..000 ,·2S.000 ··25.000,~ 32.000 .32.000 
2.776 -2.943 3.762 4.334" 4.74.9 4.802 
'," 4 .165, '. 4.223· - 4,,965. 5.721··· 4'.897,·" 4 .802, 
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. Appendix 8.3 Ranking of RAs' turnover for"1980 and 1982 (2m) 
Ranking of RAe' 
Turnover(19S0)(£mil) 
RAs'/Year 
WRc 
WI 
PERA 
ERA 
MIRA 
BHRA 
BCR 
SIRA 
BCIRA 
BNF 
Lea 
RAPRA 
SI 
PIRA 
WIRA 
SAT 
FIR 
BRA 
PR 
BGI 
FCR 
CAT 
CIRIA 
Ranking of Turnover (1982)(£mil) 
RAe 
WRc 
PERA 
WI 
ERA 
HRC 
MIRA 
BHRA 
Lea 
BCR 
BCIRA 
SIRA 
PIRA 
SI 
BNF 
RAPRA 
SAT 
FIR 
CIRIA 
BRA 
PR 
BGI 
FCR 
CAT 
Median turnover = 2.259 
1980 
7.531 
6.987 
6.916 
4.241 
3.200 
2.680 
2.450 
2.386 
2.270 
2.240 
2.150 
2.028 
1.961 
1.867 
1.700 
1.500 
1.452 
1.002 
0.787 
0.616 
0.261 
0.122 
0.121 
1982 
11.016 
9.256 
9.003 
5.342 
4.500 
3.500 
3.346 
3.020 
2.976 
2.470 
2.422 
2.259 
2.224 
2.207 
2.142 
1.5SS 
1.527 
1.379 
1.300 
0.753 
0.667 
0.311 
0.124 
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Appendix 8.3 Ranking of RAs' turnover for 1984 and 1986 (£m) 
Ranking of RAs' 
Turnover (£m)(1984) 
RAe 
PERA 
WRc 
WI 
ERA 
MIRA 
HRC 
SIRA 
Lea 
BHRA 
BCR 
PIRA 
SI 
BCIRA 
BNF 
SAT 
FIR 
CIRIA 
BRA 
AMTRI 
PR 
BGI 
FCR 
CAT 
Median turnover = 2.865 
1984 
19.316 
15.712 
10.844 
8.300 
5.100 
5.059 
4.397 
4.000 
3.836 
3.405 
3.300 
2.865 
2.763 
2.252 
1.800 
1.759 
1.600 
1.480 
0.815 
0.720 
0.670 
0.464 
0.143 
------- •.... - .. --_ .. 
Ranking of Turnover of RAs'(1986) (£mil)(1988 Prices) 
RAs' 
WRc 
PERA 
WI 
ERA 
BMT 
MIRA 
SIRA 
HRC 
Lea 
BHRA 
BCR 
PIRA 
S1 
BC1RA 
SAT 
BNF 
FIR 
BRA 
C1R1A 
AMTRI 
BLC 
PR 
8GI 
CAT 
Median turnover = 4.283/2.970 = 3.627 
1986 
18.295 
17.379 
12.489 
10.515 
10.405 
8.198 
6.601 
6.296 
5,.200 
5.167 
4.371 
4.283 
2.970 
2.489 
2.488 
2.470 
1.853 
1.680 
1.550 
1.013 
0.954 
0.851 
0.643 
0.187 
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. Appendi.x-~.3 -RankiDG of RAs'tut'Dover for 1988 (£In) 
Ranking of Turnover of RAs(19SS) 
(£mil)(198S Prices) 
RAs' 
WRc 
PERA 
WI 
ERA 
BMT 
MIRA 
HRC 
SIRA 
Lea 
BHRA 
PIRA 
BCR 
RAPRA 
SI 
BNF 
SCR 
SAT 
TRA 
BCIRA 
FIR 
BRA 
WIRA 
CIRIA 
AMTRI 
PR 
BLC 
LAM 
FCR 
BGI 
SRA 
HAT 
CAT 
Median of turnover • (2.8+2.7)/2 =2.75 
(1988 ) 
22.00 
15.444 
15.00 
10.500 
10.024 
9.082 
8.000 
7.763 
6.331 
5.600 
5.000 
4.609 
3.500 
3.200 
3.000 
2.80 
2.700 
2.70 
2.643 
2.300 
2.300 
2.20 
1.700 
1.409 
1.000 
0.970 
0.700 
0.700 . 
0.700 
0.50 
0.400 
0.260 
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Appendix 8.3 Ranking of RA.s' turnover 
for 1989 (£m) 
Ranking 
RAs' 
WRc 
PERA 
WI 
ERA 
BMT 
MIRA 
SIRA 
HRC 
BTT 
BHRA 
RAPRA 
BCR 
TRA 
BNF 
CAMP 
SAT 
BCIRA 
FIR 
SCR 
BRA 
CIRIA 
AMTRI 
PR 
BLC 
FCR 
LAM 
SRA 
BGI 
HAT 
CAT 
of Turnover(1989)(£mil) 
(1989 ) 
23.000 
19.000 
14.000 
10.500 
10.000 
8.700 
8.377 
8.000 
6.500 
5.600 
4.500 
4.300 
3.000 
3.000 
3.000 
2.800 
2.681 
2.600 
2.200 
2.150 
1.800 
1.221 
1.000 
1.000 
0.700 
0.700 
0.700 
0.700 
0.400 
0.300 
Median. (3+2.8)/2 • 2.9 
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Appendix 9.1 
JGB/?, .. AL 
14/09/89 
HI" D Miles 
Co~ission of the European Co~unities 
Rue De La Loi 120 
B-I049 
Brussels 
Belgium 
Dear David 
RESEARCH FU~:OING FOR THE CLOTHING AND rOOTi."EAR r;OUSTRIES 
We are loo~ing forward to your visit to SATRA and the Clothing Technology Centre 
on October 2nd and I f::!t it may be useful to put some thoughts. on paper regardif'~ 
research for our type of industry. If you feel it wo~ld be helpful we could 
discuss th~se in morp Jepch during ~?ur vi~it. 
The catalyst that prompted me to put pen to paper, was a co~ment Robin Roach ~ade 
two weeks ago, t~at the Commission may be prepared to con~\der funding a coh~~ent 
progranme of rese~rch projects in addi~ion to the present approach of funding 
single large sca~e projects. If this is the case it could, in our opinion, m~ke 
it po~sible to achieve much more ef:ective research on a broad Europea~ basis for 
our type of industry. 
A major inhibitor to our industry's current involve~ent in BRITE is that clothing 
or foot~ear manufacturers normally rely on machine suppliers to to do research and 
find it difficult to justify substantial invest~ent in a long term, high risk 
research project aimed at automating a limited number of operations for a limited 
range of garcents. Successful research of this type would result in the 
require~ent for machines to be built and marketed by one of the relatively small 
nU:Ilber of European machine manufac:urers. This inhibit ion is particularly true of 
SME's. 
It is relevant to quote here the !u~7.ary froo Jeff Hewitts' lecture 'R & 0 for the 
European Clothing Industry' given at the EC symposium in Brussels on June 28th 
this year. 
"R & O' progracoes need to be related to the strategic priorities of the European 
Industry today 
- NOT large scale autooated cell type developcents such as TC 
· ... - ·.squared/Draper laboratories. 
- NOT Super integrated production systems of the ~ITI type. 
Di''''~:1r r.J O,i< uc::wfi:oc 
J C 8\l~-. OB£ 8x fl.-.s1P AJITCS fC'1 FBIM 
DitC::Jf v: "~,., ift:S:~~"'''''/ s,.:",,~ry 
'011."\ Buteo".:. MD£JP F5CA flNlA.\( FBN 
Di,«fo, rtf Rc.J'a, ,.,J ~ 
,EWb;r,;. EhPlft:J'kPpnlcWS'RN 
~.M" A!!:~T:ac!es Raurdl Auoci.ation 
A 'O::li'&-"I)' ~Ied by 1'1&:1111" 
509: 
In Eu;o?e the real need is for pragmatic and (possibly) quite small in scale 
~ultiple proiects that ~ill enhance flexibility and responsiveness across the 
broad spectrum of garment oakers (and their customers and suppl~ers)." 
I accept Jeff's analysis and hence cy enthusiasm for a coherent prOtra~e of 
related projects. 
A further t:l.)ti\'ation for encourag ing a move to""ards research prog,:"am:nes rather 
than individual projects is the agreement reached last ~eek in Faris for the EEe 
Clo~h ing Research Institutes to fore an A~sociation to encoura&e closer 
co-operation. It is hoped to put a proposal to SPR!NT to accelerate this 
co-operation - the initiative certainly gives a core coherent research resource 
for European Industry. The foot~ear institutes have been co-operating for several 
years but the nature of the BRITE project funding has npt made it possible for 
broad co-operation under that initiative. 
It may be helpful at this point to identify the fundamental (and often 
unrecognised) differences bet~een progra~e based collaborative research involving 
mainly SHE's and project based or contract research involving mainly large, or at 
least scientifically literate, companies. These are listed in the following 
table: 
USUAL CUSTOMER TYPE 
NtMBER OF FIRMS SUPPORTING 
EXPERTISE AVAILABLE IN 
COXPANY TO ~.rERFACE WITH 
RESEARCH STAFF 
D!:VELOPME1'.'T STAGE REQUlRED 
FOR COMMERCIAL ACCEPTANCE 
IY.Pl!XE~TATION RESOURCES 
A.·m SKILL AVAILABLE IN 
CO!".PANY 
CO!"~~RCIAL ASSESSY.Eh'T OF 
ECm,OXICS OF A SINGLE 
R [. D PROJECT 
PROCRA."t'1E BASED 
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH 
(NORY~LLY ME~~ERSHIP 
O~ lNDUSTRY SUPPORTED) 
90% S~'S 
"Can reach several hundred 
Practical factory 
ma,agement 
Available for fairly 
trouble free l~plemen­
tation onto factory 
floor without major 
p~oduction hold-ups 
Very limited, u~ually 
part time additional 
r~sponsibility on 
~anag~rs' shoulders 
"Required skills and 
information not 
normally available in 
~any SHE's. A small 
group of selected 
individuals from different 
cocpanies give balanced 
judgement on esch project 
and or complete programme 
2 
PROJECT BASED 
CONTRACT RESEARCH 
(CAN BE SINGLE 
COY.PANY OR 
COLLAEORAT!NG 'CLUB') 
Large compar..ies 
1 - 10 
Scientifior strong 
technical/engin~ering 
Can be picked up at 
working prototype 
stase or even earlier 
Usually have 
qualified ~tarf that 
can be seconded full 
t ice to project 
it:?le'-lentation 
A necessary skill 
requir~~ent for the 
funding of any 
contracted research 
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Hence progra~~e based collaborative research Coften called co-operative re~earch) 
is a fundamentally different business fro~ project ba~ed contract research. 
Co-operative re~earch, by its very nature, is not directed to assisting o~e 
co~pany to develop or i~prove one or core of its specific products. It is mainly 
'E~ablins Technolo~v' ie its objective is to provide kno~ledge, products and 
services to companies to er.able thee to be core cooretit~'e in the market place. 
As all subscribiog cocpanies receive the results of the ~esearch at the sa~e time, 
the :-esearch is, by definition, 'pre-cocpetitive'. 
A vital part of any business is its ~arketing Policy. It l~ no less icportant to 
tr.arket 'research' than it is to carket shoeS or clothes. If a body - be it an 
Institute or an industdal co=pany - concel\'es a research project that ... ·ould glve 
valuable results to other industrial cocpanies it can decide to offer a 
partnership in the project and cake its results availa~le in exchange for a 
contribution to the costs. So far so good, but much ef furt is normally required 
to obtain a signature on any such agreement for a company to spend a significant 
a~ount of money on a research proj~ct (and ~hat is 'a significant amount of 
~oney?'). It is likely to take at least t~o or three discussions before the 
decision making hierarchy in a company are ~illing to sign an agreement. Also 
several companies need to be approached in order for one to say yes to the 
proposed project. Such discussions cannot be carried out by junior laboratory 
staff. In all probability the possible participators will also be spread over a 
sizable geographic area - particularly if the EEC is the potential market. 
The logistics of single project marketing no~ begin to emerge. A normal minimum 
of t~o or three visits to at least four or five companies ~ill be required to 
obtain one partner. The rcu's add up and it is no surprise that the cost of 
preparing a full BRJTE proposal- is often quoted as being in excess of 30,000 reus. 
If the project value is ~wo or three millio~ rCU3 and the n~eber of final 
participants is in the range two to five, the econo~icsare not unreasona~le. If, 
ho~ever, we are dealing with ~ non-scientific. largely SHE type of industry, where 
even large companies are mainly a grouping of disparate small/medium factories: 
the situation is co~ple[ely different. Here a 'significant' investment in 
research (as distinct from product develop~ent) ~ould be only hundreds or, at b~st 
the low thousands of rcus. Marketing costs for a single project could, therefore, 
easlly 'consu~e all the money that such companies could afford to invest in 
research. 
What then is practicable in developing a 'E~ropean' research strategy for 
i~dustries such as clothing and footwear? 
I suggest that the Research Institutes in the differe~t -rc countries could play an 
i~?ortant role in both the develop:ent of a strategy and in its imple~entation, 
~here appropriate linking ~ith other research bodies. All are (or certainly 
should be) in fairly regular co~unication ~ith the large as ~ell as the small and 
~edium sized cocpanies in thei:- do=e~tic industry. ~orkin& together a~ Institutes 
\O'ith selected technolog-ists froo the illduHry, they shoula...be able to evolve a -
coherent protra~e of research projects that satisfies the ~llowing 
requirements:-
(i) The topics cover a broad enough spectrum to be of interest and value to a 
~ide cross section of the European Clothing industry. 
(ii) Projects are ceveloped to mctch the expertise of participating research 
----bodies "'-hich could ioClude coc.pa~ies and universities) and no~al1y one 
project would be the responsibility of ooe research body. Parts could. of 
course, be sub-contracted if appropriate. 
3 
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(ii:) Industry funding for the p~oj~cts ~ould come largely from the normal 
contribution to the institutes but extra funding and contributions in kind 
could be sou&ht for individual projects fro~ larger cocpanies or specific 
i~dustry sectors ~here this is appropriate. 
(iv) Each individual project or sub-&roup of projects should be vetted and 
foroally endorsed by selected industriali~ts in the ~ountry in ~hich the 
:lein contractor \.'as based. The · ... hole program:ne should then be subject to 
the approval of the co=ission a:'1d its technical advisors, augmented, if 
appropriate, by selected European industrialists, 
(v) A critical requi~ement for effective European r~search progra~~es 1S that 
the results of each project should be available to all relevant co~?anies in 
each of the participating countries. It is therefore e~sential that all 
bodies invol ..... ed in the program:ne are cOt:l~itted to take the results of a 
project carried out by one body and translate, and ~here neces~aTy modify, 
the results to make them applicable to and impleme;table by the relevant 
co~panies. This should particularlv includ~ SHEs and hence such means as 
demonstration sites, general and in-factorv a~areness presentations and the 
developcent of implementation training progra~es should be a normal part of 
the pro~ra~es exploitation and funding. 
It would be presumptuous to say how best the Commission could develop this 
approach, if indeed it ~ished to pursue it at all, but there ~ould appear to be 
appropriate mechanisms in BRITE, CP.AFT and SPRINT. 
I hope you have found these co~ents of interest. the principles outlined have 
certainly been the foundation on ~'hich SATRA's SUCCess has been built.~ 
1 f there tS any further ba.:kg.rou1'\d YOlJ ,,',)U Id 1 ike to h~ve before your .vis i [ , ..on 
SATRA, t!-le Clothing Tecnnologj Cent:-~ or AIRTO (the UK A:;sodetior. of Indep~~dent 
Rese~rch and Te~hnology Organisation) of ~hich . 1 am a Vice Pr~sid~nt plelse let me 
kno1ol. 
~ith best ~ishes. 
Yours sincerely 
~, . ?(ii~~ 
Butlin 
Chief [Xl·cut ive 
./ 
4 
JGB/KJl 
13/05/88 
Sir lohn Collyer 
Cha i mon 
Appendix 9.1 
~ 
United Machinery Group Limited 
PO Box No 88, Ross Walk 
Belgrave 
LEICEHER 
LEl;. SBX 
Dear Sir John 
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I was very pleased to have our brief discussion in Pinnasens, yet sorry that 
I had to use such an occasion to comment on Government Policy. 
You mentioned that the Welding Institute receive only 2% of its income from 
the DTI. This surprised me because I had long assumed that the bulk of 
their inco~e ",as from either single company contracts or small group 
collaborative projects with significant DTr ' input • . 
I hav~ j~st been talking to the Director of ' the '~~i~t~~ Insti~ute, 
Alan Wells, and , now _realise how similar in nature SATRA is to Welding 
Institute (excluding their "Institute Activities"). You may be interested 
in the comparison shown in the following table : 
CC~2arison of ~elding Institute and SATRA Income Sourc~s /' 
Total I No of I Average I Subs lOTI I Other I % I % I % I 
I Income 3 Income4 I Subs I Drl I Other I Revenue I Members Subscription I Income I 
I I I I I 
I Welding I I I I I 
I Ins tIl .I: 12m I 600 .I: 5,000 I £ 3m I .I: 3m I .I: 6m 
I I I I I I 
I SArRA 2 I .I: 3m I 1100 .I: 820 I£O.9ml .I: 0.6m I £1.4m 
(Figures are approximate). 
1 Excluding Professional Institute activities. 
2 Excluding Clothing Tec~nology Centre (",hich SATRA manages). 
3 F~om 50% funded research contracts. 
4 Fro~ contract research and sale of services etc. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I I 
I I I 
25 I 25 I 50 I 
I I I 
33 I 2'J I 47 I 
'-
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You .... ill see that our respective "earnings" from the market place are a similar 
proportion of turnover (50% vs 47%), although SATRA's are almost totally from 
mecber companies. Interestingly, Welding receives a higher proportion of 
turnover from the DTI than does SATRA (25% 'vs 20%). 
A striking difference bet .... een the two organisations 18 the size of the average 
subscription - a 6 to I difference - which I am confident is a reflection of the 
average size of member company. This has prompted me to test the validity of my 
argument that industries such as footwear and clothing have a different 
structure than cany other UK industries. Of firms employing over 50 people 1n 
footwear and clothing, only I company in 40 employs more thsn 500. This 
contr~sts .... ith 1 company in 10 for the rest of UK manufacturing industry. 
This difference has a direc: bearing on the type of research toat an RTO can 
most effectively perform, ie whether the most effective strategy is to major o~ 
single company contracts; collaborative projects involving say 2-20 companies; 
or co-operative research involving up to several hundred or more companies. 
Since you are both Chairman of one of our largest mer.lber companies and a Iso 
close to the centre of Government R&D policy thinking, I hope you feel it 
reasonable for me to enclose a copy of some notes I hurriedly made for a meeting 
.... ith Peter Corley (Head of the DTl Consumer Markets Division) last March. 
In these I try to show what is a large and fundamental difference bet .... een 
co-operative research and collaborative research and to show that for our type 
of industry the strategy must be aimed at effective co-operative research. In 
addition I point out the damage that could be caused if th~ ne .... Enterprise 
policies for R&D are interpreted in basically the same way when being applied to 
collaborative and co-operative research - "sauce for the collaborative goose can 
easily be poison for the co-operative gander". 
My concern over the situation has been further heightened since my return to 
SATRA.· I have reports from other Research Organisations .... ho are a 1 ready 
suffering the practical effects of the policy changes. If treated similarly, 
SATRA could lose income from DTl roughly equivalent to losing our five biggest 
member companies - or about 120 of our "average" sized members I 
Because I am convinced of the profound damage which .... ill inevitably be caused to 
co-operative research, I conclude there are only t .... o possible explanations. 
Eit~er the Secretary of State is fully aware of the difference between 
collaborative and co-operative research and is using the new policy as a 
cleverly disgui~ed ceans of cutting Government support for R&D in the lower 
technology SME type industry, or, as I assume is the case, he is not aware of 
the realities of the difference. This would nO\be surprising as I suspect some 
of my RTO colleagues are not either! . 
I believe that it is feasible to apply the ne .... policies to co-operative rese~rch 
in a constructive rather than a damaging manner. First it would be necessary to 
distinguish between collaborative and co-operative research. Three criteria 
could be a) the number of companies involved (eg over 50 for 'co-operative' 
research), b) the median size of company (eg not to exceed 250 employees) and 
c) that funding is for a progra~me of research projects rather than a single 
project. 
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Having agreed that a proposal is for co-operative research. the principle of 
tapered funding could be applied to the individual projects within the programme. 
Funding at a maxicum 75% level for the first phase of high risk projects 
could taper to 25% in the latter stages with the safeguard (to avoid possible 
abuse) that overall programme funding should not exceed 50%. 
The principle of 'innovation' has always been present in nTr funding decisions -
our only concern is that innovation is a concept very dependent on the type of 
industry concerned. What is highly innovative for a medium size shoe 
canu f acturer could be mundane for Eritish Aerospace. A fair and reasonable 
judbe~ent of innovative contact has been present in TOMe decisions to date 
which I hope would continue. 
On the 'distance from the ~arket ?lace' concept I have argued that as the 
results of co-operative research are available simultaneously to all members it 
is, bi' definition, "pre-competitive" and hence far from the market place. 
If you felt it appropriate I would be pleased to elaborate on any of these 
points, or to discuss them further with you. 
Having "got that off cy chest" could I repeat my war.:! invitation to you to visit 
SAT~~ to see what we do and how we can and do interface with the UHG. 
With Kind Regards. 
Yours sincerely 
J Graham ButUn 
Director and Chief Executive 
~. 
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Appendix 12.1 
HOW TO FORM AN EQUITY p.~TICrpATION CO-OPERATIVE 
(New Business) 
._- - ._--
A guide to the formation of a co-operative which can set up in 
business by attracting equity from one or more non member investors. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
2. WHAT IS AN EPC? 
3. EQUITY OPTIONS 
4. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
5. INITIAL FUNDING ARRANG~~ENTS 
6. INCREASING THE EPC'S SHAREHOLDING 
7. TAX AND LEGAL FACTORS 
8. SETTING UP THE EPC 
( 
( 
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HOW TO FO~M AN EQUITY PARTICIPATION CC-OPE~ATIVE 
(New Business) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Raising finance is a major hurdle to any group of people 
setting up in business. In each case there is usually a need to 
raise external finance as it is unlikely that the group will have 
sufficient personal resources. If the group wishes to form a 
worker co-operative the form of finance available is usually 
limited to loans. 
1.2 Due to the members inability to offer adequate security or 
guarantees many worker co-operatives are at best under 
capitalised and at worst fail through lack of finance. Any 
business venture, co-operative or otherwise, carries with it some 
element of risk and the providers of finance are rarely prepared ' 
to inject money at risk unless there is some prospect of a return 
in excess of the market rate of interest as comoensation for the 
risk ~f loss: Co-ope~ative shares cannot offer· such a return as(' 
they ao not ~ncrease ~n value and non emp~oyee ' members are ' 
usually excluded. 
1.3 The vehicle most suitable for raising risk capital is the 
conventional share company. By using an EPC structure the 
members ,iill set up a company: which is able to offer shares to 
investors. The remaining shares will be held by an EPC (equity 
participation co-operative), which will be a company limited by 
guarantee incorporating co-operative principles. 
1.4 The remainder of this guide explains how to go about 
forming an EPC structure and examines the partic~lar areas 
which the members need to consider. The CDA is available to be 
consulted on such matters and will advise the members on the best 
way of satisfying their requirements. 
1.5 The EPC structure, therefore, enables a co-operative to 
raise risk capital and could mean the difference between forming 
a viable venture and failure due to the inability to raise ( 
sufficient finance. 
2. ~nAT IS AN EPC? 
2.1 An EPC is a corporate body, registered with a co-operative 
constitution, its purpose is the acquisition and mangaement of 
shares and representation of its members' interests in a 
conventional company, some or all of whose employees are 
members of the EPC. 
2.2 Membership of the EPC is restricted to employees of the company • 
• 1e."t1oershl.t- "trf ene ' EPC 1s no l d. condlt'iun at ~mptoymen t ..I.n that' 
company, but it is expected that the majority of employees would 
choose to join. 
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3. EQUITY OPTIONS 
3.1 The equity of a conventional com9any consists of shares with 
various rights. The extent ·of control over the company will 
depend upon the proportion and class of shares held by the EPC 
and outside shareholders. There are various combinations that 
could be used to satisfy the requirements in each particular 
circumstance. The EPC would normally acquire ordinary shares 
with full voting rights. The shares issued to the outside 
investor will · normally be the subject of negotiation but the 
shares offered can be purchased back at some future date by 
either the EPC or the company. 
3.2 The basic share structure would be as follows: 
Ma~bers are company 
employees 
~ 
I 
Ordinary shares 
in company 
Other Investor(s) 
J 
Equity investment 
in company ~t ____________ ~, __________ ~ 
[COMPANY I 
3.3 The voting rights and powers attached to each class of shares 
will need to be drawn up in either the company's Articles of 
Association or a separate Shareholders' Agreement. 
The three main equity options cover the issue of ordinary 
shares, preference shares and redeemable shares • 
. 
OrdinarY Shares - These may be of the same class as those 
issued to the EPC. In this case both shareholders will have 
equal voting rights and powers depending upon the number of 
shares held by each. The eventual transfer of ownership to the 
EPC can come about through the shares held by the outside 
investor being ~e-purchased by the EPC or re-purchased by the 
comoany and cancelled. The value of ordinary shares will 
fluctuate in line with the value of the business and dividends 
paid. Ordinary shares may also be issued without voting rights. 
Preference Shares - These have preferential rights in the 
event of winding up the company and in terms of dividend. As 
such they offer greater protection for the investor. Often 
issued with or without voting rights or with an intervention vot( 
in the event of unpaid preference dividend. They mayor may not 
part~cipate in profits. Preference shares will not qualify an 
investor for relief under the "Business Expansion Scheme". 
Redeemable Shares - Ordinary and Preference shares may be 
issued as redeemable. The amount payable upon redemption may be 
at par or with a specified premium depending upon the terms of 
issue. 1f redeemable shares are issued the Company must also 
have issued shares which cannot be redeemed. Redeemable shares 
offer a means by which the Company can re-purchase the outside 
investor's shares, thus facilitating the EPC's final take over 0 
control. 
( 
( 
( 
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4. ~~AGE~ENT AND CONTROL 
4.1 The effective control of companies is vested by the shareholders 
in its board of directors, elected at General Meeting. The 
election of directors may be the subject of negotiation be~~een 
the co-operative members and the outside investor. Articles of 
association may provide for the number of directors to be 
a9Pointed by each class of shareholder. Where the outside 
investor has non voting shares the articles may allow for the 
co-operative to appoint all of the directors. 
4.2 
4.3 
The appointment of the company directors is in the hands of the 
management committee which is elected on a one member one vote 
basis by the EPC members. Management committee members are 
eligible for appointment as directors of the company, on either a 
full or part-time basis. It may be advisable to appoint one or 
more independent advisory directors, who have co-ogerative and/or 
business experience. They need not be full time directors and 
may be non executive. 
Day to day management of the . company would be vested in 
management appointed by the directors and mayor may not be 
members of the EPC. In a small company management may well 
also be directors, but in a large company this may not be 
the best o:ption. It would be preferable for management to be 
drawn from the EPC membership, but if the members do not have 
managerial ability it may be wise to recruit outside management 
until the membership can develop their own managerial ability. 
Outside management, of course, could well be recruited into the 
EPC. 
( 
4.4 The following is a suggested managerial/control stucture:-
·~.P.C. Outside 
rnves tor (s ) 
I 
Elects 3 Directors Elects 2 Directors 
(including I independent (including I 
adv .. ~_s_o_r_) -----------,r--------~-. n_d_e_p-,~nden t adv is 0 r) ( . 
5 Member 
Board of - - -
Directors 
I 
Elects 
Managerial Team 
I 
2 EPC members 
1 Outside Investor 
representative 
2 Independent 
advisors 
Preferably EPC Management. 
Team - - - members, but must 
~----------- have the ability to 
manage the company 
. 
. 
5. 
5.1 
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Role of Directors - The directors have a res~onsibility 
to the shareholders generally. The EPC appointed 
directors, in particular have a responsibility to the 
EPC. They are representatives, rather than delegates, of the 
EPC. They cannot be mandated by the EPC but must obviously 
take account of its wishes. Their prime objective is 
running the company in the interest of all the shareholders 
and will therefore need to balance the overall business 
interests with those of the EPC. The role of the outside 
investor(s) representative will be one of ensuring that 
the interests of the outside investor(s) are safeguarded, 
and the representative will be unlikely to have executive 
responsibility. The~e is a safeguard against business 
interest being overidden in the above example, by the two 
independent advisors allying with the outside investor(s) 
representative to outvote the two EPC appointed directors. 
The Directors need to give management clear objectives in 
order that managements' role, responsibilities and 
limitations are fully understood. Within such objectives 
management should be allowed freedom to manage. 
It should be pointed out that the above is one managerial 
$tructure and members should consider var{ous alternatives. 
INITIAL FUNDING ARRANGEM~NTS 
The acquisition of shares in a company will be funded by the EPC 
and one or more investors. 
This section covers the possible arrangements that may be made to 
cover the acquisition of shares, firstly, by considering the 
f~nding of the EPC and secondly by considering the funding 
provided by the outside inve~tor. By considering the various 
alternatives and their relevence to each particular case the 
reader should be able to build up a suitable package. 
Reference should be made where necessary to the section on tax 
and legal factors. 
5.2. Fundina the EPC 
The employees of the company provide funds for the EPC as 
follows:-
Fundina 
Ca) Providing loan finance 
to the ~PC 
Comments 
Income tax relief 
available on interest 
paid on a loan for the 
purposes of investing 
in a co-operative (FA 
1981 s 25) 
( 
( 
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The E?C rr..~y a 1so be a ble to obta in funds from othe c so urc~s 
(b) Loan from bank etc., 
secured where necessry, 
on 
(i) assets of EPC i.e. 
shares in company. 
(ii) assets of company 
(c) Grant or loan by 
public or other 
promotional body 
5.3 Fundinq bv the outside investor 
Int~r~st on bank loan 
is relieved against 
pro fits of the EPC. If 
profits in EPC "Group 
Relief" available. If 
secured on company 
assets "Financial 
Assistance" deemed to 
have been given and 
company will need to 
comply with statutory 
procedures. 
Several bodies may wish 
to promote the 
formation of an EPC 
through grant or loan. 
If a loan, interest "c 
will be relieved 
against profits of the 
EPC. If no profits in 
EPC "Group Relief" 
available. 
The outside investor acquires shares directly in the company. 
Fundinq 
. Ca) Funds provided by a non-
connected individual. 
(b) Funds provided by a 
"Business Expansion 
Scheme" venture capital 
fund. 
(c) Funds provided by 
conventional venture 
capital fund e.g. ICFC. 
Comments 
Tax relief available tc 
individual under 
"Business Expansion 
Scheme" for certain 
classes of share. 
Early days, but ( 
requirements of the 
fund in terms of cost 
may be prohibitive. 
May require Some 
managerial inVOlvement 
e.g. non executive 
director. 
Requiremen ts as to for: 
of equity and degree 0 
control may vary 
between funds. 
( 
( 
~( 
6 
522 
(d) Grant or loan by public 
or other promotional 
body. 
(e) Member with capital 
to invest may invest in 
company shares rather than 
loan to EPC. 
INCREASING THE EPC's SH~3EHOLDING 
Hay be more supportive 
of long term objectives 
rather than a sole 
interest in capital 
gain. 
Loan to EPC preferable 
as this maximises EPC 
shareholding. 
Individuals may not be 
prepared to invest sums 
larger than other 
members directly as 
loan to EPC and may 
want potential capital 
growth. Shares should 
be non voting. 
6.1 Whatever the intentions of the EPC members the option is open to 
increase the proportion of the EPC's shareholding. This section 
.considers the possible arrangements by which this can come about. 
In many c'ases sacrifices will have to be mace by the members i.e. 
by forsaking the distribution of dividend as bonus and in others 
help may be available from the other shareholders. Such 
sacrifices will be more readily made when the objective of 
forming a fully co-operative business is firmly established in 
the minds of the members. The options are broadly classified 
under tpe following headings:-
6.2 
EPC purchases shares from outside investor. 
Conversion of outside shareholdings. 
Company buys back its Qwn shares. 
Company issues bonus shares. 
EPC Purchases Shares from Outside Investor 
With shares in the company held by the EPC and one or more 
outside investors, the obvious route for increasing the EPC's 
shareholding is for it to purchase shares from the outside 
investor. To do this the EPC needs funds, these can be obtained 
as follows:-
Fundina 
Ca) EPC members plough back 
a percentage of earnings 
or bonus to EPC on loan 
account. 
Comments 
Interest may be paid tc 
members on loan 
account, this will neec 
to be financed or 
accumulated on loan. 
Interest relieved 
against profits of EPC 
- if no profits -Group 
Relief- available. 
(b) Loan from company. 
ec) Loan from bank etc., 
secured, where necessary 
on 
(i) assets of EPC 
(ii) assets of company 
Cd> EPC receives dividend 
from the company and 
does not distribute 
it to members as bonus 
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(e) More employees join EPe. 
6.3 Conversion of Outside Shareholdinqs 
Benefits of using a 
savings related share 
option scheme to 
acquire company shares 
should be considered. 
Shares could be sold to 
EPC on loan account. 
"Financial Assistance" 
deemed to have been 
given and company will 
need to comply with 
statutory procedures. 
Interest on bank loan 
is relieved against 
profits of the EPC - if 
no profits "Group 
Relief- available. If( 
secured on company 
assets, "Financial 
Assistance" deemed to 
have been given and 
company will need to 
comply with statutory 
procedures. 
Only possible where 
company has profits 
available for 
distribution. Dividend 
may be paid gross using 
"Group Relief". 
Income Tax relief 
available to an 
individu~l on interest 
paid on a loan for r 
purpose of investing In 
a co-operative (F.A. 
1981 s. 25). 
In the initial stages of' forming the company, the outside 
investor may have insisted on certain rights regarding 
dividend and control attaching to his or her shares. This 
may have been retained to prove the abilities of the 
employees, once proven the outside investor may be prepared to 
convert his or her shares to non voting equity or loan stock. 
There are advantages to the ouside investor or residual 
shareholder in having redeemable equity or loan stock on agreed 
terms as· the ordinary shares themselves may have limited 
marketability. 
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6.4 Comoany Buys Back its Own Shares 
The Companies Act 1981 gives companies the ability to buy 
back their own shares. The company should consider this 
facility to purchase the shares back from the outside investors 
or residual shareholders. The legislation comprises thr~e main 
elements, namely:-
Power of a company to issue redeemable shares of any 
class, thus permitting short term equity investment; 
power of a company to purchase its own shares through 
the media of a recognised stock market, private contract 
or a contingent purchase contract (future option); 
power of a private company to purchase or redeem its 
shares out of capital. 
Except in the last case, purchase or redemption monies must be . 
satisfied by the company's distributable profits (as defined by s 
62 (1) companies Act 1981) together with the proceeds of a fresh 
issue (if any) made for the purpose of purchase or redemption. 
The company therefore may buy in some or all of the shares of 
outgoing ·shareholders thus leaving the EPC in control of the 
company. Such an option, however, should never overide the need 
to maintain sufficient working capital in the company. 
Various statutory procedures will need to be complied with. 
6.5 Comoanv issues Bonus Shares 
It is open to the company to issue bonus shares out of profits to 
either the EPC or individual employees through an approved profit 
sharing scheme. In the case of an -approved profit sharing 
scheme- funds applied may be offset against the company's profit 
for corporation tax purposes and the employee obtains some relief 
against income and capital gains tax. Once in the ownership of 
the employees the shares could be sold to the EPC on loan 
account. 
7. TAX AND LEGAL FACTORS 
7.1 In the previous sections various legal and taxation 
considerations were referred to. This section explains in 
further detail some of the main considerations which are:-
Profit sharing schemes; 
Relief for loan interest; 
Share buy back: 
Financial assistance: 
Business expansion scheme: 
Group relief: 
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7.2 Profit Sharina Scheme 
The 1978 Fi~ance Act introduced certain reliefs for participants 
in profit sharing schemes which have been approved by the Board 
of the Inland Revenue. The sch~me must be administered by a 
trust constituted for that purpose. Out of monies paid to them 
by the company which has established the trust, the trustees must 
purchase or subscribe for qualifying shares. The shares so 
purchased or subscribed must be formally appropriated to named 
individuals who are eligible to participate. 
Under an approved scheme the company can offset payments to the 
trustees against corporation tax and the individual employee will 
not be subject to income tax on either the original grant of the 
shares or their growth in value. For sums appropriated on or 
after 6th April, 1983, the maximum sum eligible to be contributed 
by the company in respect of each employee is £1,250 or 10\ of 
the employee's earnings, whichever is the greater, subject to a 
ceiling of £5,000. 
The following are the main c~nditions necessary for Inland 
Revenue approval:-
Cal 
(b) 
ec) 
Cd) 
(e) 
ef) 
The employer must establish a UK trust and the trustees 
will appoint shares to the beneficiaries, account for any 
income tax and generally administer the scheme: 
Participation in the scheme must be open to all full time 
working directors and employees of the company: 
The shares acquired under the scheme must form part of the 
ordinary share capital of the company, be of a class 
quoted on a recognised stock exchange or be in a company 
which is not under the control of another company; 
The shares must be.fully paid up, not redeemable and not 
subject to any restrictions other than those which attach 
to all shares of the same class: 
The scheme must be open to employees with five or more 
years service although the scheme may allow those with a 
lesser service to join; 
( 
The employees must agree to leave their shares in the 
scheme with the trustees for at least two years, if the 
shares are sold within seven years some income tax may be 
payable on a reducing scale. 
The scheme as it stands is simply alnethod of extending share 
ownership to employees. The scheme can be used, however, to pass 
shares to employees who may then sell the shares to an EPC on 
loan account after seven years. The CDA is pressing for relief 
under the scheme to be extended to enable the shares to be held 
by an EPC. 
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7.3 Relief for Loan Interest 
7.4 
Onder section 25 of the Finance Act, 1981 interest is eligible 
for relief against an employee's income tax if it is interest on 
a loan to defray money applied:-
(a) In acquiring a share or shares in a body whi~h is a 
co-operative, or 
Cb) In lending money to any such body which is used wholly 
and exclusively for the purposes of the business of that 
body or of a sUbsidiary of that body, or 
Cc) In paying off another loan, interest on which would have 
been eligible for such relief. 
The conditions on which such relief is given are:-
Ca) That when the interest is paid the body continues to be a 
co-operative, and 
Cb) That in the period from the application of the proceeds of 
the loan to the payment of interest, the individual has 
worked for the g=eater part of his or her time as an 
employee of the body or of a subsidiary of the body, and 
Cc) That he or she shows that in that period he or she has 
not recovered any capital from the body. 
This provision, therefore, considerably assists employees who 
raise a loan in order to finance an EPe. 
Share Buv Back 
Sections 45 to 62 of the Companies Act, 1981 grant companies the 
power to purchase their own shares. This power will be of 
considerable help in enabling the company to buy back the shares 
held by an outside investor, thus leaving ~~e EPC in control of 
the company. Any class of shares may be purchased by the company 
including redeemable shares. -
The legislation comprises three main e1ements:-
Ca) Power of a company to issue redeemable shares of any 
class, thus permitting short term equity investment; 
(b) Power of a company to purchase its own shares through 
the media of a recognised share market, private contract 
or a contingent pu~chase contract (future option): 
(e) Power of a private company to purchase or redeem its 
shares out of capital. 
.. 
• 
:~ 
. 
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Exc~pt in (c) purchase or red~mption monies must be satisfied by 
the company's distributable profits tQgether with the proce~ds ~ 
a fresh issue (if any) made for the purpose of the purchase or 
redemption. The main features of the legislation which will nee! 
to be considered by a company considering buying back its own 
shares are: 
REOE~~aLE SHARES 
The company's articles of association must authorise the issue 0 
redeemable shares and provide for the manner of redemption, 
Subject to the following statutory requirements:-
Ca) 
(b) 
(c) 
Cd) 
Ce) 
(f) 
they may only be issued if there are also non-redeemable 
shares in issue: 
redemption may be at the option of the shareholder or the 
company; 
only fully paid shares can be redeemed; 
the redemption terms"must provide for payment on 
redemption; 
( 
on redemption the shares are treated as cancelled and the 
share capital reduced accordingly; 
an appropriate transfer to capital redemption reserve 
must be made to maintain the company's capital. 
PURCHASE OOT OF RESERVES 
(a) The company's articles of association must contain 
general authority; 
(b) Authority of a special resolution must be obtained for an 
off-market purchase or contingent purchase contract Ci.e. 
option), and authority of an ordinary regolution must be 
obtained for a market purchas~; ~ 
Cc) At least one. member (e.g. the E?e), must hold non 
redeemable shares following the purchase. 
PURCHASE OOT OF CAPITAL 
Ca) The articles of association must contain general 
authority and this power may only be exercised by private 
companies with the authority of a special resolution 
passed within one week of a statutory declaration by the 
directors; 
(b) Any available profits or proceeds of a fresh issue (if 
any) must first be used for the purpose of redemption or 
purchase before any depletion of capital can take place; 
, 
... 
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(c) Where there is an excess of the pay:n.~n t ou t of cap i ta 1 
plus the p~oce~ds of a fresh issue <if any) over the 
nominal value of the shares redeemed o~ purcha~ed then the 
excess may be applied in reducing:-
(1) capital redemption reserve, share premium account, 
or fully paid share capital; and 
(ii) the revaluation reserve. 
If there is a deficiency the difference is added to the 
capital redemption reserve. 
Cd) The following statutory procedures must be complied with: 
statutory declaration by the directors, 
auditors' report on the declaration; 
notice in the Gazette and appropriate national 
newspaper (or to each individual creditor) within one 
week of the resolution; 
declaration and auditors' report filed with registrar 
. of companies; 
payment out of capital must be made within five and 
seven weeks of the resolution. 
7.5 Financial Assistance 
Sections 42 to 44 of the Companies Act 1981 considerably relax 
previous restrictions applying to private companies which wish to 
use their own resources to enable or facilitate the acquisition 
of shares in themselves or in their holding company. This 
relaxation will considerably assist the company to help the EPC 
obtain finance to acquire the company's shares. 
Financial assistance may be by gift, guarantee or security, loan 
etc. The company can now give security over its assets for the 
purpose of assisting the EPC raise long term finance and it may 
make loans to the EPC, provided that any provision required 
against such loans is covered by the company's distributable 
profits. The company may need to make loans to the EPC to enable 
the EPC to make loan repayments to its financiers, such loans 
constitute financial assistance since they are made for the 
purpose of enabling the employees, through the EPC, acquire the 
company's shares~ 
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The company, if it is to provide the financial assistance, must 
p~ss a sp~cial resolution to approve the arran9~ment. The 
directors of the company must ~4ke a statutory declaration in the 
prescribed form. Copies of the declaration must be delivered to 
the registrar of companies t09~ther with the relevant special 
resolution within 15 days of the resolution. The statutory 
declarations by directors will contain:-
Prescribed particulars of the assistance to be given; 
Prescribed particulars of the business of the company; 
Identification of to whom the assistance is to be given; 
A statement that the directors have formed the opinion that 
immediately following the date assistance is proposed to be 
given there will be no ground on which the company could be 
found unable to pay its debts: 
A statement that the directors have formed the opinion (" 
either that: 
(a) if it is intended to commence winding up the 
company within 12 months, the company will be able 
to pay its debts within 12 months of the 
commencement of winding up or, 
(b) in any case, the company will be able to pay its 
debts as they fall due during the following year. 
In forming these opinions prospective and contingent liabilities 
must be accounted for according to their likelihood of 
crystallisation. 
An auditors report must be annexed to each declaration stating 
that they have enquired into the state of affairs of the company 
and are not aware of anything which would indicate that the 
directors' expressed opinions are unreasonable in all the ( 
circumstances. 
The special resolution must be passed on the date of the 
statutory declaration or within the following week and is only 
effective if the statutory declaration is open for inspection at 
the meeting and has not been cancelled by the court. Financial 
assistance may then only be given after the expiry of four weeks 
from the date of the last relevant resolution unless every member 
voted in favour of the resolution. Financial assistance must be 
given within eight weeks of the date of the earliest statutory 
declaration made by the directors. 
The court has powers to cancel or confirm the resoluton, arrange 
for the purchase of the interest of dissenting members, provide 
for the purchase by the company of shares of any members, or make 
alterations in the company's memorandum or articles. An 
application for cancellation may be made within 28 days of the 
resolution by the holders of not less than 10 per cent of the 
nominal value of company's issued share capital. 
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The company is liKely to b~ making loans to the EPC at r~gular 
inte~vals to cover the EPC's loan repayments and it would be b~st 
to include as many quanta of loans as possible to be ratified by 
the required proc~dures. It is advisable in any circumstance to 
obtain prof~ssional advice to ensure that the procedures are 
followed in accordance with the law as the above are simply 
guidelines to the necessa~y procedures. 
7.6 Business Ex~ansion Scheme 
The Finance Act 1983 introduced the Business Exoansion Scheme 
(BeS) as a successor to the Business Start-Up Scheme. Under BES 
qualifying individuals are eligible for income tax relief ~n 
sums, up to a maximum of :40,000 per year, invested in the 
eligible shares of qualifying companies. The scheme has made 
available substantial funds for investment in new and existing 
businesses. The EPC structure enables co-operatives to tap this 
source of funding which may be available directly from individual 
investors or from funds set up to administer such investment on. 
behalf of individuals. An individual must subscribe at least 
£500 in each year if the investment is made on his or her own 
behalf, although where a BES Approved Fund subscribes on his or 
her behalf there is no lower limit. 
Eligible ·shares under the scheme means new ordinary shares 
which throughout a period of five years from the date on which 
they are issued carry no present or preferential right to 
dividend or to the company's assets on its winding up and no 
present or future preferential right to be redeemed. The shares 
are effectively, therefore, locked into the company for five 
years. After five years, however, the rights may be changed to 
enable the shares to be purchased by the EPC, converted to loan 
stock or repurchased by the company. Voting rights, however, do 
not necessarily have to be attributed to the shares when they 
are issued and it is possible for the EPC to retain the voting 
shares, but allow the BES investor to participate in asset growth 
and continue to receive dividenJs. 
The income tax relief is given to the individual at the highest 
marginal rate ie up to 60%. The relief is given in respect of 
the amount subscribed for any eligible shares. In practice, 
these shares may be offered at a premium, and it is the entire 
amount paid for each share that will qualify, rather than the par 
value of the share. 
To qualify the investor must live in the UK, not own more than 30 
per cent of the ordinary shares, nor be a paid director or 
employee of the company. The investor may be an unpaid director 
and receive payments from the company so long as they relate 
solely to travelling or other expenses that have been wholly, 
exclusively, and necessarily incurred in performing his or her 
duties as an unpaid director of the company. 
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Most unquot~d trading companies will qualify provided that they 
are incorporated in the UK. Throughout the period of three y~ars 
after the issue of the eligible shares or the commenc~ment of 
trade, whichever is the latter, the company must:-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Cd) 
(e) 
Be resicent in the UK only for tax pur~oses: 
Be an unquoted company. This means that none of its 
capital can be dealt with on the Unlisted Securities 
market or be listed on the Official List of the Stock 
Exchange; 
Exist wholly, or substantially wholly, for the purposes of 
carrying on one or more qualifying trades in the UK. Non 
qualifying trades include: dealing in commodities, shares, 
securities, land or futures, conducting banking, 
insurance, debt-factoring, hire purchase or other 
financial services, leasing, or letting, providing legal 
or accountancy services, and farming; 
Not be itself a 51\ subsidiary of another company. 
There must also be no arrangement in existence whereby the 
company could become controlled by another company. 
Whether, this provlslon excludes a 51% holding by an EPC, 
registered as a Company limited by guarantee, is as yet 
untested: 
Have only fully paid issued share capital. 
The attractions to a business in seeking BES finance are 
several. There are now substantial amounts of BES money 
looking for a suitable home. Investors go into these 
investments on the basis of risk, and so the criteria are very 
different from those the banks apply when lending money. The 
money is, on the face of it, provided in perpetuity as the 
company receives cash in exchange for an issue of shares and the 
individual investors are required to hold their shares for a 
minimum of five years in order to obtain BES relief. Thi~ period 
will allow the company ample opportunity to plan the use of the ~ 
money, and also to make provision for it to be repaid where 
appropriate. 
A further attraction is that the finance carries little cost. 
Because BES shareholders are likely to be higher rate taxpayers 
they would prefer capital growth rather than dividend income. 
Many of them would not wish to receive dividends at all, and this 
factor may compliment the company's own wishes that the profits 
should be retained in the business, rather than be paid out by 
way of dividends. -
Th~ exit route ought to be discussed in any initial negotiations 
and the preferred route may be for the company to buy back the 
shares in five years time. The situation is similar to a five 
year loan except that repayment does not have to be made until 
after the' end of five years. The other methods referred to in 
section 6 are all possibilities worth considering. 
7.7 
8. 
8.1 
8.2 
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Groue Relief 
To obtain the benefit of group relief the company would have 
to be a 75\ subsidiary of the EPC and, in this case, losses 
could be surr~ndered by either company to the other. 
One particular area that may need clarification by the ravenue 
for a particular case is that of the surrender of losses made 
by the EPC occasioned by the payment of interest on its loan 
stock. 
It would seem that this interest on loan stock, if it produced 
a lOSS in the EPC, could then be offset against the taxable 
profits of the company. If the company is 100\ owned this has 
the same effect on the amount of profits liable to tax as if 
the trade were carried on by the EPC. 
Where the company is a 51\ subsidiary of the EPC it would seem 
that, so long as both the company and the EPC jointly elect, 
then ACT is not payable on any dividend paid to the EPC. Such 
dividends then constitute Rgroup income- which is exempt from 
corpora tion tax. .. 
SETTING UP THE EPC 
A group of people want to start a co-opertive but find that they 
need to obtain outside equity investment in order to fund the new 
venture. They can do this by forming an EPC to hold shares in a 
conventional limited company in conjunction with an outside 
investor. 
Steo 1: Business Plan 
. 
Before embarking on any business venture it is essential that a 
detailed business plan has been prepared to assess the viability 
of the venture and to calculate the financial requirements. 
Before embarking on the formation of an EPC the members should 
first try to obtain funding from members, supporters, grants or 
loans from local authorities or banks etc. without resort to 
equity investment. This will enable them to commence as a 
conventional co-operative. 
If equity funding is required then proceed to step 2. 
8.3 Stee 2: Funding the EPC 
The members of the EPC will usually invest in loan stock in the 
EPC, rather than in the company, in-order to maximise the EPC's 
shareholdinq. The EPC may also be able to obtain funds directly 
from other sources. A bank loan may be obtained, possibly 
secured with a cross debenture over the assets of both the EPC 
and the company. Funds may also be available as qrant or loan 
from public or other promotional bodies. (see section 5.2). 
, , 
8.4 Steo 3: Eauity options and eauity partners 
The equity partner(s) may be ·an individual, whether a memb.!r of 
the co-operative or not, a venture capital fund or a public or 
other promotional body (see section 5.3), The m~mbers will need 
to consider the suitability of such investors, particularly if 
they are going to have voting rights or the power to appoint 
directors. The type of equity option (see section 3) will 
effect the overall level of control the EPC has over the 
company (see section 4) and its share of the company's 
profits. The members will also need to consider how the equity 
option may effect the EPC's ability to eventually acquire full 
control of the company. 
The object of allowing equity investment is mainly to obtain 
funds whilst retaining control in the hands of the employee 
co-operators. Such an option will involve issuing the investor 
with non voting shares. A member with surplus funds to invest, 
a publi: sector ag7ncy or ~rivate ven~ure capital group may all"C be will~ng to cons~der tak~ng non vot~ng shares. An alternative 
may be to offer shares with v~ting rights only where dividends/ 
or profits fall below a ~ertain level. 
A venture capital fund will be looking for capital growth and 
will require a share that participates in profits. The public 
agency, however, may be happy with a fixed interest share 
repayable at par at some time in the future on agreed terms. 
Provision ought to be made for the outside shares to be 
redeemable although the ordinary shares held by the EPC ought 
not to be if the EPC is to take advantage of the share buy back 
leg is lation. 
8.5 Steo 4: Reaistration Proceedures 
The following agreements will need to be drawn up and agreed. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
EPC memorandum and articles 
Company memorandum and articles 
Shareholders agreement. 
The CDA has models available for (a) and (b) which can assist 
the process of registration (see section on registration). 
The company model is widely drawn to allow it flexibility in 
the shares it may issue. The exact terms attached to the 
( 
shares issued will need to be set out in a separate Shareholders 
Agreement. We strongly.~ecommend that an experience solicitor 
or accountant is employed to draw up this agreement as, whilst 
the CDA can advise, professional legal expertise will be 
required. 
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APpendix 12.2 
TAXATION RELIEF FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ORGANISATIONS 
Note for Aoplicants Seeking the Approval of the Deoartment 
of Trade & Industrv 
1. Application for approval may be made under one or both 
of the following Acts of Parliament: 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (ICTA), 
Section S08(1)(a)(b), and Section 90 Capital Allowances 
Act 1968 (CAA) , Section 90. 
The former Act (ICTA) provides for (a) exemption from tax on 
an approved association's income from rents, profits, 
interest, dividends etc, such as is currently afforded to 
charities under Section 508 and (b) exemption from tax in 
respect of chargeable gains, eg capital gains tax. The 
latter Act (CAA) allows any contribution to an approved 
association from a trader to be counted as an expense, and 
consequently only benefits the trader. 
2: The Department has to be satisfied on two main counts 
before granting approval:-
i. that constitutionally, both in theory and in 
practice, the organisation is an "Association" 
of which the Department can approve. 
ii. that the organisation is devoting a major 
proportion of its effort to the undertaking of 
scientific research which may lead to or 
facilitate an extension of any class or classes 
of trade, which should be an object of the 
organisation. 
The Inland Revenue has subsequently to decide, in the case 
of new applicants for Section 508 approval, whether "the 
RTSABE-l 
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memorandum of association or ocher similar instrument 
regulating the functions of the Association precludes the 
direct or indirect payment or transfer to any of its members 
of any of its income or ~roper~y by way of dividend, gift, 
division, bonus or otherwise howsoever by way of profit" 
(Section S08(1)(a)(b». An example of a typical Memorandum 
and Articles of Association may be obtained from RTP Divison 
of the Department of Trade and Industry. 
It is up to the applicant to decide, or seek professional 
advice if necessary, on whether it is worth his while to 
obtain approval but applicants should always feel free to 
contact the Department for help in preparing an application. 
3. "Scientific research" is defined in the two Acts as 
"any activities in the fields of natural or applied science 
for the extension of knowledge". The latter has previously 
been interpreted as meaning the uncovering of n!! knowledge, 
not the dissemination of already existing knowledge nor any 
work based on the results of research. 
in practice, however, in view of the crucial need to 
encourage the industrial application of research results, 
the Department accepts that where dissemination and 
exploitation activities, including design and development, 
are associated with scientific research, wherever and by 
whomsoever that research may have been carried out, the 
relevant dissemination and exploitation may, within reason, 
be included as an admissible overhead. Activities 
preliminary to a research project, like a literature search, 
are similarly admissible. On the other hand, certain 
activities never qualify, such as training and education, 
routine testing and manufacture of goods for sale. It is 
important to note that, for approval, co-ordination of other 
people's research or general promotion of research does not 
usually qualify. 
RTSABE-2 
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To qualify for approval under ~~e Acts, an association's 
effort on scientific research, as described above and 
including admissible overheads, should be a major part of 
its overall gross annual expenditure. A low figure in one 
particular year would not formally disqualify a previously 
approved body, but the Department would want to be assured 
that there was the intention to rectify matters in the 
future. We would like to see Associations have at least 
seven financially independent ordinary (voting) members. If 
two or more members are inter-connected bodies corporate or 
individuals carrying on business in partnership, or have an 
employer-employee relationship, then they should be treated 
for this purpose as a single member. 
4. With the first application we require two copies of the 
Memorandum and Articles of Association, one is for 
retention by the Department and the other is sent to Inland 
Revenue. 
Once an association is approved any proposed significant 
changes to the M&A should be submitted to this Division 
before the change. As a reminder to associations with 
approval under section 25 of the Companies Act 1981 
Companies Division of the Departnent of Trade and Industry 
should also be notified prior to the change. 
With the initial application and thereafter annually the 
following documents are required: 
For the previous year: 
i. the Annual Report 
ii. the Audited Statement of Income and Expenditure 
iii. a list of technical staff, showing 
qualifications. 
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for the year for which approval is sought: 
iv. the Research Programme 
v. an Estimate of Expenditure 
and for both years 
vi. a breakdown of the gross expenditure showing the 
effort on "scientific research" and on other 
major activities of the Association. 
Normally, these documents should be submitted within 3 
months of the commencement of the year for which approval is 
sought. The Department is prepared to accept draft accounts 
on the understanding that the Audited Accounts will not 
materially differ and that a copy of the latter will be 
provided as soon as possible. 
Item (vi) is an important document and it is suggested that 
the following information is tabulated in columns: 
In Column (1) all the main items in the R&D programme and 
other major non-research activities; 
In Column (2) the relevant expenditure on each item or 
activity specified in column (1) including 
its share of the normal overheads such as 
administration and accommodation expenses; 
the total sum of column (2) should equal the 
gross expenditure of the Association; 
In Column (3) the estimated "scientific research" content 
(%) of each item, or for non-research 
activities, the degree (%> to which they 
could be regarded as an "admissible overhead" 
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on the scientific research undertaken; 
(It is recommended that the Director of 
Research completes this column); 
In column (4) the resultant expenditure that can be 
credited to "scientific research" (obtained 
by multiplying the figures in columns (2) and 
(3); and 
In Column (5) (or as a footnote) any necessary explanation 
or justification for the figures given in 
Column (3). 
Enquirias regarding these notes should be made to:-
Research and Technology Policy Division 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Room 212 
Ashdown House 
London 
• SW1E 6RB 
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